LECTURES ON HISTORY

SECOND AND CONCLUDING SERIES

ON

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

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VOL. II.

LECTURES ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.



LECTURE XVII.

VIEWS OF DIFFERENT WRITERS.

I WILL now proceed to refer to some of the histories and commentaries on the French Revolution, drawn up by actors in the scene, or those who lived at the time. These accounts will present you with the same transactions and topics again and again repeated; but this, as I have mentioned to you, will only impress the leading points of this great subject more and more on your memories. To men of intelligence, to those who mean well, to all who are really interested in the liberties of mankind, and in the best happiness of their country, I consider this portion of the revolutionary story to be most particularly important: such men were, at this period, as I conceive, wanting in caution, in respect for those who had gone before them; were too sanguine, too enthusiastic in their good feelings, too confident in the people. And if these things be so, they ought to operate as an example to others hereafter; to other wise and good men; to other patriots, who must be taught, that it is not sufficient to have good intentions or great talents; that they must have prudence, circumspection, and many other virtues, which those, who engage in revolutions, are too apt to despise. Look, therefore, at the portraits of this singular period, which I am holding up to your view; for this is what I am now doing, while I am quoting from the writings or speeches of those who lived at the time. It might be more easy, and

more regular, and less tedious, to offer you my own estimates of these things; but I choose rather, while I am exhibiting to you my own opinions, to lay before you, as well as I can, the materials on which those opinions have been formed, and you can then judge of both the one and the other, in a general and rough manner, if I may so speak, now, while you hear me, and more regularly hereafter, when you come to meditate these subjects and read for yourselves. The interval that elapsed between the 14th of July and the 5th and 6th of October was the precious season when the Constituent Assembly were in power, and when it might have been possible for them to have carried their new opinions into effect, and have laid the foundations of the happiness of France; and you cannot, therefore, examine too patiently the opinions and views of all concerned.

It is on this account that I am now endeavouring to call them up to appear before you, speak in their own language, tell their own story, give their own evidence, and leave you sitting in quality of jurors to bring in your verdict on the case.

I will add one consideration more and then proceed.

One of the most celebrated productions in our language is the work of Mr. Burke, his Reflections on the French Revolution. This is a work that can never die; not only on account of its own merits and its reference to the great principles of human nature, but because it must be always connected with an event that can never be blotted from the history of Europe.

I have already declared to you, that I should hold it no mean praise, but esteem it an important reward, for the labour of these lectures, if I could at all contribute to your accurately appreciating the proper value of this great performance; if I could enable you the better to distinguish its spirit and its fire from its enthusiasm, its profound philosophy from its declamation; in a word, if I could enable you to discern, while you are reading with delight, when it is that your understanding and when it is that your imagination only is affected. But this can best be done by entering into such particulars and submitting to such details as I am now exhibiting to your observation. Mr. Burke's work is a critique on the conduct

of the Constituent Assembly, and of that conduct a most important portion is that now before us. But to proceed. I have already mentioned to you Rabaud de St. Etienne, a lawyer, a man of letters, a minister of the reformed religion, and a distinguished member of the Constituent Assembly. He is a specimen of a numerous description of men of the time; a friend to freedom and a virtuous man, but a convert to the new opinions, and an enthusiast in their favour. His story is shortly told: he supported these new opinions, but he supported order also, on every occasion; he voted against the death of the king: and for these crimes, or rather virtues, he was in the course of the year (1793) denounced, and at the end of it perished under the guillotine.

I shall now make some references to the accounts he gives. In the fourth book of his Précis of the Revolution, he observes, that at the period we are at present alluding to, "France was like an immense chaos, in which all the elements of order subsisted, and waited but the hand of the Creator; every thing," says he, "seemed to indicate that the kingdom would be a prey to anarchy;" and this was the great fear of the good, and the hope of all bad citizens, who thus looked for the renewal of the ancient despotism.

"But the men of property," he continues, "got armed, and this was the safety of France. France was covered with three millions of men clothed in the national uniform. It was the nation that protected the nation, and force was wisdom.

"The Assembly thus placed in security (this you see he admits), proceeded to the Declaration of Rights, and to lay down the principles of the monarchy, which they did, as they had been required to do by the people.

"When they came, however, to discuss the share which the king was to have in the legislation, then arose the great struggle in the bosom of the Assembly. There were those on the one side whom long established associations had prepared for a blind tenderness for the name and person of the king, the king, who, or whatever he was; who were for things as they found them; who thought the only legislator was the king; and in short, who hoped to regain by the king what they had lost by the people.

"On the other side there were those who were terrified,

who were rendered wild, at the very shadow and appearance of despotism, and who could conceive no safety for liberty but in the permanence of the legislative body—a body first making the laws and then presenting them to the sanction of the monarch. These two parties the president saw ranged on his right hand and on his left, and the same was the division through the whole of the kingdom."

Rabaud de St. Etienne then proceeds to the discussions that took place on the subject of the veto. These will be edifying to you, but still more so, those which related to the National Assembly itself.

You are never to suppose in political questions that much is not to be said on each side; it is for good sense to compare and decide.

"While the minds of men," says Rabaud, "without doors got influenced on this subject of the veto, the Assembly proceeded to decide upon the permanence of its body, and the famous question of the two chambers. Before the meeting of the States General, the numerous partisans of the English constitution had declared their opinion. To this opinion great weight was given by the authority of Montesquieu, and the recent publication of De Lolme. But the advocates for the one chamber considered this equilibrium in the English constitution, but as a treaty of peace between three powers then existing; and however adapted to England this system of adjustment might be, France, they contended, was in no similar situation. Personal interests, however, mixed themselves in the discussion.

The high clergy were for the two chambers in the hope of obtaining a place in the upper; so was a great part of the nobility, but a division ensued: the noblesse of the provinces were for a representation of the whole order, the noblesse of the court wished to have the rights of the peerage conferred on them alone, and many of the nobility feared, that in some way or other, it would be contrived by the National Assembly that the high chamber should be composed only of the forty-seven that had first gone over to the Tiers Etat.

The curés, those that were not devoted to their bishops, were for the unity of the Assembly. The majority of the deputies saw in the upper house but a constitutional refuge

for aristocracy, and a preservative of the feudal system. Their distrust of it was but strengthened by the continuance, as they thought, of that triple league which existed between the two privileged orders and the court, and was again confirmed by the intrigues that were practised to prevent the king from giving his sanction to the decrees of the 4th of August. The result of all this was a sort of uncertainty and obscurity thrown over the measure of an upper house, and this diminished the number, at least the warmth of its partisans. No one could exactly see what the Assembly was to be, or what share he was to have in it; and in affairs of this kind, and in all politics, personal interests will necessarily find their way into the minds of men.

Nothing better, as it seemed, could be made of a senate for life, composed of citizens of all descriptions, for this might easily be corrupted by the court; nor of a senate taken from the whole of the Assembly for the time, and of which it would only be a fraction; and with respect to those who objected that no restraint could be imposed upon a single assembly, and no counterpoise contrived for it, it was answered, says Rabaud de St. Etienne (you will observe the answer), "that means enough could be found in the Assembly itself to stop its course by introducing delays into its proceedings; that a counterpoise would naturally be found in the veto of the king, which veto might be considered as representing the negative will of the nation, as the Assembly did the affirmative; that if they abused their power by making decrees contrary to the interests of the community, the king would find his merit with the community in saving them from the tyranny of the Assembly; that these two counter powers of the king and the Assembly were far better for the people than three, of which two would be naturally united against them. And so the Assembly," continues the historian, "decreed by a majority of nine hundred and eleven to eighty-nine voices, that there should be only one chamber;" and again, "that the Assembly should be created afresh, by new elections every two years; and this term of two years be called a legislature."

You see here the nature of the plausible but superficial and unfortunate reasonings of the more warm partisans of liberty at this time. Even so early as August, 1789, the king was ex-

pected, without an army, without a power of dissolving the Assembly, and without a second house of any kind whatever, to oppose his veto to the representatives of the people, not indeed whenever, in his own judgment, their measures were wrong, the natural meaning of a veto, but when it was also clear that the people would be with him. And this was to be the situation of the executive power; and this was to be the king's chance for the necessary prerogatives of his station; and these his means of supporting his crown and dignity; and this the treatment of one of the great authorities in the state, already constituted, acknowledged, and existing, and hitherto considered as supreme.

Now I do not see a single remark of this kind in the historian, though he was writing, as he says in the preface, not in 1789, but some time after, when the constitution was made, and when the mistakes of it were already, one might have thought, sufficiently displayed.

We will now refer to the other history which I mentioned, the history of the Two Friends of Liberty: the state of the Assembly and of Paris, and the warning it holds out to all who love freedom, is still more distinctly seen in this history of the "Two Friends of Liberty." The whole subject of the constitution, as it appears from this work, was thoroughly discussed both within the Assembly and without; the nature of the rights of man, the veto, and the two chambers, all were made matter of the most lively contest and debate.

Of the rights of man three different systems were, it seems, offered to the Assembly; one by La Fayette, one by the Abbé de Sieyes, and one by Mounier. Each had, it was supposed, its merits and defects, of course. The Assembly referred them to a committee, who were to report and produce a new one: this was done, but in vain. In politics the incurable nature of human dissent should be taken always into the calculation by those who are criticising old systems, or are ready to propose new ones. Mirabeau, it appears, interfered with all his commanding powers, very reasonably proposing that the prefatory rights and the constitution, the theory and the application, the tree and the fruits of it, should be all seen hereafter, and all at one and the same time—in vain.

The more warm partisans of liberty insisted on the danger

of any delay; talked of pretexts, subterfuges, and chicanery; expressed their suspicions of Mirabeau himself and of the steadiness of his principles.

These are, I think, among the lessons of the Revolution, and are admitted by those historians who lived and wrote at the time. Men must love liberty, but, if possible, even in perilous times, should be conciliatory and ready to come to adjustments, and deeply aware of the controversial nature of independent minds.

The declaration was at last agreed upon, such as you see it. I must now digress for a moment, to make an observation on the general subject of these declarations, or rather to contrast the conduct of the statesmen of America with those of France on this occasion. I have already pointed your thoughts in this direction; I must do it once more.

It is remarkable, then, even in the case of America, when in 1776 the people of the continent were to be worked up into resistance to Great Britain by Congress, and soon after by the state legislatures, that though the rights of man were *then* brought forward and drawn up in battle-array, and very naturally; yet when a general constitution was to be formed by the convention in 1787, eleven years after, some lessons had been received in the mean time by Washington and the best patriots of America, and, therefore, their preface is then simple and calm, and there is nothing said about rights of man and elementary principles. "We, the people," they say, "of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America." This is their language; and then (to use a common phrase) they immediately proceed to business. "All legislative power herein granted," they declare, "shall be vested in a Congress," &c. &c.; and the sensible men engaged in this work concluded it with saying, "the ratification of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the states so ratifying the same." The form of government which they chose was that of a republic, agreeably to the inherited and existing notions and manners

of those for whom they were acting; but there was nothing of arrogance or rashness in their proceedings, and no longer any metaphysics.

But to return to France. France, at the period we are now considering, chose a monarchy; but a monarch could not be set up, like a tall column on the surface of a plain, single and unsupported, and then expected to stand. Yet was this pretty nearly what the patriots of the National Assembly attempted. One of them talked of a "royal democracy." The question of the veto was, as you will see in the history of "The Two Friends," very fully discussed. I cannot, in a lecture like this, exhibit to you all these reasonings, which you ought to read fully stated in this history. In my last lecture, indeed, I referred to them, and gave you a specimen of them.

Mounier, Lally Tollendal, and others, above all Mirabeau, were for giving the monarch a veto absolutely and entirely, on all laws presented to him; Garat the younger, and other distinguished members, were quite of an opposite opinion; and both perfectly united in rejecting all compromise, all idea of a suspensive veto. Here, therefore, the three parties might have remained; but it was impossible that the sages of the Palais Royal and the statesmen of the streets of Paris should rest undisturbed spectators of these discussions, and the part they were likely to take may be easily imagined. You will have some proper notion of it from the "History of the Two Friends."

The prospect of falling again under the yoke of the nobles and the priests filled every mind, it seems, according to these historians, with indignation. No one could conceive, they said, how the representatives of the nation could dare to propose in the National Assembly to arm the royal authority with such a power as that of the veto absolute. It was in vain that wiser men endeavoured to restore a calm; nothing but perfidies and treasons were talked of; and in short it was resolved at the Café de Foy that a deputation should be sent to Versailles, to declare to the Assembly "that the secret practices of the aristocracy to procure the veto were well known, as were all the accomplices in this odious plot; that if they did not instantly renounce this their criminal league,

that five thousand men were ready to march; that the nation would be desired to recall such faithless representatives, and replace them with good citizens; and that the king and his son would be requested to repair to the Louvre, there to live secure in the midst of his faithful Parisians."

With great difficulty, by the exertions of the constituted authorities, of La Fayette, and some of the more reasonable of the popular orators, the storm was at last appeased. Some of the deputies from the Palais Royal, however, reached Versailles and the house of Lally Tollendal; they came to inform him, they said, "that Paris was not for the veto; that it regarded as traitors, those that were; and that it punished traitors;" and many of the members were named and already menaced with proscription.

Lally Tollendal replied with spirit and propriety, and went with them to the Assembly. Similar communications, it was there found, had been made to others; anonymous letters to the president and secretaries, filled with the most furious menaces. Two hundred torches were ready to set fire to the chateaux of certain of the members, as an intimation, in the first place, of what they were afterwards to expect. The Assembly was universally indignant. Clermont de Tonnerre and Mounier spoke with their usual force and eloquence.

Such, according to these historians, were the beginnings of troubles, and as such I mention them to you. They ought to have warned the more warm partisans of liberty how perilous was the situation in which the Revolution was already placed.

The next great question was the permanence of the Assembly and its organization, whether two houses or one. The reasonings were all founded on a terror of the executive power. It was evident, they said, that a permanent body, for instance, would more easily restrain the executive power within its proper limits. The moral force of the Assembly, if consisting of only one house, and the consequent spirit of its deliberations, would form a much better counterpoise than could be found, if the Assembly were to be divided into two, and by its very composition be thrown into a state of equilibrium. On the first supposition the veto of the king would have its meaning and necessity, but in the second it was but a wheel useless,

and therefore dangerous, to the machinery. In this manner proceeded the reasoning, according to the historians; and in short the conclusion was, that there was a necessity that the constitution should be settled and strengthened; that incessant efforts were required from the constantly recurring exigences of the community; that details of every kind made it expedient that the whole system should be regenerated; and that all these concurred in powerfully demanding from the community an universal vote for the presence, the activity, and decidedly the permanence, or rather the constant existence, every year renewed, of the National Assembly.

Such were the general notions of the public, according to these historians, at this critical period. Calling to mind all that we have seen, it is very grievous to observe the mistaken apprehensions that were entertained, the total blindness that prevailed, with regard to the real seat of the danger. No doubt it is a testimony to prove how wretched and how oppressive had been the ancient government, with its own abuses, and the abuses of its aristocracy, when men seemed to have no terror but of its return. But the whole may still be held up as a warning to all future patriots, of whatever country, never to withdraw a society entirely from its accustomed restraints; to alter, to modify them, to substitute others more convenient, but never to clear away the ground in the first place, and remove the old building, as the necessary preparation for the erection of a new one. We have not to deal with the insensate materials of stone and mortar, but human beings incapable of rest, or even suspense, if roused; exposed to misapprehension, highly selfish, and always the mere slaves of the present uneasiness.

The conduct of the friends of freedom at this particular epoch of the Revolution is the more inexcusable, because the great leader, Mirabeau, spoke the words, and in his own forcible manner, both of wisdom and even prophecy.

"For myself," said he from the tribune, "I consider the veto of the king as so necessary, that I would rather live in Constantinople than in France, if it be not granted. Yes, I do declare it, I know of nothing so terrible as a sovereign aristocracy of six hundred persons, who, making themselves per-

manent to-morrow, will make themselves hereditary the next day, and finish, as the aristocrats of every country on the face of the globe have always done, by leaving no power in existence that they did not invade and absorb."

It is but justice, too, to Lally Tollendal, Mounier, and other wise and good men, that they proposed to their countrymen, as I have already mentioned to you, a system of government, which, if it could but have met the opinions and expectations of the Assembly and the public, all might have been well. The friends of freedom would have had a good case, its enemies none; the king would have been satisfied, and the nation happy; and Europe saved from a series of the most tremendous crimes and miseries that ever afflicted and terrified the civilized world since the irruptions of the northern nations.

You will observe, or rather remember what I intimated yesterday, that in the name of the committee of the constitution (the committee of five), M. de Lally Tollendal had made the following report:—

"1st. The legislative body shall be composed of three parts, the king, a senate, and the representatives of the nation." Two houses, you observe, as in England, and the king.

"2ndly. It is the right and duty of the king to convoke the legislative body at epochs fixed by the constitution. He may prorogue and even dissolve it, if at the same time he call a new one." The power of dissolution, you see, given, without which any thing else that might be given was totally vain.

"3rdly. The taxes are in every respect to come from the representative body on the requisition of the king, and the senate are on this occasion merely to consent or reject simply, and no more.

"4thly. The senate is to be the tribunal in all state delinquencies.

"5thly. Each house is to judge of what concerns its own police and particular rights."

By the 7th article, the royal sanction is necessary to every law.

"8thly. The initiative of every law and the mode of enactment belongs to the two houses; the sanction, to the king."

"10thly. The two houses are to have the negatives each

upon the other; the king upon them both. The senate to be elected for life."

Even here there was nothing said of the army and the necessary patronage of the crown; but the whole was evidently in the right tone and spirit. The example of England was taken advantage of; experience was made a guide. Proper prerogatives might have been introduced into the system for the support of the executive power; the whole might have been rendered such, that the king might have acceded to it without degradation, and therefore with sincerity. And now there is seen the accusation of the more warm and enthusiastic supporters of the new opinions in the National Assembly. No system of this kind was thought possible for France.—

A scheme of organization like this, say the historians, the Two Friends of Liberty, was universally disrelished. The basis of it was, as every one saw, the famous balance of the three powers, and the example of the constitution of England. But neither the authority of Montesquieu, they observe, nor the logical reasoning of Mounier, nor the eloquence of Lally, could reconcile it to the friends of freedom. They could see in it but an asylum for the ancient aristocracy, the cradle of a new one, still more dangerous, as it planted corruption in the very bosom of the Assembly; an allurement to the ambitious, and a nourishment for all those unhappy prejudices of distinction and pre-eminence, so contrary to the spirit of the new constitution.

The Assembly, indeed, ordered it to be printed, out of respect to its own committee; but submitted it not to discussion, article by article, out of respect to the judgment of the public, already most clearly expressed.

It was, however, examined, continues the historian, and refuted in all its points (refuted, you will observe), during the discussion of the three great questions at issue, the veto, the permanence, and the organization of the Assembly. Due homage was paid to the wisdom of the English constitution, but examples, it was said, are in politics apt to deceive. The constitution of a people ought to be accommodated to its character, opinions, and manners: often modified by local circumstances; so that an institution that will prosper in one country will cause the ruin of another. Such were the

reasonings of too many of the assertors of liberty at this period.

And in this manner, and from considerations of this kind, was the example of England, its long and eventful history, and its successful Revolution, to be set aside, though the case of a monarchy; and the constitution of America to be preferred as a model, and even that model not properly followed (for in that constitution there are two Houses of Assembly, not one); though this was a case of thirteen confederated republics, resisting the harsh government of the mother country; and though, at the same time, the people were republicans from their first origin: a case in no respect similar to that of France.

No scheme of government, no measure in politics, can ever be without its appropriate recommendations; no men, who take a side, can be without their arguments; but every thing in this world is a choice of difficulties or a comparison of advantages; and, as I have already observed, and as you must remember, it is for those who mean well to do more than mean well, and, after due reflection, to labour if possible to judge well.

Rabaud de St. Etienne, and no doubt many others, depended on such arguments as the following, which I quote from him, and which were urged with all the triumph of the most irresistible logic.

"The very nature of things," says he, "resists this division of the legislative authority. The nation is one; so should then be the body that represents it.

"The National Assembly is to collect and proclaim the general will; that will is one and indivisible; it is illogical, therefore, to divide the Assembly into two, that there may issue from it a will that is one.

"If the two chambers have not a veto upon each other, their division is without meaning; if they have this veto, they are then so formed as to do nothing.

"If the senators are for life, they will think no more of the nation, and be corrupted by the crown; if for a time, they will never acquire a consistency, or a character, or an individual interest, sufficient to fit them to be a weight in any political scale."

And so the result of all this exquisite logic, the very quintessence of smartness and infallibility, was, that the country and the monarch were to be left at the mercy of one great Assembly, that was sure, as Mirabeau predicted, to render Constantinople itself a more eligible residence.

"The Two Friends of Freedom" bring their historical observations on this critical period to a sort of conclusion by saying, "The National Assembly advanced rapidly in their career. In less than eight days they had proclaimed as many truths and political axioms as the teachers of superstition and the ministers of tyranny had proscribed or obscured during the course of ten centuries. They had restored to the laws their supremacy, which despotism had usurped (this was no doubt true); they had ennobled the sceptre itself by submitting it to their empire; and they had consecrated the royal authority by deducing it from the first great original source of all authority. They had defined the nature and fixed the boundaries of the different powers of the state; acknowledged the inviolability of the person of the king; restored to the nation the legislative power, to be exercised by its representatives; assured to the subject personal liberty; and conferred on the monarch the supreme executive power."

Such is the panegyric of these historians, and it is in some of its particulars a panegyric perfectly just. Many things had certainly been done by the Assembly; their difficulties and their exertions are not to be forgotten; and if the last thing mentioned by the historians had been done also, if the supreme executive power had been conferred on the king, fairly, fully, and justly conferred, their labours might have been crowned with success, and the Assembly might have received and deserved the title which they had bestowed on their unfortunate monarch, that of "restorer of French liberty."

These remarks, and notices, and quotations, will give you some general idea of the views taken by the popular historians and by the popular reasoners of the time. You see how the minds of men were influenced by the thought of their escape from the old government of France, by their ardour to make a new one; one that should secure them from the return of the oppressions which they had experienced. Mounier and

his friends, you see, were not listened to. What Necker, a man of intelligence, thought at the time, is sufficiently known, not only from his measure of the suspensive veto, the best terms he could make with the Assembly, but from all that he has published in remarks on their conduct, and in his work on executive power. To these I may hereafter allude.

His daughter, Me. de Stael, to whom I shall now, in the last place, refer, takes the same ground with her father, having been, like him, an eye-witness of the scene, though still more animated with the generous enthusiasm of liberty. She sees very clearly the crisis of this particular period, and thinks that the example of the English constitution should have prevailed.

"On the right hand of the president," she says, "was ranged the aristocratic party, composed chiefly of nobles, members of the parliament, and prelates. There were on this side scarcely thirty of the Tiers Etat. This aristocratic party had constantly protested against every resolution that had been taken by the Assembly, whose insolent movements they found it difficult to treat with seriousness; and the discovery of the eighteenth century, that there was such a thing as a nation, they considered as somewhat ridiculous, accustomed as they had themselves been to see and hear of nothing but nobles, priests, and people. To the popular party they addressed only reproaches and abuse; and then, with a total contempt of the circumstances in which they were placed, their receipt for doing good was to make what they thought bad, worse; regardless of what was to become of themselves, if they could but have the satisfaction of having been prophets."

This is a picture of human nature, and of the privileged orders, and of any fallen party, but too faithful, and yet very melancholy.

"The more violent of the two parties," she says, "were on the more elevated benches on the opposite sides. As the eye moved down the right, it reached the plain, where sat the moderate men, for the most part the defenders of the constitution of England.

"The principal people here were, Malouet, Lally, Mounier. Men more conscientious (says Me. de Stael) in the Assembly were not to be found; but though the eloquence of Lally was

quite superb, though Mounier was a publicist of the most elevated wisdom, and Malouet an administrator of the first efficiency, though, from without, they were supported by the ministers, with Necker at their head, and though often in the Assembly, men of the greatest merit rallied round their opinions, still did the more violent of the two parties never fail to overpower them in every thing they proposed or said; courageous though they were, and pure, and of all in the Assembly the most so; they never ceased, indeed, to cry aloud in this wilderness of disorder: but the high aristocrats could not bear men like these, whose object it was to establish a constitution wise and free, and therefore durable; and one often saw them, rather than assist such real patriots, giving their hand to unprincipled demagogues, whose follies menaced France, as well as themselves, with the most frightful anarchy." This you see is a repetition of the most serious accusation possible that can be urged against the privileged orders at this period; their desperate perverseness and impolitic blindness.

"Proceeding now from the moderate and the impartial to the popular party," she says, "however united on more important questions, they had fallen into different divisions. There were those attached to La Fayette; Mirabeau, though without what could exactly be called a party, had a great ascendant over the whole by the admirable powers of his mind. There was Barnave, of all the most fitted by the nature of his talents to be an orator after the English manner; there was the Abbé Sieyes, who enveloped himself in a sort of mysterious wisdom; he was supposed to be possessed of secrets on the subjects of government from which the most extraordinary effects were expected, when he should think proper to disclose them; and there were the Mountaineers, as they were called; they sat the highest on the right; Robespierre was already seen there, and Jacobinism was preparing in the clubs.

The chiefs of the majority of the popular party rather amused themselves with the exaggerations and violence of the Jacobins, and were pleased with the air of wisdom which they thought they might assume, when they *complacently* compared themselves with these factious conspirators. These pretended modérés, one might have said, followed after, and attended

these violent democrats, as a huntsman does his pack, priding himself that he can stop them at a call.

"It has been asked," continues M^{e}. de Stael, "who were those in the Assembly that could be called the Orleans party?

"Perhaps no one, for no one would have acknowledged the duke for a chief, nor did he wish for it. Mirabeau had sounded all the depths of his character, and thought no enterprise could be rested upon it.

"But he gave money to the populace, it is said. Whether he did or no, it is little to understand the Revolution, to suppose that this could have the slightest influence. It is not by such means that a whole people can be put in motion; this has always been the mistake of the people connected with the court. In some facts of mere detail they seek for the cause of sentiments expressed by the whole nation.

"The leaders of the popular party," says M^{e}. de Stael (and what she says contains, I think, the lesson which from the love I bear to civil liberty I ought to enforce, no matter at what risk of tediousness and repetition), "the leaders," says she, "on the left side (on the popular side), might have made the project of the English constitution succeed, if they had but united in this object with M. de Necker among the ministers, and with his friends in the Assembly; but then they would have been but secondary agents in the march of events, and they wished to take the lead; they chose therefore to draw their support from without, from the collections of men who were preparing commotions; they gained an ascendant in the Assembly by mocking at the moderate men, as if moderation were weakness, and they themselves alone possessed of any character of strength. One saw them in the hall, and on the seats of it, turning into ridicule any member who ventured to observe, that really men had existed in society before, that they themselves had so existed, and certainly that there were writers who had supposed that England was in possession of some little liberty; one would have thought it was the tales of the nursery that one was thus telling them; with such impatience did they listen, with such disdain did they pronounce their particular phrases and positions, highly exaggerated and peremptory, "that it was quite impossible to

admit an hereditary senate," "or a senate even for life," "or the absolute veto," "or any condition of property," "or, in short, any thing that, as they said, trenched upon the sovereignty of the people." These leaders of the popular party were of more elegant manners and wished to be in the ministry; and would have conducted affairs, if they could, to the very point, when it would have been necessary to have called for their interference; but in a rapid descent like that of a revolution, the car could not have been stopped, because they were a relay to be harnessed to it; they were not indeed conspirators and traitors, but they trusted too much to their powers over the Assembly, and they flattered themselves that they could again raise up the throne after they had brought it within their disposal. But it turned out that when really, and in good truth and faith, they wished to repair the ill they had done, it was impossible. It is not easy to say how many misfortunes might not have been spared to France if this part of the younger members had but united with the moderate men. Before the events of the 6th of October," she continues, "when the king had not yet been brought away from Versailles, and the French army, scattered over the provinces, still retained some respect for the throne, circumstances were such that a reasonable monarchy might have been established in France. Vulgar philosophy, indeed, is pleased to believe that all that has happened could not but have happened." (This you will find hereafter is the philosophy of her opponent Bailleul; often of still more weighty and respectable writers, Mignet and Thiers); "but to what purpose, then, the reason and liberty of mankind, if the same will that evidently *accomplished* things could not also have *prevented* them."

Such are the views and sentiments of Me. de Stael, and I know not how better to impress you with what seem to me reasonable opinions on this portion of the French Revolution than by continuing to borrow passages from some of the chapters of her first volume.

"All the power of the government," she says, "had fallen into the hands of the Assembly after the 14th July, which yet had only functions that were legislative; their distrust, however, of the intentions of the king, or rather of the court, prevented them from confiding to him the necessary powers

for the re-establishment of order. M. Necker was the intermediate person between the royal authority and the Assembly.

"But those deputies who were attached to him, notwithstanding his moderate politics, thought that the aristocrats were deceiving him; that he was their dupe. This was not so, but Necker knew that the privileged persons, under the former régime, would reconcile themselves to any party rather than the *first* friends of liberty: but he did his duty in endeavouring to restore force to the government; for a free constitution can never be the result of a general relaxation of its restraints, but rather a despotism.

"The Constituent Assembly could not depose a sovereign, virtuous as Louis XVI., though England had deposed James II., and yet it wished to have a constitution that was free; the consequence was, that it came to consider the executive power as an enemy to liberty, instead of making it one of its safeguards; it combined the constitution, as it would the plan of an attack; every thing followed from this mistake. Whether the king was or was not reconciled in his heart to the limits which the national interest required, this was not the point; it was not for the Assembly to examine his secret thoughts, but to found the royal authority, independently of what one might exactly hope or fear from the monarch. Institutions are at length more easily conformed to than broken through; and to retain a king, and yet strip him of his necessary prerogatives, was, of all parts that could be acted, the most absurd and reprehensible: a constitution which comprehended within its elements the humiliation either of the sovereign or the people, could not but be necessarily overthrown by the one or the other."

These observations of Me. de Stael are surely very reasonable.

With respect to the second House of Assembly. "M. de Lally," she says, "wished for a House of Peers. It could not even be proposed, and M. de Lally therefore wished to supply its place by at least a senate for life.

"But the popular party had got irritated against the privileged persons, who had always separated themselves from the nation, and they therefore rejected a durable institution of

this kind, from the prejudices of the moment: "A very great fault this," she says, "not only because a high chamber was necessary as an intermediate body between the sovereign and the deputies of the nation, but because there was no other method to make fall into oblivion that noblesse of the second order so numerous in France; a noblesse not known to history, not recommended by many considerations of public utility, and continually displaying, even more than did the first rank, a contempt for the Tiers Etat, lest it should not be sufficiently distinguished from them.

"The right side of the Assembly," she goes on to say, "that is, the aristocrats, might have carried this measure of a senate for life, by uniting themselves to Lally and my father; but they voted for one chamber rather than two, that they might make things hereafter better, as they thought, by making them first as bad as possible—a detestable and unprincipled speculation, that seduced the mind, by appearing to be so profound.

"The next subject," she continues, "was the veto. Was it to be absolute or suspensive?"

"The word 'absolute' sounded to the ears of the vulgar like despotism, and one saw now begin the unhappy influence of the cries of the people against men the most enlightened. It is scarcely possible for any mind to place within its view all the questions that may be connected with a political institution; what, then, more calamitous than to leave such questions to the reasonings, and often to the pleasantries of the multitude? In the streets of Paris they spoke of the veto as of some monster that was to devour all the children."

She then goes on to describe the views taken by the opposite parties, and the reasonings of her father, and at last observes, that under the existing circumstances, it was impossible to think of irritating the public by the word "veto absolute," when, in fact, the royal veto in every country always gives way more or less to the national wish. The high sounding nature of the word," she says, "one may, indeed, regret; at the same time one must not overlook the danger of placing the king alone in the presence of one great assembly, no gradations of rank near him, and left singly, as it were, to

confront his people, and to oppose in the balance the insulated will of himself against that of twenty-four millions.

"M. Necker, however, protested, so to speak, against this means of conciliation, this suspensive veto, even while he proposed it; for at the moment that he was showing that it was the necessary result of the single chamber, he continually insisted that a single chamber was wholly inconsistent with any thing that could be durable or good.

"This institution of a single chamber, and many other decrees relative to the constitution which so entirely departed from the political system of England, occasioned Necker," says his daughter, "the greatest possible concern, for in this democracy royal, as they called it, he saw (as he thought) every danger both for the throne and liberty. The spirit of party has always only one fear, wisdom has always two. One sees in his writings the respect he always bore to the constitution of England, and the arguments on which he depended, while wishing to adapt the great bases of it to France.

"But on this occasion it was amongst the popular deputies, then all powerful, that he encountered obstacles as great as those he had hitherto met with in the council of the king. As minister and as writer his language has been always the same.

"The Chamber of Peers," continues M^e^. de Stael, "was a project that displeased both parties; the one as reducing the whole noblesse to one hundred or one hundred and fifty families of names known in history, the other as renewing those hereditary distinctions to which so many were entirely hostile; for the whole nation had been deeply wounded by the privileges and pretensions of the nobility.

"M. Necker reasoned in vain with the one and with the other; simple and sincere, he could little prevail over the passions of which selfishness and vanity are the leading springs; and the factious, perceiving that the king, guided by his ministers, was gaining popularity, resolved to deprive him even of this moral influence, after having deprived him of every other.

"All hope of a constitutional monarchy was thus once more lost for France at a time when the nation, as yet

unsullied by any very serious crimes, retained its own proper self-esteem, and the esteem of the rest of Europe."

These views of Me. de Stael I conceive to be very just, and I therefore now leave them to your meditation.

To-morrow I will offer to you the general impressions of particular men on this most critical period—men who were actors in the scene; impressions such as arose in their minds at the moment, and therefore highly worthy of your consideration. On such impressions, on their minds and the minds of those around them, in the Assembly and out, hung the fate and fortunes, the joys and sorrows of millions of human beings; for all Europe, and all the world, and ages present and to come, were to be affected by the course that the Revolution was now to take.

LECTURE XVIII.

QUESTION OF MONARCHICAL POWER, AND CONDUCT OF PARTIES.

I MUST continue, for one lecture more, to exhibit to you the sentiments and opinions of those who took a part in the memorable scene before us. I have already explained to you, why I dwell so long on this particular period, and why I treat it in this particular manner. Before the 14th of July, the Assembly were engaged in a struggle with the crown; after the 5th and 6th of October, they were removed from Versailles to Paris, and were brought too much under the influence of the violent party; but in the interval which we are now considering, between these two periods, if the patriots had but seen the path of wisdom, and the court had acquiesced, or even if the patriots alone had been moderate and firm, France might yet have been saved, and Europe might have been saved, from what they were both to suffer; and the noblest of all causes, the cause of liberty, not been marked by those outrages and crimes, which can never cease to be lamented by all, who wish well to the best interests of mankind.

Among those who were distinguished at this particular era, it is impossible to overlook Bailly, the philosophic mayor of Paris. The observations of such a man, on this occasion, are particularly deserving of regard. He was, as I have already described to you, a man of science, of intelligence, patriotism, and virtue; and yet, though he seems to have been aware of the nature of the people, he never carried his reasonable apprehensions into practice, nor ever laboured for a proper establishment of executive power. Such being the patriot and the man, I consider his example as one among many others, that are highly edifying.

" This memorable day," says Bailly, " of the 14th of July was scarcely over, when other memorable days succeeded:

The Assembly, however, in the midst of its anxieties, returned to its labours. The great point was the constitution, but how to begin or proceed, if every one was to be heard? The diversity of objects, the confusion of different opinions, how were such wishes and opinions to be reconciled in any moderate portion of time, on questions so profound, and amid interests so weighty? Pétion proposed a committee of eight, who were to trace out a plan of a constitution, and then submit it to the Assembly: this was agreed to. It was a question, whether a declaration should be inserted in the scheme of the constitution, or placed before it. It was insisted, that the laws to which liberty must be subjected, should be laid down before liberty was produced and established in its mere principles; that men must be taught how to enjoy liberty in a social state: liberty may otherwise be the destruction of men, and destroy itself. It were to be wished," says Bailly, writing in February, 1792, nearly two years after, "that the Assembly had been controlled by considerations of this kind, and that it had perceived, that provisions must be made to supply the place of the barriers that it was going to remove.

"The meaning of the Assembly, at least so I believed at the time," says Bailly, "was to withdraw the existing constitution from its foundations, and to place it on those that were more solid and lasting. If the scheme of Barrere de Vieusac had been followed, and the principal articles only decreed *provisionally*, the Revolution would have been less complete, but we should have been saved from the anarchy which threatens the constitution, and has so long threatened it." These are admissions that are now remarkable. "But one must admire," says he, "the Assembly, deliberating in the midst of such scenes of horror (the July of 1789), discussing with calmness and consideration, and then pronouncing the oracles of wisdom.

"Among the eight members," says he, "of the committee, the chief were Talleyrand, Lally Tollendal, Clermont de Tonnerre, Mounier, and the Abbé Sieyes.

"These were to be supplied by eight others, among whom were La Fayette, Mirabeau, Bailly, Rabaud de St. Etienne, and Pétion.

"It was in the midst of the anxiety and terror of the celebrated 14th of July, that, with much of a Roman firmness, the Assembly were occupied on the subject of their rights as men and as citizens, and that La Fayette first proposed his declaration of them: this was the groundwork of all that followed. The subject was considered on the 1st of August and the 4th, and the declaration, that is now a preface to the constitution of 1791, was selected from many others, particularly from those presented by La Fayette, Sieyes, and Mounier: it was adopted on the 27th.

"In this Assembly, Mounier," he says, "read a project from the committee of the constitution." He now alludes to the committee of five. "He expressed," says he, "those manifest truths, that are a lesson to the Assembly, and to the king: 'That when the government does not clearly emanate from the will of the people, there is no constitution.' We have in France, therefore," says Bailly, "no constitution, but we have some fundamental laws, monarchy, the hereditary nature of the crown, &c. &c. We must have a constitution, that determines precisely the rights of the nation, and of the king; this constitution cannot be found in a despotism royal, nor in a feudal aristocracy, nor in a liberty without restraint; which last would place an arbitrary power in the multitude, which would but lead to anarchy and that to despotism, which always follows in its train, to reunite and devour whatever has been thus torn in pieces."

You will now note attentively what Bailly observes upon this Declaration of the Rights of Man.

"M. Mounier," says Bailly, "prefaced his scheme of a constitution by a declaration of rights, but thought as I did, that they should go together. Abstract and philosophic ideas, if not accompanied by a statement of the consequences intended, allow people to suppose other consequences than those which are afterwards to be admitted by the Assembly. Such," he continues, "was the event. This precipitate publication of rights gave occasion to an infinity of misapplications and usurpations, and when these were to be stopped, when the violators of order were to be stripped of their imagined rights, the multitude resisted. We had to meet force opposed to us, and a sort of right acquired in opposition to the law. The law

itself was perceived to be without support; order could not be reestablished but by means difficult in themselves, uncertain in their success, and that cost us much. This anarchy, defended by the multitude, who rejoiced in it, has had consequences of which one cannot yet see the duration or the result; one must hope, that it will not be despotism."

This remarkable sentence was probably written in 1792, when it was now too late. Bailly, like his friends, was no doubt too sanguine originally, and yet he seems often to have acted contrary to his better judgment, and to have had a great notion of the authority due to public opinion. He afterwards notices the difference that existed between his own sentiments and those of Lally Tollendal.

"Lally Tollendal," he says, "had with him the example of England, where the royal prerogative, and the rights of the barons, were made sacred, along with those of the people." With Bailly and his friends there were no rights sacred but those of the people: observe, then, his statement. "Myself," he says, "and the rest of us, *we* were more for the assertion of the great principles of society. If we succeed, reason is with us, and we shall have done better; but if we fail, we shall have lost an opportunity that can never be recovered, and we shall have lost the happiness of France."

These are remarkable words to be used by so celebrated an actor in the scene: for the question now is, whether the happiness of France was not lost, and lost, as Bailly here himself declares, that it was *possible* it might be lost. What need of so perilous an experiment? it may now be asked; but how feeble at the time, in August 1789, would have been an expostulation like this!

From Bailly we will now turn to the Marquis de Ferrieres, one of the most respectable of the high party, as Bailly is of the low. In his second book, he gives an account of the communication made by Mounier to the Assembly, from the committee of the constitution, in the sitting of the 9th of July. He mentions what were the very reasonable wishes of Mounier, that the deliberations of the Assembly on such a subject as the constitution, affecting the happiness of twenty-five millions of men, should not be precipitated, but should be continued from week to week, three general sittings in each,

but he objects to Mounier, the rashness and inexpediency of his notions, in their origin and from the first, on this great subject of a constitution. The Marquis de Ferrieres, though a sensible, virtuous man, was, you will recollect, of the order of the nobility, and never makes sufficient distinction between men, who though of popular opinions, were of very different popular opinions: a most common species of mistake or injustice this. He is quite unfair, for instance, to Mounier. What I am going to read to you, he addresses to that excellent man; I would rather address it to the more ardent friends of liberty who thwarted Mounier.

"It is impossible," says the marquis, "not to reproach Mounier for not having sufficiently reflected on the danger of placing a great people, arrived at a state of civilization, which has advanced their intelligence, developed their passions, and affected every man with the vice of selfishness, a people so corrupted, a people among whom the inequality of fortune and condition had left many without any interest in the community, or chance of procuring any—it is impossible, I say, not to reproach him for placing a great people like this out of the reach of all laws of restraint. What are we to say to Mounier for reporting it to be in a state of nature; for considering it, as if now in, the infancy of society, and that for the sake of giving it a constitution, and one different to that under which it has lived for fourteen hundred years; without examining whether a people like this is fit for such a constitution; without examining whether it has not now sunk into such a state of degeneracy, that it can only be suited by a government which, though just and moderate, shall be firm and active; and competent to repress this ignorant fermentation, a fermentation which can only lead to the dissolution of society itself; without examining whether this new constitution is accommodated to the manners, to the political situation of a people surrounded by nations civilized and corrupted like itself? It is impossible," says the Marquis de Ferrieres, "not to reproach Mounier with not having sufficiently reflected on what must be the consequence of thus fatally destroying all ancient principles, habits, and prejudices, and of abandoning to the influence of an order of things, whose laws no longer exist, a multitude of men that have hitherto lived but in their

intrigues and their vices, totally removed from all the purity and virtue of the primitive man, such as he is supposed to be in a state of nature; men, on the contrary, hitherto kept in order, and with difficulty, only by a vigilant police.

"Mounier ought to have known," he continues, "that the interval that must elapse before laws could be reestablished, however short it might be, would open a wide field for the ambitious, for the speculations of the wild, and the machinations of the bad. The whole of the constitution, therefore, should have been presented gradually, and each part in succession, so that the people should have seen in these alterations only reforms, however they might, in fact, have been receiving a real constitution; that in obeying the new laws they should have believed themselves ruled by the old; for as to laws, it is quite necessary that the people should have been long in the habit of respecting them; their origin, like that of illustrious families, should be lost in the obscurity of ages. True, there was no need of announcing a new constitution, it was only necessary to reestablish that which had existed in France for fourteen hundred years; to disengage it from the abuses with which it was encumbered; to reform it in those points where the difference of times and circumstances made a change expedient; to pursue the tract which had been pointed out to us by our mandates; they were, in truth, the expression of the general will. In this way, and after this manner, might the constitution have been established, and upon the basis which the committee proposed; no obstacle would have been encountered, and every thing would have remained in a state of peace and order, but the philosophers, the intriguers, the men of ambition, were determined on a Revolution; they were determined to realize,—some their senseless systems, others the unbounded hopes which they had conceived."

These views and reasonings of the Marquis de Ferrieres must appear to men of reflection at the present moment, in the abstract at least, sufficiently just and wise. I must repeat however, that he does not sufficiently distinguish Mounier and his friends from the other patriots; his observations should have been rather addressed to the latter: and he takes no notice of any difficulties in the case before him. Mounier

was obliged to make sacrifices to the opinions of others; and so far were the generality of the friends of liberty at the time from relishing such notions as these expressed by the marquis, that to them appeared more reasonable the elevated sentiments of La Fayette, "that for a people to love liberty, it was only necessary that they should know it; and to be free, that they should will to be so."

Ferrieres afterwards alludes, at some length, to the discussions that took place on the great subjects of the veto and the two chambers.

"The popular party," he says, "were afraid that the king would exercise his veto, if given to him, on the decrees of the night of the 4th of August, and the same popular party were unwilling to be checked in their schemes of a total renovation of the government, and they thought they might be so checked by the existence of a second house of legislature. This was a fault in those among them who meant well," says the marquis: "the second house might have been composed, and would have been most evidently and naturally composed, of the two orders, formed as in the case of the National Assembly, and then thrown into one house; or a senate might have been contrived according to the plan of Mounier and Lally; but their exertions, and they made every possible exertion, were in vain. The more violent of the popular party made it their business to deride the senate and the senators; and those of the nobility, who considered the minority of their order, who had joined the Tiers Etats, as having betrayed them, unhappily indulged their sentiments of hatred and vengeance on this occasion, and joined in rejecting the project of the two chambers. It was in vain that Lally mounted the tribune, and that Mounier (this is a very curious fact) went from rank to rank, assuring the deputies of the commons, that the nobles and the aristocrats, who resisted the measure, did so only that the Revolution might fail. Every effort within doors and without was vain, and the decision was at last made, eight hundred and forty-nine to eighty-nine, almost ten to one."

After Bailly and Ferrieres, I will now turn to this most respectable patriot, whom you have just heard mentioned, to Mounier.

The sentiments of Mounier, who was, as you may have

perceived for some time, one of the most distinguished leaders of the Revolution, are such as, from what you have heard of his character, and of his projects of a constitution, might be expected. I will give you a short quotation from his book; observe it well. He means, no doubt, to describe the causes of the *failure* of the Revolution, and he is great authority. He had originally materially contributed to the formation of the National Assembly.

"I am far," says he, afterwards, in his work printed in 1792, at Geneva, p. 233, "I am far from priding myself on the efforts I then made. Like so many others, the friends of humanity, I was guilty of the fault of having hopes too sanguine; but what had passed in my own province had contributed to delude and betray me, when I reflected on all that we had obtained in Dauphiny by the mere force of justice and reason; I now see, how I was led on to believe that the French, in like manner, might deserve to be free. The lower classes of the people in my own province awaited calmly the result of our labours; never had the multitude any influence on our assemblies, the spectators restrained themselves always within the bounds of decency; our votes were perfectly free; the clergy and the nobility showed themselves generous, the commons moderate; many of those who now distinguish themselves in Dauphiny by their zeal for new institutions, were not then, as now, the vile agents of despotism; there was nothing then to indicate that they would one day seduce and deceive the multitude, so as even to make the people suppose that they were attached to liberty. Some, indeed, of the members of our states had endeavoured to gain celebrity by ranking themselves as enemies to the throne, but in general their opinions were my own: they published in favour of the two houses; they tempered the effervescence of hot-headed men; and they told the people, that there was no arriving at liberty, unless they knew how to limit their desires, and not make the advantages they obtained pretexts for requiring more."

Mounier, as I have just intimated to you, is here, no doubt, describing the great causes which he thought, whatever might be their origin, contributed to the failure of the Revolution.

"Many persons," he afterwards observes in a note, "have blamed me for the Declaration of Rights. I did every thing I could to resist this project: I presented one to the committee, in which I took care to insert no article that I thought dangerous. I had done better, no doubt, to have maintained, as did some of the deputies, that *all* abstract ideas on the rights of man admitted into legislation might be exposed to misinterpretation, and produce the most unhappy consequences."

Afterwards in his work he argues with great earnestness against any suspensive veto in the king, and contends for the power absolute and unlimited.

"The States General," says he, (note, p. 8,) "owed their very existence to an act of the king: their deliberations could have no force without his free consent, and every friend to royalty should have acknowledged, without any reservation whatever, the necessity of the free consent of the king, even to the very decrees that related to the constitution.

"How rapid," says he, "has been the progress of the degradation of the royal power since the establishment of this suspensive veto: before, the representatives of the people, even in their acts of menace, had been humble in their supplications, and called themselves the subjects of the king; but from the moment that they had reserved to themselves the legislative power, the monarch was to be designated under the title of 'the executive power,' a title which could only indicate a subordinate magistracy, of which the legislative body could modify the rights, or even pronounce the extinction, as of any other subaltern employment. From this moment, in every public act the king was not named till after the Assembly, and the ministers themselves submitted to adopt a language like this, so injurious to the crown.

"The suspensive veto prepared the minds of men to see the decisions of the king, and the orders which he gave the administrative bodies, submitted to the examination of the Assembly, which could annul them in consequence of their supreme power; it prepared the minds of men to see him excluded from all participation in the laws relative to the imposts, and in all changes in them relative to the constitution; it has demolished the throne, and substituted for the throne nothing

but a mere simple seat by the side of the president, who is to treat the king as his equal on public occasions of ceremony, and as his inferior on every other.

"The absolute veto left the king in possession of a great part of his sovereignty; the suspensive made him at once a subject.

"It is no matter of wonder," he goes on to say, "that the majority of the committee of the constitution attached such great importance to the absolute veto; and if the royalists who were there (he is speaking of himself and his friends) gave in their resignation, when they found that the legislative body was to consist of one chamber only, that the Assembly was to be permanent, and the veto of the king suspensive, it was only because, after such a triumph of the democratic party, there was no alternative left, but to contribute to the destruction of the throne, or discontinue their labours."

Such were the sentiments of this reasonable and virtuous patriot, when he contemplated, in his retirement, a short time afterwards, the scenes in which he had been engaged.

I will now turn to the works of the more violent men on each side, to Bertrand de Moleville, of the court party, and M. de Bailleul, of the democratic party.

Bertrand de Moleville takes notice of the transactions of the period, we are now considering, much in the way you would expect.

"Jacobinism," says he, "has formed the sovereignty of the people into a principle, in order to make it the rallying cry of rebellion, and the essential dogma of revolution."

And again. "The factious, whose intention it was to annihilate the monarchy, took great care not to let it be known that their object was to seize the supreme power themselves. It is to you, said they to the multitude, it is to you that the sovereignty belongs, from you it has been usurped; there was people before there were kings; kings were made by the people, therefore it is you who are the sovereign, and all we want is to restore you to your rights.

"Those," he continues, "who combated these sophisms were by far too metaphysical in their reasonings. The principle of sovereignty, they said, is in the people, but the exercise of the sovereignty must be always separated from the principle.

The people are to discover it only in a visible and commanding representation, which impresses them with obedience." Bertrand may object to this reasoning, but I know of no other possible.

Bertrand de Moleville then produces his own theory and reasonings, which are also both long and metaphysical, and would probably not have been more easily understood by the populace than those he rejected. In defiance of them, this populace would have gone on to reason, as he says, they did reason; the nation is the sovereign, the sovereign is king; we are the nation, and therefore we are king; and the cry of *Vive le Roi* became *Vive la Nation.*

Certainly this doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, though in itself perfectly just and true, when it means, as in practice it can only mean, that in all government the great justification of rule, restraint, authority, the great end to be accomplished, the great and the only end, is the happiness of the community; certainly this doctrine was a dangerous doctrine, (and thus much we may concede to Bertrand de Moleville,) to be produced and thrown broad-cast among the people, in the way it was proclaimed by the great leaders of the French Revolution; and we must allow that from the first it was sure to be interpreted in the manner Bertrand de Moleville describes, and though fatal to the court originally (this it might be), was sure to be afterwards fatal to the patriots themselves. It is, on the whole, a doctrine that might be inscribed with good effect on the chairs of a cabinet council, but not, therefore, on the tribunes of a popular assembly.

Our author goes on to describe the efforts of the Palais Royal to reign over the Assembly at the crisis we are now considering, and much in the way we have seen them described in the Memoirs we have just alluded to. I will, however, give you a specimen. "The anonymous letter," says he, "which the president received was couched in these words: 'The Patriotic Assembly of the Palais Royal have the honour to make it known to you, that if the aristocratic faction formed by some of the nobility, clergy, and one hundred and twenty ignorant and corrupt members, continue to disturb the general harmony, and still insist upon the abso-

lute assent, fifteen thousand men are ready to enlighten their country seats and houses, and particularly your own.'

"The heads of the motion," he says, "delivered to M. Lally were, 'We are arrived at the critical moment of French liberty (this was but too true), we think it time to recall several of our deputies; they may be impeached after their recall; the veto does not belong to one man, but to twenty-five millions. It has been unanimously resolved to go immediately to Versailles, as well to put a stop to the aristocratic effervescence there, as to protect the lives of the worthy deputies, which are in danger.' Such was the sort of manifesto presented to M. Lally." These were pretty strong symptoms, no doubt, of the movements that were afterwards to be expected, and that actually took place; and though these letters might be dismissed with contempt, as they were by a majority of the Assembly, they should have been the signal to all, who meant well, to rally round the king and the executive power immediately, and with all their strength. To Bertrand it appeared, and I think with reason, that the king should have accepted no veto unless the power of dissolving the Assembly was granted him.

And indeed this power, as it existed at the time in the example of the English constitution, should have been the point contended for, if necessary, by the king, or rather should have been from the first proposed by the patriots. To have the veto without the power of dissolving the Assembly, was only to be exposed to a combat without the means of defence. Bertrand de Moleville is a writer that you must read attentively, and I need not further allude to him. If you do not read him, you will never know the case of the court.

I will now refer to M. de Bailleul, who drew up his work expressly to confute what he considered the errors of Me. de Stael. He is a very good representative of the most violent patriots of these times; decisive, able, authoritative; very ready with sweeping statements, little affected by difficulties, contemptuous of the privileged orders, and considerably unfeeling. In his pages you will always find the democratic view of the question when you wish to know it; as in Bertrand you see that of the court. He forms, as you may suppose, a very different estimate of such questions as we have

been considering, and of the situation of France during these important months, in the middle of the year 1789. "The short explanation of the events of the Revolution," says he (vol. i. p. 244), "is this: a nation chooses to have laws and liberty; its government refuses; but the supreme power placed, as it happened to be, under the influence of a well meaning minister, like M. Necker, shows symptoms that are favourable and encouraging. Hopes are therefore entertained by the nation: the one has, however, promised more than it exactly meant to give, and the other has pushed its pretensions further; calling for its rights and for justice; a struggle ensues; force is produced: it is impossible to retreat without being in a worse situation than ever, at least such is the apprehension; and so the nation rushes onward into a profound abyss, which indeed could not have been avoided even if the nation had foreseen it." Such is the account of Bailleul. But this is rather a description of the facts than an estimate of what might and ought to have been the conduct of the parties. "How," he continues, "does Me. de Stael torment herself, to show in what a thousand different ways M. de Necker would have directed, retarded, or modified the Revolution; as if to scatter a few handfuls of dust were sufficient to disperse two armies already in presence of each other, and who have begun to engage."

This, we contend, in opposition to reasoners like M. de Bailleul, is not a proper statement of the case. The question rather is, first, whether the parties cannot be prevented from assuming the form and character of armies disposed to engage; and secondly, what is the one army, what is the popular party to do, when the other, the king and the court, has declined or given up the combat, has been unable or unwilling to contend. Wisdom too, and the counsels of peace and kindness, may not at the time have been heard, though breathed by M. Necker and other good men, by the Lallys and the Mouniers of the period; but it does not thence follow that they ought not to have been, or as M. de Bailleul supposes, that they might not have been; and it is the business of those who speculate on the events of history, to mark these wild and senseless movements of the passions of mankind, and to hold them up as a warning to those who are to

come after; not to vote them inevitable and irresistible. All reason and reasoning are at an end, as Me. de Stael has observed, if every thing that leads to violence and revolution is, after the manner of democratic thinkers, to be thus voted inevitable. "The moment," says M. de Bailleul (247), "that the monarch took refuge in the ranks of the privileged orders, and that an army was in march to dissolve the National Assembly, as Necker was informed, and as Me. de Stael agrees, nothing but extremities were to be expected."

The king, however, it must be observed, never did, even on the 14th of July, properly speaking, take refuge in the ranks of the privileged orders. And again,—the National Assembly, long before, were the first to encroach upon his authority, and if nothing but extremes were to be expected in the case of the 14th of July, as thus described, this was owing originally to the mistake or the fault of the patriots, not to any meritorious conduct that can be ascribed to them, in this instance at least.

"The 14th of July did not," he afterwards observes (249), "overthrow the monarchy, as Me. de Stael supposes; it only purified it, and prepared it for a new existence." How is this, it will be said. "Because," says M. de Bailleul, "the court, instructed by this terrible experience, had only to adopt, with sincerity, the principles which afterwards could alone bear sway in France."

Now the question is, whether the patriots made their terms such, that it was possible they could be received, by either the court or the king, with the sincerity here required.

"Every one," continues M. de Bailleul, "should, according to Me. de Stael, be in full possession of his rights, or what chance for his sincerity?" It is curious to observe what will here be the answer of M. de Bailleul; it is this.

"But was the king then," he says, "in the possession of his rights, when in the midst of the people of a court, rebels both to the real interests of his throne and to the wishes of the nation? Was he then in possession of them; or was he not rather in possession of them when in the midst of his people (the good people of Paris, you will observe), who only required him to acknowledge those rights (that is his own rights) and to maintain them?"

This is the sort of unfeeling declamation which every where pervades the work of M. de Bailleul, as it must have done the conversation and writings of all violent men at the time. But again,—no doubt M. de Bailleul is at issue with us on the great fact of the whole case, whether the court and the old régime were still the main object to be dreaded. "Three descriptions of opinion," says he (299), "existed, according to Me. de Stael, in the bosom of the Assembly: the partisans of the ancient régime, the partisans of the royal prerogative, and the demagogues. Now these last," says he, "were always from the first the majority. It was amongst these that in fact were found the men of talents and enlightened minds. Indeed? The second were but a handful (he must here allude to Mounier and his friends), their intentions were good, their objects laudable, but they deluded themselves about the facts. It was not true that the Revolution had disarmed the partisans of the old régime; these men still deliberated in the counsels of the king; they still had all the employments and disposed of the public force (M. de Bailleul seems here to forget the 14th of July and the events of it). The patriots could not possibly withdraw themselves from the consideration of circumstances so real as these; they therefore rejected all propositions that were too favourable to the royal authority, not that they meant to overthrow the royal authority, but that while that authority was placed under aristocratic influence, they trembled to give it an independence of the Assembly, which it appeared likely to use, even at the very moment against liberty."

This, in opposition to M. de Bailleul, we must contend, was a mistake. No doubt the king, though benevolent and patriotic, wanted character; no doubt his advisers (the court and its followers) were unfavourable to the Revolution; but this is no sufficient reason why the Assembly should have rejected all propositions, not only those too favourable, but those that were *at all* favourable to the royal authority; that they should act, at least, whatever they might intend, as if they really did mean to overthrow it; that they should not only tremble to give it an independence of the Assembly, but that they should leave it no power that was not at the mercy of the Assembly; that they should make no terms and should enter into no composition with the old opinions; that they

should not see that in August, September, and October, 1789 (I am speaking of the period before me, not of any period prior), the court and the old régime were not so much the proper objects of terror as the popular party and the new opinions, whose victory on the 14th of July was complete. But you must read Bailleul all through the History of the Revolution, when you wish to know the democratic view and representation of the case.

A word now in reference to Mirabeau. It is but justice to Mirabeau to say, that he seems at this particular period to have seen the difficulties of the situation of the patriots. He insisted upon a veto for the king, but his own personal ambition was unhappily in the way of the project of the two houses, perhaps too an inordinate fear of the returning power of the crown. In his Courier de Provence, he observes, "Truth would command me to say every thing, wisdom to temporize. On the one side, for the sake of justice, we are to burst through and disregard the timid expostulations of prudence; but on the other, the fear of exciting a fermentation that may be dangerous, will reasonably alarm those who do not choose to buy the welfare of posterity at the price of calamity for the existing generation. With the philosopher who labours for the future, as for the present, with him, indeed, circumspection may be weakness, and the tolerance of abuses prevarication; but it is not so with the statesman, who, in the first place, must act for the present; he will not give arms to the people till he has taught them how they are to be used, lest, in their first paroxysms, the people should be only agitated with fury, turn them against each other, and abandon them with remorse and terror.

"It is necessary, therefore," continues Mirabeau, "that a declaration of rights should be promulgated only in conjunction with the constitution, of which it is to be the foundation; that the principles of liberty should be accompanied by the laws which are to direct its exercise. Upon the people, one should act in every way at once: upon their minds, to enlighten them; their passions, to restrain them; their sentiments and feelings, to temper their bitterness, and to inspire them with a hope of better things." These, the views of Mirabeau, are the views of a man of sense and reflection; and in his speeches to the Assembly, when he had to speak as a

member of the committee of constitution, there was nothing of confidence or presumption. He seemed quite aware of the incurable nature of human dissent, of the difficulty of coming to right decisions, of the danger of coming to none, when so many had to propose their opinions.

I will digress for a moment. There is a remarkable paragraph, and one somewhat amusing on the subject of committees, which any one who has attended them will know how to appreciate. "One man," says he, "offers to a committee the result of his reflections, another proposes retrenchments of the plan, a third additions, and so on, till there is no longer any plan or coherence left. And yet one must submit, for the very first duty of a committee is to produce a report, in which all are agreed. In all human circumstances and affairs," says he, "I know but of one in which despotism is not only good but necessary—it is so in a committee; to make it digest and do something."

Mirabeau was never without his sense of the necessity of order, or even his attachment to the royal power; but on some account or other, the want of skill in the court, his dread of their returning power, his want of timely prudence, the rashness of his ambition, on some or on all of these accounts he put not forth his strength at the proper time in favour of the executive power, and never properly united with the first more wise and sound patriots of the Assembly, when it was possible, that with his assistance, they might have prevailed. His great mistake seems to have been that he supposed a king might be left alone with his people to settle every thing to their mutual advantage, and that there was no necessity for the intervention of any aristocracy; no necessity to surround a monarch with natural defenders, and furnish the people with safe leaders.

An annual assembly, an annual army, annual taxes, responsibility of ministers, and an absolute veto in the crown, which might be absolute in theory, as he said, but could never be so in practice; these were his views: two chambers of legislation, if they were but two sections of one and the same chamber, for the purposes of more complete deliberation; but only one, rather than have two and leave each to exercise a vetoon the other, which would end, he thought, either in

collision or inaction:—views these of too democratic a nature at any time, but entirely out of the question on the supposition, then accepted and reasoned upon, that France was to remain a monarchy.

These general references and quotations will serve, I hope, sufficiently to give you some notion of the sentiments and opinions of the different descriptions of men and of patriots that existed in France during these very critical weeks that intervened between the middle of July, 1789, and the beginning of October.

And now, while I am concluding my lecture, I must again remind you, that the period that elapsed between the middle of July and middle of October, 1789, was the interval during which all reasonable hope of the peaceful success of the Revolution was lost. It is, therefore, that interval which should, I think, be most particularly studied; studied by those who are friends to liberty, and who will always find it so difficult to restrain their ardour and limit their expectations, when engaged in her animating cause. I dwell, therefore, on this part of the subject, and repeat the same lessons again and again; and I exhibit the faults to which patriotic men and patriotic assemblies are exposed, not for the purpose of reconciling you to despotism, but from the hope of teaching you how best to escape from it. I must again and again remind you, that the mistakes of arbitrary rulers, the greater or less quantity of oppression or harsh government which they exercise, are, within certain bounds, of little comparative import to the general stability of their own cause: advantage cannot be taken of their errors and faults by the friends of freedom so readily and with such effect. But it is not so with those who are endeavouring to establish the rights of mankind and the civil happiness of the community: their golden opportunities are like angel visits, short and far between; and if they seize them not and improve them not to the utmost, if they do not even exercise virtues of a most high and sometimes almost of an inconsistent and contradictory nature, caution in the midst of enthusiasm, and forbearance and conciliation in the midst of a high sense of indignation and wrong, all is lost.

The purport then of this part of my present course of lec-

tures is to warn you of the possible mistakes of men of elevated and generous natures, of men of ardent and sanguine minds, of men, of young men more particularly (they were almost all young men that took a lead in this Revolution), of men of presumptuous and conceited understandings, such is naturally the character (I mean not to offend) but such is naturally the character of men at any early period of life, especially when they are men of talents; such men, as in the instance of France before us, and in any other instance that can be expected to arise, will always start up from society, the supporters of new opinions, the scoffers of prejudices and antiquated notions, the patrons of sweeping measures and daring experiments; and they will undertake to manage mankind as they would the pieces on their chess boards; and suppose that what is clear to their own particular understandings, must necessarily be so to that of the community; and conceive that when a reasonable doctrine or system, or what appears such to themselves, has once been held up to the acceptance of men, no further difficulty remains.

The fact is always otherwise; and, if the system which the patriots adopt has not been from the first one of compromise and conciliation, opposition, determined opposition, is engendered; the multitude are then to be called in, the violent prevail; and for the early patriots, and for the friends of peace and order, there is no longer any hope; they find that they become unpopular, they lose their power.

—— "Carceribus sese effudêre quadrigæ,
Addunt se in spatia: et frustra retinacula tendens
Fertur equis auriga, neque audit currus habenas."

I must now conclude; but I must make one parting observation on the noblesse of France at this period, which will enable me to do equal justice to all parties, and exercise my censure (such as it is) on both the descriptions of offenders that appeared in these memorable scenes.

It is melancholy then to reflect upon the conduct of the nobility, during these discussions on the constitution; what chance for them, what chance for the king, what chance for their country, even according to their own particular notions, but in the formation of two houses? Yet mark now their

miserable jealousies and small views. From the superabundant noblesse of France, only a small portion could be chosen to form an upper chamber; those, who saw no chance of their being themselves elected, were against the measure of two houses. Some imagined that the forty-seven who had first joined the Tiers Etat would be first promoted to the upper house, and this again was intolerable; and of the rest too many of the higher orders, who were enemies to the Revolution in any form, thought that such a regulation would give stability to it, and prevent that discord, precipitancy, and anarchy, of which they already saw the seeds and the beginnings in the present Assembly, and from which they augured its overthrow and the restoration of the old régime.

The question was, therefore, lost by an immense majority: the higher orders and the royalists voted *against* the two chambers, uniting with their enemies; and this conduct of the noblesse, which was the destruction of France, is but too much the conduct of privileged orders at all times and in all countries: they can never rise superior to the temptations of their situation, whether in religion or politics; and the wellwisher to the civil and religious liberties of mankind, the historian or the philosopher, who comes afterwards to weigh them in his balance, loses all his proper calmness and consideration, and in the impatience of his indignation, when public disorder and ruin have been the consequence, pronounces them to be as selfish, contracted, and improvident in their notions, as the lowliest of the rabble which surround their carriages in the streets.

The mistake of the noblesse, to which I have just alluded, was not only one very obvious and very unpardonable, but it was a late one. They and the court had already made their mistakes before, and they now repeated them; but the people also and the popular leaders had now to make their mistakes, and I think, as we have just seen, they did make them. I speak not of bad and wicked men, such as will always be found, such as must always be taken into all calculations in political affairs; I speak of men of enlightened minds and patriotic feelings, such as I have no right to suppose meant ill to their country. To these men, the patriotic leaders of 1789, and to the privileged orders who preceded them in their

mistakes, to both descriptions of men the words of Mr. Burke, in one of his celebrated passages, are strictly applicable, and were not only a lesson to them, which they ought to have observed, but they are also a memorable lesson to those who are to come after them; for a sort of conflict between old and new opinions in the history of this world of ours will never cease.

"Early reformations," says Burke, in a well-known paragraph in his well-known speech on economical reform, "are amicable arrangements with a friend in power; late reformations are terms imposed upon a conquered enemy. Early reformations are made in cold blood; late reformations are made under a state of inflammation. In that state of things the people behold in government nothing that is respectable; they see the abuse, and they will see nothing else."

Weighty words these, and universally applicable; uttered many years before, and prophetic, if applied to France; for the privileged orders never could see the wisdom of early reformations, and the patriotic leaders (too many of them) could afterwards behold in government nothing that was respectable. They saw the abuse, as Mr. Burke says, and would see nothing else. "They fell into the temper," as he continues, "of a furious populace, provoked at the disorder of a house of ill fame: they never attempted to correct or regulate; they went to work by the shortest way; they abated the nuisance, they pulled down the house."

LECTURE XIX.

FIFTH AND SIXTH OF OCTOBER.

IN the three last lectures, I have endeavoured to draw your attention to the period that intervened between the 14th of July and the beginning of October, 1789. I have endeavoured to place it before you in every point of view: the different questions that were then discussed, the different opinions that were then expressed; and I have done this at great length (reckless of any charge of tediousness and repetition), on account of what I believe to be the importance of the lessons that this period offers to all who are disposed to engage in public concerns, more especially to the friends of freedom. During this period, had Mounier and his friends been properly supported, the Revolution might have been adjusted upon a system of mutual sacrifices, conciliation, and peace; but the opportunity was lost. No proper terms were kept with the king and with the court. The friends of freedom, some of them, still entertained their terror of the return of arbitrary power, while others of them were animated with hopes of a new order of things, more favourable, as they thought, to liberty, but evidently of a nature far too vague and unqualified, far too democratic to be admitted into a system like that of the French monarchy, without much positive injustice, great violence, the certainty of much commotion, and the hazard of a civil war.

Now these I conceive to have been serious mistakes made by the friends of freedom on this occasion in the one way and in the other; and I am now, you will observe, speaking only of those men who are entitled to our respect, those who meant well, who supposed that they were friends to their country and mankind. I speak not of daring, selfish, unprincipled men, such as always come forward on occasions of

public agitation: I speak not of those; of such men it is in vain to speak; I am directing my observations to those who were too full of their own opinions to respect those of others; who expected too much from the influence of truth and reason; who considered not the perilous and uncertain nature of all political dissensions; who were too sanguine to be wise. Men like these will, as I conceive, always exist: nay, more; unless men of generous minds and ardent temperaments are continually found in society, freedom cannot be maintained in it. No point, therefore, can be a point of greater anxiety than to teach men like these, the temptations of their situation; to warn them, by the example of a period like this in the French Revolution, that they are to keep a guard upon their very virtues and upon some of the most indispensable and highest qualities of their nature. In revolutions, the history is always much the same. There are those of warm passions, of ready eloquence, of fearless minds: these are the men who put a revolution into motion; dangerous from the very elevation of their characters, from the very purity of their enthusiasm; young men, for the most part, caught by novelty, disposed to experiment, offensive by their presumption, and who turn away with contempt from what are proposed to them as the lessons of experience. These are found on the *one* side; and on the *other* are ranged those more advanced in age, more especially those of the privileged orders, accustomed to a certain routine of duties and opinions, and too much disposed to consider, as still in existence, those sentiments and prejudices, good and bad, which, amid the changes of the world, *may* have passed away.

Now, between these descriptions of men stand the men of intelligence and reflection, too young for the one, too old for the other; who are by nature, as by wisdom, placed between the two, and whose wish and whose labour it will be to conciliate and to harmonize, to estimate and to provide at once for the past, the present, and the future. But what will naturally be the fate of such men? Belonging not to the violent on either side, they will persuade neither, they will displease both; they will fail, they will be disappointed; they will be found in the company of the first that come forward while the revolution is ripening, but they will be also

among the first who will have to retire or perish, if the revolution proceeds.

Such may be in general the melancholy history of revolutions; but the question is, ought these things to be so? This may be indeed the history, but *ought* this to be the history?

Democratic writers continually speak, as if there was a progress in these affairs totally inevitable. Such, since I have drawn up these lectures, I have found to be the language even of the late able writers, Mignet and Thiers, in their Histories of the French Revolution. That it is in vain for the men of wisdom and counsel to raise their voice when revolutions are begun; that the wind bloweth as it listeth; that the wind becomes a storm, and the storm a hurricane, raging till the air be purified: this is their excuse for the measures of violence and guilt that too often occur. But reverse the picture, and the same is the reasoning of writers whose principles are those of an opposite and arbitrary cast; and it is *their* excuse, on the contrary, for listening to *no* projects of reform, and for ruling men from the first by mere force and authority; not perceiving that it is for them at all times to consider whether what is proposed be just and reasonable or not; to concede nothing indeed to fear, but every thing to reason.

It is for those who read history, above all, for those who comment upon history, to resist these sweeping conclusions on the one side and on the other, these doctrines of despair, these views of human nature, that can lead to nothing but slavery on the one side, or bloodshed and anarchy on the other. Men must be called upon to observe the mistakes and the crimes of those who went before them; and they must be required to avoid and fly them, as they are rational creatures, as they are beings "that look before and after." In like manner, in domestic and social life, men will be selfish, hard-hearted, licentious, wicked. It must needs be that offences will come; but it does not follow that our sages and our divines are not still to labour on, in the duties of their callings, are not still to cry aloud and spare not. The cause of human nature must never be abandoned; nor need it, it may be added, for it can never be sufficiently known or estimated what may have been even the *success* of those, who toil for the benefit of mankind; because the evils

they have prevented, do not appear, and cannot be brought to the credit of their account; while those, they have in vain resisted, are seen but too plainly, and operate against them.

In the history of our own country, in the times of the great rebellion, Charles I. was so arbitrary and obstinate, and the religious principle got so interwoven into the disputes between the monarch and his parliaments, that the moderate men, the men of wisdom and counsel (who had been always, however, far too torpid), were at last obliged to give way, and a civil war ensued; but it was not so at the period of the Revolution of 1688; in this instance they prevailed, and this is the eternal glory of the Whigs of that era. What was then done, however, may again be done; and this splendid instance in the annals of mankind must ever be of avail to encourage the friends of freedom in their virtuous struggles, must ever be sufficient to show them that efforts for the welfare of the community do not necessarily fail; that resistance to oppression is not necessarily followed by anarchy and civil war; that the friends of their country and of mankind *may* succeed, if they can but to their high virtues add other virtues that are equally indispensable, though they may at first sight appear scarcely necessary, and, indeed, to bold and generous men may always appear virtues of a very lowly and ordinary nature. Patience, moderation, modesty of temperament, candour; attention to the feelings of others, to the arguments of their opponents; a disposition to make the ground solid under them as they go along; a deep sense of the infirmities of their own nature, and of the irritable nature of the passions of mankind: these are the virtues not less necessary than those of a more popular nature, to the proper completion of their character as patriots and reformers. The union of these qualities is difficult, but a fair object of virtuous ambition; it is within the reach of human nature, and it may and ought to be produced. On the whole, then, of the case, opposite lessons must be directed to the different portions of the community. Those in the political system, who in the first place want instruction, are, on the one side, the grave and the old, and the privileged orders, who will suffer no alteration, and make no provision for the new circumstances that may have occurred, the changes that time may have operated upon

their own community and the world; and, in the second place, are those on the other side, who will make no allowance for what they may esteem the prejudices of others, and who forget that, at all events, reformers must proceed upon a system of conciliation and peace, for if a temperament of this sort once cease, the violent will alone succeed, and they themselves be no longer listened to; lastly, and above all, that if, when they have the power, they make their terms too hard, their opponents cannot be expected (I speak not of the point of duty, but they cannot in *practice* be expected) to keep good faith with them, and nothing durable or solid will have in reality been accomplished. So was it in France on this present occasion: the friends of freedom did not sufficiently assist Mounier and the men of moderation and wisdom; they would not accommodate themselves to what they esteemed the prejudices of their opponents; they proceeded not sufficiently on a system of peace and conciliation; they had more splendid views, we will suppose, of the happiness of France and of mankind, and, in a word, they made their terms with the king and court too hard, and their Revolution failed: it could not but fail; and it failed, though the king was not of a temperament to resist them; was too gentle, and too benevolent: had he been of an ordinary complexion, a civil war would have ensued; and this also I should call the failure of a revolution, as I do the subsequent disorder and anarchy.

I do not, as I must again repeat, now speak of the licentious, daring, bad men, in the Assembly and out of it, the higher rabble or the lower, which unhappily then existed in Paris. I speak of the first more sanguine and ardent leaders of the Revolution, of those whom I conceive to have meant well, and who cannot be supposed to have meant otherwise, and with whom so many in their own country, and in this country also, at the time entirely sympathized.

But the daring, licentious, and bad men of every description, such as were to be found in Paris at the time, and such as must be always taken into the calculation, when wise and good men speculate upon the affairs of their country—such men found assistants to their wickedness in these first sanguine and unreasonable leaders of the Revolution; a system of peace and adjustment would have put an end at once to

their consequence and their hopes; wicked and bad men would have had no opportunity of appearing; but the want of character in the king, the want of prudence in the court, and the want of caution and moderation, not to say of moral feeling, and a sense of justice in the more young, and able leaders of the Constituent Assembly, gave full play, circumstanced as France was at the opening of the States, and for some time after, to these daring and unprincipled men, and they had full opportunity to display their courage, their ambition, their unfeeling insolence, their lawless fury, their atrocious cruelty.

Paris and France, Paris more particularly, was extremely agitated during all the discussions to which we have alluded during the months of July, August, and September. Such questions as these "of the two houses," "the permanency of the Assembly," and "the veto of the king," were dreadful questions to be debated in such a place as Paris, when the royal power had just been put down by the people, and their sovereignty proclaimed.

We have already alluded to the manner in which, immediately after the 14th of July, the metropolis became a scene of different assemblies and constituted authorities, all debating at the same time; each of sixty districts, assuming to itself legislative power, and conferring executive power on its committees; the manner in which soldiers, tradesmen, artisans, and domestic servants, all in their separate classes and places of rendezvous, were haranguing and disputing (and more particularly at the Palais Royal), discussing and settling the same questions, which occupied the National Assembly; and to all this unhappy fermentation was to be added a real scarcity, sufficient of itself to have collected the people together in troops and mobs in the streets, ripe for disorder from their sufferings, and ready, however unreasonably, to attribute to the mere fault of the government their want of bread, and the privations and wretchedness to which themselves and their children were exposed.

To talk to a metropolis, in a situation like this, of limits to be assigned to different powers in the state, more especially to their own power, and of the veto of the king, was to speak a language that only irritated them to fury. They had some

confidence in the Assembly, and therefore the Assembly was to do every thing; in the king they had none, and therefore the king was to do nothing: to give any power to the king and the court was only to restore, as they supposed, the old régime, and to bring on a counter revolution. A public sentiment in Paris soon vents itself in songs and pasquinades, and the king and queen were sung about the streets as Monsieur and Madame Veto: and this was to be the manner in which the great question of the executive power of the country was to be decided; and menacing letters, as we have already mentioned, were issued from the Palais Royal, to virtuous patriots like Mounier and Lally Tollendal, to tell them that they were to be cashiered, and that the legislators of Paris were about to march against Versailles, and clear away the faithless legislators of the Constituent Assembly. Such is the sad description I have to give of what may be called the more violent party, and of the lower orders of Paris at this particular juncture.

We must now reverse the picture, and turn to the king and the court. On all occasions violence in one direction produces it in another. When the decision of every question in the National Assembly went unfavourably to the executive power, what were to be the feelings of those who were attached to the royal authority? When the Assembly, who were summoned by the king to assist him in reforming the state, assumed all power to themselves, and evidently set the king entirely aside, referred every thing to the sovereignty of the people, and considered themselves as its only legitimate representative;—when to those who spoke of the ancient institutions and established principles of the French monarchy, it was only replied that France was to be now regenerated, that a new constitution was to be given, and that the king was not even to concur in its formation, was not to sanction, but was only to accept it;—when these were to be the results of the experiment, which the king had made in calling the States General, partly no doubt from the necessities of the state, but surely from motives of benevolence and patriotism also;—when these were to be the results of his efforts for the general happiness, with what sentiments was the king to be affected, with what sentiments but those of indignation

and anger? And what were to be the feelings of his courtiers, and the court, and the privileged orders, who had neither his benevolence nor his patriotism; what but the feelings of horror at the populace, and of hatred of their leaders, rage at the patriots in the Assembly, an abjuration of all measures of change and reform, and thoughts only of an appeal to arms, the succour of foreign powers, and a civil war? How impossible was it that effects of this kind should not be produced in the one party by the hard terms that had been imposed, by the unlimited pretensions that had been advanced by the other! But what was to be done? The royal authority had been produced on the 23rd of June, and the king's system of a constitution offered, in vain. The soldiery had been drawn out, and force had been all but employed on and before the 14th of July—in vain also. What measure was left? To the court there could appear none but flight and a civil war; this therefore was supposed by the Assembly and the patriots to be the intention of the king; it was concluded that he would retire to Metz, to the Marquis de Bouillé and his army, that he would there summon the nobility and aristocracy of France to his assistance, and what troops yet remained faithful to him; denounce the National Assembly; and if he could not restore the ancient régime, at least establish the system that he had himself proposed in his declaration of the 23rd of June.

And all this reasoning would have not only proceeded very smoothly, but been probably just, both with respect to the court and the king, if the king had been a man of energy and decision; but this was not the case, and it was known not to be the case; and therefore the leaders in the Constituent Assembly could not reasonably believe it to be the case, as far at least as the king was concerned, and were guilty of a great fault, while they acted as if they supposed it to be the case; and the violent and the bad men in and out of the Assembly, with or without believing it, very readily persuaded themselves that for them there was no measure but that of transferring the king and the Assembly to Paris, where both the one and the other might be placed in fact under their superintendence and control.

Such is but too often the unhappy progress of civil dissen-

sions—no magnanimity, no moderation, no kindness, no peace, no opportunity for the wise and good; violence, fury alone, bearing sway; and the happiness of a community, if accomplished at all, the result rather of its good fortune than its merit. Melancholy reflections of this kind will obtrude themselves; but we must not speak thus, though not to feel thus is sometimes impossible. The lesson is every where and always the same; moderation—timely moderation—the despised, unpalatable lesson of moderation, disdained by the high-minded, ridiculed by the thoughtless, forgotten by all, and most so when most needed.

But we must not, I say, speak thus, but continue to note, as well as we can, the mistakes and faults of every party in its turn; the whole of our lesson being still comprised, as I have just intimated, in the single word, moderation. And now, then, what were the events that took place? what was the more immediate history? The two great parties in the state were in the situation we have described. The history was sure to become important: the adherents of the old opinions could not possibly acquiesce, with any sincerity, in the terms which the assertors of the new opinions had imposed upon them. There were very violent, unreasonable men among the former, the adherents of the old opinions; they might and did wish only a counter revolution: but again, there were very violent and unreasonable men among the latter, the assertors of the new opinions; and to these latter also were united many daring and bad men,—the lower orders of the lower fauxbourgs of Paris, and the mobs and orators of the Palais Royal,—and these were determined to secure themselves and their Revolution, as they supposed, and to bring the king to Paris. A collision could not well be escaped, the moderate men in the National Assembly having failed—and a collision *did* take place, a dreadful one—the crisis, so well known in history under the general name of the events of the 5th and 6th of October, and I must consider it at some length.

The immediate causes were soon found, these were, 1st, a scarcity in Paris; and 2dly, some imprudence on the part of the court at Versailles. Nothing is so easy as to rouse the people to acts of violence when they want bread; and in this

situation they will believe any thing of their rulers or their government that is told them. What was told them, too, in this instance, of the intentions of the court to retire and prepare a civil war, was not in itself improbable.

When a train of this kind was laid, the slightest spark from the imprudence of the court was sure to produce an explosion. But this slight spark was produced by the imprudence of the court, and in the following manner.

The critical state of affairs in Paris seems to have been apprehended at Versailles, and among others, by the Count D'Estaing, who wrote a letter to the queen, on the 14th of September, detailing to her the conversation he had lately heard in the metropolis, to the effect we have just described, the rumours and suspicions that prevailed, and requesting an audience. This was granted. What passed is not known, but the result probably was, that the queen satisfied the count that the machinations he talked of meant only the safety of the king and the royal family. This is, indeed, sufficiently clear from what followed. The old French guards, who had joined the popular cause, and were at Paris, talked of returning to Versailles to re-assume their post of duty around the king; La Fayette wrote to St. Priest, who was in the confidence of the court, on the 17th of September, not to be alarmed, for he was sure he had influence enough with the troops to prevent this measure of their return. But this assurance from La Fayette could not satisfy the court; there was no force to be opposed to them; four hundred body guards and one hundred chasseurs were all; the town militia of Versailles could not be depended upon; and by a decree of the National Assembly, no troops of the line could be brought up without a requisition from the municipality. Now this requisition the Count D'Estaing made it his business to procure from the municipality of Versailles, by representing to them that La Fayette was favourable to the measure; that the king was alarmed; that the royal family, that the very National Assembly would be endangered by the presence of two thousand of the French guards, who were coming to resume their post, as they called it, round the king, and that a regiment of the line must be brought up immediately. The regiment of Flanders was fixed upon; the court thought they could best

depend upon them, for they had refused the civic oath; and, on the contrary, their colonel was a member of the Assembly, and attached to the popular cause; this consideration, therefore, it was thought would tend to quiet the fears of the Assembly. The Assembly seem not to have behaved improperly on this occasion, though the measure had, on the whole, (however prudent and necessary in itself,) somewhat of the appearance of an intrigue.

You will immediately see how fast were now collecting together the materials of future commotion. The municipal force, or national guards, of Versailles were to be made to coalesce as much as possible with the regiment of Flanders; they had not yet been organized; the queen was to give them their colours; there was to be a day appointed for the benediction, a sort of joint review of them and the body guards to take place. This was all very well, and would have been so at any common juncture, but on the present occasion all this was interpreted by the people of Paris as the beginning and the preparations of a counter revolution; which was therefore to be prevented by sending to Versailles the old French guards disguised, and women of the town, to detach the soldiers from their allegiance. These old French guards, as I have mentioned, were not satisfied that, because they had become patriots, they were no longer to occupy their posts of honour about the palace of the king; who, on his part, could not be well disposed to those who seemed now rather to belong to the city of Paris than to him; and the Assembly itself had already proposed its decrees and votes on the future constitution of France, of a nature far too democratic to be sincerely admitted by the king, or to be at all relished by those who wished well to his authority. Lastly, and above all, it must have been well known to the court, that the popular party meant, if possible, to accomplish the removal of the king and the Assembly to Paris; and the queen and the court could not but have surveyed any project of this kind with sentiments of perfect horror.

This was a most calamitous state of things, and the slightest untoward accident, or unfortunate mistake, or offensive imprudence, might evidently lead to consequences the most important. Such an accident, or mistake, or offensive impru-

dence, did immediately occur. What it was is well known; it was after the following manner. The gardes du corps (the king's body guards at Versailles) gave an entertainment to the officers of the regiment of Flanders, to which they invited several officers of the national guard, of the rangers, and other military corps; the king, at their request, lent them the theatre of the palace for the purpose; the dinner was served to near three hundred guests; the lights of the house, the crowd of spectators who filled the boxes, the music of the different regimental bands, gave to the repast the brilliancy and gaiety of a festival. During the first course all was decency and order; in the second, the company drank, very naturally, to the health of the king, the queen, the dauphin, and the royal family, and the cries of "Vive le Roi," "Vive la Reine," "Vive la Famille Royale," of course resounded from every quarter. All this was innocent enough, but the health of the nation was feebly proposed by some one of the company, more patriotic than wise, for the present was not the precise moment for a toast like this, and the toast (though not exactly rejected) after all was not drunk. "Vive la Nation" had not as yet become a national cry. But this was the first offence committed, and it was an offence, and was afterwards not a little dwelt upon. It was but a matter of course, that some of the ladies of the palace should run to the queen, to tell her how prosperously went on the banquet, and to beg her to send the dauphin. The queen was in no spirits; she was requested to come herself; the spectacle might amuse her; she hesitated, and some mysterious, inexplicable presentiment seemed to say, that sad might be the consequences of what in itself appeared so innocent and unimportant. The king returned from hunting—would he accompany her? The king complied, and, with the dauphin, the royal visitors placed themselves in one of the latticed boxes; but they were soon discovered, and a thousand cries of "Vive le Roi," "Vive la Reine," "Vive M. le Dauphin," resounded from all parts of the theatre. The poor king was unable to resist these testimonies of affection, they had become to him of late more than ever precious; he descended from his box, and the queen, with the dauphin in her arms, made the tour of the table amid the most loud and reiterated acclamations and applauses.

This was a sight not likely to be unaffecting to such a company, and on such an occasion. The graces and elegance of the queen's deportment had been long the subject of general admiration in a court, and amid a nation, where graces were virtues, and elegance was the ambition of all; the dauphin, too, always made the idol of the nation, was seen reposing on the bosom of his mother in all the affecting innocence and simplicity of childhood; and both were now more than ever recommended, as well as the father near them, to the courage and the loyalty of every true Frenchman—to their courage and loyalty; for the necessity of such virtues must have been deeply felt at the moment, amid a thousand apprehensions of unknown and mysterious danger, that seemed to be gathering around them, menacing with insult their dignity and honour, and threatening even the security of their throne, and the very tenure of their existence.

The swords were drawn and flourished in the air; the healths were again repeated; the acclamations again and again resounded, and the queen seemed to renew the image of her august mother, Maria Theresa, addressing herself to her Hungarian subjects, with the young emperor in her arms, and like her, appealing for compassion, and requesting their protection against the daring and unfeeling men who were going to drive her from her throne, and plunder her possessions.

At this moment, as the royal family was retiring, the bands struck up the air of Gretry, in his musical romance of Richard Cœur de Lion, the well known air, "O Richard, O mon Roi, l'univers t'abandonne." Never were sounds that so completely convey the sentiment that is to be expressed. They are put into the mouth of the queen, addressing her song, disguised as a minstrel, to the captive king—"O Richard, O my love, by the tyrant world forgot," as the original words were translated for the English stage. It is many years since I heard them delivered at one of our own theatres, no doubt by the sweetest voice that theatre ever listened to; and to this hour I can recollect the melting of the heart, and the indignation that was excited against the oppressor and an unfeeling world, that thus abandoned the royal captive to his brutal tyrant; all this I well recollect, (allow me to speak of myself,) and if at the distance of so many ages from the real event,

sitting only for my amusement at a public spectacle, I could thus be affected, as I remember myself to have been, by the mere delusion of the scene, what, (I can readily conceive), what must have been the effect produced by the same music upon the hearts of Frenchmen, of young officers, men of honour and of arms, fearless of the future and prodigal of life, each animated by the banquet and the sympathy of surrounding minds, while they saw palpably standing before them, with his queen and dauphin, their own unhappy Richard, whom surely the world seemed to abandon; for where was he to look for aid, and how had he offended?

What followed at this unfortunate entertainment may be without difficulty imagined. Imprudences without number. "Down with the tricoloured cockade!" "Long live the white!" "The white for ever!" these were the cries that were heard. The boxes were scaled; the guests were intoxicated; uproar and noisy merriment every where prevailed; white cockades were noticed in the king's anti-chamber; in the evening ladies of the court, it is said, took the white ribbons of their head-dresses, and put them into the hats of officers of the national guard, who had asked for them.

"But what," as the Marquis de Ferrieres very naturally asks, "what have follies and extravagances of this kind to do with the plan of a civil war and a counter revolution? What is there in all this but the natural effects of the French character; of a people full of enthusiasm, never reflecting, ever in extremes, accustomed for ages to see the nation and the state only in the person of its king? Again, the conduct of the queen, what is it? what is there," says the marquis, "in the expression she made use of to those who came to thank her the next day for their regimental colours, 'that she was delighted with yesterday?' what wonder that, amid the cruel griefs and mortifications that she must of late have suffered, she should be alive to the marks of attachment that were offered her, or that, deserted by the ungrateful beings whom she had loaded with her favours, without succour, and made the object, by designing men, of the hatred of the people, what wonder that she should rest herself upon the first prop and stay that was presented to her? Certainly I can believe," continues the marquis, "that the ladies of the

court, that enthusiasts, that courtiers without forethought, might have imagined they saw an infallible means of a counter revolution in the momentary exultation produced by wine on four or five thousand people; that they might abandon themselves to the most indiscreet projects; that they might cry, 'Long live the white cockade, it is alone the true one;' all this I can believe," says he, "but that the court and the ministers, with so little force, should now think of doing what they could not dare to attempt on the 14th of July, with forty thousand troops of the line, one hundred pieces of cannon, and a general, this, indeed, is what I certainly do not believe, nor will any man believe of any sense."

Such were the observations of the Marquis de Ferrieres; but very different were the conclusions drawn at Paris, and no doubt the imprudences of the court had been very great; any thing and every thing was believed, and these transactions produced the most lively indignation. Other imprudences (they were now, alas! becoming follies and faults) in the mean time took place at Versailles: the banquet was repeated the next day, the 2nd of October, and the company indulged in even greater excesses of revelry; the ladies were more bold and active with their cockades, and black cockades appeared even in Paris. The people were irritated; and with perfect reason; for these were the beginnings of a civil war, after a national cockade, the tricoloured, had been once established, and the king had himself once adopted it.

Follies and faults, or experiments (as they were thought) of this kind called into full activity the revolutionists in Paris; they could now perceive, that every thing was prepared for the execution of their own projects, in the front of which was placed the removal of the king to Paris. Symptoms of a counter revolution at Versailles, and a populace in want of bread in the metropolis, these were sufficient hinges on which to move the metropolis and the kingdom.

You will see in the histories the gradual progress of the insurrection, which was at last brought to the point desired, and "Bread," "Bread," "To Versailles," "To Versailles," became in Paris the universal cry. The town house was on the point of being burnt; the constituted authorities exerted themselves in vain; La Fayette harangued, exhorted, and

conjured them, equally in vain; his life was in danger; and the Assembly of the Commune at last sent him word, that he must go with the people, as they desired, to Versailles, since there was no alternative.

As La Fayette was one of the first movers of the Revolution, no proper justice is ever done to his character by those who were unfriendly to the Revolution; it must, therefore, be mentioned, that it is quite clear, from the concurring accounts of all writers, that he made every possible exertion to prevent this fatal measure, this march to Versailles, and that, with an afflicted and foreboding heart, he accompanied the populace and the soldiers to take the chance of moderating and directing, as well as he could, a dreadful mass of men, whom he could no longer control or bring to reason.

In the mean time, the agitation was at Versailles only less than at Paris: from the first opening of the sitting, this agitation appeared not only in the Assembly but in the tribunes, and in the looks and gestures of the multitudes that surrounded the hall.

You will see a short and good account of what passed in Ferrieres. It happened that, at the time, very unfortunately, the president had to report the answer of the king to the Constitutional Decrees and the Declaration of Rights. This answer was not sufficiently favourable and agreeable to the more ardent part of the Assembly; violent language ensued; strong allusions were made to the unfortunate fêtes that we have just described, to orgies, as they were called; to menaces uttered; to counter revolutions intended; to the national cockade trampled under foot. "It is not the cries of 'Vive le Roi,' or 'Vive la Reine,'" said Pétion, "that we complain of, they are ever welcome to our hearts; but in these military orgies have not imprecations been vented against the National Assembly, and against liberty? Have the body guards taken the oath? What means this black cockade?" One of the members of the nobility, shocked at these misrepresentations, moved that Pétion's denunciation should be signed by him, and laid upon the table. Pétion was embarrassed; but Mirabeau, formed for such conjunctures, instantly started up, and cried out, that he would himself denounce and sign, if the Assembly would first declare, that all but the king were within

the reach of the law. "I will then," said he, audibly enough to be heard by those around him, "denounce the queen and the Duke de Guiche."

This unexpected proposition soon made it necessary for the president, who luckily happened to be Mounier, to call for the order of the day, and get rid of such a perilous discussion. The result was, that the president, at the head of a deputation, was ordered to wait upon the king, to beseech him to give his assent, pure and unconditional, to the articles of the constitution, and the Declaration of Rights, that had been just presented to him. But in the midst of this debate, four hours before the brigands arrived, Mirabeau had gone behind the president's chair, and apprized him that there were forty thousand men marching upon them from Paris, "You had better break up the sitting."

Mirabeau, it is thought, wanted a clear stage, the better to ensure the success of his operations; and this notion is somewhat strengthened by the cold and pointed reply of the president, "So much the better, they have but to kill us all—all—and the affairs of the republic (a sarcastic word) will go on better." "That's prettily said," replied Mirabeau, and retired.

It is possible, however, that Mirabeau only wished, as a well meaning man naturally might, on the first impulse, at least, to get the Assembly out of the way, when such a storm was approaching. Bertrand de Molcville blames La Fayette for not sending off intelligence of the formidable body of men that was coming. Only women and brigands were expected; it was thought enough to shut the iron gates of the palace, and to draw out, on the Place d'Armes, the regiment of Flanders, the rangers, the gardes du corps, and some other military force; the national guards of Versailles were in their neighbouring barracks. About three o'clock the phalanx of the women arrived, Maillard at their head, the man who had played the chief part in the attack of the Bastile.

A disgusting scene soon ensued; Maillard presented himself at the bar of the Assembly with his retinue, and set forth, that for three days past there had absolutely been no bread in Paris; that they were come to Versailles to ask for it, and, at the same time, to have the gardes du corps punished for having

insulted the national cockade; that the aristocrats wanted to starve them. The Assembly were able to pacify tolerably well this first orator and his deputation; but other women soon forced their way into the Hall of Assembly, mounted upon the benches, crying for bread (all at once), the dismission of the regiment of Flanders, the punishment of the gardes du corps, and uttering, at the same time, the most horrid imprecations against the queen; some insulted the deputies, particularly those of the clergy. "Speak, you deputy there," they said to one; "Silence, you deputy there," to another; and, in short, the scene soon became so scandalous, that the Assembly had no measure left but to charge the president to go immediately to the palace, at the head of a deputation, and represent the calamitous situation of Paris to the king. This was done, some of the women accompanied, and the king received and was able to soothe and tranquillize them.

These were, indeed, the occasions on which the unfortunate monarch appeared to such an advantage: his genuine benevolence, his ready sensibility, his calm patience, his dignified fearlessness, his anxiety to do every thing that was or could be required of him, his gentleness, his politeness, his humanity, lawless as these women were, women they still were, and such qualities it was impossible should not have some effect upon them. One of them, a girl of seventeen, fainted, and they all retired, crying in the court, "Vive le Roi," "God bless the king and his family," "We shall have bread tomorrow."

But the situation of the king and the palace was, in truth, most unprotected and most deplorable. The regiment of Flanders seems to have been ordered away from the palace; it had been corrupted by the municipal force of Versailles. Most of the body guards, too, were sent to Rambouillet by the king from motives of humanity, lest they should be massacred; they were gentlemen all, from the nature of the institution. The king then sent for the National Assembly, meaning to place himself under their protection; but such part of the National Assembly as still remained in their hall, was mixed up, and reduced almost to a level, with the poissardes and first banditti that had arrived from the metropolis, and no use could be made of them. And afterwards, while

Mounier, the president, was endeavouring, by beat of drum, to collect a proper representation of the nation, with which to surround the king, La Fayette arrived, and their protection was thought, after an interview with him, no longer necessary.

But the disgraceful scenes to which we have just alluded in the Assembly, were but the beginnings of troubles. It is impossible to give here the slightest idea of what passed for many hours afterwards in and about the palace. Bertrand de Moleville was on the spot, and gives a very detailed account, and you must refer to it. You will easily see what were the great component parts of this dreadful whole: the royal family who were to be protected; the body guards, who were now left few in number, and who were alone faithful, and who wanted protection also; the old French guards who had come to resume their posts about the king; the national guards of Versailles, whose fidelity to the king and whose attachment were of a very wavering nature, or rather were extinct and void; and lastly, the military bodies that were coming up with La Fayette, the national guards or militia of Paris; these were not favourable to the king, and not favourable to the old body guards: and again, mixed up with the whole, and first making their appearance with the women, and afterwards in fresh crowds with La Fayette's army, were to be enumerated, as actors in the scene, a description of people called by the general name of brigands, the most ferocious and brutal men and women that could issue from the most desperate part of the population of Paris; supposed by most writers to have been hired for purposes of mischief, and even for the destruction of the queen, by the Duke of Orleans and his party; but at all events engaged and brought up by the revolutionists to accomplish their one great end, that of forcing the king and royal family to Paris, that they and the Assembly might be under their control, and not only all chance of a counter revolution, or the king's flight be prevented, but the Revolution itself made to proceed according to their pleasure.

Mirabeau and the Duke of Orleans were so accused of being the prime movers of the dreadful occurrences which now took place in and about the palace, that a judicial inquiry was afterwards instituted, which ended, as such inquiries generally

do, in an exhibition of evidence, which it is impossible to weigh, and fatiguing to read, and in the acquittal of the accused. Even Bertrand's account, though comprised within a couple of chapters, it is in vain to attempt minutely to understand.

But the general history of what now took place, in a word, is this: the body guards are insulted and assaulted; La Fayette appears, answers for his troops, pacifies the court, quiets the National Assembly, and tranquillizes the king and royal family; the old French guards, who had lately gone over to the nation, resume their old posts about the king, which was their particular object and wish, as guards of the palace. Every thing is at last quiet, and at a late hour, the general, overcome with the fatigues and anxieties of such a day and such a night, sinks for a short interval to rest. The brigands, the horrible wretches that we have mentioned, early in the morning get into the palace; they make for the queen's apartment; she has just time to fly for her life to the king; her guard at the door is left for dead; many of the gentlemen of the palace and distinguished officers of the different corps are murdered, or left mangled and expiring; La Fayette is roused from his unfortunate repose; by his personal courage and activity, and the exertions and steadiness of the king, the body guards (the gentlemen about the king) were saved from massacre, and at length something of the appearance of peace and good will and order are procured, but at a most fatal price; the removal of the king to Paris, which is the cry at last heard, and to which no refusal, it seems, could then be given.

This is, in a few words, I can offer no more, the general description, of which you will see all the interesting particulars in the historians and memoir writers. You will have to mark, as happens on these occasions, at one moment, perfect prodigies of human virtue, and at the next, the most repulsive acts of cruelty and abomination. I know not what is to be concluded from instances like these, but that every exertion is to be made by every means, of moral and religious instruction, to civilize and to purify the human animal, since he is thus at once capable of the highest elevation, and yet also capable of a degradation, the most afflicting, ferocious, and appalling.

I will dwell a little longer, before I conclude my lecture, on these scenes of the 5th and 6th of October. You must remember how distinguished a figure they make in the eloquent reflections of Mr. Burke. The most complete account of these unfortunate transactions is to be found in the history by the Two Friends of Liberty. These writers are, no doubt, not of the school of Mounier, or the first moderate leaders of the Revolution, but they are friends to order, and as far as they have understood them, to the best interests of mankind. The reader will find no difficulty in perceiving where he is to receive with hesitation, and where he is not to receive at all, the representations that are offered to him; and the detail extended through six chapters will put him in full possession of the facts, which appear to me, on a comparison with the account of Bertrand de Moleville and Ferrieres, to be exhibited with sufficient fairness and impartiality. I must just allude to the account they give, and afterwards to the account given by Weber; that is, to some particulars furnished by each writer.

It appears that a communication from La Fayette *did* arrive at nine o'clock in the evening, sufficient to throw the whole palace into confusion and alarm. The departure of the king instantly from the palace was certainly a measure much agitated. The two historians mention various particulars, and then observe, " It will be difficult not to suppose, that it was amongst the projects of the league at Versailles to avail themselves of these events to alarm the king, determine him to fly, and thus hurry him into a civil war, so desired by the bloodsuckers of the court, as their last chance for despotism and aristocracy. But Louis XVI. was immoveable, and amid the fluctuations of the council he adhered constantly to this principle, ' that it was very doubtful whether his withdrawing from Versailles would place him in safety, but that it was very certain that it would be the signal of a war, that would shed torrents of blood. I would rather perish for my people than have thousands of them perish in my quarrel; happen what will, I will not move.' " This is the account given by the two historians, the Two Friends of Liberty, themselves, and the account that is to be received. It is affecting to see this unfortunate monarch devoting himself in this manner.

This was his language at all times: "It was his quarrel," he said;" "no blood shall be shed." But his people were unworthy of him; they saw not what was due to his gentle nature; they dragged to a prison the helpless being who had no wish but their happiness, and at last they executed on a scaffold the king that could not bear, lest he should shed their blood, even to defend himself. But the king who thus devoted himself, as these two historians acknowledge, so generously for the nation, was, however, still a husband and a father, and he trembled when he heard from his apartment the ferocious cries, the horrid imprecations of the multitude, who mixed the name of the queen with that of the gardes du corps, and clamoured aloud for their blood. Every instant augmented the irresolution of the council on the measures to be taken for the preservation of the royal family, and every effort was made to persuade the queen to retire. But when it was at last clear that the king was determined to stay, and that the rage of the Parisians threatened her alone, she declared, that she would perish at the king's feet, but would never leave him. And in the midst of the general consternation, say the same historians (the Two Friends of Liberty), the queen alone displayed a countenance calm and serene, supported and animated those who were sinking with terror on her account, and made even those admire her courage who condemned her principles, and whom the remembrance, still present, of her faults inspired with every prejudice to her disadvantage.

Abundant testimony is paid by these historians to La Fayette, and it appears that he did not retire to rest till five o'clock in the morning, and till every thing seemed calm and composed. It is clear, too, that he afterwards made every effort for the safety and for the honour of the king and the royal family, and finally that he saved the gardes du corps from being massacred. "Gentlemen," he cried to his soldiers, "I have pledged my word to the king, that nothing which belongs to him shall come to harm; if you murder his guards I shall be dishonoured, and can be no more your general."

Two of the body guards had just before been cut down by the mob, and their heads were on pikes for the gratification of

such spectators at the very time. "The king," says Weber (he was foster-brother of the queen), "threw open the window, and from the balcony implored the people to spare the lives of these his unfortunate servants. Those of them who had taken refuge near the person of the king, threw their bandoleers to the people, and cried, "Vive la nation!" "Vive le roi!" was immediately echoed from all quarters; and the body guards, saw themselves on a sudden embraced and caressed by the very tigers who had been disputing in what manner they were to be murdered. La Fayette was able to rouse some proper feelings in the old French guards, but was obliged to depend on them, and more particularly on his own officers. The common soldiers of the national guards, the militia of Paris, would not fire on their fellow citizens, as they called them, and these fellow citizens happened now to be the dreadful fiends, who were ready to pillage and murder. Weber, who gives a very interesting account of these transactions (he was at Versailles at the time), cannot forgive La Fayette for his mistaken confidence, at least for going to rest any where but in the antechamber of the king; others excuse him. La Fayette and his officers, and the grenadiers of the old guards, having now allayed the murderous fury of the multitude, and saved the body guards, the king was obliged to intimate his willingness to go to Paris, and he came at last to the balcony to reiterate his assurances to this effect. The joy of the populace knew no bounds, but "the queen," "the queen," became every where the cry; and she was given to understand that it was necessary for her to come forward: she advanced into the balcony immediately, leading the dauphin in one hand, and the young princess in the other. "No children," was then the cry; "no children!" An ominous sound, as if she alone was to be made the victim. The queen, with a movement of her hand, returned them both back to the inside of the apartment, and with a calm countenance of repose and dignity, her hands folded upon her bosom, stood alone—unprotected indeed, and alone; like one, that thought death might at the moment await her, and that did not mean to brave it; but still like one that was a queen, and the daughter of Maria Theresa, and did not fear it.—The multitude gazed for a moment, and the elevated grandeur of a mind, that corre-

sponded with its high station of dignity and rule, awed their rude passions into obedience, and prevailed. The admiration was universal, and the clapping of hands and the shouts of "Vive la reine" made the courts of the palace re-echo to her applause; an applause, which, having been won by her magnanimity, she had a right to enjoy, and which it is to be hoped, for one short passing moment, she did enjoy—the short and passing moment of conscious exultation and triumph, to be set in contrast with all the agonies she had lately endured, and was yet to suffer.

Her great danger and her very imminent danger (as from previous circumstances that had occurred she well knew) was the possibility that she might be fired at by some of the many assassins that were mixed with the mob below; her being ordered to put away the children seemed to intimate something of this kind. Pieces were levelled at her. Weber says, he saw one, and that the man who was next the ruffian struck the barrel down, and almost massacred him on the spot; others say that many were levelled. "Finding," says Weber, "that all resistance was thought vain, and that the royal family must at all events go to Paris, my anxiety," says he, "became extreme. I equipped myself in the uniform of a staff-officer, got a horse from the royal stables, and placed myself as near as possible to the carriage of the king.

"First went the main body of the Parisians," he continues, "each soldier with a loaf on his bayonet; then came the poissardes, drunk with fury, exultation, and wine, astride on the canons, mounted on the horses of the body guards, surrounded by the brigands and workmen that had come from Paris; waggons of flour and grain formed a convoy, followed by the grenadiers, who still kept under their protection the body guards, whose lives had been purchased by the king; these captives were led, one by one, disarmed, bare-headed, and on foot, some of them with the grenadier caps instead of their hats; the dragoons, the soldiers of the regiment of Flanders, and the hundred Swiss guards then surrounded and followed the carriage of the king, where were seated his majesty, the royal family, and the governess. It would be difficult to describe," says Weber, "the confusion and tediousness of a procession like this, which lasted six hours: it began

with a general discharge of musketry at Versailles; halts were made from time to time to give opportunity for new salutes: the poissardes on these occasions descended from the cannons and the horses, to dance around the carriage of the king, and to sing their songs. But the horror," says he, "of this dreadful day, cold and rainy as it was; this infamous soldiery, wading in the mud; these harpies, these monsters in human form; and in the middle of his captive guards a monarch dragged along thus ignominiously with his family, all together, formed a spectacle so terrible, a mixture of every possible affliction and shame so piteous, that my imagination cannot to this hour recall the remembrance without an almost instant oversetting and annihilation of my faculties. No idea can be formed," he continues, "of all that was said and uttered by the populace as we went along. For three parts of the whole time I kept myself at the right door of the carriage; at any discharge of the musketry, at any explosion of the cries and vociferations of the populace, I cast a look into the carriage, and their majesties had the goodness to express to me, by their gestures, and their eyes cast up to heaven, their perfect astonishment at the state at which it had been possible to make the people at last arrive."

The remainder of the history is well known. The king and the royal family came to Paris; they were received by the mayor, by Bailly, the man of science, who called the day of their arrival a beautiful day, a strange and most unfortunate expression, which Bailly was not a man to have used in its more obvious and offensive sense. It was an expression that neve rwas or could be forgotten, apparently so completely at variance with every sentiment and reflection that could at the time, and on the spot, be entertained by any wise and good man like M. Bailly, who might wish, indeed, for freedom and the fall of tyranny, but who surely could not see a tyrant in Louis, or freedom in excesses like these.

The king was then transferred to the Tuilleries, and the palace of his ancestors became his prison.

LECTURE XX.

LALLY TOLLENDAL. MOUNIER. BURKE. FOX. DARWIN. COWPER. MRS. BARBAULD. SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH.

THE violent party must now be considered as having entirely succeeded. They had got possession of the king and the royal family, and they had lodged them in the Tuilleries.

The National Assembly was next transferred to Paris, and all the real power was thus placed within the inspection and control of the tumultuous inhabitants of the metropolis.

The Assembly, it might have been at first sight hoped, would still have been able to maintain its consequence, and protect the king, by the assistance of La Fayette and the national guards, and by the influence of its own weight and character.

But all constituted authority had just been found inadequate to the preservation of order. Nothing but the most lawless fury had of late prevailed, and no friend of the Revolution or of mankind, who had actually witnessed these scenes, could have been otherwise than deeply afflicted at the past, and surely, as it might have been expected, somewhat appalled at the prospect of the future.

Yet these do not appear to have been exactly the sentiments generally felt in and out of Paris (such was the enthusiasm of the season), felt, I mean, among the more ardent friends of liberty.

Excesses and enormities, it was thought, could not but be expected from a populace just broken loose from oppression; they were of a temporary nature, it was held, and such excesses and enormities now, and at every period of the Revolution, were always considered as in themselves a proof

how bad had been the system of government under which the people of this great country had formerly lived; a reflection that afforded a general answer, of a most convenient nature, to every complaint that could be uttered, or accusation that could be made.

But very different was the impression which these and other events had made on the more reasonable friends of liberty; on the more moderate part of the Assembly itself; on Mounier and his associates; on those who wished for a limited monarchy and a free constitution; free, at least, after the measure and the manner of the constitution established in England.

Very different were the feelings of such men; and Mounier and his friends, immediately after these outrages at Versailles on the 5th and 6th of October, and before the Assembly had left the place, held a meeting, and considered the situation of their country and their own.

Nothing could have been more deplorable than must have appeared to patriots like these, the circumstances of both; themselves defeated and disappointed in their dearest hopes, without the chance of being further useful; their country abandoned to the caprices of a giddy and bloody populace; and their king, whom they had not meant *thus* to assist and honour, left to await his fate, in the midst of his helpless family, and to stand the result of a revolution which they had themselves so contributed to set first in motion, and which it was now no longer in their power to direct or to control.

The consciousness of virtuous intention must support men in situations like these: their reflections, however they may fail, can never be like those of men who are disappointed in enterprises of guilt; for they have at least meant well, and the Almighty Master has not left afflicted virtue without its appropriate support—but still what is suffered is severe. There is nothing of joy or triumph, there is little of cheerfulness in what passes in the virtuous mind on these occasions; and we are thus taught the duty of being prudent, if possible, as well as benevolent; that laudable intentions are not of themselves sufficient; that we are not to rest satisfied with them; that good must not only be attempted, but accomplished.

The mortification, the indignant feelings, the agonies of men of high sensibility in great conjunctures of affairs like

these, are best described by what was written by Lally Tollendal himself—(the measure, you will observe, that these first patriots of the Revolution resolved upon was a secession from the Assembly altogether).

"The part I have taken," says he, alluding to this secession, in a letter to his friend, "is well justified in my own eyes; and neither has this guilty city, nor its still more guilty Assembly, any claim upon me to justify myself further; but I have it at heart, no doubt, that you, and people like you, should not condemn me. My health, I solemnly assure you, would render the discharge of my functions impossible, but setting this aside, it is quite beyond any power of mine to bear any longer the horror that I feel at all this blood; these heads carried on pikes; this queen all but assassinated; this king dragged along as a captive, entering Paris in the midst of his assassins, and preceded by the heads of his unfortunate body guards; these perfidious janizaries (the old French guards he means), these assassins, these female cannibals; this cry of 'All the bishops to the Lanterne,' at the very moment when the king was entering his capital with the two bishops of his council in his carriage; the report of a musket which I saw fired into one of the carriages of the queen; M. Bailly calling this a beautiful day; the Assembly declaring coldly, on the morning of this day, that it did not consist with its dignity to go in a body and environ the king; M. Mirabeau saying (and with impunity), in that Assembly, that the vessel of the state, far from being stayed in its course, would only launch itself forward with greater rapidity than ever towards regeneration; M. Barnave smiling, as well as he, when torrents of blood were flowing around us; the virtuous Mounier escaping by a sort of miracle from twenty assassins, that wished to make of his head one trophy more.

"Such are the horrors that make me swear never to set foot again in that den of cannibals, where I have no longer the strength to raise my voice at all, where now for six weeks I have raised it in vain: for myself, Mounier, and every honourable man, the last effort that we could make for the common good was to fly from this Assembly. Any idea of personal danger never approached me. I should blush to have to defend myself from any charge of the kind. I

have still received on my journey, from this people (less guilty are they than those who have made them drunk with fury), I have received acclamations and applauses, with which others might have been flattered, but which have made me only shudder. ' It is to the indignation, to the horror, to the physical convulsions which are excited in me by the very sight of blood, that I have yielded. Death one can brave; one can brave it when any good is to be done, again and again; but no power under heaven, no opinion public or private, has a right to condemn me to suffer a thousand punishments every minute, and for no possible use, and condemn me to die of despair and rage, in the midst of triumphs and of guilt, which I can neither prevent nor stay. They will proscribe me; they will confiscate my property: I will dig the earth; I shall, at least, see them no longer.

" Such is my justification."

Mounier, in like manner, explained the motives of his secession, and at some length. He thought it would be an useless sacrifice of himself, he said, to speak the truth either at Versailles or Paris, and yet that to be silent was to be criminal; he therefore declared openly, that he would neither commit guilt himself, nor be an accomplice in the guilt of others. He then describes the circumstances that made it impossible for him to remain in the Assembly any longer; the duty, on the contrary, that was imposed upon him to return to his constituents, and lay the truth before them. He considers the proceedings of the 5th and 6th of October, as an insurrection against the king. He considers him as in a state of durance, and the Assembly itself as no longer free. Even at Versailles he says that the galleries expressed their opinions, and that he often saw the effects produced by proscriptions and menaces. If firmness and good intentions could be of use, he concludes, " I might hope to be useful; but I cannot show indifference to crimes."

The whole memoir, and the part extracted from Lally Tollendal, are both in the notes to the third volume of Bailly's Memoirs.

These extracts will sufficiently show you what was thought of these transactions, and of the Assembly itself, by those few of the more early movers of the Revolution, at this particular

period of its progress, those who first seceded. Whether they were, after all, right in seceding, is indeed another and a very difficult question; an allusion to which has given occasion to one of the many striking and affecting passages in the writings of Mr. Burke.

"I cannot bring myself," says Mr. Burke, addressing himself to one of the patriots who had *not* seceded, and alluding to those who *had*, "severely to condemn persons who are wholly unable to bear so much as the sight of those men in the throne of legislation, who are only fit to be the objects of criminal justice. If fatigue, if disgust, if unsurmountable nausea, drive them away from such spectacles, 'ubi miseriarum pars non minima erat, videre et aspici,' I cannot blame them."

"Again; last and worst," says Mr. Burke, "who could endure to hear this unnatural, insolent, and savage despotism called liberty? If at this distance, sitting quietly by my fire, I cannot read their decrees and speeches without indignation, shall I condemn those who have fled from the actual sight and hearing of those horrors? No, no; mankind has no title to demand that we should be slaves to their guilt and insolence, or that we should serve them in spite of themselves. Minds, sore with the poignant grief of insulted virtue, filled with high disdain against the pride of triumphant baseness, often have it not in their choice to stand their ground. Their complexion (which might defy the rack) cannot go through such a trial; something very high must fortify men to that proof; but when I am driven to comparison, surely I cannot hesitate for a moment to prefer, to such men as are common, those heroes who, in the midst of despair, perform all the tasks of hope; who subdue their feelings to their duties; who in the cause of humanity, liberty, and honour, abandon all the satisfactions of life, and every day incur a fresh risk of life itself. Do me the justice to believe that I never can prefer any fastidious virtue (virtue still) to the unconquered perseverance, to the affectionate patience of those who watch night and day by the bedside of their delirious country; who, for their love to that dear and venerable name, bear all the disgusts and the buffets they receive from their frantic mother. Sir, I do look upon you as true martyrs; I regard you as soldiers who act

far more in the spirit of our Commander-in-Chief and the Captain of our salvation, than those who have left you; though I must first bolt myself very thoroughly, and know that I could do better, before I can censure them. I assure you, sir, that when I consider your unconquerable fidelity to your sovereign and your country, the courage, fortitude, and magnanimity, and long suffering of yourself and the Abbé Maury and M. Cazales, and of many worthy persons of all orders in your Assembly, I forget, in the lustre of these great qualities, that on your side has been displayed an eloquence so rational, manly, and convincing, that no time or country perhaps has ever excelled. But your talents disappear in my admiration of your virtues. As to M. Mounier and M. Lally, I have always wished to do justice to their parts and their eloquence, and the general purity of their motives. Indeed I saw very well from the beginning the mischiefs which, with all their talents and good intentions, they would do their country, through their confidence in systems.

"But their distemper was an epidemic malady. They were young and inexperienced, and when will young and inexperienced men learn caution and distrust of themselves? and when will men, young and old, if suddenly raised to far higher power than that which absolute kings and emperors commonly enjoy, learn any thing like moderation? These gentlemen conceived that they were chosen to new model the state, and even the whole order of civil society itself. The fault of M. Mounier and M. Lally was great, but it was very general. If those gentlemen stopped when they came to the brink of the gulf of guilt and public misery, that yawned before them, in the abyss of these dark and bottomless speculations, I forgive their first error; in that they were involved with many. Their repentance was their own."

Such were the sentiments of Mr. Burke; and I will dwell a little longer upon this particular part of the history of the Revolution, this secession of the first patriots from the Assembly, both because the propriety of such secessions is a curious and not uncommon question in political science, and because the consideration of it will make you reconsider the past, and will again bring before your view many striking particulars and characters, and an important crisis in the history of the Revolution itself.

I will mention to you the facts of the case as I understand them. You have heard the eloquence of the case; observe now the facts. I will report them to you from Bertrand de Moleville, the minister.

"When the king had left Versailles," says that writer, "the discussions of the Assembly were frequently interrupted by complaints of insults and menaces directed against a great number of the deputies. Many of them, little encouraged by the decree which had declared their persons inviolable, withdrew themselves; and, in the space of two days, the president had been obliged to give passports to about three hundred of his colleagues, among whom were the Bishop of Langres, M. Lally, and M. Mounier.

"It would be a great mistake," says the same author, "to suppose that all the deputies who retired were induced by motives of fear. Those whom I have named cannot certainly be accounted in this class; but they were all as disgusted, as discouraged, at seeing the factious so completely triumph, and compel the king, not only to sanction the new constitutional principles, but to fix his residence at Paris. They could no longer hope to persuade the Assembly to return to their system of two houses; they foresaw the fatal consequences of the outrages of the 5th and 6th of October, and, convinced that they should labour in vain to prevent them, they chose to resign their places, and withdraw from the state of inability and inactivity to which they found themselves reduced. The retreat of nearly half of the bishops ought much less to be attributed to fear than indignation; to the conviction that all was lost, and the embarrassment that would naturally be produced by such criminal violence among men, whose situation and whose habits of tranquil life rendered them strangers to civil commotions.

"I am very far," he continues, "from blaming the motives of the deputies who withdrew themselves at this period; without doubt they were very pure and very laudable; yet it is but too true that the consequences of their withdrawing were disastrous. How many unjust and atrocious decrees might we not cite which passed by a very small majority, and which their votes would have prevented.

"If the nobility and clergy had retired altogether in a body, their retreat might have been of the most important

service; but a partial desertion of worthy men from all the orders could but ensure a majority to the factious and triumph to villains. He who deserts his post renders himself answerable, not only for the loss of all the good he could have done in it, but for all the evil he might have prevented."

Such is the account given and the opinions offered by Bertrand de Moleville, an account confirmed by all the other historians. Malouet, Clermont de Tonnerre, and others, remained; the Abbé de Maury and Cazales continued their gallant warfare to the last.

And here it may be remembered, in the history of our own country, that the more moderate party seceded in like manner from the long parliament, and retired to Oxford (Hyde, afterwards lord Clarendon, among them), and with the same deplorable consequences. Measures of this kind are always to be avoided. In the instance of France before us, the very situation of the king himself should have decided the question. Why was he to be left to suffer, the general victim, the unhappy being on whom alone the storm was to beat? "If the king goes to Paris," said nobly the Archbishop of Aix to some of his brother prelates, "*I* go; if he remains, *I* remain. Wherever he is, *we* ought to be. We have no force to defend him, but we do our duty."

Having thus briefly exhibited the affecting eloquence of Lally Tollendal, the powerful observations of Burke, and the facts of the case from Bertrand de Moleville, with his very reasonable opinions, I will now proceed.

From the moment of the secession of so many distinguished men, and the transfer of the Assembly itself to the city of Paris, the cause of the old opinions was on the whole at an end; the triumph of the new opinions was complete. Any system, like that of the English constitution, of checks and balances, and of a monarchy supported by posts and places, and defended by aristocratic orders of clergy and nobility, was now impossible, and was thought unfavourable to the interests of society and the general rights of mankind. Other notions and other views of the public happiness had become popular; the new opinions were more and more entertained; and the Revolution, as it was called, was to go on, in defiance of its enemies and in disregard of its calumniators, till

the welfare of France was accomplished, and a new era had commenced, to be marked by the renovation and improvement of Europe and the world.

And this is now, as it has been from the first, to become a source of your instruction. You are to observe still further these new opinions; you have already been called to do so, particularly from the 14th of July: you are now to proceed, and watch the measures they led to in the Assembly, and the consequences by which they were followed, from the 5th and 6th of October to the close of the Constituent Assembly.

I will first offer you a very general and brief account of those measures; and next an account, first, of the effect produced on the king and higher orders in France, and, again, on the minds of different writers and reasoners, more particularly in our own country.

I conceive this to be a part of the general subject highly fitted to afford you instruction, if you can but meditate it with due calmness, impartiality, and patience.

Of these new opinions, then, the great and visible result produced in the course of about two years was the Constitution of 1791, the work of the first or Constituent Assembly. This Assembly laboured on, through evil and good report, for these two years, from this last crisis which we have spoken of, that of the 5th and 6th of October, 1789; and then, at the end of September, 1791, terminated their sittings, delivering to their fellow-citizens at the same time this the last product of their united exertions for the renovation and happiness of their country, this Constitution of 1791. This was their work, this was the first practical result of the new opinions. It was soon overthrown, and melancholy events followed; but of these we must speak hereafter. We must first attend to the leading decrees in the Assembly, which showed the nature and the progress of the new opinions. We must acquire some general notion, sufficient for the present, of the Constitution of 1791.

These decrees were in brief the following.

The kingdom was, in the first place, immediately divided into eighty-three new departments, and all the former system of different provinces, with their different usages and laws, was swept away. The parliaments followed. The great

establishment of the Gallican church was dissolved, as I have already endeavoured to describe to you in a former lecture. All titles of nobility were formally extinguished; that is, there was an end, real and apparent, of the two ancient orders of the clergy and the nobility. The ministers of the crown were not to be members of the Assembly. These great measures marked the progress of the new opinions after the 5th and 6th of October, in addition to those that had marked their progress before, which had also been most important: the rejection, for instance, of the two houses; of the king's absolute veto; and the new and civic organization of the national military force: that is, the army, the clergy, the nobility, were taken away from the crown, and the whole kingdom and its legislation and official business were organized and adjusted on a new and different system.

The Constitution of 1791 therefore turned out at last to be, a sort of experiment to try, with how little patronage, respect, and executive power, a king could maintain and carry on a limited monarchy.

The event was, that such a monarchy did not stand, and was never likely to stand.

We will now proceed to the second part of my subject. What in the mean time, what were the effects produced by their leading decrees on the king and higher orders in France? And secondly, what was the effect produced on our own writers and statesmen? These shall be the subjects of the remainder of my lecture, that you may the better comprehend the nature of this particular period of history, one most memorable and extraordinary.

These proceedings could not be approved by the king, and those who were more or less attached to the old opinions. The king indeed was a prisoner, and he at last, as you will soon see, endeavoured to escape, but he failed; and the progress of the new opinions became then more violent than ever. The court, and all of the old school, resisted the Constituent Assembly in every way they could, and continually turned their eyes to foreign powers for assistance. These foreign powers were more and more disposed to interfere by force in assertion of the old opinions, from what became to them more and more the offensive nature of the new; and

while La Fayette and his friends—the last friends that the king and the monarchy had—succeeded to the task of Mounier and his friends (the task of mitigating the new opinions by some adherence to the old), their efforts were continually attended with more and more difficulty, from the continually growing hatred felt by the court on the one side, and continually increasing distrust felt by the patriots on the other.

Such was the effect (and a most unhappy effect) of these great leading decrees of the National Assembly on the king and higher orders of France.

We will now turn to the writers and statesmen out of France, more particularly those of our own country; and we will advert to the sentiments with which these memorable scenes were surveyed by men of intelligence and reflection, not resident in the kingdom, at this singular crisis of the world.

The government of France had long been considered by such men, as on the whole, in church, a sort of splendid superstition, a most unworthy representation of Christianity; and as in state, a sort of qualified despotism.

The Constituent Assembly was supposed to have freed the country from temporal and spiritual thraldom. This was, in brief, the general view of the subject taken by benevolent and intelligent men; and the means that had been resorted to, and the immediate consequences, were not very scrupulously inquired into, the result being apparently so magnificent. The attention too was easily caught by particular objects that had been accomplished, objects in themselves most striking and important. The government had been rested upon free principles; the Bastile had been destroyed; *lettres de cachet* abolished; feudal impediments and oppressions of every kind removed; religious liberty established; the system of law made uniform; the criminal jurisprudence reformed; monasteries abolished; and, by making the military force consist of the citizens of the country, freedom, and all these new and weighty advantages, seemed to be for ever secured from the machinations of arbitrary power.

Such an event, as the appearance of liberty in such a king-

dom as France, was naturally hailed by the generality of liberal and good men, of whatever country, as one of the greatest that could have happened. The poets every where took fire; they saw

"O'er the vine-covered hills and gay regions of France,
The day-star of liberty rise."

The poet of Caledonia, who, like the lark that hovered over his plough, "warbled his native wood-notes wild," the ardent and impetuous Burns, saw a vision of Liberty, that stood "tiptoe on his misty mountain's top."

Another poet, in like manner, Dr. Darwin, a great, though now neglected poet, who was the first that could persuade the Muses to enter the factories of the artisan and the laboratories of the philosopher, expressed himself with all the enthusiasm and the hope that then so generally animated the minds of distinguished men on the subject of the French Revolution. He is speaking of Liberty.

"Long had the giant form on Gallia's plains
Inglorious slept, unconscious of his chains:
Round his large limbs were wound a thousand strings
By the weak hands of confessors and kings;
O'er his closed eyes a triple veil was bound,
And steely rivets locked him to the ground;
While stern Bastile with iron cage inthrals
His folded limbs, and hems in marble walls.
Touched by the patriot flame, he rent amazed
The flimsy bonds, and round and round him gazed
Starts up from earth, above the admiring throng
Lifts his colossal form, and towers along;
High o'er his foes his hundred arms he rears,
Ploughshares his swords, and pruning-hooks his spears;
Calls to the good and brave, with voice that rolls
Like heaven's own thunder round the echoing poles;
Gives to the winds his banner broad unfurled,
And gathers in the shade the living world."

A very different, and a still greater poet, that had arisen a few years before, the unhappy Cowper, in the musings of his imagination, had glanced on the Bastile of France, and had

anticipated the feelings that were afterwards to animate the bosoms of his countrymen, for assuredly such feelings did animate their bosoms in the month of July, 1789.

"Ye horrid towers, the abode of broken hearts,
Ye dungeons, and ye cages of despair,
That monarchs have supplied, from age to age,
With music, such as suits their sovereign ears,
The sighs and groans of miserable men!
There's not an English heart that would not leap
To hear that ye were fallen at last; to know
That even our enemies, so oft employed
In forging chains for us, themselves were free;
For he who values liberty, confines
His zeal for her predominance within
No narrow bounds; her cause engages him
Wherever pleaded; 'tis the cause of man."

You can little conceive the feelings of mankind at that extraordinary period of the world, still less what they afterwards became as the Revolution advanced; certainly you can little conceive them.

On the contrary, however, the great philosophic statesman of our own country, Mr. Burke, seems on the subject of France to have been very cautious from the first. He seems to have been able, even though living at the time, to have surveyed these events as calmly as we can now.

So early as the 9th of August, 1789, according to the account given by Mr. Prior in his Life of him, he made the following observations in a letter to his friend, Lord Charlemont; and this letter, I find from an application to the present Lord Charlemont, is genuine.

"The thing, indeed (says he), though I thought I saw something like it in progress for several years, has still somewhat in it paradoxical and mysterious. The spirit it is impossible not to admire: but the old Parisian ferocity has broken out in a shocking manner. It is true, that this may not be more than a sudden explosion: if so, no indication can be taken from it; but if it should be *character*, rather than *accident*, then that people are not fit for liberty, and

must have a strong hand, like that of their former masters, to coerce them.

"Men must have a certain fund of natural moderation to qualify them for freedom, else it becomes noxious to themselves, and a perfect nuisance to every body else. What will be the event, it is hard, I think, still to say. To form a solid constitution requires wisdom as well as spirit; and whether the French have wise heads among them, or if they possess such, whether they have authority equal to their wisdom, is yet to be seen. In the mean time, the progress of the whole affair is one of the most curious matters of speculation that ever was exhibited."—p. 346.

This was written so early as the 9th of August, 1789, when, on account of the fall of the Bastile, every other friend of liberty was probably, in this country at least, animated with no feelings but those of hope and triumph.

The night of the 4th of August, the destruction of the feudal rights and privileges, or rather of the feudal tyrannies, as they might lawfully be exercised by the great land proprietors, had just before occurred; and early in the month of October, Mr. Burke appears to have written to M. de Menonville, a member of the National Assembly, who requested his opinions. The letter appears in Prior (p. 348), and has every mark of being authentic.

But in this letter also there is nothing of exultation; all is hesitation, distrust, and doubt.

"The freedom that I love," says he, "is social freedom. It is that state of things in which the liberty of no man, and of no body of men, is in a condition to trespass on the liberty of any person, or any description of persons, in society.

"I have nothing to check my wishes towards the establishment of a solid and rational scheme of liberty in France.

"When, therefore, I shall learn, that in France the citizen (by whatever description he is qualified) is in a perfect state of legal security with regard to his life, to his property, to the uncontrolled disposal of his person, to the free use of his industry and his faculties; when I hear that he is protected in the beneficial employment of the estates to which, by the favour of settled law, he was born, or is provided with a fair compensation for them; when I know all this of France, I shall be as well pleased as any one must be," &c. &c.

These expressions show plainly enough the state of the mind of Mr. Burke at the time.

In a second letter, which must have been written *after* the 5th and 6th of October, he speaks in a manner far more distinct and determined.

(Page 352.) "If any of those horrid deeds, which surely have not been misinterpreted to us, were the acts of the rulers, what are we to think of an armed people under such rulers? Or if (which possibly may be the case) there is in reality and substance no ruler; and that the chiefs are driven before the people, rather than lead them; and if the armed corps are composed of men who have no fixed principle of obedience, and are embodied only by the prevalence of some general inclination; who can repute himself safe among a people so furious and so senseless?

"In all appearance, the new system is a most bungling and unworkmanlike performance. I confess I see no principle of coherence, cooperation, or just subordination of parts in this whole project; nor any the least aptitude to the conditions and wants of the state to which it is applied; nor any thing well imagined for the formation, provision, or direction of a common force. The direct contrary appears to me. I cannot think with you, that the Assembly have done much. They have, indeed, *un*done a great deal, and so completely broken up their country as a state, that, I assure you, there are few here such Antigallicans as not to feel some pity on the deplorable view of the wreck of France. I confess to you, that till I saw it I could not conceive that any men in public could have shown so little mercy to their country."

This was very strong language, and must have been the result of the outrages that he had observed committed by the populace of Paris, and the sweeping measures that had been adopted by the National Assembly. The current of the new opinions had run very high from the fall of the Bastile on the 14th of July; the night of the 4th of August, the 5th and 6th of October, had occurred; and during all the remainder of the year, the proceedings in France had been carefully watched by Mr. Burke, and, therefore, soon after the meeting of our own parliament, in January, 1790, so early as the 9th of February, 1790, not a year after the first meeting of the States General in May, 1789, he took his part in the English House

of Commons, directly in opposition to the whole system of the French patriots and rulers, and protested, in the most decided terms, against the principles, proceedings, and tendencies of the French Revolution.

The other great distinguished statesman and friend to liberty, Mr. Fox, on the other hand, had in conversation, and in the house, expressed his sympathy with the French people in their struggle for liberty, and his exultation in their success, for success it appeared to him to be; and the difference of opinion between these illustrious men was so vital, that a rupture was evidently possible, and even to be expected.

A meeting of the Whig party (Mr. Burke included), it is understood, was held at Burlington House immediately after. It lasted from ten at night to three in the morning, but it ended in the breaking up of the assembly amid irreconcilable differences of opinion. Great talents, it is said, were displayed, but no mutual compromise, or general adjustment, could unhappily be effected.

Mr. Burke after this meeting turned his thoughts to the press; and so early as May 25 of the same year, 1790, he told Lord Charlemont that he was much occupied and much agitated with his employment, and his task was carried on during the summer with his accustomed ardour.

The result was memorable. In the beginning of the following November, 1790, was published his celebrated work, his "Reflections." Its appearance was a sort of event in the history of the Revolution. Thirty thousand copies were sold in an instant in London. No previous production ever excited so much attention.

The work must be considered on the whole as a defence of the old, and as a most indignant protest, and most eloquent indictment, preferred against the new opinions; illustrated by such events and proceedings as had already taken place in the history of the Revolution.

The sovereigns of the continent transmitted to Mr. Burke their approbation.

The university of Dublin and distinguished members of Oxford offered him their tribute of admiration.

The archbishop of Aix, and others of the dignified clergy

of France, very naturally wrote letters of acknowledgment.

In our own country, the most decided effect was produced on the great body, not only of our clergy, but of our nobility, our statesmen, our men of letters, and our people of property. The tide of public opinion was entirely rolled back, as far as these were concerned; but on the other hand, the book was considered by many as assailing the very foundations of liberty. Mr. Fox thought so, and was not a man to conceal his sentiments upon a great subject like this. He had never done so from the first; he had early made allusions to the French Revolution (and even in the House of Commons) in a very different tone and temper from those of Mr. Burke; and he had afterwards, both in public and private, avowed opinions totally in opposition to those of Mr. Burke's book, when it came out.

The subject of the Quebec Bill, therefore, in the ensuing spring of 1791, produced at length an altercation between these two distinguished men, in the presence of the House of Commons of England; and all political friendship between them was from this moment at an end, and for ever.

They had fought together in many a long debate in the cause of freedom, and the mild government of mankind, during the American contest. They had struggled together in what they conceived a generous cause, resistance to the oppressions of the East; they had united against what they considered to be the excessive and undue influence of the crown, in the constitution of their own country; they had been bound together by the most ennobling of all ties, the mutual admiration of the great talents and elevated qualities of each other; even a sort of tender sympathy existed between them. Fox declared that Burke had been his master, and that he had learned every thing from him that he could suppose he knew. And at a subsequent period, Mr. Burke, when his end was now fast approaching, declared in like manner, that Mr. Fox "was born to be loved."

He had indeed shown himself born to be loved in this very altercation with Mr. Burke in the House of Commons; but all these mutual merits, these ties of generous sympathy and kindred genius, all at this unhappy moment were overpowered

and found to be vain; and this memorable conflict in the history of mankind between the new and the old opinions, which had already produced such extraordinary events in France, and was to be followed by such convulsions in that country and in Europe, was first to be marked by a conflict and a convulsion of two of the greatest minds that had yet been given to our parliaments by the free constitution of England.

There may be those to whom a subject of this kind may be of no material interest. You are not, I trust, of a temperament so unworthy.

He is without genius himself, who can be indifferent to whatever has concerned illustrious men like these; beings of a higher order, who are destined to be ranked with those who have been the glory of our country; the *Dii majores* of the Pantheon of England, whose memory can never die, while her story is yet to be told.

I must confess indeed, unwillingly confess, that you will have to note, and you may turn it to your instruction, the irritabilities that appear so often, in our common nature, even when that nature is exhibited, as on the present occasion, in its noblest specimens. These irritabilities were fatal, more especially while one of these great defenders of the rights of humanity was contending, as he conceived, for the freedom of mankind, and the other, as he believed, for the peace and good government of the world.

These general views that I have now offered you on this particular period of the Revolution, and the influence that it had on this country, may be further illustrated by one or two more quotations, which I will proceed to give you. When Mr. Burke first spoke in the spring of 1790, so decidedly and at some length in the House of Commons, producing, in fact, the principles and views that he *afterwards* in November so eloquently and so fully exhibited in his book, Mr. Sheridan immediately rose, and among other observations, and after paying some warm compliments to Mr. Burke's general principles, said, that "he could not conceive how it was possible for a man possessing such principles, or for any man who valued our own constitution, or revered the Revolution, that obtained it for us, to unite with such feelings an indig-

nant, unqualified abhorrence of all the proceedings of the patriotic party in France. He conceived theirs to be as just a Revolution as ours, proceeding upon as sound a principle, and a greater provocation. He vehemently defended the general views and conduct of the National Assembly; he could not even understand what was meant by the charge against them, of having overturned the laws, the justice, and the revenues of their country. What were their laws? The arbitrary mandates of capricious despotism. What their justice? The partial adjudications of venal magistrates. What their revenues? National bankruptcy. This he thought the fundamental error of his right honourable friend's argument, that he accused the National Assembly of creating that, which they had found existing in full deformity, at the first hour of their meeting. The public creditor had been defrauded; the manufacturer was without employ; trade was languishing; famine clung upon the poor, despair on all. In this situation the wisdom and feelings of the nation were appealed to by the government; and was it to be wondered at by Englishmen that a people so circumstanced should search for the cause and source of all their calamities, or that they should find them in the arbitrary constitution of their government, or in the prodigal and corrupt administration of their revenues? For such an evil, when proved, what remedy could be resorted to but a radical amendment of the frame and fabric of the constitution itself? This change was not the object of the National Assembly only; it was the claim and cry of all France united, as one man, for one purpose. He joined with Mr. Burke in abhorring the cruelties that had been committed, but what was the striking lesson, the awful moral that was to be gathered from the outrages of the populace? What but a superior abhorrence of that accursed system of despotic government, that set at nought the property, the liberty, and the lives of the subject; a government that dealt in extortion, dungeons, and tortures; that set an example of depravity to the slaves it ruled over: and if a day of power came to the wretched populace, it was not to be wondered at, however it was to be regretted, that they acted without those feelings of justice and humanity which the principles and practice of their governors had stripped them of."

This was early in the spring of 1790, and this is the animated speech, as he calls it, of Mr. Sheridan, to which Mr. Burke alludes, when he gives in his works an epitome of his own.

But again, soon after this, it happened that the Dissenters applied for a repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts. This repeal was refused.

Mrs. Barbauld, one of their brightest ornaments at the time, immediately wrote an eloquent and indignant address to the opponents of the measure: a sort of digression to the subject of France, in the course of her remonstrance, will give you some idea of the general feelings of the friends of liberty at this time in Great Britain, and in truth, of the new opinions, wherever they were entertained. In March, 1790, "Can ye not," she says, "discern the signs of the times? The minds of men are in movement, from the Borysthenes to the Atlantic. Agitated with new and strong emotions, they swell and heave beneath oppression, as the seas beneath the polar circle, when at the approach of spring, they grow impatient to burst their icy chains; when what but an instant before seemed so firm, spread for many a dreary league like a flood of solid marble, at once with a tremendous noise gives way, long fissures spread in every direction, and the air resounds with the clash of floating fragments, which every hour are broken from the mass. The Genius of Philosophy is walking abroad, and with the touch of Ithuriel's spear is trying the establishments of the earth. The various forms of prejudice, superstition, and servility, start up in their true shapes, which had long imposed upon the world under the revered semblances of honour, faith, and loyalty. Whatever is loose must be shaken off, whatever is corrupted must be lopped away, whatever is not built on the broad basis of public utility must be thrown to the ground. Obscure murmurs gather, and swell into a tempest; the spirit of inquiry, like a severe and searching wind, penetrates every part of the great body politic; and whatever is unsound, whatever is infirm, shrinks at the visitation. Liberty *here*, with the lifted crosier in her hand, and the crucifix conspicuous on her breast; *there*, led by philosophy, and crowned with the civic wreath, animates men to assert their long forgotten rights: with a policy far

more liberal and comprehensive than the boasted establishments of Greece and Rome, she diffuses her blessings to every class of men, and even extends a smile of hope and promise to the poor African, the victim of hard, impenetrable avarice. Man, as man, becomes an object of respect; tenets are transferred from theory to practice. The glowing sentiment and the lofty speculation no longer serve but to adorn the pages of a book; they are brought home to men's business and bosoms; and what some centuries ago it was daring but to think and dangerous to express, is now realized and carried into effect. Systems are analyzed into their first principles, and principles are fairly pursued to their legitimate consequences. The enemies of reformation, who palliate what they cannot defend, and defer what they dare not refuse, who, with Felix, put off to a more convenient season what, only because it is the present season, is inconvenient, stand aghast, and find they have no power to put back the important hour when Nature is labouring with the birth of great events. Can ye not discern?—but you do discern these signs; you discern them well, and your alarm is apparent.

"You see a mighty empire breaking from bondage, and exerting the energies of recovered freedom; and England, which was used to glory in being the assertor of liberty and refuge of the oppressed; England, who with generous and respectful sympathy, in times not far remote from our own memory, afforded an asylum to so many subjects of that empire, when crushed beneath the iron rod of persecution, and by so doing, circulated a livelier abhorrence of tyranny within her own veins; England, who has long reproached her with being a slave, now censures her for daring to be free; England, who has held the torch to her, is mortified to see it blaze brighter in her hands; England, for whom, and for whose manners and habits of thinking, that empire has, for some time past, felt even an enthusiastic predilection, and to whom, as a model of laws and government, she looks up with affectionate reverence; England, nursed at the breast of liberty, and breathing the finest spirit of enlightened philosophy, views a sister nation with affected scorn and real jealousy, and presumes to ask whether she yet exists? Yes, all of her exists that is worthy to do so. Her dungeons, indeed, exist no

longer; the iron doors are forced; the massy walls are thrown down; and the liberated spectres, trembling between joy and horror, may now blazon the infernal secrets of their prison-house. The cloistered monks no longer exist, nor does the soft heart of sensibility beat behind the grate of a convent; but the best affections of the human mind, permitted to flow in their natural channel, diffuse their friendly influence over the brightening prospect of domestic happiness. Nobles, the creatures of kings, exist no longer; but man, the creature of God, exists there, who only now truly begins to exist, and to hail, with shouts of grateful acclamation, the better birthday of his country. Go on, generous nation, set the world an example of virtues, as you have of talents. Be our model as we have been yours. May the spirit of wisdom, the spirit of moderation, the spirit of firmness, guide and bless your counsels!"

This fine effusion of a comprehensive benevolence, and an ardent imagination, was written in March, 1790, when the new opinions had been now strongly asserted in France, and when Mr. Burke (to whom several passages allude) had taken his part in the House of Commons. In the November following his book appeared, and Sir James Mackintosh, then just entering upon the public exercise of his great powers, soon after published his reply. He presumes not, after the meditation of the work of Burke, to give the reins to his sensibility and generous expectations, as does Mrs. Barbauld; still, in the more measured tone and manner of a philosophic reasoner, he ventures to declare, "that the discussion of great truths has prepared a body of laws for the National Assembly; the diffusion of political knowledge has almost prepared a people to receive them; and good men are at length permitted to indulge the hope, that the miseries of the human race are about to be alleviated. That hope may be illusion, for the grounds of its enemies are strong,—the folly and villainy of men. Yet they who entertain it will feel no shame in defeat, and no envy of the triumphant predictions of their adversaries.

'Mehercule malim cum Platone errare.'

Whatever be the ultimate fate of the French revolutionists,

the friends of freedom must ever consider them as the authors of the greatest attempt that has hitherto been made in the cause of man. They never can cease to rejoice, that in the long catalogue of calamities and crimes which blacken human annals, the year 1789 presents one spot on which the eye of humanity may with complacence dwell."

In another page, after a sort of summary and general estimate, he observes (p. 202, Vin. Gal.): "Thus various are the aspects which the French Revolution, not only in its influence on literature, but in its general tenor and spirit, presents to minds occupied by various opinions. To the eye of Mr. Burke," he says, "it exhibits nothing but a scene of horror; in his mind it inspires no emotion but abhorrence of its leaders, commiseration of their victims, and alarms at the influence of an event which menaces the subversion of the policy, the arts, and the manners of the civilized world. Minds who view it through another medium are filled by it with every sentiment of admiration and triumph, inspired by widening prospects of happiness."

Such are the expressions in the Vindiciæ Gallicæ; and among these minds must therefore be numbered the mind of the author.

I have now, in a general way, exhibited the different views and opinions of the great writers and reasoners of our own country on this interesting occasion, on this memorable crisis of human affairs; it is surely not without a sentiment of melancholy that we can now read these splendid effusions of the wisest and brightest of mankind. We think of what has passed in France, and however variously we may distribute our censure, we have no admiration to bestow, we have no triumph to enjoy; we have only a painful task to endure. We have to meditate, we have to inquire again and again how it could possibly happen, that such natural hopes, such generous feelings, were all disappointed and in vain; how the cause of liberty was lost; and that, following the course of this Revolution, there is little for the eye to rest upon but violence, and fury, and bloodshed, and guilt—little but what is fitted to appal the imagination and mortify the heart of every man who can sympathize with the happiness of his fellow creatures, or feel for the dignity of our common nature.

LECTURE XXI.

FROM THE FIFTH AND SIXTH OF OCTOBER TO THE FLIGHT TO VARENNES.

TO us, who live at a distance of time and place from the opening of the French Revolution, and who, above all, have the advantage of judging after the event, it appears not a little surprising, that such a crisis in the affairs of that kingdom as this, should have been hailed with such brilliant anticipations of the result. It is even yet more surprising, that the most favourable expectations should have been retained and persevered in, not only through the early months of 1789, but through the years of 1790 and 1791; by some even beyond the dreadful massacres of September, 1792. What was the real truth of the case? From the first there was every possibility that great changes might ensue, so lost had been the government in public opinion; so active and powerful had been the writers who had been agitating the minds of men on every subject of morality, politics, and religion. And what could these changes be; must they not be perilous in the extreme? Immediately after the meeting of the States, the popular party appeared to have no modesty of expectation, the court party no prudence of management; and if then abuses were to be rooted out, and the state to be regenerated, as it was called, what could be expected; what, but that the most violent concussions would take place? The people were not used to freedom; they had no maxims, principles, and associations ingrafted on their minds, favourable to the establishment of it, or even to its permanence, if established. A people vain, thoughtless, and easily excited; in their disposition essentially military; nay, more, a people among whom such men of education and intelligence as were to be found, had been long exposed to the influence of such

writings and opinions, as were fitted to loosen all the principles by which society is held together. Under these circumstances, all perfectly known and acknowledged at the time, it certainly now appears somewhat wonderful, that such hopes could have been entertained of an experiment, so truly fearful and uncertain. Never, perhaps, was an instance, where wishes were so mistaken for realities, where the influence of the feelings had such an effect on the understanding. To such an extent was this carried, that the truth is, that it was at first, and that it long remained, a mark of prejudice in those who lived at the time, of old age, of want of intelligence, or an indication of some attachment to arbitrary principles of government, to want sympathy in the proceedings or confidence in the intelligence of the patriots of the Constituent Assembly; it was a sort of mental phenomenon, in any wise and good man, to be explained and accounted for: no doubt some exceptions are to be found. Mr. Burke in this country is an obvious one, and Mr. Mallet du Pan in France is another. So early as November, 1788, this last observer, far from looking forward with hope and delight to the scenes that were disclosing themselves to his view, could only express himself in the following manner.

"This violence, this anarchy," he writes, "still continues. The authors of it suppose that they are in six months to bring a government to perfection, transform an absolute monarchy into a republic, and administer, according to M. Lacretelle, the most beautiful lessons to all free states. In the mean time there are no two schemes, ideas, or proposals alike: assemblies are held in the provinces with or without orders, or contrary to orders. Every brain is heated. We have reasonings and counter-reasonings; and instead of showing the different orders in the States how their interests agree, men are only occupied in showing them the contrary, in setting them against each other, and in creating a schism between the Tiers Etat and the other two orders. They have succeeded. The excess of the abuse of power has brought on an actual crisis, and this crisis will produce no good, owing to the extravagance of what is required and demanded. France is on the eve of seeing the times of Henry III. renewed, where the king had to combat one half of the nation with the other."

This was written by M. Mallet du Pan in November, 1788, and bears a strong testimony to his sagacity and intelligence. Instances of this kind no doubt occurred, but in general little fear seems to have been entertained in France, and nothing but hope in England.

Yet what could be more ominous than the state of affairs at the period where we have just left them, even so early as the middle of October, 1789, but six short months after the meeting of the States General?—The king a prisoner; the first wise and good men, that were leaders of the Assembly, Mounier and his friends, throwing up the cause of the Revolution in disgust; the court and the adherents of the old régime emigrating or preparing to emigrate, looking only to foreign powers for succour; the sovereign people triumphant, and every chance for peace and a happy adjustment of the national difficulties left to depend upon the influence of La Fayette and his friends on the one side, and the prudence of the king and his ministers on the other. Surely this was but a melancholy situation of things, and little fitted to encourage such expectations as seem to have been maintained for many, many months, after the period to which we are now alluding. —During all these months, the Constituent Assembly proceeded, and in the way I have already in general described.

I do not write the history of the Revolution, and can only represent generally what you must attentively read yourselves. Great reforms were made, great and lasting benefits procured for France: I have already mentioned them; but these were accompanied by the most violent subversions of property, and of all established authority: I have already alluded to them. No terms were kept with the patrons of the old opinions; no proper attention paid to the common principles of justice and right. A certain looseness of principle was observable, a certain indifference to those notions which bind society together, and are necessary to its very existence; and this more particularly out of the Assembly, in the clubs that ruled the Assembly: on the whole, no system of general conciliation, mutual sacrifices, and temperate adjustment between the supporters of the Revolution and those who were to suffer by it. In vain were claims and rights to this effect insisted upon by some who still remained in the Assembly, and whom Mounier

and his friends should not have parted from. Nothing of the kind was either carried into execution, or was its necessity sufficiently admitted even in theory by the majority of the Constituent Assembly.

But I am now speaking of their conduct more particularly during a period which I consider as a distinct interval, from the 14th of July, 1789, to the king's flight in June, 1791. I do not mean to say that the difficulties of the Assembly were not always great, even during this interval, supposing them to wish well to the king, and the monarchy, and the cause of order and of peace; but after this interval, and from the unfortunate event of the king's flight, their difficulties became more and more embarrassing; and it would not have been very possible, whatever had been their wishes and opinions in favour of the monarchy, to have properly satisfied the public, or secured their Revolution, when the king had once fled, and been brought back to his prison; not possible, without trenching materially upon the prerogatives that are most obviously necessary to the existence of every monarchy. I speak not, therefore, at present, of this last interval between the return of the king and the close of the Constituent Assembly, but of the interval between the 14th of July, 1789, and the king's flight, in June, 1791. And where the blame is really to reach the Assembly, and I think without much hesitation, is, not only at the first opening of the States, but from this 14th of July, 1789, to the king's attempted escape in June, 1791, the interval we have first mentioned. Be it admitted that the queen and the court could not bear the Revolution, and wished only the return of the old régime; be it admitted, that the king wanted character; still it was clear, that as far as benevolence and humanity went, he did *not* want character, and that he did not at all insist on the return of the old régime, if the new régime was but made agreeable to the interests of his people, and reconciled in any tolerable manner to his natural feelings and ideas of his prerogative. Even during the 14th of July itself, in 1789, the only reasonable, or indeed I must think, possible solution of all the phenomena was, that he could not be brought to order the troops to fire upon the people; that he would go the lengths of having the troops drawn out to awe the populace

into what he conceived a proper obedience to his authority, but had never for a moment admitted the thought of subjecting them, even if necessary, to military execution.

In this situation of things there was no necessity for destroying all the national safeguards and defences of the monarchy. The plea of necessity is all that is urged by the most violent of the democratic writers: the necessity cannot be shown. The better experiment, the experiment more consonant to humanity, to justice, and to wisdom, would have been to have made good terms with the monarchy and with the privileged orders, particularly the clergy; to have had confidence in the known gentleness, probity, and patriotism of the king; and not to have hurried on, while they were busy securing, as they thought, their Revolution, till they left the king no fair hope of honour or comfort to be derived from the new order of things; till his friends and adherents, and the patrons of the old opinions, could turn their eyes no where, as they conceived, but to foreign powers; and till every chance was incurred of a civil war, accompanied, in all probability, by a foreign invasion.

I cannot but suppose observations of this kind occurred, not only to Mounier and his friends, from the first, but to many members of the Constituent Assembly long after; but why they influenced not the majority of the Assembly, why they occurred not sufficiently to the understandings of La Fayette and his friends (for their feelings, I admit, were always well directed), why they had no effect on the clubs, why they did not even reach the majority of the French nation, the people of property in the provinces and in Paris (I say nothing of the mob in or out of the metropolis, or of wicked and ambitious men wherever they might be found), why they were, on the whole, every where so little regarded or respected: this, I think, must be accounted for by such considerations as we have mentioned, all included under the general term of the influence of the new opinions; an influence that arose, not only from the plausible nature of the opinions themselves, but from the disgraceful conduct of the old government, through many prior ages of licentiousness and guilt. And when these new opinions were again (as it was supposed) illustrated and enforced by the late revolution

and existing prosperity of America, though the cases were entirely dissimilar, this influence became, even among the enlightened and good (among too many of them at least), particularly in Paris, totally ungovernable and irremediable.

I cannot, as I have said, give the history. I will allude, however, to a few particulars.

Observe the situation of the parties from this 6th of October to the flight of the king.

The leaders of the Constituent Assembly would not, and perhaps thought they could not, separate the king from the court, and trust the one while they could not trust the other; and they therefore continued to make their terms such, that the king, though he might submit, could not possibly approve them.

The court and followers of the old régime wished for nothing but a counter-revolution, and they thought it their best policy, forsooth, to throw difficulties in the way of the Constituent Assembly, and contribute to the failure and confusion of every thing, that the folly of the Revolution itself, and the necessity of a return to the old régime, might be the more apparent; looking, however, in secret to foreign powers for assistance, to improve any opportunity that might offer, and no longer supposing that any such opportunity could be derived from any proceedings of their countrymen at home; mistaking thus the best and most humane policy: for the Constituent Assembly was, with all its offences and faults, the best master they were likely to have, if they would but cheerfully and sincerely acquiesce in the new order of things; and to look abroad was only to look for a civil war. The people (the respectable part of them) found themselves already more free and more happy than they had been, and they continued to indulge in the warmest hopes and expectations of a freedom and a happiness more and more increasing. The mob and their orators, for it is lamentable to think that they are an important part of the general picture, had been gratified in all the furious and degrading passions of their nature, and considered themselves as the persons whose interests were to be alone attended to, and of these interests they thought themselves the best and only judges. They were, therefore, always ready to be unreasonable, and to destroy all hopes of

the Revolution; while the king, in the mean time, sat silent in the prison of his palace, fixed and determined on two points at least, but apparently on two only,—not to shed the blood of his people, and not to give up his religion: in every other respect, without effort or remonstrance, observing every thing but preventing nothing, and only ready to receive any benefit or assistance that might reach him, from whatever quarter it might come.

Such was the general situation of all the parties concerned in the Revolution during the period we are now considering, the period that intervened between the 5th and 6th of October, 1789, and the king's flight in June, 1791.

You will observe the events that took place, the measures that were adopted by the Constituent Assembly; I cannot go into the detail of them. They may generally be described by saying, that though many were of a very useful kind, highly favourable to the rights and liberties of the community, still they were on the whole such, and such was the disposition shown by the Constituent Assembly, that the king at last lost all patience, and attempted to escape.

I cannot, I say, go into the detail, but I will mention a few particulars. In the first place, they did not sufficiently secure themselves from the influence of the popular clubs and mobs of Paris. They made a Riot Act, to which I shall allude, and no more.

The great difficulty which the Constituent Assembly had always to struggle with, was the mobs in the galleries, the mobs in the streets inflamed by their orators, and above all, as the Revolution rolled on, the clubs, who often put the mobs in motion, and were a sort of permanent mob themselves. The difficulty is very candidly considered by the Marquis de Ferrieres.

" Nothing," says the Marquis de Ferrieres, " would have been so easy as to restrain the people and their agitators, but they who wished well to the constitution, always distrustful of the king's sincerity, feared, if they repressed the people with too strong a hand, that they should thus deprive themselves of their services when they might stand but too much in need of them; they broke not an arm which they might want to use. Yes, if they could but have counted on the sincerity of the

king and queen, if they could but have seen them unite themselves to those who were really the friends, and separate themselves from those who were naturally the enemies, of the new constitution, and still more the enemies of the leading constitutionalists, those constitutionalists would, I am sure, (says he) have been the first to repress those disorders and make the people submit to the law."

All this may be very true, as the Marquis de Ferrieres states it, but it is only an explanation of the conduct of the Assembly and of the court, not a justification of either the one or the other. Both were, according to this statement, in fault; and the blame falls heaviest on the Assembly, for of all legislatures and houses of legislature, the first and most indisputable duty and policy is, to put down mobs and all *rival* clubs and associations; there is no other safety for the public or for themselves.

This last is a very endless subject, and one most important through every part of the French Revolution. You must be already, even from what you have heard in these lectures, perfectly able to comprehend it; and you will, I think, agree with me, as you read the history, that the Constituent Assembly failed in their duty on this point most completely; more particularly after the 14th of July. It was the point, of all others, which they should have resolved to accomplish, whatever they might think of the insincerity of the court, as of all others, the one most necessary to their success.

The club of the Jacobins was at first but a collection of the Breton deputies, who met every day, while the Assembly sat at Versailles, for the sake of mutual discussion and co-operation. Afterwards this sort of party association became more numerous, and all that were of the popular side were admitted. When the Assembly got to Paris, the club met in the hall of the Jacobins, under the name of the Friends of the Constitution. Hitherto it had been only composed of the deputies; but members were now received from the commune and the districts: the club soon swelled to twelve hundred, was the rallying point of all the more violent promoters of the Revolution from time to time, had its affiliated societies all over France, soon began to exercise a sort of domination over the Assembly, and at length became the scourge of France and the terror of Europe.

The Club of 1789, so called from the year of its formation, was the club of the constitutionalists, La Fayette, Bailly, le Duc de Rochefoucault, &c. These were more moderate from the first, and more reasonable, but, like the Jacobins, they had to sacrifice to popularity, and being men of more principle and more sense, they were outstripped in the race, and exercised a far less important influence on the fortunes of the Revolution.

To the mobs in the galleries, the mobs in the Palais Royal, and the mobs in the clubs, were to be added the mobs of the press, the journalists, libellers, and political writers of every description. With such materials in existence, a commotion, an insurrection, was always ready. A desperate and bad man in the Jacobin club, or in the Palais Royal, if but gifted with popular eloquence, had no difficulty. Rumours, suspicions, falsehoods of whatever kind, were first whispered, and then openly circulated. The demagogues, the journalists, were in motion, speeches made and pamphlets read, groups collected; these were united into a crowd, and the business was then done. But surely all this time, the want of all regular ideas of propriety, of justice, of humanity and sense, of all moral feelings on the subjects of property and law, were most deplorably visible in all the members of the community taken together; in the people (of the second and middle ranks more particularly), who must have constituted the national guard; in the members of the clubs, and in those who were connected with the press, and who surely might altogether have furnished, it might have been supposed, in every capital of a civilized country, a sufficient majority, a sufficient physical strength, for the purposes of the National Assembly, while they were only endeavouring to repress disorder, outrages, and crimes, and supporting and defending their own rights and authority; being, as they were, the only image of regular government then existing; and employed, as they would then have been, in asserting and protecting the most obvious interests of every society of human beings.

Some efforts, however, were made by the Assembly, as I have announced to you, and I will now allude to them. Soon after the king and queen had been brought to the

Tuilleries, Mirabeau, who, though a tribune of the people, was still a man of sense, and well aware of the necessity of order and law, brought in a decree, imitated, he said, but not copied from the Riot Act of England. This is the Riot Act I have just alluded to.

The decree is well expressed, in strong and just terms; it has the same fault with our own act, that of requiring the magistrate, in the presence of a furious mob, to read it (at the peril, no doubt, often of his life); but it is extremely superior in one material respect, for it allows the rioters to come forward, to the number of six, and state their grievances to the magistrates, the rest withdrawing.

This decree was proposed on the 14th of October, 1789, and Mirabeau seems very properly to have received the applauses of the Assembly; the business, however, was adjourned. But it happened a few days after, that a baker was seized by the populace, and, with every circumstance of the most ferocious injustice and cruelty, was murdered in the presence of the representatives of the commune. They came therefore to the Assembly, and implored them to pass the law immediately. The subject of the decree was therefore resumed, and the law made and passed. But a very great improvement was introduced, for the decree (or Riot Act), after a short and sensible preamble, stating, that liberty only could exist on the supposition of obedience to the laws, went on thus: first, the municipal officers, if the public peace is endangered, shall be bound to declare that military force must be produced; and of this declaration, secondly, the signal shall be, the hanging out of the windows of the Town House, a red flag, and their carrying before them a red flag through the streets, wherever they, with their armed force, go; and thirdly, on the appearance of this red flag, all crowds and collections of men shall from that moment be held criminal, and liable to be dispersed by force.

The former reasonable provision is then renewed, that six may be named to state grievances, the rest dispersing; and after three notices given aloud by the magistrate, he may take what measures he pleases to put down the riot. Proper distinctions are afterwards made, and different punishments enacted.

This Riot Act appears to me a great improvement on the Riot Act and law of England. With us, a meeting or concourse of the people only becomes illegal, when it has become a just cause of terror to the peaceful inhabitants of the town or community, so that it is often impossible for the people to know whether they are obnoxious to the law or not; and they ought to have counsel, and take their opinion every five minutes, as the case may alter in the eye of the law, from their increasing numbers, or the nature of their conduct. They may be fired upon if they are committing violence, but the custom having always been, for the last half century, for the magistrate *first* to read the Riot Act, the people ignorantly suppose that they are safe till the Riot Act has been read; and it then often becomes a question of fact, whether the Act has, or has not, been read; at all events, it cannot have been heard by rioters at any distance. Now a red flag on a town house, or carried along by an officer, can always be seen; and there is also a justice and a humanity in allowing the people to send six to state their grievances, the rest dispersing, perfectly worthy of the imitation of an English legislature.

You will see the decree, as brought in by the lawyer Target and Mirabeau, and as afterwards left to stand, in the third volume of Bailly.

In the fifth book of the Marquis de Ferrieres, you may observe the conduct of Robespierre, the only deputy that resisted the enactment of this law; and that, in a regular speech, affirming that the magistrates, and not the people, were in fault. He probably hoped to be considered by the populace, as the only person who supported their rights and their sovereignty. Robespierre was always from the first the principle of evil.

The murderers of the innocent man who had perished were then punished. But in the event, the ferocious populace of Paris were never kept in any proper obedience to the laws, even when all that was required from them was, an observance of the common duties of humanity and justice; and the reproaches you have just heard from me must, I think, be considered as perfectly deserved both by the Constituent Assembly and the whole community.

This Riot Act, the Law Martial as it was called, was afterwards acted upon by La Fayette and Bailly, on an occasion of a riot clearly treasonable; people were killed. But some time after, this performance of his duty was made an accusation against Bailly, and he was on that account dragged from his retirement and perished under the guillotine.

I stop to observe, that science had on this occasion not to be ashamed of her son. "You are afraid, Bailly," said one of the ruffians who surrounded him; "you turn pale and tremble." "'Tis the cold," said the philosopher, and calmly submitted to his fate.

Mirabeau seems to have become aware that the monarchy was in danger, for after procuring this Law Martial, he had again the merit of carrying (not a little by his own personal exertions and commanding eloquence) the decree, which threw the decision of peace and war considerably into the hands of the king. He had met, however, every opposition in and out of the Assembly, his name being hawked about the streets as that of a traitor; and he had been made to see how shifting was the breath of popular applause. "I know," said he, "that from the Capitol to the Tarpeian rock is but one step."

Such were the chief points that were carried in favour of the crown. What further particulars I have to allude to were of a different kind; for instance, the violent party, though overpowered by Mirabeau, on this last occasion had obtained a terrible advantage in the publication of what was called the Red Book, the register of the depredations and foolish and criminal expenses of the court: those of the former reign, out of respect to the present king's wishes, were not examined; and those of the present were less than might have been expected. They are considered at full length by Bertrand de Moleville. Still the publication of the Red Book was unfavourable to the royal authority.

The new opinions had always set strongly in the direction of republicanism; the expense of a monarchy is the best topic, whether of reasoning or abuse, which democratic speakers or writers can avail themselves of, and the disclosures of the Red Book (misrepresented and exaggerated as the facts it contained were sure to be), was a fatal event, when

the Assembly, that is, the public, were determining what was the quantity of republicanism that was to be mixed up with the monarchy, for the better advancement and security of the public happiness. Decrees and opinions, and a language was adopted, as the language of the constitution, all highly unfavourable to the royal power. The domains of the crown were considered as belonging to the nation only: far from remembering that these domains were originally the property of the family of the Bourbons, the people considered themselves as highly munificent, when in exchange for these they established the Civil List. The bargain was but an injurious one to the crown, and the fact was, that far from being generous, they were not even just. But this was then of little consequence; and this was not all. The king was thus made to assume the appearance of a tax upon the country, of a useless excrescence, the amputation of which would be the riddance of an expense: he was now looked upon as salaried and paid, an idea little consonant to the dignity that had been attached for fourteen centuries to the name of king. The titles of the first French citizen, of the first public functionary, totally altered the very nature and essence of all monarchy in the eyes of the people. Instead of a prince invested, in right of his very birth, with an authority that seemed to derive its source from the very will and appointment of the Deity himself, the people were now to see in their king but a delegate from themselves, obliged to act, not in conformity to his own will, but theirs; not strong in his own strength, but in theirs; not rich in his own possessions, but theirs; not illustrious on his own account, but on theirs; owing every thing he possessed, inherited, or enjoyed, to their liberality alone; their mandatary, officer and servant, accountable, and referring for every thing he was to think and do, to their tribunal and their directions.

These new notions of the nature and situation of a king of France, the result among the more violent and among the people themselves, of the prevalence of the new opinions, might accord with the feelings or befit the dignity of the president of a republic, or might satisfy the mind of a private citizen, raised by his military merit to a throne amid the storm of a revolution; but were fatal to Louis XVI., who was to

fall through all these immeasurable degradations, and yet to retain the respect of the public, and still more, was often to be called upon to exercise the unpopular offices of executive authority. No success could possibly attend a disposition of things like this; no such change of situation could possibly be supposed voluntary on the part of the king; and a wide field was thus opened for every description of fear, distrust, and insinuation, complaint and accusation, on the part of the more violent leaders of the Assembly, and the demagogues of the Palais Royal. In all this there was no wisdom.

The question is not, what a king may or may not be in the eye of philosophy and reason; the question is, whether the existing king was to be stripped of all the associations that belonged to this character, as king of the French people. But even in the eye of philosophy and reason, it is quite idle to talk of a king as a mere man: he may be so to his medical attendant, or an anatomist, but nothing beyond this. He is a being who is to discharge high duties to the community, to save them from contending for pre-eminence among themselves, and to be assisted by every possible association of honour and respect; and the question is, in the case before us, during the progress of a revolution, whether the leading men in the assembly, or popular men in the clubs and streets, *could be so ill* employed, as in tearing away from the monarch, or first magistrate if you please, all the long transmitted and inherited love and respect, that belonged to the office, and during such a revolutionary period of violence and disorder, totally destroying all the supports and defences that had hitherto surrounded the throne as with a rampart; in short, all "the divinity that had before so hedged in the king, that treason durst not look at it." But considerations of this kind (the result, I venture to conceive, of a far sounder philosophy than that which leaves the most important interests of society to depend upon the mere abstract notions of utility, and the mere unassisted conclusions of the understanding, utility ill understood, and the understanding most superficially exercised), reasonings of this apparently humble nature were not likely to be relished by the heated men who were now conducting the Revolution, and not likely to oppose any proper obstacles to the current that was setting in, so clearly

to the destruction of the monarchy. The right of peace and war had been determined favourably to the crown, but every other question much the contrary. The Assembly had decreed, that justice should be administered in the name indeed of the king, but the magistrates of the police were to be elected by the people, and so were the higher judges. Again, the entire destruction of the nobility was now to follow; and this was accomplished while the grand measure of the federation was preparing. It is an important part of the Revolution, and I will dwell upon it for a moment.

The middle of June had arrived; the 14th of July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile, was approaching, and the general fermentation became greater than ever.

And two measures were now to be accomplished—the abolition of the titles of the nobility, and a grand federation: and now observe a particular circumstance by which they were prefaced, that was a part of the plan of attack, and was strongly indicative of the state of the public mind at this period, the middle of the year 1790; a circumstance that is quite a specimen of this fermentation which I have just spoken of, and of the French nation itself (how little fitted at the time to undertake such an enterprise as a revolution). The scene I allude to took place about this time in the Assembly; you will find it regularly described and recorded in the histories; but it is a scene which you yourselves, in your own sound state of mind, will be unable to figure to your imagination without contempt and laughter. Before then the titles were to be taken from the nobility, and the federation exhibited, conceive, as a sort of preparatory measure, conceive a man presenting himself to a National Assembly, as the orator of the human race; bringing after him a hired mob of creatures, who were, each in his proper dress, to represent the various nations under heaven, English, Russians, and Spaniards, Turks, Africans, Indians, and Arabians, and in a solemn speech, addressed to the president, who was to keep his countenance all the time, and who actually did so, requesting to be placed in the middle of the Champ de Mars on the day of the ensuing federation. "This civic solemnity," the orator observed, "will not be the festival of the French only, but also the festival of mankind;

the trumpet that sounds the resurrection of a great nation has echoed through the four quarters of the world, and the notes of joy, of a chorus of twenty-five millions of free men, have awakened nations, long buried in slavery; our mission is written in indelible characters upon the hearts of every man. You have proved beyond a doubt that the sovereignty resides in the people; now the people are every where under the yoke of dictators, who call themselves sovereigns, in spite of your principles. The *ambassadors* of tyrants could not do so much honour to your august festival as most of us, whose mission is tacitly acknowledged by our countrymen, that is to say, by oppressed sovereigns," meaning thereby the people, the aforesaid English, Russians, Spaniards, Turks, Africans, Indians, and Arabians.

The president assented with due form and dignity to this universal request of the habitable globe. The Deputy Fermont voted that this request should be granted, by acclamation, a request which came from citizens assembled, as it appeared, from all parts of the world: the motion was seconded in favour of these generous strangers, as they were called (who were hired in and about Paris to come from all quarters of the world); it was seconded, strange to say, by one of the Lameths (distinguished members of the Assembly at the time), but he had another idea, he said, to lay before the Assembly: "The figures representing four provinces, which are chained as images of tributary nations at the feet of the statue of Louis XIV., are a sight not to be borne by free men. These monuments of pride are not to stand in the reign of equality." And after this sortie on the fine arts, for these unfortunate images were beautiful specimens of sculpture, at length and at last came the grand attack of all, to which all this degrading mummery was but an introduction. "This day," said the Deputy Lumbel, "we dig the grave of vanity. I move that all persons be prohibited from taking the titles of peer, duke, count, marquis, &c., and that nobility be no longer hereditary."

"Hereditary nobility," said Charles de Lameth, while he supported this motion, "shocks reason, and is repugnant to true liberty;" another thought the same of the term "My Lord;" M. de Noailles, of liveries; M. de St. Fargeau, of

all names but family names; Mathew de Montmorenci, of armorial bearings. It was in vain that M. de Virieu exclaimed, "Urge not on this popular fury, which has already so dishonoured our Revolution;" it was in vain that the poor Abbé Maury observed, "that the very Romans themselves had orders of knighthood, and yet were free, and that in France to destroy the nobility was to destroy the monarchy." It was not till the conclusion of the debate that the coté droit began to perceive that it was seriously proposed to pass these decrees; and then indeed several deputies of the nobility sprang towards the tribune, and demanded with warmth to be heard; but their remonstrances and their indignation were lost and overpowered amid the general shouts of the coté gauche and the galleries. In a fortunate moment of silence, the Comte de Lansberg, the deputy from the noblesse of Alsace, was just able to observe, "My constituents will disavow me, and will hold me unworthy to appear before them, if I sanction by my presence a deliberation so injurious to their honour. I retire, then, but it is in the grief of my heart. Submit yourselves (I shall say to them), yes, submit to the laws of the Assembly. They will so submit, but they will know, at the same time, that gentlemen they were born, and that gentlemen they must live, and they must die; and that this nothing can prevent." Such was the scene, and such the conclusion of it.

The decree was considered by the Marquis de Ferrieres as but impolitic; it set the feeling of honour in opposition to the national interest, amid a numerous body of men, who possessed a large part of the wealth of France at the time. Hitherto the nobles had suffered patiently enough the hostile measures of the Assembly, but they now became irreconcilable enemies to the Revolution, and a league was formed between the nobility, clergy, and the parliaments; and they laboured with equal spirit and activity against a new order of things, which they could no longer tolerate for a moment, as it left them without name or place, the mere images and spectres of their former greatness. Indeed, on every account the decree was impolitic. The nobility had in reality been already put down, when they were refused their separate constitutional existence at the opening of the States, and had been mingled among the Tiers Etat in the National Assembly; and again,

when on the night of the 4th of August their feudal prerogatives, distinctions, and properties were, without the slightest discrimination or reservation, all swept away and abolished; lastly, when they were to vote, like other citizens of the Electoral Assemblies. The influence, therefore, of their mere titles would have been gradually lost; and there was no need of outraging them in the tenderest point, by depriving them of this last illusion of their feelings, and the sole surviving pride and treasure of their hearts.

But a democratic feeling was to be indulged by the leading members of the Assembly, a democratic spirit was to be diffused among the people: every badge of inequality was therefore to be destroyed, and it was thought necessary to the Revolution, that the whole character of the government, and therefore of the country, should be altered; that every thing should emanate from the sovereignty of the people. Now, it is to this notion and spirit, acted upon more or less from the first opening of the States, that we object, as violent and unnecessary, as leading directly to confusion and a civil war, as rendering it totally impossible that the Revolution should be conducted by men of any peaceful feelings or sober sense. All might have been well, if the more violent friends of freedom could but have seen the real wisdom of the case, as it stood before them, and been properly doubtful of themselves and of the public, and duly impressed with the uncertain issue of every thing human.

This is the sort of sentiment that I mean to pervade every part and portion of the lectures I am now delivering. I repeat my sentiment again and again, totally regardless of what may be the rules of taste or propriety of composition. It is the great impression that I wish you to bear away, accompanied, however, as it is in my own mind, and as I must expect it to be in yours, with a due sense of the indispensable necessity of civil and religious liberty to the regular and proper happiness and prosperity of every community, and in no respect withdrawing from your view the faults of the supporters of the old opinions.

The Assembly, for I must now return to their history, immediately after the abolition of the titles of the nobility, proceeded to support their Revolution by the measure I have

already announced to you, the federation; a measure in itself more harmless and more adapted to the national character. The truth was, they were not quite at ease on the subject of the military force of the country; at least, they thought it advisable to pledge to the Revolution the national guards, every where dispersed over France, and the troops of the line. They therefore formed the project of an immense federation, to take place on the 14th of July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile; and deputations were to be sent from all the armed bodies, by land and by sea, from all the different departments of the kingdom and constituted authorities of the capital. These were all to assist at the fête, in the presence of the National Assembly, the king, the queen, and the court: they were to be surrounded by the greatest possible number of spectators, three or four hundred thousand people. An immense plain, the Champ de Mars, was to be hollowed out into an amphitheatre; a superb altar to be erected; three hundred priests, one thousand two hundred musicians; and an oath to be taken by these deputies, by the nation, and the king, of fidelity to the constitution, the great leading principles of which had been already sufficiently promulgated, though the constitution itself had not as yet been finally prepared and delivered.

The Histories and the Memoirs, particularly those of the Marquis de Ferrieres, will give you a sufficient description of this celebrated federation, so characteristic of the Revolution and the nation.

But the leading observation resulting from the whole is, that the Revolution and the National Assembly must now have been most clearly and universally approved and acceptable to the French people, or such a fête could neither have been attempted nor executed. This popularity of the Revolution, and therefore of the fête in honour of it, was in different stages of it severely tried and abundantly shown. It was intended, for instance, as I have mentioned, that three hundred thousand spectators should be accommodated with seats. Twelve thousand, some say twenty-five thousand, workmen were employed; but it was reported that the necessary preparations could not thus be finished by the day appointed. This would have been a serious difficulty any where but in

France, and even in France must have been fatal to the success of the fête, if the Revolution had not been popular. But in an instant all Paris was in motion, and citizens of every age, sex, and condition, appeared with the spade, the pickaxe, and the wheelbarrow, all mixed and mingled together, to carry on the work. The women of fashion and the poissardes, those of good report and those of ill, courtiers and butchers, players and monks, old men and children, capuchins, academicians, chevaliers of St. Louis, and workmen from the villages, headed by their mayors and curés,—all this assemblage of voluntary labourers was fed and accommodated by people with travelling taverns and portable shops, and enlivened by songs, and shouts of joy, and the national air of "Ca ira;" and the result was, that all the preparations for the fête were ready before the time appointed, and the triumph of these apparently curious and comical groups, but in reality these striking representatives of an overwhelming and therefore very serious and almost frightful patriotic enthusiasm, was quite complete.

It was in vain, in like manner, that the rain poured down in torrents on the day of the federation; the fête still went on. Nothing could oppose resistance to the universal joy. The dances were formed, and the processions moved forwards, and the music sounded; and neither earth below nor sky above, the wet Champ de Mars nor the drenching coldness of the descending clouds, had been or were of the slightest avail to repress the vivacity of the multitude, excited as they were by what was to them the dearest of all objects, a magnificent spectacle; fired, too, with exultation at the visible departure of the old régime, and gazing with delight on the approach and promises of the new.

And certainly, if we could forget for a moment all subsequent events, and the stain that has been brought on the great cause of liberty by this giddy people, by many of the very individuals here assembled, certainly there was something in this spectacle, this universal expression of interchanged happiness and affection, this apparent dedication of a whole nation to the leading principles of liberty, this resounding exultation of the people at their emancipation from the blighting and degrading influence of a government that

had so long ceased to be respected, this union and amalgamation of the interests and wishes of the king and of the people well fitted to overpower the imagination and awaken the sympathies of the benevolent, wherever they might be found, in France or in England, in Europe or in America. It seemed no time now to hesitate or to examine, no time to consider what had preceded or what was to follow this glittering and magnificent show. Altars and arches were to be seen; the inscriptions that every where appeared were testimonies to liberty and to law. "The country and the law: let us die to defend them," was one, for instance. "The king of a free people, he is alone the king of power," was another. "Cherish liberty; you possess it, be worthy of it." "It is not birth that makes the difference between men, it is virtue only." "It is the law that should be every where; before it, all are equal." These were among the mottoes and inscriptions; and where the Bastile had once stood was an esplanade, and over every entrance to it was written, in a manner, affecting no doubt, yet truly characteristic of the nation, "Here we now dance."

But it was fêtes and festivals in honour of liberty that this sensitive, theatric people, far better understood than the nature of liberty itself; and the scene before us has been thought the most awful and extensive exhibition of perjury that the world ever saw; for it must be observed that the same scene was acted at one and the same moment in every department of France. The perjury was that of millions of human beings swearing to a constitution which the next moment they destroyed; and it will be a warning, it is to be hoped, to mankind, never again to have recourse to such idle expedients, or rather to such impious mockeries. No legislation is so immoral as that which has recourse to oaths; none so unwise, as that which depends upon them. I speak not of the point of duty in those who take them. In the coarse legislation of commerce, custom-house oaths have become a proverb; and, even in the instance before us, Louis XVI. was a man of piety, and would not have bound himself by an oath which he did not mean to keep; but observe the temptation to which the integrity of his mind was on this occasion exposed. How could he resist the measure? How could he

decline taking the oath? He was to all intents and purposes a prisoner, and had been so since the 5th and 6th of October. He had no force to oppose to that of the National Assembly; and not to assent to the oath in the general manner in which it was worded, would have been to say that he was determined to restore the old régime, that he would have no further concern with the Revolution, and in short to leave the patriotic party no measure but to dethrone him, or himself no measure but to resign his crown. He stood, therefore, at the federation, under the strictest political necessity to conform to the wishes of the Assembly, and to act the part allotted to him in this grand national performance. It is indeed sufficiently clear that the king, as far as the oath went, was perfectly sincere. No doubt the Revolution had rolled on, and far overflowed the boundaries within which he would have thought its course ought to be confined; still, he was desirous of the happiness of his people, he had confidence in his own good intentions, he had no wish for any authority inconsistent with the public good, and as yet he did not despair either of the affection or the loyalty of his subjects; as yet he conceived that, if he could but weather the storm, the storm would gradually subside, and that he and his people might hereafter see happier days, and enjoy the calm of mutual confidence and an improved constitution of the government. It is sufficiently probable, therefore, that the king was sincere when he promised to uphold the constitution by all the means that were put in his power, and that he conformed, if not with a cheerful, yet with a general acquiescence, to what was required of him during the fête and ceremonials of the federation. Still, the oath was imposed upon him. But he was not entirely without his gratifications. He seems to have been much and very naturally affected by the general testimonies of loyalty and respect which, amidst all the fervour of revolutionary feelings, were still paid him by many of those, who came deputed from the different provinces. But when the tumult and excitement of the fête were passed away, when the National Assembly resumed its wonted course of procedure, and when various circumstances continued to dispel the hopes and illusions with which the king had soothed the benevolence of his nature, different views of his

situation seem gradually to have opened upon his mind, and before the end of the year he had begun to entertain thoughts of escaping from his prison, and of neither acquiescing nor appearing to acquiesce in the constitution, such as it was likely to become, or as it was even then administered and understood, at the close of the year 1790. The entire destruction of the ancient clergy of France was accomplished even before the federation in July 1790; their property had been voted to be at the disposal of the nation. In the November afterwards they were to receive their stipends only on their acquiescing in the new tenure that was prepared for them: this they could not do. I have already alluded to this part of the general subject; and the unhappy monarch found himself obliged to assent to the decree of the Assembly, and appear to himself and to the world the approver and accomplice of all this intolerance and injustice.

His feelings, too, were violated to a degree that, patient as he was, seems to have thrown him into a state of real illness and fever, by an unfortunate occurrence that took place at the Tuilleries (you will see the detail in the histories). A body of gentlemen, who thought his life in danger, and had rushed to his assistance, were disarmed and turned out of the palace by La Fayette and the national guard. La Fayette was not a man likely to have wantonly distressed the king, or needlessly to have treated his adherents with violence and disrespect; but, on some account or other, the impression left by this affair on the feelings of the monarch was of the most painful kind, and rendered the situation in which he was placed more than ever, in his eyes, a situation of humiliation and disgrace.

Another circumstance occurred (you will again see the detail in the histories), which still further outraged his feelings. He and the family wished probably to escape from the priests of the Constituent Assembly, and go to St. Cloud, during the Easter week of 1791, where a regular priest might assist them in their devotions; but the populace of Paris had got a notion that this expedition to St. Cloud was only a pretence; that the royal family intended to fly the kingdom and create a civil war. The same notion got possession of the national guards. The king's carriages were, therefore, stopped at the gate of the Tuilleries, and no entreaties, no efforts that

La Fayette could make, whether of persuasion or force, were of the slightest avail, and the helpless monarch and his queen were obliged to submit and to return to their palace, which was now not nominally, but avowedly a prison.

It was impossible that an insult of this kind, at the gate of the Tuilleries, in the midst of the metropolis, in open day, and in the face of all Europe, could be tolerated; and events of this kind were well fitted to desolate the heart of the unfortunate monarch, and to show him that he was indeed fallen from his high estate, and at the mercy of the populace.

In addition to these circumstances, a negotiation with Mirabeau had been rendered fruitless by the death of that extraordinary man. You are not to suppose that the object of this negotiation was to restore the old régime, and that either the king meant to be an arbitrary monarch, or that Mirabeau was ready to be a traitor to the liberties of his country. The intention of both was to call a new Constituent Assembly, for the purpose of procuring better terms for the monarch than the existing Assembly offered. Any such plan (doubtful from the first) was, however, entirely at an end when Mirabeau expired; and the king conceived that he had no measure left but to try to escape from the Assembly and the populace of Paris, establish himself in some frontier town, collect around him that part of the army, the nobility, and the people, that were still faithful to him, and (if necessary) with the assistance of foreign powers, in some mixed way, as he hoped, partly of persuasion and partly of force, by the combined operation of the hopes and fears, the good and bad feelings of his subjects, procure more honourable terms for *himself*, and a more stable and rational system of liberty for *them*. The only question was whether the escape from the Tuilleries was practicable; and the king having at length persuaded himself that it was, he drew up a memorial to be presented to the Assembly, a manifesto that was to explain and justify to the people of France the motives of his conduct, and he then fled.

LECTURE XXII.

FLIGHT TO VARENNES.

IN my last lecture I have endeavoured to describe to you the situation of the king, and the circumstances which led him at last to conceive that he had no measure left but to try to escape from the Assembly and the populace of Paris. His project seems to have been to establish himself in some frontier town, as I have already mentioned, and to have called the well-disposed around him, to procure better terms from the National Assembly.

In the manifesto which he drew up and left to be presented to the Assembly, he observed, "that while the king could hope to see the order and happiness of the kingdom revived by the measures of the National Assembly and by his residence near that Assembly, in the capital, he regretted no personal sacrifice; nor should he have objected to the nullity with which an absolute privation of freedom has infected all his proceedings, since the month of October, 1789, if that hope had been fulfilled; but now that his only recompense for so many sacrifices is to behold the destruction of royalty, to see all the powers of government dissolved, all property violated, personal safety every where endangered, crimes remaining unpunished, and perfect anarchy domineering over the laws, while that semblance of authority given him by the new constitution is insufficient for repairing any one of those evils with which the kingdom is afflicted, the king, after having solemnly protested against all the acts which emanated from him during his captivity, believes that he ought to submit to the view of France and of the whole world, a detail of his own conduct and of that of the government which has established itself in the kingdom."

Such is the first paragraph of the memorial, and it is in

itself a justification of his flight. The only point remaining is the prudence of the measure; and the prudence of the measure must have been thought to consist in the absence of every other alternative. To the king, and his adviser, the queen, who was long indisposed to the attempt, it must at last have appeared that he was every day journeying on to his dethronement; that this event might be accelerated by the failure of this expedition, but could only be prevented by its success.

The king, therefore, attempted to escape, but failed; and this failure led immediately to the loss of all his consequence and respect with the public, gave every facility to the violent promoters of the Revolution, and enabled the republican party first to dethrone him, and then put him to death. What might have followed, if he had succeeded in the attempt, it may be difficult to say; but these results at least, and they were inevitable results, are surely for ever to be deplored; and it is impossible for us not to turn with the greatest interest to inquire, what can now be known of the history of this most unfortunate expedition.

It appears to me that every thing relating to it may be found that can well be required. In the collection of Memoirs now publishing by the "Baudouin Freres" at Paris, you will find a memoir, or an account of some kind or other, furnished by almost every person that was concerned in it. I will refer you to proper authorities, and mention a few particulars. In the Memoirs of Weber you will see an account (of itself sufficiently minute and satisfactory) drawn up by the Archbishop of Toulouse, from conversations that he himself had with the queen, with the Marquis de Bouillé, and with other individuals well informed of all that passed.

Through all the years of 1789 and 1790, the king had, it seems, turned away from every project of the kind, though reasons were urged to him by his most devoted adherents, and sufficient facilities afforded him during his stay at St. Cloud.

"In the summer of 1790 I spoke to the queen, and reasoned with her," says the archbishop. "'What would you have the king do,' replied the queen; 'at a distance from Paris, without money, without those personal qualities which

might recall the army to its allegiance, without any proper power of seeing his own way, without any counsellor to show it to him and supply his deficiencies, above all, with his horror of a civil war. Let us quit the subject.' "

From these few words may, I think, be collected the whole of the case, as it long appeared to the court, the queen, and the king; the different sentiments of each are here, however briefly, fully displayed. But towards the close of the year 1790, as appears from the Memoirs of the Marquis de Bouillé, the king had begun seriously to consider, whether he could not withdraw himself from the domination of the Assembly. He saw, as he thought, that it was they, who were to exercise all executive authority, even in its most minute details: his ancient ministers were dismissed, and more revolutionary ministers were substituted; and above all, the persecution of the clergy, in which the king had himself been made to appear an accomplice, rendered his situation totally intolerable to him. He opened his mind to the queen, but she saw the difficulties and the consequences, and for a long time would not hear of any project of escape.

The very first point to be accomplished, that of quitting the Tuilleries, seemed quite impracticable; every where they were surrounded by guards and spies, within and without their prison: two or three valets and ladies of the chamber, were all that either king or queen could depend upon. When escaped too from Paris, some armed force would be necessary to clear the way for them to the frontiers. The project appeared totally hazardous and unadvisable. But at last the king was quite determined on some attempt of the kind, and the queen from that time bent her whole thoughts to the providing of the proper means for its success.

The first part of the enterprise, the escape from the Tuilleries, she resolved, in concert with the king, to undertake herself; and for the management of the second part, the king and queen looked round, and the Marquis de Bouillé was fixed upon. You will see in the memoir drawn up by the archbishop, and in the memoir of the marquis himself, the communications that we re interchangedand the arrangements finally made.

The whole project was for a time suspended by the nego-

tiation with Mirabeau, but was on his death renewed; and the plan of the enterprise was this:—The queen was, as I have intimated, to provide for the success of the expedition till the royal family reached Chalons, and afterwards the marquis. He was to have military detachments in motion, on the plea of watching the movements of the Austrians, and some of them fixed at each post, under pretence of escorting a treasure, and then to receive and transmit the royal fugitives from place to place, peaceably and unobserved if possible, but if not, by force.

Now here it will be immediately seen, that as the Revolution was popular, the minds of the people every where excited and alive to every circumstance that occurred, and as any escape of the king and queen would necessarily be considered by them as the signal of a civil war, accuracy in point of time was every thing. Detachments of troops, however stationed, and under whatever pretence, could not but be subjects of suspicion and alarm; and the longer they stayed at any post, without any known object, the more violent and ungovernable would these suspicions and alarms become.

You will be prepared by this consideration to sympathize with all the cruel accidents that from the first occurred to delay the royal family. The king and queen had fixed their departure for the night of the 19th. One of the ladies who was to be in attendance on the dauphin on that night fell sick; her friend therefore had to remain in service a night longer than was expected; but she was a suspected person, and this night was the very one appointed for the flight; and the queen had no resource but to put off the expedition for twenty-four hours, and to fix it for the succeeding night of the 20th. The Marquis de Bouillé was indeed apprized of the change on the 15th, but it was a change, he says, most inconvenient and untoward; and one of the officers, ignorant of the importance of what he was doing, neglected to observe the alteration in his orders, and fixed his relay at Varennes on the evening of the 19th instead of the 20th, giving thus a more prolonged and unnecessary alarm to the inhabitants. The next misfortune was, that more than half an hour was lost while the queen was finding the carriage that waited for her, after she had left the Tuilleries; neither she nor the

gentleman (one of the body guards) who accompanied her, seem to have known properly the streets of Paris; a most unexpected difficulty: the point had not been thought of. No doubt this part of the archbishop's narrative is very improbable; but he had conversed with the queen, he says, and this was one of those particulars, which the queen was most likely to have dwelt upon.

Afterwards the Count de Fersin, who was coachman on this occasion, appeared to make a détour through many streets, but he did so probably to ascertain whether the carriages were gone, according to his orders, to the place where he was to meet them; but on whatever account, another fatal half hour was thus expended before the travelling carriages were reached, that stood waiting at the place appointed. Every thing else was managed by the queen and the count with great good fortune and address. The escape, through an unsuspected room and door of the Tuilleries; the passports, and the choice, as far as their fidelity went, of the body guard, who were to act as couriers and attendants; but alas! for the etiquette of an ancient court! M. de Bouillé had very properly required that M. D'Agoult, a man of presence of mind and experience, should be one of the party, to take the direction of it, and leave it unnecessary for any of the royal family to appear; but Me. de Tourzel, who had the care of the royal infants, could by no consideration on earth be persuaded to give up her place and what she thought her official station; and the marquis was therefore left behind. The result was, that when difficulties occurred, as they were sure to do, the king was sometimes uneasy and impatient, put himself forward too often out of the carriage, was observed, and this, and the want of a man like the marquis at every turn of the expedition, contributed not a little to its failure. But what turns occurred! The queen, as she was leaving the Tuilleries, was certainly passed by La Fayette in his carriage; she was obscured by the night and a large hat, but was close upon it; so were also Me. Elizabeth and Me. Royale; they passed, too, one of the sentinels, as his back happened to be turned; the king had to adjust the buckle of his shoe almost under the eyes of another sentinel; and the queen and the body guard, when they lost their way, had to inquire it from

a third, stationed at the Pont Royal, had to return on their footsteps, and to traverse once more the courts of the Tuilleries before they could arrive at the place appointed. The queen too, by a very silly and unworthy fancy for some sort of dressing-case, without which she could neither travel nor exist (you will see the story in Me. Campan), had awakened the suspicions of one of the ladies about her, who probably made out all that was going on, and who had a lover in La Fayette's aide-de-camp, M. de Gouvion; and how this did not lead to a discovery of the whole scheme is inconceivable, more especially as Gouvion asserts, that he watched all the night the very door out of which the royal family issued, in consequence of information he had received.

Conceive too what must have been the sufferings of the royal party when, within a few leagues from Paris, fresh delay was to be occasioned, while the carriage was to be repaired, in consequence of an accident it had met with.

The fugitives, however, reached Chalons: there, one of the people of the town, as they changed horses, thought he recognised the king in the carriage. He went to the mayor, and was for stopping the party immediately, but luckily the mayor was not as much disposed to discover the king as himself, and contrived by a proper mixture of wise and prudential considerations to pacify the man, and the carriage passed on. It had not passed far, but stopping a moment, a person dressed like an inhabitant of the town came to the side of it; "You have not managed well," he said, "you will be stopped," and he then disappeared; probably some one who had also recognised the king or queen, but did not choose to interfere. This was but an uncomfortable incident to precede the next disappointment that occurred. At the Pont de Sommeville the king was to have found M. de Choiseul and M. de Goguelat with a detachment, but no one appeared. This detachment was to have received the king, and then given its impulse to all the other detachments, taking care itself to stop all couriers and communications from Paris. The king was extremely affected by this strange disappointment. "All is lost," said the queen to Me. Elizabeth; "we shall certainly be stopped."

When the Marquis de Bouillé came to publish his memoirs, it

was impossible for him not to express the disapprobation he felt at the conduct of the young Duc de Choiseul, who was placed by him at this Pont de Sommeville, and to whose disobedience of his orders he ascribed the failure of the whole scheme.

M. de Choiseul was obliged to publish a memoir on the subject. He gives, in this publication, his remonstrance to the marquis, and the marquis's reply, both excellent in their way. "The king may excuse and pardon you," said the veteran, "but myself, I, who am your general, and who was responsible for the whole affair, it is for me to tell you your faults." The duke then proceeds to make his own statements; and the memoir is explanatory not only of his own case, but descriptive of the whole and every part of the expedition, and nothing can be more interesting. I have hitherto chiefly followed the archbishop's account, given by Weber.

I shall now turn to this Memoir of the young Duc de Choiseul, the nephew of the celebrated minister. What relates to his own justification may be told in a few words. He and M. de Goguelat were at their post at the time appointed, they and their hussars; but they expected a courier to precede the king by an hour at least, and the king was to arrive at three; but two, three, four o'clock sounded, and neither king nor courier arrived. In the mean time, most unfortunately, from particular circumstances, which the duke states, the hussars placed at the bridge, and remaining there, hour after hour, had entirely disturbed and alarmed the town of Chalons and the neighbourhood: it was impossible to remain there any longer, and it was not easy either to stay or to move away, without causing the most dangerous suspicions. The people murmured aloud, and declared to the officers that they and their hussars were waiting for the queen; and, in short, a regular deputation came from the town to know why the hussars were posted there: the most intolerable remarks of every kind were made; and in this situation of things, to have had the king and his carriages making their appearance would have been fatal. It struck the duke and M. de Goguelat that as the expedition had been already put off twenty-four hours; some new adjournment of it might possibly have been thought again necessary; it was now half-past five, and in the midst of these

cruel perplexities and most untoward circumstances, the duke was well pleased to profit by an incident that occurred; for in the midst of the crowd of people and national guards that surrounded him and his troop, he saw the master of the post, and he took the opportunity of questioning him what escorts of money had lately passed that way. "One this morning," said the master. "Indeed!" "I was myself one of the escort," added one of the national guards who was standing by. "This must have been, then," said the duke to his brother-officer, M. de Goguelat, "this must have been the money we are waiting for; we need stay no longer:" so giving the necessary orders, and putting his troop in motion with an air of tranquillity and indifference, as a thing of course, he quitted the place, and took the road to St. Menehould. The town and neighbourhood he left were pacified in an instant, and when the king arrived in about an hour after, all was calm and silent; the relays were found, and the carriages proceeded without remark or molestation. In the mean time the duke and M. de Goguelat, with their troop, had moved slowly on, but M. de Goguelat and the lieutenant of the troop, M. Boudet, both agreed, from what they had observed as they came up from Varennes, in the contrary direction, in the morning, that St. Menehould, which they had passed through, must not now be approached, nor Clermont; and so, on the whole, the duke and his party, turning aside from these towns, made for Varennes by by-roads; but difficulties, and an unfortunate accident having occurred to some of the troop, from the almost impassable nature of these roads, they reached not Varennes till more than an hour after the king had been stopped; a most unhappy circumstance, as will be seen hereafter. I now quit the duke's memoir, though I shall return to it.

The royal party in the mean time proceeded to St. Menehould, but the courier, M. de Valory, was never sufficiently in advance, and was only five minutes before the carriage. It happened that he knew not exactly where to find the post-house; he had to make inquiries; he excited attention, and he thus drew together a crowd in a town already disgusted by the appearance and stay of the detachments that had been placed there under M. Dandoins; not to mention that the

town was of itself extremely ill disposed to the royal cause. The king, instead of keeping himself concealed in the carriage, sat with his head at the window, uneasy at the delay, and this gave opportunity to Drouet, the master of the post-house (who knew the queen), to compare at leisure his countenance and appearance with the picture on some assignats which he had that morning received, and to satisfy himself that certainly it was the king himself, however disguised, who was seated in the carriage before him. He communicated with a friend; but the dragoons, many of them, were walking with their officer in the street, and while he hesitated what to do, the carriage drove away. The courier had unfortunately, before they set out, inquired about the road from Clermont to Varennes, so the postmaster and his friend Guillaume had nothing more to learn. Varennes they saw clearly was their point, and mounting each a horse, they pursued the fugitives. They knew that there were dragoons stationed also at Clermont, and they thought it not advisable to make their effort there; so they took a cross road, and pushed on for Varennes.

We have next the relation of what happened at the next post, Clermont, given by the officer who was stationed there, the Comte de Damas. He makes a very unaffected representation of his difficulties and anxieties; the inquietude of the place and neighbourhood on the subject of the troops; his doubt about their fidelity; his uncertainty and misery when the king did not appear; hour after hour succeeding, and every hour increasing the impossibility of keeping either the troops or the inhabitants of the town in the frame of mind he wished. A valet, who dressed the queen's hair, of the name of Leonard, at last passed him, bringing him a billet to say that the Duc de Choiseul thought the treasure would scarcely arrive, as was expected—a fresh cause of uneasiness this. Verdun, where the garrison was unfavourable, was near; if a toscin sounded, all would probably be lost. Nine o'clock came, but no appearance of the king; and so having no other measure to take, M. de Damas ordered his men to dismount and go to quarters; and the town being thus rendered tranquil, he quitted his dragoons, and employed himself in keeping watch on the road from Paris. At last

he saw the king's carriages approach: a few remarks were interchanged with M. de Vallory, one of the body guards, and again with Me. de Tourzel, who talked (characteristically enough) of the weariness of the children; and he was rewarded for his sufferings by a few stolen glances of acknowledgment from his royal master and the queen. At last he saw the carriages duly forwarded on their journey, and his heart was set at ease. But the courier on the box unfortunately gave the word to the postilions to go to Varennes; unfortunately, for the postilions, when they had thus brought the carriage to Clermont, and were afterwards returning to Menehould, were able to satisfy Drouet, whom they met, that the carriages had been ordered to Varennes, and were certainly not gone to Verdun, to which place the road, at a particular point, branched off. The postmaster therefore made for the right place, for Varennes; and not only this, but he avoided Clermont, where M. de Damas would have stopped him, or, at all events, would have delayed him: but every thing was unfortunate. M. Lagache soon after reached M. de Damas from Menehould, and told him that he had followed two persons who had made pursuit after the king, but that he had lost them at a cross turn in the road; that the dragoons were prevented by the people at Menehould from coming up, and that every thing there was in confusion. M. de Damas was, however, comforted, on the whole, by supposing that the king's carriages were sufficiently in advance, and that if they once reached Varennes, where there was a relay and dragoons waiting, all would be safe. He, however, ordered M. de Remy, a faithful and active officer, with four dragoons and two fourriers, to follow with all possible speed; they did so, but missed their way, taking the road to Verdun: they were thus prevented from entering Varennes with the king's carriages, which, if they had done, they would most probably have cleared away all difficulties, and got the king away, before Drouet could have collected and arranged the means of stopping him. One mishap more. But in the mean time, at Clermont, in the town where M. de Damas and his dragoons still were, matters soon began to assume a very ominous appearance: in the result he was deserted by his troop, the people had surrounded him, called his officers traitors, and

M. de Damas, with M. de Floir and a few others, had to fly and provide for their own safety as speedily as they could. M. de Damas and his companions thought it best to take the road to Varennes, expecting to come up with the king some leagues beyond, between Dun and Stenay.

The narrative of M. de Damas is extremely distinct, and has all the appearance of being entitled to perfect confidence. It is entirely simple and unaffected, but it is too short and too rapid a statement (after the manner of a soldier) of the more prominent facts; still it is something more; and it at least touches, however briefly, upon all the points that are interesting.

But now observe the singular state of every thing at Varennes. The king arrives there; stops opposite the house, which had been so described to him that he knew it instantly; knocks and inquires for his horses; but no tidings of them; the king and the queen get out; M. D'Agoult is unhappily not with them, as the Marquis de Bouillé had intended; they wander about to see what intelligence can be got; M. de Vallory, one of the body guards, who acted as courier, does the same; all in vain: they return to the postboys, once more desiring them to pass on over the bridge, and take them to the further part of the town; the postboys refuse, for the horses, they said, were tired; they were ordered to go no further; they must wait, &c. &c. Now, while the king and queen are in this perplexity, and every thing at a stand, consider for a moment what are the facts of the case, and what is going on elsewhere. The horses are all this time waiting for the king at an inn at the further end of the town, where the postboys will not carry the king, under the care of one of the Marquis de Bouillé's sons, and of M. de Raigecourt, young officers who are expecting a summons from M. de Goguelat, or some courier; near them are sixty hussars in their quarters; in the *further* end of the town, also, under the command of a young officer stationed there by the marquis, and in attendance, though not in the secret of the expedition. But, in the mean time, Drouet and his friend Guillaume are approaching the town from the Paris side, for the purpose of stopping the king's carriages, and every moment brings them nearer and nearer; and you will now recollect that the young Duc de Choiseul

and M. de Goguelat are also coming up and making their way with their troop through by-roads, as fast as they can, from the Pont de Sommeville to Varennes. M. de Goguelat, you will observe, knew every thing about the relay and about the dragoons, at the further end of the town, and if he reached the place before Drouet, all was safe. Again, M. de Damas and his friends were also coming up from Clermont, while in the mean time M. de Valory, who acted as courier, was looking about in the town, and making what inquiries he could. All this was at half-past eleven at night; the town itself quiet, and the people in bed; and still more to increase the critical nature of all these circumstances, the young de Bouillé and M. de Raigecourt are at this moment sitting at their inn at the other end of the town, with the window open, wondering why no courier reaches them, and listening to every sound in the hope every instant of his approach. And now it is to be remembered, that on the turn that these various circumstances might take, depended, on the one hand, the life of the king and queen, the existence of the monarchy of France, the events of the Revolution, dreadful as we have seen them, year after year; or, on the other, the chance perhaps of an adjustment between the king and the Constituent Assembly; or if that failed, the events of a civil war. Such was the importance of what was now passing in and about an obscure town of France in the middle of the night of the 21st of June 1791. I doubt whether the historian can show such another half-hour in the annals of civilized Europe. Further, it is to be observed, that beyond the town of Varennes, a few leagues onward, was M. Deslon stationed with one hundred hussars; two leagues further, at Mouza, fifty horsemen of the royal German, and beyond, at Stenay, the marquis himself with a regiment of royal German, of undoubted fidelity; so that it was not only uncertain whether the carriages would be stopped at all, but whether, if stopped, a rescue might not be accomplished either by the officers and troops coming up on the Paris side of the town, or by the officers and troops stationed at the other.

But to return to the king. After much time lost in contending with the postilions, they at last agreed to take him over the bridge to the further town: but at an arch before

the bridge was already stationed, waiting for his prey, Drouet with a few others; among them Billaud, so distinguished afterwards in the Revolution; and they found no difficulty in here stopping the carriage, calling for the passports, and insisting that the whole party should immediately go before the procureur of the commune.

The fact was, that Drouet had reached Varennes not long after the king did; had immediately alarmed Sausse, the procureur, who was a sort of fanatic in the cause of the Revolution, and orders had been given to call out the national guard of Varennes, to surround the quarters of the sixty hussars, and cut off their communication with the town, and to apply for instant assistance from all the neighbouring towns and villages, particularly from the garrison at Verdun and at Sedan. The bridge had been, in the mean time, blocked up by Drouet, a waggon overturned in the middle of it, and rendered as much as possible impassable, if the king should attempt to escape.

The royal family was received by Sausse with all possible courtesy; the passports were found right, but at the same time the king was told, that he could not possibly continue his journey at present, that the horses must be refreshed, and that the party would be better in his house than in the carriage and in the street. Into the house therefore they were obliged to enter. The queen soon saw the crowd gradually assembling round the door: she was not to be deceived by the apparent civilities of their host; she perceived too plainly that they were stopped, and that all was lost. The magistrate kept going out and returning, on pretence of hastening the horses, in fact, to make every disposition for the detention of his royal guests. And here again, therefore, every thing depended on the point of time, whether the officers could come up, for instance from the Paris side, soon enough to attempt a rescue, and before a sufficient force had been collected to render the attempt hopeless.

At last, it was supposed by Sausse and Drouet that all was secure, and the tocsin was then sounded in Varennes and the neighbouring villages; and in less than two hours some thousands of the national guard had assembled in the town.

But the noise of the tocsin and the general tumult, had at last roused from their inaction the young de Bouillé and M. de Raigecourt, who had been waiting in the inn with the relay of horses. M. de Rodock too, the commander of the hussars stationed in the further town, had discovered that the king was stopped; and first this officer, and some time after the other two, having no other measure, as they thought, to take, all, and the two last with great difficulty and after being fired at, got out of the town as fast as they could, and pushed on to Stenay, to apprize the marquis, as soon as possible, of the disastrous events that had just occurred. They reached him about four in the morning, almost five hours after the arrest.

But the Duc de Choiseul, with his troop, at last got to Varennes, about an hour after the king had been stopped. He found the town, he says, in confusion and lighted up, the inhabitants armed and in the streets, and the national guard disputing his entrance; but he insisted on seeing the hussars, (part of his own troop) stationed in the town; and he seems to have overcome all difficulties, and to have faced all dangers with the most consummate courage and address. He found, when he got to the quarters of the sixty hussars, that they were now dispersed and drinking in the town, and that officers there were none; his own part therefore of the troop, his own forty hussars which he had brought with him, were all he had to depend upon. These therefore he harangued, told them the situation of the king and royal family, trotted them up to the house which he had observed to be surrounded by the national guard, cleared this national guard away, drew up his men before the door in order of battle, and rushed in through the two national guards who were stationed there, to obtain an interview with the king and to take his commands. He had also to thrust away some peasants that, armed with pitchforks, stood as sentinels at the chamber door, and with his drawn sword in his hand he presented himself before his unfortunate master. M. de Damas and Goguelat had followed him, for just as he had dismounted, it is to be observed, and was making his way to the king, M. de Damas had come up. "Are you in any force?" said the duke. "No," replied M. de Damas, "I am alone; my regiment has mutinied."

So there was evidently, whatever might be done or attempted, not an instant to be lost.

"What is to be done?" said the king. "Save you," returned M. de Damas. "Give your orders, I replied," says the duke in his Memoir, "Sire; I have here forty hussars, they will go as far as Dun perfectly well; something must be done. I will dismount seven of my hussars, place you and the dauphin on one, the queen and the family on the rest. We will surround you with the three and thirty that remain, charge those that oppose us, cut our way through; but there is not a moment to be lost; an hour, and all my hussars will be gained over." "Can you answer for it," replied the king immediately, "that in this unequal scuffle of thirty against seven or eight hundred, a shot might not kill the queen, one of the children, or my sister?"

"A misfortune like this," I cried, "and I would shoot myself and die at your feet." "Ah, come," said the king, "let us reason coolly. The municipality does not refuse my passing on, but says I must wait till break of day. Young Bouillé set off, just as I got here, to apprize his father, to put the troops in motion; they no doubt are ready. Were I here alone, I would do what you advise, and make my way through; but the queen, the two children, my sister, their ladies, it is impossible to venture so many with a party so small as yours, a party that must be made still less, for I cannot leave behind these three gentlemen of the body guard. It is now almost one; Bouillé went at half-past eleven; you, too, dispatched a person when you came. M. de Bouillé has no doubt placed his troops at different distances; those nearest will be first informed of what has happened by his son: they will be here one after another; it is not eight leagues to Stenay, a distance that a man and horse will go in two hours and a half; detachments will be coming up all the night; M. de Bouillé himself will be here by four or five, and then, without the family's running any risk, and without any violence to any one, we shall get away in safety."

The narrative of the duke is at this particular point very important to the character of the king. You will observe how natural, how forcible, were the considerations by which the conduct of the unhappy monarch seems to have been

determined at this crisis of his fate. He has been variously censured. He has been accused of causing the failure of the expedition, by getting out and losing time while he was eating: this is a mere calumny. Again, by wanting decision, and not ordering a passage to be forced. No doubt he always wanted decision, when the consequence was to be the shedding of blood. He was not fitted to rule a disordered kingdom, but I am not aware that this fault in his character can be shown to have operated at any distinct point or place, fatally to the success of the enterprise, we are now considering.

"The reasoning of the king," continues the duke in his Memoir, "appeared to me perfectly just; I could urge nothing in reply. How often have the king and queen recalled it to memory! I appeal to those who have had the happiness to be near them. Our conversation ended, M. Sausse, who had stood at a distance, left us, as he said, to go to the commune to have the horses ready by daybreak, that the king should then go to Montmedy with an escort of the national guard, and that the tocsin should be stopped."

"It was then about two in the morning, the number of people about five thousand: there were ten thousand the next day. The king consulted with me what was to be done. I acquainted him with every thing I knew. I had sent M. Aubriot to tell the marquis that all hope for the king rested on him. M. Aubriot went the four leagues to Dun in so short a time, that his horse could go no further. M. Deslon, who was in command there, gave him another, and instantly put his one hundred hussars into motion to come himself to the king's assistance at Varennes.

"M. de Damas and I calculated that the marquis would be there between five and six; but my forty hussars having seen their sixty comrades join the people, I expected they would soon do the same; and as M. de Damas and I perceived that the trying moment would be when the general and his troops arrived, we made our calculations and dispositions, as well as we could, to defend the house, and more particularly the staircase, and to contrive that the troops should get possession of the town before we could all be cut down. In this manner we passed the time till it struck five, but with an

anxiety that was intolerable. We went out from time to time to observe what the disposition of the people was. On one of these occasions, M. de Goguelat was engaged in a scuffle with some of the national guards, and was severely wounded; but he got dressed, and appeared again (though suffering extremely) before the royal family. M. Deslon, from Dun, reached Varennes with his one hundred hussars, but found the town so barricaded and guarded, that all he could do was, to obtain permission for himself to see the king. An unfortunate prejudice had been entertained against him by the general, and had been communicated to M. de Goguelat and the king, who was somewhat reserved to him: a gallant and loyal officer, that would have saved every thing if he had but been in command at Varennes. 'I can give you no orders,' said the king; 'you see I am a prisoner. You must wait for the marquis; tell him how we are situated: he cannot be long.' M. Deslon retired.

"But hour after hour had passed away; our astonishment, our wretchedness, had increased with every moment. No news of the marquis or of the troops in the neighbouring cantonments; the tocsin still sounded; the crowds of people increased; and at last, about five, M. Baillon and M. de Romeuf, La Fayette's aide-de-camp, arrived from the National Assembly. The scene was then changed."

Such is in the main the account of the young Duc de Choiseul; whose fate was truly hard: to have made all these exertions, to have confronted all these dangers, afterwards to be severely wounded, to be thrown into prison, and there left to expect his death as a traitor to his country, and in the mean time to be blamed by his illustrious general, the Marquis de Bouillé, as one of the main causes of the failure of the expedition.

One of the most cruel moments that the king and queen had to undergo was the moment when they were to set off for Paris, and see this Duc de Choiseul, and M. de Damas, and the Baron Goguelat, left behind them. "Do not quit us," said the queen, with horror painted in her countenance. She knew too well the brutal nature of a French mob. The carriage drove away, and these gallant men were soon after abandoned, as it was thought by the royal family, to imme-

diate assassination; and this must have been assuredly their fate, had it not been for the incredible exertions of the young aide-de-camp of La Fayette, M. de Romeuf, whom indeed the queen had engaged in their protection. They were bruised and wounded in every way. The people, like wild and hungry animals, were rushing upon them to tear them to pieces. They were at last, and with the greatest difficulty, saved, and lodged in confinement. Their prisons were then assaulted; the enraged and disappointed populace tried to fire at them through the air-hole. They were afterwards passed from prison to prison, expecting their trial, and of course their condemnation and death.

But the king did not forget the faithful and suffering friends of his misfortunes, the brave and loyal men who would have died to save him; and he made it his bargain with the National Assembly, when he afterwards accepted the constitution, and declared it to be one of his reasons for accepting it, that a decree should be passed in favour of all who had been concerned in the expedition, a decree of general pardon and oblivion.

We will now advert to other accounts that have been drawn up by those who were engaged in this unfortunate enterprise. You will already have seen that the cause, above all others, that prevented the escape of the king, was his not finding his relay of horses when he reached Varennes. He was five-and-thirty minutes by his watch, while inquiries were in vain made for them by himself and his gentlemen of the body guard, and during that interval Drouet had time to reach the town, and prepare measures for his arrest. We naturally wish to know how this could possibly have happened.

The fault, as far as there was any, seems to have lain with the Baron de Goguelat. It may be described in a few words. It was he who was intrusted by the Marquis de Bouillé with the disposition and management of the relays. He was to leave Montmedy and to pass along through the different posts, take the forty hussars to the Duc de Choiseul at the Pont de Sommeville, and then to return when the king arrived there, apprizing, as he returned, all the different posts and relays of the king's approach.

But the Duc de Choiseul and he were not able to remain

at the Pont de Sommeville, as you have seen, till the king arrived; nor durst they return through the different posts, St. Menehould and Clermont: they were obliged to make for Varennes by cross roads, and the baron had it not in his power or forgot to contrive some means of informing the king's carriages, where the relays were to be found; particularly at Varennes, where an alteration had been made, and the horses were no longer, as the king expected, at the Paris side of the town, but had been placed by the baron himself, or certainly with his knowledge, at the other end of the town.

I cannot but think that this is the real state of the case, though the baron does not acknowledge it, nor is he any where distinctly accused to the extent or in the manner I have thus presumed to censure him.

The young Marquis de Bouillé, in his Memoir, says distinctly that the baron had placed the relays, two days before, at the inn in the lower town, and he thinks with good reason, but that he ought to have apprized the royal party of the alteration he had made in the first arrangement.

The baron has himself written a Memoir on the subject of this expedition to Varennes, and in one of the notes he alludes to this particular question before us, though in too general a manner.

"The relay of the king," he says, "was at Varennes on the 19th. It was placed in one of the inns of the town, it mattered not where. There should have been officers to take care of it; there were none arrived on the morning of the 20th, when I passed. I had not been charged with the care of this relay, nor could I be, my mission taking me away fifteen leagues off, to the Pont de Sommeville."

This is all but loose and inaccurate; and though it were all true, still the question is, whether the baron, though he was to go to the Pont de Sommeville, was not to have returned, and preceded the king's carriages as a sort of courier, clearing away every difficulty, and preparing the relays for them as they advanced. This is certainly the conclusion to be drawn from all the memoirs, and from the Memoir of the young Marquis de Bouillé, and from what falls from the father; and though both are so employed in censuring the young Duc de

Choiseul that they think not of the baron, it is the baron that I conceive must be censured, as far as this relay is concerned, by any indifferent person.

Either the baron depended on reaching Varennes, by the cross-roads, before the king could arrive there; or the importance of this relay, and more particularly of the alteration of the place, was, amid the agitations and disappointments of the hour, forgotten; or he was unable to leave any one behind him at the Pont de Sommeville to apprize the royal party where the horses were *now* stationed. Some of these suppositions must, I apprehend, be the true one; and were the baron before us, and the questions put to him, according to his answers must be the regret or the censure with which we should at last, very unwillingly, visit the conduct of a faithful and gallant man like this, who had risked his life in the service of his unfortunate master.

When we turn to the account that is given of their proceedings by the two young officers that were stationed with the relay at Varennes, at the lower part of the town, nothing can be more uncomfortable than the sensations with which we peruse it. They arrive at the inn; they appear to be highly circumspect and prudent; are made anxious in the extreme when they find no courier appear; at the same time, they had learned from the queen's valet, Leonard, as he passed through, that the king had certainly left Paris, though it was thought there was little prospect of his making his appearance, as expected. The two young officers, however, order their supper, go to bed, as the people of the house were left to suppose, and sit in their room in the dark, with the window open, listening; but they seem always to have supposed that the relays would be expected by the king and his suite at *their* end of the town, and it never occurred to either of them, at all events, that one of them should be on the look out on the road to see whether any carriage approached; they contented themselves with sitting, listening for the courier; and it actually appears, that while in this situation, they really did hear (as the rest of the town was silent and asleep) they *did* hear people walking about and talking, but they were unable to make out what was said. Soon after they heard noises in the town, and at last the toscin; and after staying twenty minutes with

the horses ready for the king, if he got disengaged from what they perceived must be his arrest, they found they could do nothing for the king's service more, but only endeavour to reach their general as soon as possible, and tell him that every thing was lost at Varennes, and that succour must be brought up immediately; that this was all they could now attempt; and this they did attempt: they were fired upon, and with difficulty escaped. So unfortunate was every turn of this ill-fated expedition, and the more this exposé of one of these young officers is examined, the more will this appear. They found the relays at the inn, placed there by M. de Goguelat; they considered him as the pivot on which their own movements were all to turn; they expected the king at eleven at the latest, the baron an hour before. About half-past nine, Leonard, the queen's valet, came to the inn to get a horse for himself; he came there as a thing of course, which prevented them from ever supposing that the station of the relays was not known. The baron not coming at ten as expected, M. de Raigecourt went to the lodgings of the officer who commanded the sixty hussars posted in the town (the lodgings were actually in that part of the town where the king first arrived), told him to be on the alert, him and his men; that the treasure was coming. The officer went to quarters to get the hussars ready, M. de Raigecourt returned to his inn; it might then be a quarter after eleven: he saw that the relays were ready; all was quiet in the town; but in a quarter of an hour after all was tumult and uproar, and the king, they were told, had been stopped.

It remains now to be considered, where was the general himself all the time that the king was expecting him at Varennes.

"I found the marquis," says M. de Raigecourt, the young officer we have just been talking of, "about a quarter of a league beyond Stenay; my horse had dropped down under me, which had delayed me a little, but I had got another, and the general dispatched me to Montmedy to order the regiment of Nassau to make immediately a forced march to Varennes. On my return to Stenay, the general had gone with the regiment of the royal German to the king's assistance, and I could not overtake him till within a quarter of a league of

Varennes, at half-past nine; so that in nine hours, from half-past twelve, when I left Varennes, the marquis had been apprized of the king's danger, and had brought up a regiment, all mounted and equipped, to his succour, a distance, backward and forward, of twenty leagues, the roads extremely bad, and the night dark."

Such is in brief the account of M. de Raigecourt; but you may remember, that a young officer, who had commanded the hussars at Varennes, left also the place to repair to the general, when the king was first arrested: apparently he should have already reached the marquis; but on adverting to the Memoir of the marquis's son, this does not turn out to have been the case. The account that M. de Bouillé gives is, that he, with his father (the marquis) and a few others, passed most of the night waiting on the road between Stenay and Dun, oppressed and overpowered with anxiety, catching every sound, and exposed to every vicissitude of hope and fear. As the morning advanced, the latter sensation but too much prevailed; and the general thought, when the day began to break, that it was for him to fall back on Stenay, and to be ready at his post. "Within a quarter of a league of the town we heard people," says his son in his Memoir, "following us at full gallop. The couriers from the king! Alas! no; my brother, with the Comte de Raigecourt, and what was still more astonishing, the officer who was in command at Varennes. This was at half-past four; the king had been stopped at half-past eleven."

The young marquis then gives an account of the exertions made by his father and himself, to get the regiment of royal German drawn out for the king's rescue. The sufferings of both were great. The colonel seems not to have been sufficiently on the alert; at least, on some account or other, he and the soldiers, instead of being all ready to mount, with their horses saddled, as the marquis expected, were all in bed, and in short, the regiment was three-quarters of an hour, instead of ten or fifteen minutes, before they were in motion; they were found, however, sufficiently loyal when they were harangued by their general. All possible dispatch was used, but just as they came in sight of Varennes they were met by M. Deslon, who had commanded at Dun, and who told us,

says M. de Bouillé, all that had happened at Varennes, and added, that he and his troop had contrived to swim the river, with the intention of falling upon the escort that was carrying away the king, but were stopped by a canal which they had in vain endeavoured to get across. This was at eight o'clock; it was now nine. The garrison of Verdun was in motion with artillery to support the people of Varennes; and it was impossible after a nine leagues' march to overtake the escort, or to succeed if we did, in any forcible attempt at rescue; and this even if we could have found any fords in the river before us, which we could not. All was evidently lost; we could only return as we came. I shall never forget," continues the young marquis, "the affliction painted in my father's countenance; I shall never forget the heart-breaking tone (I had often talked to him of his successful life), the accents of complaint and wretchedness, with which he broke the silence, and the grief in which he rode along. 'Well now,' he said to me, 'will you still talk to me of my good fortune?'"

Such appear to me the leading facts connected with this unfortunate expedition. It failed from the loss of time at Paris; from the want of M. d'Agoult to superintend and overcome the difficulties of the expedition; from the Duc de Choiseul's not being able to maintain his post at the Pont de Sommeville; from M. de Reney and his six dragoons missing their way, and taking the road to Verdun instead of Varennes; from the king's being recognised by Drouet; above all, from M. de Goguelat's forgetting, or being unable, to apprize the king's carriages, where the relay was to be found at Varennes; from the desertion of the troops; and from the general popularity of the National Assembly and the cause of the Revolution, which made every accident, that occurred, irremediable and fatal to the royal fugitives.

I will now make two observations, and conclude. In the Edinburgh Review for October, 1823, there is a critique on the narrative given of this flight from the Tuilleries by the Duchess of Angoulême, one of the royal children at the time. Observe the loose manner in which the reviewer speaks of our present subject. "The principal misfortunes and blunders were," says the reviewer, "the arriving at Varennes,

where relays of horses were provided for them, but not taking care to ascertain where those relays were to be found. Even this, however, would not have proved fatal, had their zealous and devoted adherents been able to travel on swift horses and a good road, as much as six miles an hour during that one night, and to get more help, supposing them to have no right to attempt a defence or a rescue with sixty hussars, and nothing but a mob to oppose; for, without ever dreaming that such a thing was practicable, three gallant and chivalrous spirits rode off, between ten and twelve o'clock, to the Marquis de Bouillé's head quarters, twenty-four miles distant, and brought back a regiment of cavalry, which did not arrive before nine, when the royal prisoners had been gone an hour and a half, and no attempt was made to overtake them." Such is the paragraph in the Edinburgh Review. It is thus that in this world of ours, "this busy world, where praise and censure are at random hurled;" it is thus that the characters of generous and gallant officers are disposed of by lively and able men, like the Edinburgh Reviewer, in their closets or over their wine, in writings or conversation; and it is in this manner, that by a wave of the pen, or a glance of the thought, subjects are often adjusted and settled in any coarse and sweeping way that may occur; subjects which it would require the most patient examination, and even a lengthened report, to appreciate with the precision and delicacy that they deserve.

I know of no greater intellectual cruelty or injustice that men can exercise upon each other than this; nor know I any more common source of erroneous judgments on the most important questions that may come before us. Extremes are said to meet; and certainly men of the most improved minds and brilliant understandings often assimilate themselves to the mere vulgar, by the rapidity with which they jump at their conclusions, the carelessness with which they depart from all candour and good feeling, and the violence and presumption with which they decide. A few lively sentences, a smart sarcasm, and some general authoritative position; these once produced and laid down, and they seem often to suppose that nothing more is necessary: they have shown the vivacity and vigour of their talents and understandings, and they are satisfied.

My next observation is of a still more serious nature, and connected with the evidences of our religion: for instance: the discrepancies that appear in the Gospels have sometimes been a stumbling-block to men of thoughtful and inquiring minds; they have insisted that those narratives cannot be true, which sometimes differ with each other, and in a manner that cannot be reconciled. In reply to this objection Dr. Paley has remarked, "that he knows of no more rash or unphilosophical conduct of the understanding, than to reject the substance of a story by reason of some diversity in the circumstances with which it is related. The usual character of human testimony," he says, "is substantial truth under circumstantial variety; this is what the daily experience of courts of justice teaches: when accounts of a transaction come from the mouths of different witnesses, it is seldom that it is not possible," he says, "to pick out apparent or real inconsistencies between them. A great deal of the discrepancy observable in the Gospels," he adds, "arises from omission." This is at all times a very uncertain ground of objection. "These discrepancies," he continues, "will be still more numerous when men do not write histories, but memoirs, which is, perhaps, the true name and proper description of our Gospels; when they mean to give such passages, or such actions and discourses, as offered themselves more immediately to their attention, came in the way of their inquiries, occurred to their recollection, or were suggested by their particular design at the time of writing."

Now what I have to observe is this, that I conceive, these remarks of this admirable writer, which, when applied with any fair discretion to any case of narrative, are perfectly sound, might be abundantly illustrated and confirmed by the accounts and memoirs to which I have been alluding, and from which I have been piecing out my narrative, such as it is, during the whole of the present lecture. The discrepancies are many, so are the omissions; the inconsistencies, the opposite statements, not a few; but who doubts of all that is important in the story? or who questions the veracity of the honourable and respectable men that present us with their narratives? And did it fall within my province, I should think no task with which I could be occupied, more inter-

esting or more important, than to show, by reference to these memoirs, the propriety and justice of the different observations, which I have just quoted from Dr. Paley. The queen, for instance, comes from the Tuilleries, some say leaning on the arm of M. de Moustier, others of M. de Malden; but is the conclusion from this that she did not come out at all? Circumstances are mentioned by some, and omitted by others, with respect, for instance, to her seeing La Fayette's carriage.

Again. From some memoirs we should suppose it was Drouet, the postmaster at Menehould, who stopped the carriages at Varennes; from others, that it was Drouet's son; from La Gache's own account, that he had gallopped after a person, when he left St. Menehould, who, he thought, was pursuing the carriages; but it is clear from other accounts that Drouet was in company with Guillaume, and that this person therefore could not have been Drouet, La Gache speaking only of one person; and yet M. de Damas says, that La Gache told him that he had gallopped after two persons soon after he left Menehould; so that apparently it was, after all, Drouet.

Again. From some accounts it might be thought that Drouet entered the town of Clermont; from others, and from his own, that he passed near it and avoided it. There are differences in the detail of what took place with respect to the king and queen; their getting out, their conversation, &c. &c., when the carriages first stopped at Varennes, opposite the house of M. Prefontaine. The Duc de Choiseul speaks of M. de Goguelat's being wounded in the shoulder; M. de Goguelat himself, of receiving one wound in the breast, another in the head; yet was M. de Choiseul by the side of him afterwards for hours. The Duc de Choiseul relates his conversation with the king, while M. de Damas was in conference with him also: it is very important, extremely so, to the king's character in all its particulars. M. de Damas, when he comes to the corresponding place in his own narrative, takes no notice of it, mentioning only the important point, that after they had made their representations to the king, they saw that he had made up his mind to wait, and not to try force. M. de Vallory mentions, that M.

de Damas reached the king after seven in the morning, soon after M. Deslon, whose conversation with his majesty he reports at length; and he then says, that between eight and nine in the morning, M. de Choiseul and M. de Goguelat appeared; that they had forced their way to the house, and that M. de Goguelat was wounded in the arm. All this is inaccurate. And he then says, that about ten o'clock the two aide-de-camps of La Fayette arrived. In his agitation M. de Vallory seems to have been totally insensible to hours and points of time; but is the conclusion, I must repeat, from the whole of these discrepancies, omissions, and contradictions, to be, that the main facts of the story did not take place, or that the gallant men concerned are not men of veracity? In this manner might I go on to a considerable length, though in any dissertation on the subject I must proceed with more regularity and more circumstantial detail; but you will already see sufficiently what I am endeavouring to exhibit to your reflection. I feel indeed that I am on ground where I have no allotted place or regular position.

The justice, however, of Paley's observation on the character of testimony, "substantial truth under circumstantial variety," having occurred to me again and again while reading these memoirs, and on this occasion by no means for the first time, I thought I might be allowed to mention the circumstance, though the subject itself, I am well aware, is too important to be properly considered by me, or by any one, but in a far more direct and regular manner.

LECTURE XXIII.

FROM THE FLIGHT TO VARENNES, TO THE CLOSE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

I HAVE omitted several particulars that occurred at Varennes, and during the return of the royal family to Paris, because I do not write the History of the French Revolution; but they will, I think, be interesting to you (who are to read it), and I may even now mention a few of them.

There can be no doubt of the king's intentions in this attempt to escape; that he meant no civil war, that he had no design but what he could fully and fairly avow. When he found that all efforts at concealment were in vain, he addressed himself to Sausse, the room was full of people, and expressed himself with a fluency and a frankness, that were in a character like his quite impossible, upon any supposition, but that of his entire sincerity. What his motives had been in leaving the Tuilleries, the nature of his captivity, his wishes and his hopes, all these he laid before his hearers, and he only begged to be taken any where but to Paris; to any town or place where he might assure himself of the real opinions of his people, and freely concur in whatever could contribute to their happiness; that he had no other desire; and that to accomplish such an end, he would make any necessary sacrifices of the rights of his birth and prerogative, or the claims of his own personal interests. The king expressed himself, according to the account of the historians, with a dignity, a goodness of heart, a simplicity, and with a warmth and an eloquence so far beyond what was expected from him, that the greatest impression was made on the bystanders; and even Sausse himself was so struck and affected by it, that he said in an under tone, "Nothing can be more reasonable than what he proposes, but it is now too late;

and my head would answer it, if he was not sent back to Paris."

The different characters of the king and queen were marked when the decree of the National Assembly was brought them. La Fayette's aide-de-camp, M. de Romeuf, was known to them, and they had not expected that he at least would have been the bearer of it. The king took it hastily from his hand and read it. "There is no longer a king in France," he said, and threw it on the bed where the dauphin and the princess were lying. "It shall not soil my children," said the queen, snatching it up and throwing it on the ground. "And is it you?" she said, turning to the aide-de-camp. "Better I than another," replied M. de Romeuf; "I who know how to respect you, madam, as does my general, who is any thing but an enemy." "Oh, *he*," said the queen, "*he* has nothing in his head but his United States and his American republic: he will see what a French republic is. Where is your decree? the insolents!" M. de Romeuf soothed her at last, and overcame her by the genuine sympathy which he exhibited, and by the tears (he was still young) that started to his eyes. "Well, save then," said the queen, "save those gentlemen there, when we are gone,—M. de Damas, the Duc de Choiseul, and the rest."

Her words were not in vain: their lives were saved, as I have already mentioned, and saved by M. de Romeuf at the hazard of his own. It was a miserable night that the royal family had to pass at Varennes, as if a man, whose life was at issue, was to wait for the verdict of his judges, not for a few minutes, but for many, many hours. It was a miserable night; and it must have been again a miserable eight days, that they had to undergo, while they were returning to their prison, for it was a journey of eight days, as the national guards had to march on foot before them—the queen's hair turned grey in the course of it.

Being now the middle of June, the heat and dust were intolerable; but what were these? "Where the greater malady is fixed," as Lear said to the storm, "the lesser is scarce felt." Near St. Menehould, they had to see the Count de Dampierre rush to their carriage door to offer them, what testimony he yet could, of his loyalty and affliction; and they had scarcely

heard the few words he could pronounce, amid his sighs and his tears, when they had to witness the sad consequences of his generous devotion to them, to see the people falling upon him and tearing him from his hold; and as the carriage went on, to hear his parting cries, and to leave him to be massacred behind them.

The same horror, the same agony, would have been again experienced near Meaux, but at Chalons they had been joined by the three commissioners from the National Assembly. A poor priest was in like manner endeavouring to make his way to the carriage, when he was seized by the national guards and by the multitude, who were evidently in the act of dragging him away to the same barbarous fate. "Save him! save him!" cried the queen to Barnave, who instantly rushed from the carriage, and by the generous fury and indignation of his cries and expostulations, rescued the unhappy man, and shamed the monsters by whom he was surrounded.

The conversation in the carriage between the deputies and the royal family had at length become free and unembarrassed, and turned upon all the important subjects that alone could occupy their minds. The king, the queen, and Me. Elizabeth, displayed each the particular graces and amiable qualities which belonged to their respective characters. The spectacle thus presented, of misfortune at least and the instability of every thing human, was lost upon the hard republican nature of the vulgar Pétion; but not so, on the mind of Barnave, a man of genius and of eloquence, and who could not be unmoved by all that was so fitted to interest his taste and melt his heart. He was never wanting during the journey in every mark of respect that he could pay. When they arrived at the Tuileries he fulfilled his promise to the queen, and by his personal exertions saved the lives of the gentlemen of the body guard who were on the carriage, and who would otherwise have been butchered on the spot; and he ever after rendered the king and the royal family every kind office of assistance and advice, which, as a member of the other side of the National Assembly, and a distinguished leader at the time, it was competent for him toafford.

When you come to read the history, you will perceive that the conduct of the National Assembly, when the first intelli-

gence was brought them of the king's escape, was calm and dignified; they gave the necessary orders, made the natural inquiries, sent their communications to foreign courts, drew up a new form of oath for the national guards and troops of the line, and showing no alarm themselves, the public recovered from their first consternation, and the general effect of the whole was very unfavourable to the king and to the cause of royalty.

The feeling of the people was that of indignation; that the king having sworn to maintain the constitution, had deceived and betrayed them, and the Assembly having put itself into possession of the executive power, and every thing in Paris going on, just as before, a general impression arose, that a government could do as well without a king as with one. One thing, however, was necessary to the Assembly. The king had left behind him, when he fled, a memorial, a justification of his conduct, and this had been publicly read; it was, in fact, his appeal to the people: and as the people were admitted by the Assembly to be their sovereign, it was impossible for them not to submit themselves to the same tribunal; and this they therefore did, and immediately published their reply.

These two state papers you will of course read attentively, for they in fact contain the question between the king and the popular party, from the opening of the States to the king's flight. Judging from what the king's brother says in the account he gives of his own flight, the conclusion is, that the king's memorial is, in the main, his own composition; and if so, it is quite of itself a sufficient evidence of the good sense that it has been lightly thought he did not possess, because he was wanting in decision of character, and unfit for action, which is not at all a necessary inference. The flight was kept a secret, and it is not easy to say who could have assisted him, except the queen, who was of too ardent a temper to have been useful to him on such an occasion, or his minister, M. de Montmorin, apparently the most sensible man near him, but who was very humanely kept in total ignorance of the whole affair, as he afterwards had it in his power to state to the Assembly, and thus save his life.

"The queen," says Monsieur, "showed me the declaration

which the king projected; we read it together. I observed some inaccuracies in the style, and it was too long; and there was an essential omission, that of a protestation against all acts during his captivity. The king told me to take the paper with me, and the next morning I set about correcting it, a disagreeable office at any time." And afterwards resuming the subject, he says, "After all I have said, it may be supposed that I was the author of the Declaration of the 20th of June, but not so; I was but the corrector; many of my corrections were not adopted: all the close was added, after I had done with it, and such as it now stands, I never saw it, till I reached Brussels."

The memorial, I must repeat, is, on the whole, very creditable to the king; any assistance that he could have received not having been in all probability very material. There are no sentiments of violence in it, and no expression of arbitrary feelings; no unmeasured accusations of the friends of liberty, no unlimited panegyrics of the supporters of the old régime. These are all evidences of its being the king's own composition. The factious, and such men there surely were, are alone reprobated. Nothing that is inconsistent with an intention to be guided, if he was ever free to act, by a wish for the public good; understood, no doubt, in a manner different from what it was understood by the Assembly, and by men unfavourable to the rights and dignity of his crown, but not understood in any manner that would not have been a sufficiently fair and honourable ground for amutual adjustment of the great interests of the community.

The king complains that the States General took upon themselves the name of National Assembly; that they put the king altogether out of the constitution; that they refused him the right of granting or denying his assent to such articles as the Assembly should deem constitutional, reserving to themselves the right of ranging in that class all such as they thought proper, and with respect to those that are purely legislative, restraining the royal prerogative to a right of suspension to the third legislature, a right wholly illusive, as indeed it was. He complains of being held in a state of captivity; that the interior administration is altogether in the hands of the departments, the districts, the municipali-

ties; that these bodies are elected by the people; that the king has, in like manner, no influence over the army or the marine, over negotiations, or, in fact, over the issues of peace and war, or, lastly, over the finances. He then complains of the societies every where established, that these societies, without any authority for the purpose, deliberate on all points of government; correspond among themselves on all subjects; make and receive denunciations; post up their resolutions about the streets; and have acquired such a preponderance, that all the administration of judiciary bodies, not excepting the National Assembly itself, is in a state of general obedience to their orders. "People of France," says the king, "was this what you intended by sending representatives to the National Assembly? Did you desire that anarchy and the despotism of clubs should replace that monarchical government, under which the nation has prospered during fourteen hundred years? Did you desire to see your king overwhelmed with outrages, and deprived of *his* liberty, at the moment he was employed in establishing *yours?*"

"The more the king sacrificed," says the memorial, "for the good of his people, the more the factious laboured to lessen the value of those sacrifices, and to represent royalty under the falsest and most odious colours.

"The calling together the States General; the doubling of the deputies of the Third Estate; the pains which the king had taken to smooth the difficulties which might retard the assembling of the States General, and those which arose after their opening; all the retrenchments which the king had made in his personal expenses; all the sacrifices he offered to his people in the session of the 23rd of June; in fine, the union of the orders effected by the manifestation of the king's desire, a measure which his majesty then deemed indispensable for putting the States General into motion; all his cares, all his labour, all his generosity, all his devotion to his people—all has been misconstrued, all has been perverted."

After referring to the affair of St. Cloud and others, "What pleasure will the king have," says the memorial, in conclusion, "in forgetting all his personal injuries, and seeing himself again in the midst of you, addressing himself to all Frenchmen, and above all, the Parisians, when a constitution,

which he shall have accepted freely, has made our holy religion respected, when government shall be established on a footing steady, yet allowing useful action, when the property or condition of no man shall be troubled, when the laws shall be no more infringed with impunity, and in fine, when liberty shall be settled on a firm and immoveable foundation."

Such is the general tenor of the king's memorial; the doubtful part of his case is handled thus: "In the month of July, 1789, his majesty, in order to remove all cause of jealousy, sent away the troops which he had not called about his person, until the spirit of revolt had manifested itself in Paris, and even in the regiment of his own guards; the king, relying on his conscience and the rectitude of his own intentions, was not afraid to come alone amongst the armed citizens of the capital."

This representation of the proceedings of the 14th of July will scarcely be thought satisfactory now. That the king's own intentions were good, may be true; but the question is, what were those of his court and of his advisers, under whose influence, till the very last turn, he seemed to act.

To this memorial of the king, the reply of the Assembly could only be, that there were no rights in the king, or any one else, that were not merged in the rights of the public to freedom and happiness; but they added, that the chief of the executive power, or the first public functionary, had dared, on the 23rd of June, to dictate his absolute will to the representatives of the nation; that the army had menaced the National Assembly in the month of July; that the people were not made for kings, and that clemency is the only duty of those kings; that some disorders had attended the Revolution; but ought the ancient despotism to complain of the evils which it has itself produced?—that it was not decent in that despotism to express astonishment, that the people should not always have kept within bounds in dispersing that mass of corruption formed in a series of ages by the crimes of absolute power; that it was necessary that all the powers should be reconstituted, because all were corrupted.

This is the strain in which the Assembly naturally drew up their reply; and the two papers together, in fact, exhibit the whole question of the Revolution during this earlier and more

important period of its progress—the question between Mr. Burke and his opponents—or nearly so.

The creditable part of the state paper of the Assembly is that which contains conciliatory expressions towards the king; the Assembly assumes the fiction of the king's being carried away by enemies to the country, and does not consider him as having voluntarily fled. "We shall bewail," says the reply, "the misfortunes of our king; we shall call down the vengeance of the laws on those who have drawn him from his post; but the empire shall not be shaken, the activity of the administration of justice shall not relax."

On the whole, this reply, considering the circumstances of the case, is not unworthy of the Assembly of a great people. It could take no ground, situated as it was, but this, that usurpations, as they were thought by the king, were in fact necessary, first to the acquiring, next to the securing, the liberties of the country, and that the whole of the old régime was, from beginning to end, founded on false principles.

At the same time, by the fiction that was adopted of the king's being carried away by force, a door was left open for conciliation with the king and for his return to power; to such power, at least, as the constitution had provided for him. All this must have been owing to the influence of La Fayette and the Constitutionalists.

We must now turn to consider what were the effects of this flight of the king on all the parties and authorities then existing in the state.

To the king one thing had now become clear, that the Revolution was popular; and more than this, it was now clear, both to the king and the Assembly, that there was a republican party as well as the party of the Constitutionalists; that the Revolution had descended one step lower, and from a question between Mounier with his friends and the Constitutionalists, had got down to a question between La Fayette with his friends and the Republicans, or at least those who were disposed to sweep away the authority and rule of Louis XVI. and were or would have become Republicans.

This was the first unhappy effect of the failure of the flight, an effect still further confirmed and extended by the

despair of the royal party and their general emigration. This is called their *second* emigration.

Where could they emigrate to, it was asked, but to the enemies of the country; and for what purpose, but to return with them, if possible, to destroy the popular party, put an end to the Revolution, and restore the old régime? And what, in the mean time, what could the king be considered, it was again asked by the violent party, disposed to republicanism, what, but as an incumbrance, and, it was added, an enemy also to the liberties of the country; the king who must necessarily wish these invaders success, and who had now, as flight had failed, no other hope for the recovery of what he thought the just rights and prerogatives of his crown.

These were reasonings but too natural, when the nobles and patrons of the old system betook themselves to the totally unjustifiable measures of repairing to foreign courts, instituting a system of negotiations and intrigue, and appearing in a menacing attitude, while the clear majority of their countrymen was evidently against them, and the king and royal family in the possession and at the mercy of the Assembly, or rather of the people of Paris.

"What do I hear," cried the furious Danton, "Louis XVI. not forfeited his crown? What! has he not himself declared that he was hunting after the means of destroying the constitution? Is he weak or is he criminal?"

Placards were placed in every street in Paris by the club of the Cordeliers. "France," they said, "was a slave in 1789, supposed herself free in 1790, and really is so now, at the end of 1791. Louis XVI. has abdicated; Louis, therefore, is henceforward nothing to us, unless, indeed, he becomes our enemy. We are, then, in the same state that we were placed by the taking of the Bastile. The only question is, whether we should name another king or not."

Not only were the demagogues and the clubs, but the journals and the press, in a state of the greatest fury and activity. "O day of triumph!" said one of the popular pamphlets then current, "O day of triumph! happy Frenchmen! the perjured is arrested. The traitor Louis ought to suffer his chastisement; it is not death that he deserves. He has sworn to maintain the constitution; he is perjured; he

is no longer worthy to bear the sublime title of king of the French. No, no; suppose not, Frenchmen, that he will be faithful if you pardon him."

Both the Orleanists and the Republicans were endeavouring (the better to accomplish each their different purposes) to prepare the public opinion for the dethroning of the king. On all the walls in Paris, on the corridors of the Assembly, was pasted an address to the people of France, signed by one of the aide-de-camps of La Fayette, but really written by Paine. "Friends and citizens," said the address, "the perfect tranquillity, the mutual confidence, which reigned amongst us during the flight of the ci-devant king, the profound indifference with which we saw him brought back, are unequivocal signs that the absence of a king is better than his presence; that he is not only a superfluity, but a weight that presses heavy on the nation.

"Let us not deceive ourselves. All that concerns this man may be reduced to four points:—1st. He has abdicated; he has deserted his post in the government. 2ndly. The nation can never again restore its confidence to a man, who, faithless and perjured, clandestinely fled, and evidently intended not to return, but with a force sufficient to dictate laws to us. 3rdly. Was this his own doing, or that of others? Of what consequence is it to us whether he is weak or hypocritical, an idiot or a tyrant? He is equally unworthy of the functions of royalty. 4thly. He, therefore, is free from us, as we from him. He has no more authority, and we owe him no more obedience. We know him no more, but as an individual; one among others, as Louis de Bourbon."

The address then finished with referring all the evils which France, in the long pages of history, appeared to have endured, to its kings, the worthlessness of the office, its expensiveness, &c. &c; and it finished by observing, somewhat humanely, "that France was not to dishonour itself by showing any resentment against a man that had dishonoured himself."

These different specimens of the speeches, placards, and pamphlets will show you that the violence and activity of the Republican party in and out of the Assembly was very great. The king was provisorily suspended, and he and the royal

family were kept strictly confined and constantly and offensively watched in the Tuileries.

All this was to be expected; and you are now to *continue* to observe what was the conduct of the three great leading divisions of opinion in Paris and in the Assembly at the time. The tone of the Republican party has just been described to you; and with respect to the others, we will first turn to La Fayette and the Constitutional party. They had never wished to destroy the monarchy, and their part was clear, if they were men of courage and of principle: they were now to support their constitution; and this they certainly did, with great spirit and integrity.

Barnave had been much struck, while coming from Chalons, by all that he had observed in the carriage: the good sense and good intentions of the monarch, the spirit and graces of the queen, and the unaffected piety, quiet reasonableness, and amiable qualities of the princess Elizabeth. All these merits he probably now thought worthy of a better fate. He had been originally and long one of the most eloquent and distinguished opposers of the court and a powerful enemy to the monarchy, but he probably now saw his mistake, and he dedicated himself entirely to the preservation of the royal family and to the maintenance of the peace and order of the community. He, and La Fayette, and the Lameths, and all the more intelligent friends of liberty, perceived clearly that the new constitution was the only chance; that it must at all events be tried and supported; that on the one side they had to resist the old régime and the interference of foreign powers, for in this direction they could see no liberty, and certainly a civil war; that on the other side, they had to resist the clubs and their republic, since a republic could only be introduced by the dethroning and probably the trial and execution of the king; while here, too, it was not liberty that was to be found, but a civil war and the power of the sword. On every account the constitution, the experiment of a limited monarchy, limited as little as was now possible, was the only chance.

I have from the first contended, during all these lectures, that the friends of liberty should have rallied round the king and the monarchy long before, and so early as in the session of the 23rd of June, 1789; but this chance was lost, and this

mistake, if it be one, having been committed, all that was yet possible, they now attempted with great spirit and ability. Barnave drew up a very judicious answer for the king, when commissioners were sent by the Assembly to receive his declaration. It was exculpatory, yet with proper dignity and temper, and not, in what it affirmed, inconsistent with the truth, "that he had never meant to leave the kingdom; that he had formed no project with strangers or emigrants to that effect; that in the memoir he had left to be transmitted to the Assembly, he had not so much objected to the principles of the constitution, as to the inadequacy of the means allowed him to carry it into execution and to the little liberty that was left him either to judge of or assent to it; that he had discovered on his journey, which he could not do at Paris, how much the general opinion was in favour of the constitution; that he had no wish inconsistent with it, and would make every sacrifice to it, as he had been always ready to do; and that he would forget every thing that had disturbed and disgusted him, if he could but accomplish the peace and happiness of the nation."

This declaration, though not entirely satisfactory (for, after the flight, what could be?) was on the whole fitted to produce a good effect; and with this the Constitutionalists were to go to the Assembly, and, assisting it with every reasonable consideration that they could offer, procure from the Assembly and from the people of Paris the establishment of the constitution, that is, the establishment of a limited monarchy.

So much for La Fayette and the Constitutionalists. We will now turn to the Royalists.

At this crisis, then, of the fate of Louis and the monarchy, what was the conduct observed by this third remaining party, by the coté droit, by the determined supporters, as they thought, of both?

The Abbé de Meaux and D'Espremenil drew up a paper and got it signed by two hundred and ninety of the deputies, the object of which was to protest against the Constitutionalists, their constitution, and all their projects and designs; and at the very moment that the king and the monarchy wanted every assistance to enable them to maintain their existence *at all*, this was the very moment chosen by the

warmest friends of both, as they thought themselves, to show to the people of France and the Assembly that nothing could serve or satisfy them but the restoration of the old régime. They were determined, they said, to stand aloof, to take no part; and, instead of assisting Barnave, La Fayette, and the Constitutionalists, against the Republicans, in and out of the Assembly, to leave them to manage as well as they could; that was, in other words, to leave the king no hope but from the interference of foreign powers and the chance of a civil war: the very expedients of which (of the last, at least) he had always, both in words and in practice, shown a perfect horror.

This declaration or protest is given by Bertrand de Moleville. "It is the part of history," he says, "to collect these honourable acts, as so many monuments of courage and fidelity."

"In the midst of the insults," says the protest, "offered to the monarch and to his august family, and, in their persons, to the nation at large, what is the monarchy become? The decrees of the National Assembly have concentrated in themselves the whole regal authority; even the appearance of royalty no longer exists; a republican interregnum is substituted in its stead." Now, surely it might here be asked these protesters, Is all this to be wondered at, after the failure of such a measure on the part of the king as an endeavour to escape?

"Before the disastrous period at which we are arrived," continue the protesters, "we could at least embrace the phantom of the monarchy. We combated for its wrecks, and the hope of preserving it justified our endeavours. Now, the last blow has been given to the monarchy; but, deprived of this great motive, duties of another kind present themselves: the monarch exists; he is a captive; it is for the interest of the king we must rally; it is for him, for his family, it is for the loved blood of the Bourbons, that we should remain at a post where we may watch over so precious a deposit.

"But while we perform this urgent duty, let not our constituents expect that we shall interfere in any subject foreign to it. When a single interest can force us to sit with those

who have erected an irregular republic upon the ruins of the monarchy, it is to that single interest we devote ourselves entirely. From this moment a profound silence on whatever is not relative to it will mark our sorrow, and be at the same time the only expression of our constant opposition to all the decrees. We shall henceforth take no part in deliberations which do not relate solely to those interests which remain for us to defend."

Such are the leading paragraphs of this declaration of the coté droit.

I must confess that it appears to me a more striking instance cannot be produced of the impracticable conduct of which men the most respectable may be guilty, and of the manner in which they may deceive themselves, while they are engaged in political struggles, acting under the influence of their own personal resentments and irritations, while they give out and suppose themselves to be influenced by a regard to others, and by interests of a higher and very different nature.

Were such men as the Abbé de Maury and D'Espremenil to be told that the king, after his flight, could not be in the same situation as before? Was it not evident through the whole of that flight that the Revolution was popular? Was it not plain that a republican party was appearing, and was already in great force in Paris? Was not the dethronement of the king and a republic the obvious consequence that might have been expected of the king's being brought back a prisoner from Varennes? Suppose the emigrants and foreign powers appeared in force on the frontiers, suppose them marching to Paris, had they not already seen enough of the violent demagogues and mobs that it contained, to satisfy themselves that the first effect of any such crisis would be the massacre of the king and all the royal family together.

How was it possible at this period to attempt a restoration of the old régime but by a civil war? How could it possibly be carried on while the king was made prisoner by the people of Paris? What hope for him? Was it his wish; had it not been his constant effort to avoid all shedding of blood; and was there, after all, no difference between the constitution proposed by La Fayette and his friends, and a dethronement?

Under all the unhappy circumstances of the case, was it not the duty and best policy of the friends of the king to adhere to what appeared to be thought even by the king himself his own best duty and policy, not to drive things to extremities; to procure the best terms he could; to take the chance, whatever it might be, of giving the public time and opportunity, if possible, to cool down in the absence of opposition, and to subside into sentiments of greater moderation and reasonableness? The necessity might be hard, but was it not one to which their royal master thought it advisable to submit? Were they not to do the same, if on any other supposition, they must evidently sacrifice his life and crown? What conduct could the Republicans and his enemies wish them to pursue but the conduct they were pursuing? From the first had not their unhappy king, meaning only the good of all, but unable to shed the blood of any, stood in the midst, between the court party on the one side, and the popular party on the other, to be sacrificed to the fury and contentions of both; and was this warfare to be persevered in even now, and to be continued, till he was to be dragged from the prison, where he then was, to perish on a scaffold, or be massacred in some insurrection of the people? Men may be in their characters respectable, and in their principles respectable, and in their intentions respectable; but if they will take no account of the circumstances in which they are placed; if they will listen to no suggestions of prudence and common sense; if sentiment or inherited opinion is to be every thing with them, and reason nothing; if the world is to dissolve in ruins around them because they, it seems, can stand fearless amid the general wreck; if such are to be the rulers of the world and the statesmen of the world, to such men the world will be seldom found to owe much obligation. However they may gratify their own notions of right and duty, they will be the enemies rather than the friends of mankind, and they will be the very persons whom of all others one should wish, for the sake of the peace and improvement and happiness of society, to banish as much as possible from all interference in public concerns; for to what end will they interfere but to render all the efforts of sober and reasonable men idle and impossible?

The chapters of Bertrand de Moleville, that refer to this period of the history, are, I conceive, particularly instructive. Nothing can be so unfair as they are to the Constitutionalists, and so irrational in every point of view.

It is, as if the king were to have the chance of an escape from the Tuileries, and then be in the same situation as before; as if men were to have the benefit of two opposite alternatives of conduct. He quotes part of a speech from Pétion (p. 241), and then says, "Pétion concluded by moving that the king should be arraigned and tried by the National Assembly, or by a convention appointed expressly for that purpose."

"This motion," he adds, "with which the sitting concluded, "obtained some applauses from the members of the coté gauche, but too few to alarm the coté droit, who, true to the resolution they had taken, kept a profound silence. This debate was continued in the two following sittings."

And then he goes on to observe, that "the Republican party, enraged at finding themselves in a minority in the Assembly, were extremely active in stirring up the people against the majority.

"The most violent placards and pamphlets deluged the capital; the revolutionary clubs entered into the most seditious resolutions; that of the Jacobins voted an address of censure and abuse to the National Assembly, because they had sent commissioners to meet the king, instead of ordering him to the bar. Brissot read a discourse in the Jacobin club," he says, "to show that the king might and ought to be tried: the composition was ordered to be printed. The proposition with which it concluded was repeated," he says, "in the vociferations of the popular groups."

These are the representations of Bertrand de Moleville; and in this state of things, two hundred and ninety of the friends of the king and monarchy are, forsooth, true to their resolution, to sit silent and leave the battle to be fought by the Constitutionalists. They are to offer no assistance to the king and his family; he is to appear left to exist or perish, according to the issue of the contest, and all this because the Constitutionalists had originally, in the general fermentation of public opinion, and indeed of the world itself, allowed their

imaginations to be too much inflamed, and had not rallied round the king and the monarchy early in the Revolution, though they were risking their lives, certainly their popularity, to do so *now*. They had at first gone too far, it might be admitted, had made mistakes in the cause of liberty, but they were now labouring to repair them; they had never meant injury either to the king or to the monarchy, however the ardour of their prior proceedings might, with the assistance of the faults of the court itself, have endangered both; and they were now, at least, the only chance of protection that the king and monarchy really had. This might surely have been acknowledged by Bertrand de Moleville; but not so; and the members of the coté droit, as the Marquis de Ferrieres observes (vol. ii. p. 407), consulted more their wish to injure the Constitutionalists, whom they hated, than the use they might be of to the king and royal family.

If we turn to the Memoirs of the Marquis de Ferrieres, he will be found, as usual, more reasonable and candid than Bertrand de Moleville.

"The Constitutionalists," says he, "wished for a re-union with the coté droit; the nobles of the Constitutional party wished it evidently; but the great lords," he continues, "the high clergy, the members of the parliament, the financiers, wished for no new constitution under whatever modifications or concessions; it was the old régime, the whole of it, that they wanted; that, and nothing else. To the constitution therefore, though it might have brought with it peace, they preferred the chance of the ruin of the monarch, and the chance of the ruin of themselves, provided there remained to them the hope of the old régime."

Such is the description given of the conduct of the coté droit, not only by Bertrand de Moleville, but by the Marquis de Ferrieres himself, one of the order of nobles; and it is melancholy to dwell on such passages in history.

As the marquis proceeds, in his tenth book, if you accompany him, you will see a very animated account of what passed in the Assembly, while the Constitutionalists were struggling for the defence of the king and the monarchy, against Pétion and the Republican party. The speech of Barnave was very striking, and was instinct with a wisdom

that was quite prophetic. And that the Republican party did not attend to it, is one, I conceive, of the lessons of the Revolution; on this account I will call your attention to it for a moment.

Barnave, then, showed how different were the cases of America and France; the necessity of a monarchy to France, the nature of a limited monarchy; the principles of a government, representative and monarchical; the inviolability of the monarch; the nature of his responsibility; where responsibility was to exist, and might be suffered to exist. He alluded to the case of England; made at every turn of the great subject before him, the most sound and reasonable distinctions; exhibited in truth the mistakes of those who differed from him, but in the most calm and inoffensive manner, and then concluded with the following remarks, which surely ought to have impressed the Republican party, at least all those of them who meant well.

"But all further change," said Barnave, "is now fatal; every prolongation of the Revolution must be disastrous. Are we to put an end to the Revolution? are we to begin it again? If you once distrust the present constitution, where are you to stop? Above all, where are to stop those who are to succeed to you? You have done every thing for liberty, for equality: no arbitrary power has been allowed to escape; no usurpation, whether arising from selfishness or from property, has been spared; every man has been rendered equal in the eye of the law, whether civil or political. You have recovered and restored to the state whatever had been at any time taken from it, and hence results this great truth, that if the Revolution advance a step further, it cannot do it without danger; that as far as civil liberty is concerned, the first consequence would be the destruction of royalty; that, as far as equality is concerned, the destruction of property.

"You all of you know, that the night of the 4th of August gave more force to the Revolution than all the constitutional decrees; but for those who would now go further, what other night of the 4th of August remains, unless you will have laws against all property whatever? There is none of us that ought not to feel, that it is the common interest that the Revolution

should now stop: those who are losers should perceive that it is impossible now to make it retrograde, that there is nothing now to be done but to make it settle and fix: they who have been the authors of it, and its assistants, should perceive, that it has reached its appointed term; that the welfare of their country and their own glory require that it should continue no longer: even kings themselves, if truths so fundamental could obtain entrance into their counsels, ought to perceive, that even as far as *they* are concerned, there is a wide difference between a grand reform, and the abolition of royalty, and that if we do but stop here, they are still kings.

"Regenerators of the empire! Representatives of the French nation! follow on and persevere in your course. You have shown that you have courage to destroy the abuses of power, that you are competent to supply their place with wise and salutary institutions; prove then, that you have also the force and the wisdom to protect and to maintain them. The nation has just given a sufficient proof of its energy and its courage: it has produced, and it has solemnly exhibited its full opposition to the attacks with which it was menaced. Continue the same precautions: let our functions be powerfully defended, but at the same time with our power, let us prove our moderation; let us offer peace to the world, disquieted, as it is, by all the events that have taken place amongst us; let us offer an opportunity of triumph, a genuine satisfaction, to all those who in foreign countries have taken an interest in our Revolution. From every land they cry to us, 'You are powerful, but be wise, but be moderate.' It is here that you will find the last finishing point of your glory; it is thus that you will show, that as the circumstances vary, you have the different talents, means, and virtues, all ready for their occasion, and that you can show and employ them as the exigency may require."

It is very honourable to Barnave, that these were the sentiments with which he endeavoured to impress the minds of his countrymen on the present occasion, but it was in vain; he could produce no effect upon the violent party on either side, neither on the court nor the Jacobin club; and his speech becomes one of the lessons of the Revolution.

The Republican party, when they found the Constitutionalists too strong for them within the Assembly, immediately turned to their followers *without*. They got up a petition, as they called it, requiring the National Assembly to receive the abdication made by Louis; a petition declaring that he was a perjured and fugitive traitor, and that they would never acknowledge him for king unless the majority of the nation differed from them: and they finished by an insurrection against the Constitutionalists in the Champ de Mars. La Fayette and Bailly called out the powers intrusted to them to preserve the laws and the peace of their country: they acted upon the provisions, as we have described them, of their new Riot Act: several people were unhappily killed, but nothing could be more regular and justifiable than the behaviour of these magistrates. This was, however, the occasion on which, as I have mentioned, Bailly lost all his popularity, and the populace and the Republican party were so enraged, that he was afterwards dragged from his retirement, and for the discharge of his duty, publicly executed.

The Republican party could not, in this first effort to dethrone the monarch, succeed; they were prevented by La Fayette and Bailly: but on the 10th of August in the subsequent year of 1792, as is well known, they did. The allied powers had then openly interfered, and their victory was thus rendered easy. The great question that now, however, in the middle of 1791 remained, was the king's acceptance of the Constitution.

It can scarcely be believed possible, but the fact was, that every effort was made by the Royalists to prevent this acceptance, though it was quite clear that the king must immediately adopt this measure or descend from his throne.

Duport and Barnave were at last so alarmed themselves, and so alarmed the ministers, that Louis was prevailed upon to accept the Constitutional Act, purely and unconditionally. He sent a letter to the president to announce his intentions; it was judicious and dignified.

After stating his case to a certain degree and his reasons, "he accepted the Constitution," he said, "and engaged to maintain it at home, and to defend it from all attacks abroad,

and to cause it to be executed by all the means which it placed in his power."

He observed, "that he did not indeed perceive in those means so intrusted to him, all the energy that would be necessary to give motion and preserve unity in all the parts of a vast empire; but as opinions were divided on these subjects, he consented to their being left to the determination of experience; that if he faithfully used all the powers which had been placed in his hands, no blame could be thrown upon him; and the nation, whose interest alone ought to serve as a rule, might hereafter explain itself in the manner which the Constitution had provided.

"That the constitution being finally decreed, Frenchmen living under the same laws ought to know no other enemies but those who infringe them.

"Let us consent," said the king, as he concluded, "to an oblivion of the past, and let the accusations and the prosecutions, which have arisen from the events of the Revolution, be abandoned in a general reconciliation."

The Assembly sent a deputation to acquaint his majesty "that the reading of his letter had been interrupted by repeated applauses; that the Assembly partook of his majesty's desire to extinguish all animosities, and had hastened to pass, and now transmitted, a decree which obliterated every trace of a Revolution now concluded."

The king was greatly affected by the message; said, "the day would be memorable in history; that he wished it might put an end to discord, that it might unite all: I wish," said he, "that we may be but one."

Now, I must confess, that in these short state papers was traced, as far as I can judge, the good sense of the whole case, as it then stood at the close of the sitting of the Constituent Assembly; the case, that had at last resulted from all the mistakes, and follies, and faults, of all concerned. It was in vain now for any party to endeavour to punish the other for its offences; right or wrong, the Constitution was the issue at which they had all arrived,—it was the only chance left for law, order, peace, or the present or future establishment of civil liberty. The high party might turn to foreign powers and call for their interference; the low party might be

more and more determined on a republic, or a government that could not be distinguished from one; these parties might act and re-act upon each other: but this was for each to gratify their passions, not consult the interests of their country, or the interests of mankind; it was not to do credit either to the cause of right and order on the one side, as would be pretended by the high party, nor of liberty on the other, as would be pretended by the low; but to degrade and stain the sacred cause which each affected to regard,—to ruin and to destroy it by fury and violence, and anarchy and bloodshed. But it is too often thus: and the mortifications of any observer of the conduct of men, when acting in parties and bodies, are unceasing.

The Constituent Assembly was now dissolved. The scenes that took place in Paris, illuminations, rejoicings, &c. &c. you will read in the historians, and may easily conceive.

The observation with which Bertrand de Moleville concludes his account is this. "Thus terminated," says he, "this guilty Assembly, whose vanity, ambition, cupidity, ingratitude, ignorance, and audacity, have overturned the most ancient and the noblest monarchy of Europe, and rendered France the theatre of every crime, of every calamity, and of the most horrible catastrophe. Can these treacherous representatives ever justify themselves in the eyes of the nation for having so unworthily abused their confidence and their powers." This is the representation on one side.

"Spite of the faults," on the contrary, say the historians, the Two Friends of Liberty, "spite of the faults which the Constituent Assembly may be reproached with, and which were, in a great measure, the result of the circumstances in which they were placed, rather than their own, history has no period to show us in which so much and such great things have been done in so short a space of time. The constitution of 1791, with all its faults, for ever deserves the gratitude of the French people,—because it has destroyed, never to return, every trace of feudalism; imposts the most fatal to agriculture; the privileges of particular persons; the usurpations of the priesthood over the civil power, and the proud pretensions of ancient corporations; because it has realized what philosophy for ages has in vain wished, and what monarchs the most

absolute have never dared to undertake; and because it has established that uniformity, which no one could have ever hoped for, in an empire formed by gradual accretions from time to time, and with which, under a good government, there is no prosperity which France may not realize."

This is a representation very different from that of Bertrand, which you have just heard, and one far more reasonable. You will find a very strong indictment against the Constituent Assembly in Mounier: he reproaches them with many and great faults, and seems to see none of their merits. By Necker, the objections to their conduct are stated very fully but very calmly, and I think reasonably. "History," says his daughter, Me. de Stael, "ought to consider the Constituent Assembly under two points of view,—the abuses destroyed, the institutions created. Seen under the first point of view, the Constituent Assembly has very great claims to the gratitude of mankind; under the second, the most serious faults may be objected to the Assembly."

This last may be considered, I conceive, as a fair précis of the whole subject, but it is in general terms; and it is for you to consider the detail, and investigate the particulars, on which these general positions can be rested.

The later writers on the French Revolution, M. de Mignet and others, indulge themselves in these general positions, after the manner of Me. de Stael; but, very differently from that affecting writer, they resolve every thing into a sort of fatalism, which seems to absolve at once all the parties concerned in the Revolution from all charge of either folly or crime. Great general causes they hold must necessarily produce their effects; and all further inquiry, all praise or censure, it may hence be inferred (though they do not dare openly to infer it), are but a waste of time, and out of the question. This they do not exactly say, but this is the conclusion.

"We must require," says M. de Thiers (and Mignet is entirely of the same school of fatalism), "we must require from men, and from the talents of men, at every epoch, that only which they have it in their power to do. In the moment of a revolt against the injustice of ranks, how are men to acknowledge their necessity; how constitute an aristocracy, when it is against aristocracy that the war is raised? To

constitute royalty, indeed, would have been more possible, because it is placed at a greater distance from the people, has been less oppressive, and discharges functions that appear more necessary.

" But I repeat it," says M. de Thiers, " if these errors had not been in the Assembly, they would have been in the nation; and the course of events will show, that if the Assembly had left to the king and to the aristocracy all those powers which it did not leave them, the Revolution could not less have taken place, and that, in all its excesses." Indeed!

This is surely a most unexpected, most unreasonable, and, at the same time, most comfortless position for the historian to lay down.

" To convince ourselves of the truth of this," says he, " we must distinguish between revolutions that arise among a people long enslaved, and those who are free: no doubt there will be more difficulty in the one case than the other. At Rome, Athens, and elsewhere," he continues, " one sees the nations and their rulers contend with each other for more or less of authority. But in modern times, when the people have been quite despoiled, the case is different: thoroughly enslaved, they are for a long time torpid: the upper and more enlightened classes are roused at last; they start up, and recover a part of the power. This awakening, that has thus taken place, gradually descends, and so does the wish for power; it at last reaches the lower classes, till the whole mass is in movement. Soon satisfied with what they have obtained, the most enlightened classes wish to stop, but it is no longer in their power; they are incessantly trampled upon and pushed forward by those who follow them. Those who stop, though already almost the last, if they oppose the last, become in the eyes of the last an aristocracy, and are immediately so denominated; the bourgeois is called aristocrat by the artisan, and as such is persecuted and pursued.

" It is thus," he continues, " that in the Constituent Assembly we may observe those who are first enlightened, and who first exclaim against the power that is absolute over all; we may observe them wise enough to see what is due to those who have every thing, and those who have nothing: to the first, the Assembly would have left a part of what they had,

because they had possessed it always; and for the second, it would have procured the instruction and the benefits that in consequence of this instruction belonged to them. But with the one there is no sentiment but regret, nor with the other but ambition; the one would recover every thing, the other would require every thing; and a war of extermination is the result."

Such is the description given by the historian (not that I admit the description to be at any one moment exact), and no doubt he afterwards remonstrates with each party on the unreasonableness of their particular views; but the general effect of the whole representation is, that every thing in the way of folly, and fault, and crime, is the result of the operation of general principles, linked together by a sort of invincible necessity, which one may deplore indeed, but which we should in vain endeavour to burst through or prevent.

Now to all remarks of this kind in M. de Thiers, or M. de Mignet, or M. de Bailleul, or any other reasoner of their school (it is a revolutionary school, as far as we are now considering it), it may be surely replied, that what is said in the way of explanation is one thing, but to introduce the doctrine of necessity into the affairs of the world is quite another.

Men may be shown the motives that have operated on others, or that may hereafter be likely to operate upon themselves; this may be the philosophy of history; they may be told the nature of their temptations. All this is the proper office of the commentator on the past; but it is quite another thing to represent these temptations as irresistible, or to speak any language that can admit of any such interpretation. Let the historian explain the past; but could he not have equally explained it, whatever the past had been? Let him, then, do no more than explain; let him not thus talk of events as if they had been inevitable. Reason, and wisdom, and virtue, and every thing, human and divine, is at an end upon any such supposition. We have nothing but fate, necessity, and irresistible connexion,

"And helpless man, in ignorance sedate,
Rolls darkling down the torrent of his fate."

The discussions of the schools need surely not be introduced into the ordinary affairs of mankind, and the politics of the world.

I would wish to recall you, therefore, to the facts of the case, as I have endeavoured to exhibit them to you in the course of these lectures. Lose not yourselves in generalities like those, of these historians and commentators, but consider at each point the circumstances before you, and give your praise and your censure, and draw your lessons of instruction, as you are bound to do upon this occasion as on every other, on the supposition that all men, and more particularly patriots and rulers, are to resist the temptations of their situation; that they are to respect the rights and reasonable expectations of each other; that they are to do justice and love mercy, and not resolve every thing into a question of violence and force, and into a submission to what they call the irresistible influence of general causes and principles, till they wrap themselves and others in a desolating storm of anarchy and blood.

I have at every point of this fearful story stopped to compare and consider, to the best of my power, the mistakes and faults of every party in their turn; and you must do the same.

You must proceed on the supposition of mistakes and faults, of temptation and resistance, of wisdom and folly, of vice and virtue, as in private life so in public, as on a a smaller scale so on a larger; men must never be suffered to suppose, that they are not to proceed according to the ordinary moral interpretation of human actions, and when they have been guilty of faults or crimes, to talk of necessary motives, of the uncontrollable influence of the great principles which, after their faults and crimes have been committed, they say have been operating on the fortunes of this world, and therefore on their own particular conduct, as engaged in the affairs of the world. These are ready excuses for any enormity; and as they are refused to the criminal by the judge, so are they refused to the criminal by the historian.

And now that we have reached the period when the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, you must endeavour to estimate the conduct first of the Assembly, by placing before your view the facts, favourable and unfavourable; and next,

in like manner, that of the king, the court, and the public; finding explanations, if you please, of the conduct of both the one and the other, in such general principles as you may have observed to influence them, but not therefore excuses, still less justifications, least of all, reasons for supposing that all wisdom and counsel in the concerns of mankind are vain. And to proceed, then, upon the usual principles of human conduct, and after the usual manner of history, we may remark, that the Constituent Assembly procured for France many benefits that were most important, and that were permanent. Torture and judicial barbarisms were abolished; the commercial jurisprudence reformed; the principles of religious liberty acknowledged; monastic vows discountenanced and suppressed; *lettres de cachet* put an end to, and personal liberty rendered sacred; equality of taxation introduced; no interior customs allowed; provincial jealousies and animosities swept away, and an uniformity of administration every where established. Feudal rights were all annulled; all sorts of exclusions; and every shackle laid on industry removed; and a national force of an admirable nature instituted—the national guards: and it would be unjust to deny that this Assembly proclaimed the first principles of a free government. The Assembly may not have skilfully either interpreted or applied, but they constantly acknowledged them; and these eternal principles of truth, thus exhibited, can never be without their effect in calling the attention of the people of France, of Europe, and of the world itself, to the real end and meaning of all good government, the happiness of the people. Merits of this kind the Assembly may certainly claim for themselves, and they are great and lasting. Their mistakes and faults I have from time to time endeavoured to impress on your minds, for they were those of the leading members of the Assembly, who must be considered, on the whole, as the friends of freedom; and of such men the mistakes and faults (as I must for ever repeat) are above measure important.

They began too much from the first on a system of usurpation; they should have closed with the king and the court on the terms he proposed to them in the sitting of the 23rd. Again, when their victory was complete, after the 14th of July, they should have had the magnanimity to have trusted

the king, and made their terms good; given the executive power full strength, and rested on the force of public opinion, which was every where so clearly in their favour, so powerful, and if they had but reflected, so truly formidable: they were always too sweeping in their views, and too experimental in their measures. There is no difficulty in exposing the faults and inconveniences of any existing system, or the superior advantages that may be expected from a new one; the difficulty always is, how to introduce a new one, without inflicting misery and ruin, and throwing into a state of hostility those who have been brought up, or are benefited by the old one; even endangering in the course of the experiment, perhaps destroying, the happiness of the community. The proper management of this difficulty is, in truth, the great question at issue between Mr. Burke and the leaders of the Constituent Assembly; and Mr. Burke must be considered, I conceive, as having reason on his side, when he accuses them of not building sufficiently on old foundations; of being sanguine, rash, and presumptuous; of not proceeding after the manner of wise and regular statesmen; destroying the nobility and the right of primogeniture, and thus rendering monarchy impossible.

Even they who do not agree with me, while I thus far agree with Mr. Burke, will at least allow that they disregarded, in a manner totally unpardonable, the rights of property; that to the clergy they were cruel, unjust, and ungrateful; that they rested every thing too much and too long on the will of the people; that they debauched them by flattery and submission; and that they took no proper care to have the laws respected. Thus far the most popular reasoners must, I conceive, agree with me. The Assembly had a national force at their command, consisting very much of the middle ranks of society, and they ought to have taken care that the common feelings of mercy and justice were observed, and the brutal leaders of mobs punished, or they should have retired at once from the scene, and broken up their sittings in despair; or rather they should have done their duty, be the consequences what they might; and no duty was evidently more imperative upon them, than not to suffer themselves to be bullied and overpowered by tumultuous galleries and legislative clubs.

At the close of their sittings they made a vain effort against

these clubs, which should have been made a year and a half before, and though they saw the Republican party drawn up before them, rising in strength, and powerful in popularity, though they had only just put them down by force, they assented to the motion of Robespierre, voted themselves not eligible to the next Assembly, and left the king, whom they had not ceased to love, and the constitution which they had themselves made, to their fate. What mistake could be so obvious, or likely to be so fatal?

That the Assembly exerted themselves in the most laudable manner to protect the king and the monarchy, after the return from Varennes, is very true; but at periods before that return, I cannot see in the leaders of the Constituent Assembly that caution, wisdom, and forbearance, and that virtuous adherence to the great principles of human society which should distinguish the conduct of the friends of freedom; for without these, their efforts can never be successful.

For the court party, indeed, no defence whatever can be made. In every attempt to ameliorate the situation of their country, they resisted from the first the king, and every minister in his turn; they were always opposed to M. Necker; they fatally interfered in his conciliatory plan, produced by the king on the 23rd of June (the last chance of France); they brought forward the troops to dissolve or control the Assembly, though they knew the king would not suffer the troops to fire on the people; they then parted off from the king, and brought his cause into suspicion by tampering with foreign powers; they next turned away from the Constitutionalists even after the unsuccessful flight to Varennes; and they then made every effort to convert these foreign powers into invaders of their country, a measure scarcely in any conceivable case defensible, certainly not defensible in the existing situation of their country and of their king.

The king, in the mean time, was to have accumulated on his head the faults and mistakes of every party and his own. Whoever was wrong, whether himself or others, it was he who had to suffer; and of all the mortals that were ever called upon to rule among mankind, Louis XVI. must be considered as the most unfortunate.

LECTURE XXIV.

WAR WITH AUSTRIA.

WE now proceed to the history of the second Legislative Assembly.

The story of the French Revolution is afflicting in the extreme; the changes are rapid, and every change is for the worse. The vista darkens as we advance, and it seems to lead we know not whither.

The Legislative Assembly had no sooner met than it was quite clear that the Revolution had descended one step lower. Where before the court party had sat, were now found the Constitutionalists and the friends of La Fayette; and their former places on the left of the Assembly were now filled by men who considered themselves as the supporters of the cause of freedom, but who were far more violent in their expressions, and more republican in their tone, and who appeared many of them ready to urge the new opinions to far greater lengths than had been done by their former assertors; indeed, to any democratic lengths that could well be conceived possible.

These men were afterwards distinguished by the general names of Girondists and Jacobins.

The two fatal mistakes of the Constituent Assembly soon began to produce their full effect,—first, the mistake of rendering themselves ineligible to the Legislative Assembly; and again, the mistake of not making more early and more decisive efforts to put down the Jacobin clubs. Little or no attempt seems to have been made on the subject of the elections; the democratic clubs seem to have every where influenced the choice of the electors, and this should only have rendered the king and the court aware how difficult and perilous was their situation.

When the Assembly met, there was little disposition shown to pay proper respect to the king or his high office. It had been even intended to assimilate him to their president, by placing both on the same sort of chair; and though this was not done, the manner and reception of the Assembly were, on the whole, so humiliating in the apprehension of the king, that the unfortunate monarch was quite overcome by his feelings of mortification and despair; and on his return to the palace, burst into tears, lamenting to the queen that she should ever have come to France thus to see the degradation of its sovereign. Madame de Campan, who tells the story, says that the queen was obliged to desire her, as she stood motionless before them, to leave them, that she might no longer be a witness of her own confusion and distress, and the agony of the king.

You will now have to read the history of the Legislative Assembly: it continued sitting for ten months. It is, in truth, still the history of the conflict of the old and new opinions. For ten months you are to see the dreadful struggle that ensued.

The king and the Constitutionalists, the intermediate parties, in vain endeavouring, the king to prevent the shedding of blood and a civil war, and the Constitutionalists to save their country from the influence of foreign powers, and, at the same time, to repress the violence of the popular party, which was hastening to the dethronement of the king.

These efforts were vain. The faults of each and of all, you will have opportunity enough to observe. This struggle, then, between the supporters of the old régime, aided by the Constitutionalists, between these on the one side, and the Girondists and the Jacobins on the other, produced, first, the war with Austria, and, at length, the insurrection of the 10th of August, and the dethronement of the king.

The war with Austria was the great turn of the whole revolutionary history; and you cannot reflect upon the conduct of all the parties concerned too attentively: it must be the main subject of this lecture. Be not repelled by any tediousness in the discussion; this must be submitted to. I must again repeat that this war with Austria was the great

turn of the whole revolutionary history. The only chance of the king and the constitution, as it then stood, was peace.

You will easily comprehend that political reasoners will differ widely, and consider the war with Austria as defensive on the part of France, or not, very much as they think the cause of the Revolution was at the time favourable to the great and permanent interests of mankind, or not; the cause of freedom or of licentiousness.

You may see a debate in our own House of Commons, in February, 1800, where Mr. Pitt considers the war as unjust and unnecessary on the part of France; and Mr. Fox, on the contrary, as perfectly called for and unavoidable, from the menacing conduct of the German powers. Real grounds of difference no doubt existed, in consequence of the revolutionary proceedings of the Constituent Assembly with respect to the fiefs in Alsace, and on the subject of Avignon; but besides these causes of difference, there were others of a nature still more animating and important.

The followers of the court, and the supporters of the old régime, were continually flying to Germany, and were there received and patronised. While this was the case it was impossible to pacify the Girondists and the Jacobins on the one side; and, in the mean time, the Jacobins and Girondists were themselves making furious speeches, and carrying measures hostile to the king, to the monarchy, and the clergy: it was therefore equally impossible, on the other side, to calm the continental powers, or prevent them from thinking that in the Jacobins they saw only the enemies of the human race destroying their own country, in the first place, and preparing also to destroy, if successful, every civilized government in Europe. Whatever, therefore, had been the real grounds of difference between the two, they would have been lost and overwhelmed in the contention of such powerful motives of action as these. The great misery was, that there was no common ground for the two more extreme parties. The court for instance, the patrons of the old opinions, with the German powers, could not bear the Revolution under any possible modification or aspect; it was from the beginning, and through all its stages, insolence, injustice, and absurdity;

and they never would give their assistance to the Constitutionalists, the intermediate party. On the contrary, the more violent friends of freedom were determined that the Revolution should not be put down; that neither the court within, nor the foreign powers without, should restore the empire of what they considered tyranny and priestcraft, and in different ways "the enormous faith of many made for one." This at least is the plea, and the case of the Girondists and Jacobins, stated as they would themselves state it; and rather than suffer this, as they would have said, they were evidently ready to dethrone the king, erect a republic, or face any situation of anarchy and bloodshed that could be necessary. Political enthusiasm may reach the fury of religious enthusiasm, as it was shown in the present instance of France; and as the year 1792 rolled on, the general inflammation (whether with or without reason) of the revolutionary leaders, and of the people of France, and particularly of Paris, became totally desperate and ungovernable.

The king and his ministers were in the mean time placed in a situation singularly embarrassing.

The king had accepted the constitution, though he thought but ill of it; still he had publicly accepted it, and he had declared to his ministers, when confidentially questioned upon the point, that he meant faithfully to adhere to it. They were, therefore, to do the same; but they themselves thought worse of it than did their master; and both the one and the other conceived, that, by a regular administration of it, its total inefficiency for all the proper purposes of government would be shown; that material alterations must be the consequence; and that these must be made in favour of the royal power. Nor were they at all unwilling to receive, for any purpose of this kind, the assistance of the German powers: the king, as far as this was possible, without bloodshed and a civil war; his ministers and the court, at any risk and expense of violence and commotion; and both the one and the other contented themselves rather with a formal and exact administration of the power of the constitution according to the letter than according to the spirit of it. There were exceptions to this description of the king's ministers, Delessart Narbonne, Duport du Tertre; but I allude to the king's confidential

ministers and advisers, Bertrand de Moleville and others. The king studied the constitution minutely; but, under these circumstances, the jealousy and ill-humour of the patriotic party was incessant. It was easy to find subjects of complaint and grounds of distrust, particularly while the assembling of the French princes and emigrant nobility at Coblentz and other places, and the late flight of the king to Varennes, were facts so notorious, and appeared to speak their own lessons so distinctly. Whatever the king or the ministers might openly say in the way of remonstrance to the German powers, all, it was supposed, would be considered by them as null and void, and be perfectly understood; the king and his ministers were, therefore, held to be silently and insensibly betraying the cause of the Revolution, and preparing the country for subjugation by its enemies. And all this time the speeches of the Jacobins and members of the Legislative Assembly, accusing and vilifying the court and the ministers, only served to justify the king and his ministers in their unfavourable opinion of the constitution, and to confirm the French emigrants and German princes and sovereigns in their total abhorrence of it. Fear and jealousy are principles inaccessible to all reasoning and all evidence; and it was scarcely to be expected, under circumstances like these, amid the conflict of the new and old opinions, that a rupture between France and Germany should be avoided, or that the rupture should not be followed by calamities of the most afflicting nature.

I have made these preliminary observations that you may see the importance of the subject, and be therefore the better disposed to read the many debates in the Assembly, and the many memoirs and state papers that now present themselves to your perusal; many more than I can here consider, than I can even describe, than I could almost enumerate.

Indeed, there is no portion of the general subject at which we have yet arrived, so fitted to perplex and overwhelm the mind of the student, as the one now before us, from the multiplicity of the documents that exist, the delicate nature of the points to be considered, the difficulty with which a judgment can be formed, sometimes of the facts, sometimes of the principles concerned; and yet a rational student will

summon all his powers and attention to the task before him, for never was a subject presented to him more worthy of their exertion. These facts and these principles led immediately to the Austrian war, afterwards to the dethronement of the king, the invasion of France, the summoning of a convention, and the trial and execution of the sovereign. These are awful events, and even these are not all; they were followed by others but too well known and remembered; and some attempt to form a rational estimate of the subject before us must be made.

The circumstances, then, that led to the Austrian war, were, [illegible] differences that existed on account of the fiefs in Alsace, and the treatment of Avignon; and, 2ndly, the assembling of the emigrant princes and nobles, and the menaces, on the part of the German powers, of an interference in the affairs of France. We will advert to each in their order.

There is a very full account of these first differences between the German powers and the leaders of the French Revolution, on the subject of these fiefs, in Dodsley's Annual Register for 1790, in the beginning of the seventh chapter.

The Duke of Würtemburg with many other princes, both secular and ecclesiastical, held great possessions in Alsace and other provinces, which countries France had at different times wrenched from the empire; and though the paramount dominion had thus been transferred to France, these several districts, with all the ancient rights appertaining to them, had been secured, confirmed, and guaranteed to their proper and original possessors by the celebrated treaty of Westphalia, to which France was herself a party, and from which alone she could derive any legal title or claim to the provinces in question, of which those lesser fiefs composed a considerable part. But, alas! what were feudal rights and treaties of Westphalia to the Constituent Assembly on the night of the 4th of August, 1789; and how vain were any reasonable expectations that might be entertained by those who professed the old opinions, amidst the storm and uproar of the new. What were such rights, and treaties, and expectations, on that celebrated night? what could they ever be afterwards? The Assembly, indeed, so far recovered at last its sense of propriety as to vote an indemnity to the German princes; but the princes

had made regular appeals, after the ancient manner, to the Diet of the empire, had early become angry and inflamed, were not disposed to sell or barter their birthright, and professed not to understand the manner in which the French revolutionists were accustomed to turn all matters, however serious, to ridicule, which did not correspond with their own new ideas; and while the Assemblies, both Constituent and Legislative, only showed a sort of arrogant indifference, and only ordered the offer of indemnification to be repeated, the seeds were sown deep of severe and bitter animosity on the part of the powers of Germany, and they were made to hate the Revolution and all its abettors.

Again: you will see a good and shorter account given of the same subject by Coxe, in the fifty-fifth chapter of his "House of Austria."

You will find, also, in the Annual Register for 1790, and in a note of Coxe, the case of Avignon, which became another source of dissension. This town was the capital of countries that formed part of Provence, and they had been sold, in the fourteenth century, by Joanna, countess of Provence, to the popes. Avignon had been once the residence of popes, and was an integral part of the papal dominions. The whole district, however, had been originally comprised in the kingdom of Arles, and was still considered as a fief of the German empire. The emperors, as liege lords, had ratified the cession made by Joanna. But what an insult to the Abbé Sieyes and his eighty-three departments, and to all the new notions and the dignity of France, was the residence of a pope in one of her provinces! and who could venture to mention such a personage as Joanna, or the fourteenth century, or the ratification of a liege lord of the German empire, at a sitting of the Jacobin club? The result of the whole was, that the German States were convinced, from the treatment of their fiefs and the seizure of Avignon, that the new rulers of France were animated with a spirit of hostility and encroachment more than had ever inspired either Richelieu or Mazarin, or, even in the person of Louis XIV. had ever threatened the independence of the empire and of Europe.

These were the real differences that I alluded to as existing between rance and the German powers, and these dif-

ferences, in any common state of things, might have been adjusted by indemnifications and concessions on the one side and on the other. But these grounds of dissension or any grounds of dissension became far more deep and important amid the irreconcilable opposition of the old and new opinions that had now unfortunately taken place.

So much for the first part of the subject, the real differences to which we have referred on the subject of the fiefs and of Avignon.

But with respect to the second, the interference of Austria in the affairs of France, to form a judgment upon this also, is a task far more difficult in the accomplishment.

Nothing can be so easy as with Mr. Burke to look at the conduct and debates of the Legislative Assembly, and to see there nothing but fury and violence; to vote the Girondists, anarchists, the Jacobins, ruffians, and to call the war, on the part of France, a mere war of revolutionary injustice and rage. In like manner, nothing can be more easy, on the other side, than to say, that the cause of the court of Austria was the cause of kings from the first, and of kings against their people; and that the Girondists and Legislative Assembly had no alternative but to make Austria unmask herself as soon as possible, and defend their Revolution by open war against the attack she was meditating. Nothing can be more easy than these two opposite views of the question. The materials for the support of *each* are abundant, and the difficulty is immense for those who would wish to form a reasonable estimate of the conduct of all parties. I have found it so; and it was wearisome and disheartening in the extreme to go on for weeks and months assenting to opposite views and reasonings, each in their turn, first to the one and then to the other.

But from a fatigue and a misery of this kind I must now make what effort I can to protect you, who hear me. Without, therefore, dispersing our attention and losing our subject among the debates and memoirs that present themselves, I shall propose to you to look patiently at the state papers, and see what all these conflicting views and opinions really come to, and what are the practical results from time to time. I conceive this is a clue that will lead you through

the labyrinth tolerably well, if you will follow the thread calmly and with proper perseverance.

These state papers you will find, sufficiently for your purpose, in the Annual Register for 1792, part ii.; but they are not placed in their proper order, and you must follow the dates, beginning with the earliest.

In my first rough draught of the lecture I am now giving, I had here proceeded to give extracts from these state papers at some length, which I had meant to read to you, and which I thought would have put you in immediate possession of the merits of the case, and have, at the same time, justified the view of it which I intended ultimately to propose to your consideration.

But the style of state papers, even when they are sincere and honest, is so formal, so many words are employed to limit, and guard, and properly express what is meant, that extracts from them, however curious and important, produced in the way I have mentioned, would, I afterwards thought, be wearisome to you, and even somewhat difficult at the moment, exactly and entirely to comprehend. I have therefore thought it best to give you some general notion of these state papers, in some more broken and irregular manner, using the words of them whenever I could, and exhibiting to you what I conceive to have been, on the whole, the drift and purport of them. My appreciation of them you must therefore for the present suppose to be just, and take for granted; but only for the present. I must depend on your reading them. They are not many in number. When read, though not perhaps when only heard, they can be sufficiently comprehended. They led to such important results that they must be considered.

To advert then to these state papers. They begin with a manifesto from the French nation, sent to all the courts of Europe, professing a love of peace, but declaring that France could not consider that as a friendly territory, in which existed an army, waiting only the prospect of success, for the moment of attack.

All this, you will see, was directed against the German powers for protecting the emigrants, allowing them to assemble at Coblentz, &c. &c.

The elector of Treves was more particularly alluded to. Some official notes are interchanged; but at last, on the 16th of January, 1792, the French king informs the Legislative Assembly, that his minister at Treves declares, "that the dispersion of the emigrants is as real and as complete, as the nation had desired and the king directed."

On the whole you will see, that on this particular point concessions were made by the Elector of Treves and the Emperor Leopold.

But soon after, on the 25th of January, 1792, the Legislative Assembly renew their accusations and complaints against the emperor, whom they consider as having formed a concert injurious to the sovereignty and safety of the French nation. They state their reasons for thinking so, and the French ambassador is ordered to require proper explanations from the imperial court.

"It is apprehended (the ambassador in consequence declared to that court) that there does indeed exist a combination between the principal powers of Europe, for the purpose of producing some change in the French constitution; that a congress is to be established; that uniting their powers and their means, they will endeavour to force the king and the nation to accept those laws which they may make."

Allusions were made in this state paper to various steps that had been taken by Leopold to combine the German powers into a sort of union, to protect the king and the monarchy of France from the outrages and machinations of the democratic leaders, and more particularly the Jacobin clubs and popular societies.

Such was the real purport of the French remonstrance to the Court of Vienna in January, 1792. When you look at it, you will see that the whole matter was brought to an issue. "Do you," it said to the emperor, "and will you, interfere against the French Revolution, or not?" This was the real meaning of the whole; and it now becomes an object of great curiosity to see, when thus pressed, what was the answer which the Austrian cabinet returned.

The explanation then that was returned, as you will find, came to this:—That there had originally existed a necessity for the concert of the sovereign powers, and that it had there-

fore been formed—this was not at all denied—but that since the king had accepted the Constitution, it had been suspended.

I will quote a paragraph or two from the reply of the Austrian court.

"When France gave to Europe," says the reply, "the spectacle of a lawful king, forced by atrocious violence to fly; protesting solemnly against the acquiescence which they had extorted from him, and a little afterwards stopped and detained prisoner by his subjects: yes, it then *did* concern the brother-in-law and the ally of the king, to invite the other powers of Europe to join with him in a declaration to France, that they all view the cause of his Most Christian majesty as their own; that they demand that this prince and his family be set at liberty and have power to go where they please; and they require for these royal personages inviolability and due respect, which by the laws of nature and of nations, are due from subjects to their princes; that they will unite to avenge, in the most signal manner, every further attempt that may be committed, or may be suffered to be committed, against the liberty, the honour, and the safety of the king, the queen, and the royal family; and that finally, they will not acknowledge as constitutional, and legally established in France, any laws but those which shall have the voluntary acquiescence of the king, enjoying perfect liberty.

"But if, on the other hand, these demands are not complied with, they will in concert employ all the means in their reach to put a stop to the scandalous usurpation of power which bears the appearance of an open rebellion, and which, from the danger of the example, it concerns all the governments of Europe to repress.

"These," says the reply, "are the terms of the declaration which the emperor proposed, in the month of July, 1791, to the principal sovereigns of Europe to be made to France, and to be adopted as the basis of a general concert. He defies a word to be found which is not sanctioned by all the principles most sacred in the law of nations; and is it pretended that the French nation has raised itself, by its new constitution, above the universal law of all countries in all ages?"

Such is the language of the reply, not very unnatural, it

must be allowed, from the Austrian court, on the subject of the concert of the allied powers that had been formed against the violent proceedings in France. But this concert was declared to be *suspended*. What, then, was the language of the same court on this most important point of the suspension?

The words of the Austrian reply are these:—"This suspension," it says, "was caused by the king's acceptance of the constitution, and by the appearance that he had done it freely, and in hopes that the dangers which threatened the liberty, the honour, and the safety of the king and royal family, as also the existence of the monarchy of France, would cease in future. It is only in case these dangers shall be reproduced that the concert will again resume its activity."

Such was the reply and explanation of the emperor on the original concert of the sovereigns and its subsequent suspension; nor can it be denied that it was sufficiently explicit. The celebrated letter from Padua, and the treaty at Pilnitz, &c. &c., were, it seems, all to be considered as no longer in operation, the king being now at liberty, and having accepted the constitution. But then it was to be observed that they were suspended—no more. The right of interfering in the affairs of France was, therefore, maintained. The concert of the sovereigns was only suspended while the king and royal family were well treated; and what was more, while the form of government was monarchical. Such was the explanation and the answer of the Austrian court.

Now these, it must be observed, were conditions, as it were, prescribed to the French nation by the allied powers; and to make conditions of this kind cannot but be considered as trenching upon the independence and sovereignty of a great people. It was impossible that they should not be so considered in France.

I do not at all deny that it was very natural for the emperor and even the German powers to feel as they did. Though we may ourselves have far different notions of civil liberty and the rights of the community from any that can have been supposed to be entertained by the sovereign and princes of Germany, still it is not very possible for us, ourselves, to behold, without indignation as well as regret, the lengths to which the patrons of the new opinions proceeded, even while

the Constituent Assembly was sitting; and we neither wonder at the flight of the king, nor refuse our sympathy with the feelings he expressed in his parting manifesto addressed to the Assembly. Even on the present occasion, I am far from saying that we can refuse to acknowledge as generous and just the sentiment at least, that pervades the extracts I have quoted from the Austrian reply, the sentiment of resentment excited by the injustice and wrong committed by the French nation against a monarch that surely had deserved a kinder treatment from a civilized people. But the question is, how this sentiment was to be exhibited; what direction, without justly offending an independent people, this sentiment was to take; what conduct, what measures were to result from it; how it was to be made useful to the unfortunate king and his family; how best it could support the monarchy of France; how it was to be made subservient to the cause of order, of peace, and good government upon earth. This was indeed a question, the delicacy and difficulty of which the German courts seem little to have comprehended at the time, and still less the emigrant French princes and nobility. These observations on the one side and on the other I must leave to your consideration.

We give the German powers full credit for the sincerity of their professions; I see not, at this particular period, why it should be refused them. Subsequently, indeed, their manifestoes were of a different nature, but I am addressing myself to those which are now before us; and the first are always, in a moral point of view, the most important.

To return, however, to our subject. Whatever we may think of the reply of the Austrian court, and even we ourselves have been compelled to protest against the sort of menacing interference and superintendence which it intimated over the interior concerns of an independent people; whatever may be our own sentiments on this occasion, it will easily be supposed that this sort of reply, that we have quoted, could not but fortify the democratic writers and speakers of the Assembly and Jacobin Club in their representations, that the allied powers meant only to assert the cause of kings, meant only to produce a counter-revolution.

But the Austrian reply did not stop where we have stopped,

for it proceeded to make other observations, which, though but too much founded in truth, went still further to exemplify an interference in the affairs of France, and to push that system of interference still further beyond the limits which the honour and sovereignty of an independent nation can admit. The reply, in short, went on to comment on the practices of the Jacobins and the more violent leaders of the Revolution.

"No," says the reply, "the true cause of this ferment is the influence and violence of the Republican party, condemned by the principles of the constitution, and proscribed by the Constituent Assembly; a party, whose ascendance in the present legislature has been viewed with dread by all those who have the good of France at heart.

"It is the violence of this party which produced those crimes and scenes of horror which disgraced the commencement of the reformation of the French constitution, called for and secured by the king himself, and the consummation of which Europe would have seen with unconcern, had not attempts, forbidden by all laws, human and divine, forced foreign powers to unite for the preservation of the public tranquillity, and for the safety and honour of crowns.

"It is the agitations of this party, who, since the new constitution has declared the inviolability of the monarchy, invariably seek to overthrow and sap its principles," &c. &c.

"As they well know," continues the reply, "that the majority of the nation is unwilling to adopt their system of a republic, or more properly of anarchy, and as they despair of succeeding to bring it about, if tranquillity should be established in the interior of the nation and peace preserved with the surrounding powers, they direct all their efforts to foster the internal troubles, and bring on a foreign war."

The reply then proceeds still further to describe and to reprobate the practices of this particular party in France against their own country and against foreign powers, and then observes, "that notwithstanding these offensive proceedings, the emperor will give to France the clearest proof of the constant sincerity of his attachment by preserving, on his part, that quiet and moderation which his friendly concern for the situation of the kingdom inspires. He does justice to

the personal sentiments of the king, his brother-in-law. He is far from ascribing such measures to the majority of the nation, who either groan under the evils produced by a frantic party, or involuntarily take a part in the errors and prejudices which are instilled into them against the conduct of his imperial majesty."

"Finally," says the reply, "it is with the same amicable view that the emperor opposes truth to malevolence, being persuaded that his Most Christian majesty and the sound and major part of the nation will plainly see the professions and actions of a sincere friendship, and be much obliged to him for dissipating freely and without management the illusions to which it is intended they should fall victims."

Now certainly this reference to a frantic faction, this distinction made between this party and the sound and major part of the nation, was not to be justified on any principles of international law, nor likely to lead to any system of amity and peace between the two nations; nor, finally, at all fitted to serve the cause of the king, or the cause of order and good government in France.

This may, I think, be said, supposing the intentions of the emperor to have been every thing that they pretended to be. But you must judge for yourselves. I have quoted from this state paper at greater length than I had at first intended, that you may be able, as immediately as possible, to form some judgment of the subject before you. You see evidently here displayed the conflict of the new opinions and the old.

You will perceive it still more in the debates of the Legislative Assembly and the proceedings of the Jacobin club. By one unhappy circumstance and another, mankind had got elevated into a most frightful state of excitation, and this so early as the beginning of 1792; and on every account the prospect both to France and to Europe was tremendous.

This reply of the court of Austria was sent to the French ambassador, accompanied by a note from the Austrian minister, Prince de Kaunitz, stating still further the opinion of the emperor, on the character and practices of the Jacobins, "as a pernicious sect, the enemies of the Most Christian king and of the fundamental principles of the present constitution, and the disturbers of peace and public repose;" and the envoy of

the king of Prussia informed the French minister at Paris that the Austrian dispatch contained the principles on which the courts of Berlin and Vienna were perfectly in concert.

The question now is, what was the conduct of France? Was the matter suffered here to rest? That could scarcely be expected; but certainly, in the event, a very dignified forbearance was shown in the next French dispatch on the subject of the Jacobins and all that was so justly offensive in the Austrian note. "The king," replies the next French note, "thinks that it neither becomes the dignity nor the independence of the nation to discuss objects which he is of opinion relate to the internal concerns of the kingdom; but his majesty observes the assurances given in the name of the emperor, that far from supporting the projects and pretensions of the emigrants, he was desirous to convince the French nation of the falsehood of those reports which had been propagated against his imperial majesty, and which impute to him designs against the safety and independence of France, by plans and alliances tending to interfere in the government and overturn the constitution.

"His majesty," the note goes on to say, "has found in the answer of the deceased emperor (Leopold had just died) some amicable and pacific overtures, and he has received them with pleasure."

The note is calm and decorous, and respectful; but it declares, that the king cannot behold without uneasiness a confederacy, the object of which appears to give just cause of alarm, and that in consequence, he demands of his ally, the emperor, to abandon that confederacy, and to renew his assurances of peace and union.

The great point therefore you observe was still at issue between the two courts. The confederacy, however its original intentions might be resigned, or rather suspended, was still existing, and its very existence was thought by France a measure of hostility: the new emperor was therefore required to abandon it, and return to his former state of amity and alliance with the French nation. The note afterwards went on to observe, that the French king charged his ambassador to promise, that as soon as his imperial majesty shall have engaged to discontinue all preparations for war in his domi-

nions, and to reduce his military forces in the Low Countries to the footing they were on, at the 1st of August, 1791, his majesty will also discontinue all preparations, and will reduce the French troops in the frontier departments to the ordinary state of the garrisons.

The whole affair then, you may remark, was reduced to these two points; first, of the confederacy, and secondly, the troops in the Low Countries; distinctly; but without any intemperate observation, in reply to the Austrian remarks on the state of the French government and the parties of the state: and this forbearance must be considered as conciliatory on the part of France, as becoming, and as very creditable, to the French minister, Delessart.

What was now then the language of Austria? Was the great point of the confederacy given up, or at all modified; or any new assurance or promise on the subject of interference made? The answer was this, and you will observe it, as it turned out to be the ultimatum of the Austrian court, this answer of the 18th of March.

"The king of Hungary and Bohemia (afterwards the Emperor Francis) knows not of any armament, or any measures in the Austrian states, which can be denominated preparations for war. The defensive measures ordered by his late imperial majesty, are not to be compared with the hostile measures of France; and as to those which his apostolic majesty shall judge necessary for the security and tranquillity of his own territories, and above all, for stifling the troubles which the example of France, and the criminal proceedings of the Jacobin party, foment in the Belgic provinces, he neither can, nor ever will, consent previously to tie up his hands with any one whomsoever, nor has any one a right to prescribe limits to his conduct."

Such was the Austrian reply with respect to *one* of the points at issue, that of the troops; and the propriety of it depends evidently on the state of the facts. The enthusiasm, however, of the new opinions in Paris was so violent, and those who professed them were so animated with a spirit of proselytism, that there can be no doubt that this Austrian reply was, so far as their Belgic provinces were concerned, very reasonable, and perfectly justified, by all the existing

circumstances of the case, though this was loudly denied by the French patriots. But on the second and main point the answer was this:—

"With respect to the concert in which his late imperial majesty engaged with the most respectable powers of Europe, the king of Hungary and Bohemia cannot anticipate their common opinions and determinations; but he does not believe that they will judge it expedient to dissolve the concert until France shall have removed the causes which provoked or necessitated the opening of it. His majesty on his part expects this the more, as he presumes too much on the justice and reason of a nation, distinguished by its mildness and wisdom, to abandon the hope, that it will not be slow to withdraw its dignity, independence, and repose, from the attempts of a sanguinary and furious faction which promotes anarchy, in order to destroy, by insurrection and popular violence, all exercise of all sorts of authority, laws, and principles, and by an illusive mockery of words, is attempting to rob the Most Christian king of his liberty, to destroy every constitution and all regular governments, and to violate the faith of the most solemn treaties, and the duties of the most sacred public rights.

"But should their designs and their artifices prevail, his majesty (the king of Hungary and Bohemia) flatters himself that at least the sound and principal part of the nation will then behold, as a prospect of consolation and support, the existence of a concert, whose intentions are worthy of their confidence, in the most important crisis which has ever affected the common interests of Europe."

Such was the reply, the ultimatum in fact of the Austrian court.

Now this was certainly not at all to withdraw or modify the confederacy, but to say clearly that it existed, and that however it might tolerate the Constitutionalists, that it could not tolerate what it called a sanguinary and furious faction, and that it expected the sound and principal part of the nation would have recourse to the confederacy for support against this faction, if it prevailed; and under this term faction, the Giron dists, as well as the Jacobins, that is, the main rulers of France at the time, must have considered themselves as included.

The question then is, was this an interference in the internal affairs of France, that justified a declaration of war on the part of France, or not?

This is a point on which, under the extraordinary circumstances of the case, reasoners may differ, but I conceive that it was. The rulers of France at the time saw themselves menaced, stigmatized, and as nearly as possible proscribed, by a foreign power, on account of their conduct to their own king, in their own country.

They could expect nothing but exile, imprisonment, and death, if these foreign powers invaded their country in defence of the monarchy and succeeded; and not only this, but in that case a counter revolution was inevitable; and finally, whether the allied powers were likely to invade their country or not, depended merely on their own views of their chances of success. As men therefore, and as patriots, the question of war was to them merely a matter of prudence. They were menaced, and they were to anticipate the designs of the allied powers by an open rupture, or they were to remain at peace, and take the chance of some favourable alteration in their councils, just as they thought the safety of their lives and the interests of their Revolution required.

The law of nations, I apprehend, was with them; and the only points they had to consider were those I have mentioned.

The violent party in Paris took little time to decide. Delessart, the minister for foreign affairs, was dismissed and disgraced as too spiritless and temporizing. Dumourier, then a sort of Girondist, was called in to conduct the negotiations, in what was called a less feeble manner. This produced an animated dispatch, the purport of which was to show the court of Austria, that they were mistaking their true interests in going to war. This was followed by another, in which Dumourier set himself to refute all the reasonings of the Austrian court; "that it was impossible to believe that troops were sent into the Brisgau, those in the Milanois reinforced, and an army forming, attended with a train of besieging artillery and immense magazines, for the purpose of maintaining tranquillity in the Netherlands; that there

was no reason why the concert of the different courts should continue on the same ground as before, that is, depending on events; that the French government possessed strength, and rested on a firm basis; that it had nothing to do with a republican system; that a league formed against France must be for the purpose of dividing her spoils; that if the successor of Leopold was willing to observe his treaties with France, he must, without hesitation, break off those which he had made unknown to her, and with hostile intentions against her, and he must withdraw those troops by which she was threatened."

"Endeavour, sir," said Dumourier to his ambassador, "to finish this negotiation some way or other before the 15th of April. If from this moment to that epoch, we should be informed that the troops remain on the frontiers and receive reinforcements, it will no longer be possible to restrain the just indignation of a spirited and free nation, which it is attempted to debase, to intimidate, or to impose upon, until all preparations be ready to attack it."

The ambassador, in his answer to Dumourier, describes a conference which he, in consequence of his dispatch, had held with the Austrian minister; and the result of the whole was, a declaration from Austria, that the note of the 18th of March, to which I have already so particularly directed your attention, contained their answer to the demands that had been renewed by France, and that the disposition expressed in that note, it was observed, could be the less altered, since it contained also the opinion of the king of Prussia upon the affairs of France, an opinion agreeing in all respects with that of the king of Hungary.

The consequence was, a declaration of war on the part of France, against the king of Hungary and Bohemia.

You will see in the Annual Register the report read to the Assembly, as an exhibition of the case of France, by Dumourier, and afterwards on the other side, the proclamation of the government of Brussels: this last state paper, though no doubt but too descriptive of the unjustifiable proceedings of the French enthusiasts, must be considered rather as a manifesto against approaching invaders, than a calm statement of

a case. You must afterwards read the counter declaration of the court of Vienna against France, which is the most regular and decorous of the three.

None of these papers place this great subject in any new light: the main point at issue is evidently that of the interference. "It merely depended," says this final declaration from Austria, "it merely depended on those who at present reign over France, to make this concert cease immediately, by respecting the tranquillity and the rights of other powers, and to guarantee the essential basis of the French monarchical form of government against the infringements of violence and anarchy.

"Every cause of uneasiness would have ceased, if such dispositions had prevailed in France, and the whole court of Vienna, far from justifying any blame of its views, would have evinced its ingenuousness and moderation.

"Those who reign in France," says this counter declaration in conclusion, "pretend that the sovereignty of the French nation is injured by the establishment of a concert, whose first view has been to save the only lawful sovereign of France, while they, in the mean time, daily attack and provoke all the sovereigns of Europe in the most inconsiderate manner and with the bitterest invective. In short, they dispute with the crowns the participation and the right of interfering in or being concerned about the consequences of their new constitution, whilst they, with all their might, endeavour to subvert all governments, by spreading all over Europe the bane of seduction and insurrection."

These are the points insisted upon in the Austrian defence, and they are the real points of the case, no doubt. You see here distinctly the conflict of the new and old opinions. Their supporters could no longer keep any terms with each other.

And again, you will perceive, on the other hand, that these points are also properly stated on their part by the Legislative Assembly, in their decree of war, on the 20th of April.

But the Assembly very judiciously commissioned the celebrated Condorcet to exhibit their case in a distinct exposition of their motives, and this he has done, and with great ability; and you will find the paper in the notes of the History of

Thiers, vol. ii.; nor can you be said to have finished the consideration of the subject, till you have weighed the arguments he employs. He addresses himself more particularly to the real and main point—the interference of the foreign powers.

"The French people," says he, "free to fix the form of their government, can in no respect have injured, while using this power, either the safety or the honour of foreign crowns. Are the rulers of other countries, are they to include in the number of their prerogatives a right to oblige the French nation to give to the head of their government the same power, which they themselves exercise in their own dominions? Because they have subjects, do they mean to prevent the existence of free men elsewhere? How is it that they do not see that in allowing themselves to do every thing for what they call the safety of crowns, they declare lawful every thing that a nation can in like manner do for the liberty of another people?"

"If violence and if crimes," he says, "have accompanied particular seasons of the French Revolution, it was to the depositaries of the national will that alone belonged the power of punishing them, or of burying them in oblivion. Citizen or magistrate, whatever be his title, no one can demand justice but from the laws of his own country; he can expect it from no other. Foreign powers, while their subjects have not suffered from these events, can have no just reason either to complain of them, or to take hostile measures to prevent their repetition.

"These pretended motives, therefore, of a league against France," he continues, "are but a new outrage to its independence. France has a right to require a renunciation of such offensive preparations, and to consider a refusal as an act of hostility. It is to make changes in her constitution; it is to violate that equality which she has made the basis of her system. It is these that are alone the object of the enemies of France. They wish to punish her for having acknowledged in all their extent the rights that are common to all men."

Paragraphs like these will give you for the present a sufficient idea of this exposition, by Condorcet, which at

last becomes a very animated and eloquent appeal to the French people, calling upon them to resist their enemies, and to conquer or perish with their constitution and their laws.

Such is, I think, a fair exhibition of this subject of the war with Austria. You may now look at the memoirs and the histories; and if you have already done so, you may look at them again. No doubt there is a sort of esoteric history and exoteric history of every thing, and these memoirs and histories may explain to you how these state papers came to be, what you see them; but I have been myself, as I have already told you, lost, and perplexed, and overpowered to weariness and despair, amidst these memoirs and histories, amidst their conflicting views and opinions, statements and facts. I have found, as I thought, relief, by attending to these state papers, by following where they led me. It is by their state papers that nations and parties must be tried; it is by these that they are content to be tried.

It is in these that they appear to posterity and the world; and the only question always is, how far they are sincere.

In the case before us I see no sufficient reason to doubt the sincerity of either party. The leaders of the French Revolution had gone such lengths that the Austrian court and the supporters of the old opinions may have truly felt, and perfectly thought, every thing that these state papers express, and not at all meant the division of France or the sharing of her spoils; and the conduct of the emigrants, and the electors of Germany, and the emperor and king of Prussia had been such, and such was also the situation in which these French leaders were placed, that they might on their part very thoroughly believe that they should be sooner or later invaded; that at all events they were menaced; that the concert openly avowed in the face of Europe, was an affront to the independence and sovereignty of their country; that it was in itself a justification of war; and finally, if this concert was not resisted, while the enthusiasm of the French people was fresh and warm, that a counter revolution might ultimately be the consequence. I must confess, that with all my horror of war, of counsels of violence of enthusiastic and furious men like

these Girondists, and of dreadful and guilty men like these Jacobins, I must confess that on this particular point of the Austrian war, I am, on the whole, compelled to agree with them. It was reduced to a question of prudence; they had a right to wage it, if they thought fit; whether prudent or not is a subsequent question. I see not how, upon any other principle, the peace of the world can be maintained, or the proper sovereignty and independence of nations be preserved, nor finally, upon any other principle, what chance there can ever be for the general cause of the freedom of mankind.

LECTURE XXV.

GIRONDISTS, ETC. ROLAND. DUMOURIER.

AUSTRIA might have no right to complain if France declared war against her, but whether France was wise in doing so is quite another question. Nations are to maintain the character of their independence. It can never be their wisdom to be otherwise than perfectly alive to such considerations; but the circumstances in which the country was placed were quite unexampled, and the leaders of the Legislative Assembly, and under their influence, Dumourier and the last Girondist ministry so conducted themselves, that the war seemed at length defensive rather on the part of Austria than of France.

Men are always so eager to go to war, war is always so dreadful a calamity, that through the whole of these lectures I have never lost any opportunity of exhibiting to you, what I conceive to be the folly of mankind on this tremendous subject. It is the great instruction of history; and because after a war, as after the eruption of a volcano, a country does not disappear, or a community does not cease to exist—because our planet rolls on as before, men seem insensible to its nature, to the crimes and cruelties that it produces, and the afflictions and agonies by which it is attended. Observe on this occasion the Legislative Assembly.

It was in vain that the deputy, Hua, insisted, "that the question was far too important to be treated in an evening sitting, at a moment when the passions, agitated on so many accounts, might hurry France down an abyss of unexampled calamities." (I translate from the historian). He was refuted by murmurs. "No doubt," said the deputy Pastoret on the other side, "we must not be carried away by enthusiasm; we, above all others, the legislators of a great empire;

but are our provocations only an affair of yesterday? Is not our patience yet sufficiently clear? Are we, even *now*, to be accused of enthusiasm? . . . . It is surely time to break away from this long state of uncertainty; it is time that we should see a great nation display all its courage, and all the force of its will, in defending the cause of its liberty, and in that, the universal cause of every people. Yes, liberty is now to triumph, or despotism to destroy us; never have the French people been called to higher destinies. Knowing, as we do, the courage of the national guards, the zeal they have shown in defence of their country, can we doubt the success of a war undertaken under such auspices? Victory will be faithful, nor desert the cause of freedom; and soldier citizens, and citizen soldiers, will rush forward with equal emotion to defend her and to secure her by their triumphs. Never has the French nation better felt the necessity at once of glory and of independence."

To sentiments like these, so elevated and imposing, it was not possible to offer resistance; one voice, however, was heard above the storm. Observe how reasonable, as France was then situated, were the remarks that follow.

"If ever," said the deputy Becquer, "there is a moment when a nation requires a calm, it is immediately after the concussions of a great Revolution. The violent movements that accompany the destruction of ancient abuses, cause inevitably a number of individual calamities, that can only be repaired in the bosom of peace. To call for war under circumstances like these, is to call for the prolongation of every affliction and distress, and to retard the return of the national prosperity. New institutions can only have a trial in seasons of tranquillity and repose; war, on the contrary, is a state of crisis that unceasingly, while it lasts, opposes itself to every regular movement of the body politic; and every nation therefore that wishes to regenerate its institutions, must carefully avoid war. But never was the general principle so applicable as to us. Our constitution is not yet firmly established; our constituted authorities, as yet, are uncertain in their march, and the law obtains not, as yet, the obedience which doubtless it will at length obtain, when it has become to us a habit and a duty; intestine dissensions

agitate our departments. If our armies are fighting abroad, who shall restrain the seditious at home? And there is another point to be considered, that of the finances: our finances require some years of repose to re-establish them in any order. I know the prodigies that are to be expected from the valour of Frenchmen fighting for their liberty; but what, if the war is to become general, and we are to sustain it?"

The deputy then went on to show (observe the reasonableness of his views), that the first hostilities must take place in Brabant; that England would necessarily interfere, still more, if Holland was to be endangered; and that in short, every thing which turned the scale in favour of France, would necessarily be to England an occasion of inquietude and of arms. "And why," he cried, "why thus rush into a war? Why call down this most cruel of calamities? Above all, why say that it is inevitable, while all the powers have an interest opposed to it, and declare that they wish not to attack us?

"A concert between Austria and Prussia is supposed. No doubt the nation has very just reason to complain of this coalition of kings; no doubt the court of Vienna has been wrong, and we ought not to suffer her to usurp a sovereignty over us by an interference in our internal administration. But supposing that these powers refuse to renounce this concert, would this be a sufficient reason for declaring war against them? Are we to declare it for a mere suspicion, for a mere menace that has no real meaning? This concert is but a system defensive on their parts, and one which they have adopted out of regard to themselves, *not* hostility to us."

These last few sentences of the deputy are, I think, decisive of the question, as to the necessity of the war on the part of France. I do not say the exact right, but the prudence, the expediency of it, and the immediate necessity of it. I must confess, too, my reverence for the great maxim—"justa bella, quibus necessaria."

"Can we possibly require them," continues the deputy, "in the midst of the general effervescence every where visible in France, when the sounds of war have been heard within these walls, can we possibly require foreign powers to repose

upon our declaration, that we will renounce all schemes of conquest; require them to take no defensive measures, while the ardour and impetuosity of our national guards is eternally menacing them with invasion? The truth is, that if after all this we attack Austria, we shall force all the sovereigns of the world to unite in a league against us; for they will feel that their thrones are shaking under them, and that they have a common cause to maintain in this struggle between liberty and despotism. A free nation, shall it be guilty of such a breach of neutrality, as to call down upon neighbouring nations all the calamities of war, to revenge itself for insult offered it by a mere minister? False would be the glory that could arise from avenging any outrages of a nature like this. Let us renounce then an enterprise which has no reasonable object; let us defend ourselves if any power should dare to attack us; this, and no more. If with this we are content, we shall, in all probability, have no war, for it will be the interest of none of them to wage it against us: on the contrary, by provoking them to war, we shall prejudice our own cause in the eyes of all neighbouring nations; they will consider us as aggressors; they will represent us as a restless people, that disturb the peace of Europe in contempt of treaties, and even of our own laws. You will then have to combat, not only the despots, but the people themselves, armed against you by the hatred which you will so naturally inspire, as the disturbers of their country's repose."

But observations of this calm and very reasonable nature, often, as you will have remarked, quite prophetic, were in vain submitted to the consideration of the Assembly. It is ever thus: and it was the deputy who rose to reply, and others on the same side the question, who found, as usual, an audience disposed to listen and applaud. The violent party entirely prevailed, though at this period peace and repose might have been the preservation of France and her liberties; certainly was her only chance.

And now I stop for a moment to observe, as I have before observed, and shall have for ever to observe, that the French Assemblies and French people rushed into all sorts of mistakes and crimes, not from want of able and virtuous men to

counsel them aright—far from it—such men were always found; and were you to commit the error of supposing otherwise, you would not sufficiently estimate the warning that this French Revolution holds up, in every part and portion of it, to all men of ardent minds, if they mean well. Able and virtuous counsellors, who spoke the words of caution and moderation, and justice, and humanity, were by such men not regarded; and this is the great lesson.

On the whole of the case before us it may be observed, that it is truly melancholy to see a great question like this, in the affairs of mankind, brought to an issue so tremendous as that of war; to see that the parties concerned, all of them, committed the faults to which they were exposed.

It was the business, for instance, of the Girondists and Jacobins, to have left the German powers no excuse for assisting the emigrants; to have observed minutely all the relations of peace and amity between France and other independent powers; to have violated no feudal claims and no ancient treaties; and not to have supposed, that the world was to be submitted on a sudden, to the particular system of their *new* opinions. But their conduct was very different. And in like manner, it was the business of the German powers to be entirely on the defensive; to have avowed this distinctly; to have abstained from all menace; to be ready to repel acts of aggression on their possessions, or their constitutions of government, but not to mingle themselves in the affairs of France; not to suppose that they could separate a particular knot of individuals, the Jacobins for instance, from the rest of the people, and conceive they could wage war against one of their clubs, however abominable, without waging war against the kingdom.

But very different were their views and systems; and France and Europe were long the victims, and the most unhappy victims, of these deplorable and somewhat obvious faults in both parties, on the one side and on the other.

This Austrian war was the first great turn of the whole contest between the monarchical and popular party, after the meeting of the Legislative Assembly. I have therefore called your attention to it very particularly; it must be well considered. My opinion, such as it is, I have stated to you. It

was left too much by the language of Austria, to be, to the rulers of France, a question of prudence; but it was not decided by the Girondists as prudence would have dictated; not, as I conceive, it ought to have been; not with a due attention to the interests of France, or the cause of their Revolution. The best chance for those interests was, at the time, the constitution of La Fayette. It was not likely to stand in case of a war; and if it did not stand, a wide field was opened for every species of anarchy and disorder.

This is a very serious accusation to make against the popular party (by which words I shall hereafter always mean the Girondists and Jacobins), but it is an accusation that I conceive is just.

We have now considered the first great subject that was before us, the Austrian war.

I mentioned, in my last lecture, that the struggle between the new and old opinions produced also, at last, the insurrection of the 10th of August and the dethronement of the king.

This was the work of the Girondists and the Jacobins, and the Girondists are chiefly responsible for it.

The conduct and character of the Girondists will, therefore, for some time, directly or indirectly, be the great subject of our consideration.

Their great measures were—

1st. The war with Austria. This we have already noticed.

2ndly. Their two decrees: one for a camp of twenty thousand men, near Paris; and one for the proscription of the priests.

3rdly. The irruption into the palace on the 20th of June, 1792.

And, finally, their attack of the palace on the 10th of August, 1792, and dethronement of the king.

These measures must be all considered, and they will occupy us long.

But if such were their measures, it will be said, what doubt can there be of the unpardonable nature of their conduct?—how can this be made a question?

The difficulty is this. The conduct that is blamed in the Girondists, from the opening of the Legislative Assembly to

its conclusion, was always explained and justified by them on this principle, that a counter-revolution was intended by the court, and that they had no alternative but to act as they did.

Now this intention of the court cannot be denied; and here lies the difficulty.

It is very true that the king had no horror like that of a civil war, and would have perished on a scaffold rather than the blood of his subjects should be shed; but sentiments of this humane and benevolent character could not be supposed for a moment to have been entertained either by the queen or the great body of the king's more immediate ministers, friends, and counsellors; and the return of the old régime was supposed to be, in their apprehension, the great object to be attained, and at any risk or expense. It was impossible for the popular party not to conclude that the king and the court were intriguing with foreign powers; and though some of them might duly estimate the amiable disposition of the king, it was natural, it was not unreasonable for them to believe, that his mild counsels, and even his authority, would be lost amid the tumult and temptation of any successful invasion from foreign powers, and that the liberties of France would be gone for ever.

Here, then, is the difficulty of the case. We may say, and, as I conceive, with perfect justice, to the Legislative Assembly, to the Girondists, and more especially to the Jacobins, "You over-rate the danger; neither the court nor the foreign powers are so willing or so able to attack your liberties as you suppose. You yourselves, by your fury and outrageous behaviour of every kind, increase the danger, and in fact provoke these foreign powers, and, as they will think, oblige them to attack you. It is not in this manner that you can best defend your liberties." All this, and much more than all this, I contend, might have been truly said to the popular party, of whatever description; but it is impossible to deny the danger; it is impossible to say that a counter-revolution was not intended, by the court at least: this was supposed by the popular party and acted upon, and sufficient evidences of it, though of a general nature, now exist; and being right in this point, they cannot be dismissed from our thoughts, certainly not the higher Girondists at least, as without any

claim to be heard, and as mere furious revolutionists and unprincipled men of blood. Their views, opinions, and feelings must be considered; and as this can only be done amid histories and memoirs of the most contradictory nature, and amid crimes, and cruelties, and horrors of the most revolting kind, very great must be the perplexity and the hesitation of any man who would show a proper repugnance to violence, bloodshed, and anarchy, and yet evince a due respect for the cause of liberty, however obscured; and, finally, who would endeavour to do justice to characters of every description: a duty this last, not only more particularly incumbent upon those who read or write history, but incumbent upon men at all times and on every occasion, however difficult and painful the task may often be.

Such is, I conceive, a fair statement of the case of the Girondists; and having made this statement, I have now to represent to you that what is thus urged in their favour, though not without its weight, is, after all, not, I think, a sufficient defence, when all the various circumstances of the case are regularly and fairly estimated.

The following observations may, I conceive, be made; and you will, I hope, remember their general import, when you come to read the history, and judge for yourselves how far they are reasonable, and borne out by the facts and the general principles of all political science.

La Fayette and his friends had endeavoured, as I have formerly said, to repair their mistakes, when they saw, after the flight to Varennes, that the king's throne and life were in danger, and they had appeared to succeed: a republic was not proclaimed; the violent party was put down (put down by *them*); and the constitution was proposed to the king and accepted; but the false steps these Constitutionalists had made during the Constituent Assembly could never afterwards be recovered. The king had shown, by his flight, that he could not reconcile himself to their notions of liberty, at least, to their practical exposition of them; and when the Legislative Assembly met, the more popular party in and out of the Assembly would never place any confidence in him, whatever might be either his professions or his measures; and their only concern and only duty, as they thought, was to

prevent him and the court, between whom they would see no difference, from making a counter-revolution. 'This could 'best be done, as they unhappily imagined, by vilifying his office and diminishing his power, by questioning the expediency and resisting the operation even of the prerogatives intrusted to him by the constitution. And, most unfortunately, not only may these remarks be applied to the Girondists, and even to the Legislative Assembly in general, but still more may they be applied to another party, the Jacobins, who were ranged beyond the Girondists, and who seemed to have no wish but to bring matters to an issue as soon as possible, dethrone the king, probably erect a republic, at all events dissolve the monarchy first, and take the chances, whatever they might be, that were to result from it. Such was the afflicting situation of things from the moment the Legislative Assembly met. With every hour they grew worse. The great and only hope for France, for its peace, and the best interests of its freedom, was, *then* at least, the maintenance of the constitution of La Fayette; but it was too popular for the court, and not sufficiently so for the patriotic party; and, lastly, the king himself never approved it; it afforded him no adequate protection: still, having publicly accepted it, he told his ministers, as I have already mentioned to you, at the opening of this second Assembly, when questioned by them confidentially on the subject, that he meant faithfully to adhere to it; and at that time he was sincere; but the eternal distrust and continually increasing violence of the Assembly and of the clubs made him lose all hope of any comfortable exercise of his authority to be derived from the popular party, all hope of the constitution, and all good opinion of the patriots, of whatever description. All the pleasures of existence itself were at an end. He feared for the lives of his queen and family; he had no expectation of long preserving his own. With every hour his difficulties and dangers increased. Did he strive to sacrifice to popularity, he could only do so by weakening what power was left him; did he attempt to assert his prerogative, he only provoked resistance, and in no struggle could possibly succeed. He was in so unhappy a situation, that reasonable measures appeared of no use, and mistakes were fatal.

Such was the state of things during the latter part of 1791 and early part of 1792; and when you come to read the history, you will see the king at last obliged to propitiate the Girondists and the violent party by choosing a new set of ministers from among themselves, Dumourier, Roland, and others, who had their confidence, not his; and you have then war declared with the king of Hungary and Bohemia, which was their measure, not his. The king was visibly affected, when he came to announce it to the Assembly. The war, as he must have seen, only multiplied the chances of his dethronement; it had, on that very account, been urged on by the Girondist Brissot, as he himself afterwards proclaimed.

The war was declared; and you have next to observe the two famous decrees which I have mentioned. These were presented to the king: the one for the formation of a camp with a large body of men near Paris; the other, for the purpose of sending the nonjuring priests out of the kingdom. This was to be done upon the slightest grounds; it was sufficient (e. g.) that a representation was made to the municipality from twenty people of the district. The first (the decree of the camp) appeared to the king a scheme to collect an armed force for his destruction; the other, to violate every feeling of religion or justice that he could be supposed to entertain. He refused his sanction; and there was at last an insurrection and an attack made upon him on the 20th of June, in his palace, to oblige him to give this sanction, or, in case he continued to refuse it, to take the chances, in the confusion and the tumult, of at least dethroning him. Finally, as the insurrection answered neither of these purposes, we at last see the palace actually stormed on the 10th of August, the king obliged to fly to the Legislative Assembly, his powers and office suspended, a new Assembly called, and the king then, immediately on its meeting, dethroned and imprisoned. These are, in a few words, the main events that we are now to consider; and, though nothing can be more interesting than the different accounts we have to peruse, any real friend to liberty will find his mind, I think, not a little perplexed on account of the difficulty I have described to you, and even wearied, amid the opposite sentiments and representations by which he will see himself surrounded, each

plausible in its turn, and each well fitted to attract his sympathy; if on the one side he is unable, as a friend to freedom, to wish for a counter-revolution, and again, on the other, not satisfied that the Revolution should proceed on a system of violence and tumult. It is now, however, again incumbent on me to offer you my opinion, which, on the whole of the case, is entirely against the Girondists.

For it is not too much to say, that their conduct altogether, from the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly, was marked by violence and unreasonableness; that they always acted, as if both the king and the constitution, sooner or later, were to be disposed of and set aside. While their cry was continually in favour of the constitution, they never suffered it to be fairly tried; and when they availed themselves of what they thought their right, to go to war with Austria, the most fatal measure, as they knew, both to the king and the constitution, they never properly joined La Fayette and the Constitutionalists, though the majority at this time both in and out of the Assembly. Those Constitutionalists were as determined as they could be, to beat off all foreign invaders; and this was a bond of union sufficient, if they had taken reasonable views of the best interests of France.

Men having the independence and freedom of France at heart, and seeing both menaced by the court and the foreign powers (and this is the case of the Girondists), should have made every sacrifice to secure the confidence and co-operation of those who had the same objects in view, and particularly of the Constitutionalists, who had actually framed the constitution, and had no hope, nor wish, nor system, but to defend it. Instead of thus uniting their strength with La Fayette and his friends, and instead of exhibiting this regular, reasonable, lawful defence of the independence and liberties of their country, they could see no better mode to adopt, than violent speeches against the king, than menacing his life if he did not assent to their decrees, calling out the people to assault his palace, and, amid the horror of an insurrection, proceeding to dethrone him.

This is not, I think, an unfair view of their conduct, and I do not see the circumstances in their situation by which it

can be justified. There are no circumstances, perhaps, that could justify a resort to such counsels of anarchy and blood: but even at the last, when they might say they were proscribed by the allied powers, and were only standing on their defence, still their proper answer and defence was joining, with all their strength and influence, the Constitutionalists in the Assembly; and joining, with all their spirit and their courage, La Fayette and the regular armies of their country, who were opposed to those allied powers in the field.

Even amid the king's ministers and friends, they must have been well aware, that there were many who wished well to the constitution and the liberties of France. Malouet and others, who were even in the king's counsels, had no desire to see a return of the old régime; and if at last such men appeared to be driven to favour any counsels that could save them from mobs and insurrections, and from the Revolution (such as the Revolution seemed likely to become), this was owing (the Girondists should have seen) to their own original violence and unreasonableness; in a word, to their own republican tone and manner from the first opening of the Legislative Assembly.

Such is, I confess, my own particular view of the case, even of the Girondists, the more respectable portion of the popular party of the Legislative Assembly (I say nothing of the Jacobins, it is unnecessary); and these are my accusations, serious indeed if they are just, and well fitted to be a warning to men of daring and ardent minds, such as naturally engage in revolutions; and who, as we may judge from the instances before us, are exposed to the chance of being mixed with, or soon insensibly becoming, from the supposed necessities of their situation, men of anarchy and blood.

I have now stated, as I conceive, the case of the Girondists, and offered you an opinion upon it. We will now proceed.

The opinion I have offered you will continually make its appearance in the general description I shall give of the great scenes of the history. This sort of repetition you must excuse, for it is not very possible to avoid it; and the better to enable you to consider the subject, I will now immediately

mention the books and memoirs which, in my opinion, you can consult with the best advantage.

It is at this point of your progress that you must turn, first to the Memoirs of Me. Roland, and afterwards of Dumourier. Me. Roland was one of the most extraordinary women of these extraordinary times, and Dumourier was a man of great ability, who acted a very conspicuous part in them. The character of the first is easily estimated. She was a person of very strong sensibility, of great talents, and a passionate admirer of liberty, but on the republican model. It is, however, not so easy to judge of the minister Dumourier: his talents are clear and undoubted, but not so his virtues. I conceive, however, that he meant well to the king and to his country: it is difficult to those who read his Memoirs to suppose otherwise. You must also turn to the Memoirs of Barbaroux. And, in opposition to all these works, you must consider the representations of Bertrand de Moleville, the king's confidential minister and friend. As an estimate of the whole, you may refer to the second volume of Thiers, which, though I need not subscribe to all its opinions, I may still think very able and deserving of your attention. You will, of course, continue your perusal of the Memoirs of the Marquis de Ferrieres, and the History by the Two Friends of Liberty. Other writers and memoirs will present themselves, but to these I refer you in the first place.

The part of the work of Me. Roland, that is to our present purpose, is her account of the first ministry of Roland and her portraits, where the leaders of the Gironde party find their place. Every word is to be observed, for the whole is the best and most favourable representation we can possibly have, of the views and conduct of the Girondists. It is not too much to say, that Me. Roland was the most pure in principle, and the most powerful in talents, of all the party; and her statements and opinions must therefore be attended to. It is in vain to attempt (I must repeat) to derive instruction from history, unless we enter into the feelings of the different actors in the scene, and weigh and examine what they consider the proper statement of their case.

Me. Roland and her husband had been brought to Paris, had become acquainted with the leading men during the

earlier seven months of 1791, had retired in September, and returned in December.

About the middle of the March of the next year (of March, 1792), they were told, she says, by one of their friends, that the court thought it necessary to make an effort for popularity, and was ready to take Jacobin ministers; that the court probably wished to receive the worst, and the patriotic party to provide the best; that Roland was fixed upon as one. Brissot and Dumourier waited upon him, and the arrangement was made. She disliked and distrusted Dumourier from the first; represents what passed at the cabinet councils of the king, as more like the chit-chat conversation of a drawing-room, than the deliberations of a set of statesmen; but describes the king as having quite made a conquest of Roland and Clavière. "Good God! I often cried to them," she says, "when I saw them going to council, you seem to me always ready to do some foolish thing or other. For my part," she continues, "I could never have any faith in a constitutional king, made out of one born under despotism, educated for it, and accustomed to the exercise of it. Louis XVI. must have been a man far above the vulgar, to have sincerely wished a constitution that restrained his power; and had he been such a man, he would never have suffered the events to take place which led to the formation of such a constitution." In another part of her work she says, "that she always appealed to the king's flight to Varennes as decisive of the point."

Now here, I think, we have the whole of the case. However her husband and his friends might appear to M^e^. Roland to be thrown off their guard by the agreeable manner and apparent patriotism of the king, neither they nor any of the party, nor even the majority of the Legislative Assembly itself, ever acted on any other principles but those, which she has here herself expressed and described as her own,—those of total distrust and suspicion. And this was, I conceive, their fault, though a natural one: they never gave either the king or the constitution a fair trial. To hope nothing, to believe nothing, and to risk nothing, was not to give either a fair trial; it was not to reconcile the king to his fate, but the contrary, it was to expose him to the temptation, it was almost

to lay him under the necessity of turning to foreign powers for assistance; it was to dispose and oblige those powers, in like manner, to come to his relief; it was to pursue counsels, that while they appeared to defend the Revolution, could only lead to some dreadful termination of it, some disgraceful or appalling crisis, some attempt to dethrone the king, a civil war, perhaps a return to the old despotism.

The two points on which you are now to fix your attention are the two celebrated decrees. I have already mentioned them: that, for the formation of a camp of twenty thousand men near Paris, and that of the proscription of the priests. These were the great measures of the Girondists.

The king could not be brought to sanction them. The first he thought inconsistent with his existence as a king of France; the other, with his principles of justice and religion, as a man and a Christian: while, on the contrary, the popular party held these measures to be necessary to the safety of the country and the success of the Revolution; and the king's resistance to them, as a sufficient proof of his intentions to produce a counter-revolution by means of the allied powers, whose armies were now approaching.

This was a dreadful crisis to which matters were now reduced; nor will the student, even now, at this distance of time and place, be without his perplexity, when he has the two following great leading facts on the one side, and on the other held up to his consideration; for instance, that, first, the popular party were *ready* (all of them), were desirous (many of them) to dethrone the king; and again, on the other side, that the court were intending a counter-revolution, and the forces of the allied powers actually on their march to Paris. He will not, I say, be without his perplexity.

Each party might now be perfectly sincere in their opposite representations of the nature of these decrees, and their particular views be now but too irreconcilable. But what we contend for is, that the violence of the Legislative Assembly and of the Girondists, from the first of their sitting, brought matters to this deplorable crisis; that such violence is, therefore, the proper subject of our censure; but, after this censure has been pronounced, the nature of their conduct now, at *this* particular moment, and on this particular subject of the camp, is much more doubtful.

With M^e^. Roland and with the party these decrees were every thing; they are the great subject of all the very interesting portion of her memoirs now before us; they gave occasion to her two very celebrated letters to the king; they caused the dismissal of Roland and his friends from the ministry; and they were the cause, they were the justification produced, of the insurrection of the 20th of June, and (with the assistance of the approach of the combined armies) of the attack on the Tuileries, and the dethronement of the king. Observe the views and language of M^e^. Roland.

"Troubles," she says, "on the subject of religion and the dispositions of the enemy, rendered some decisive decrees necessary; the king's refusal to sanction them unmasked him completely: his good faith had already become suspected by those of his ministers who had before been led to suppose it real." She then gives an account of the celebrated letter to the king which she herself drew up, and of all that passed on the occasion. There were originally two letters; you will see them both in the notes of her Memoirs: the second was presented to the king. What I wish you to remark is the sincerity with which M^e^. Roland seems to have drawn up the letter. "It is a very bold measure," said Pache to her. "Bold," she replied, "no doubt, but it is just and necessary; what signifies any thing else?" "I am convinced," she says afterwards, "and I conceive the event has proved it, that this letter has contributed extremely to enlighten France; it proposed to the king, with so much force and good sense, what the king's own interest should have taught him to do, that one may see clearly that he would have acceded to it had he not been determined against the constitution, determined not to maintain it."

The letter was sent on the 11th of June: Roland was dismissed. But on the 20th of June, the mob broke into the palace to oblige the king to sanction the two decrees. The king appears now to have been quite at the mercy of the popular party; even his body guard of one thousand eight hundred men, which the constitution allowed him, had been, under proper pretences (the king unable to resist), disbanded: there seem to have been no means left him to support his authority; yet M^e^. Roland during all this time almost de-

spaired of the patriotic cause, and writes thus; and this is a sort of proof, by the way, of the sincerity with which she and the *leading Girondists*, at least, proposed and urged on these decrees.

"It was in the course of the month of July," she says, "that seeing affairs get worse from the perfidy of the court, the advance of the foreign forces, and the feebleness of the Assembly, we set ourselves to consider where Liberty might fly to, menaced as she was. We often talked with Barbaroux and Servan of the excellent disposition of the south, of the energy of the departments in that part of France, and of the facilities there afforded for founding a republic if the court should triumph and subdue the north and Paris. We took the maps, studied the military positions, &c. &c. and we all agreed, that after a Revolution that has afforded us such vast hopes and expectations, it was impossible for us to fall back into slavery; that every thing must be attempted to establish, somewhere or other, a government that was free. 'That must be our resource,' replied Barbaroux, 'if the Marsellois, that I have accompanied here, are not sufficiently seconded by the Parisians to overpower the court: this, however, I hope will not be the case, and that we shall have a convention that will give us a republic for the whole of France.'

"We could see," continues M^e. Roland, "without any farther explanation, that an insurrection was intended; indeed it appeared inevitable, as the court was making preparations which indicated a design of overpowering us by force. It will be said, indeed," she subjoins, "that the court was acting in self-defence; but the idea of any attack upon the court would either never have occurred to any one, or at least would never have been taken up by the people, if the king and his ministers had executed the constitution faithfully. The firmest Republicans, however aware of its faults, wished only for the constitution for the time, and would have waited for ameliorations in it from time and experience."

A corresponding passage occurs in the Memoirs of Barbaroux. "Roland asked me," says he, "what I thought of France, and of the means of saving her. I opened my heart to him, and in return he said to me, 'Liberty is lost if we do not instantly counteract these plots of the court. La Fayette

is meditating treason in the north; the army of the centre is disorganized; there is nothing to hinder the Austrians from being here in six weeks. And have we been labouring,' he continued, 'for three years together at this noble Revolution only to see it overturned in a day? If liberty perish in France, it is for ever lost for all the rest of the world; all the hopes of the philosophers are deceived; a tyranny the most cruel will fall heavy upon the earth. Let us prevent a calamity like this; let us arm Paris and the departments of the north; and if they fall, let us carry away to the south the image of liberty, and somewhere or other let us found there a colony of men that are free.' At these words the tears rôlled down his cheeks, and so did those of Me. Roland, affected by the same sentiment, and mine also. What consolation in these effusions of confidence when the heart is in affliction!

"I drew a picture therefore," says Barbaroux, "of the resources of the departments, and of our hopes," &c.

These I consider as very striking paragraphs, as showing very distinctly what the feelings and opinions of the Girondists were, giving them every credit they could desire, and as exhibiting, therefore, a memorable and edifying picture of the enthusiasm with which those who engage in political concerns may be animated. The Girondists, instead of making it their study, from the first of their meeting in October, 1791, to reconcile the king to the constitution, by every possible attention, on their part, to what they knew must naturally be his prejudices, if such they chose to call them, began with very offensive behaviour, and never ceased their opposition till they at last arrived at the pitch of excitement here displayed, and were ready for any enterprise of violence and blood (if necessary) to secure their objects: an awful lesson this. Me. Roland sees a young man, Barbaroux, just come up from the south, actually preparing an insurrection without the slightest emotion or remark addressed to him on the subject. Her husband votes that La Fayette is meditating treason, though the very constitution, they both talk of maintaining, was his work, and though he was the most distinguished friend of freedom then in existence. I do not say that the king was not, from the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly, a proper object of suspicion, and for the reasons Me. Roland

mentions; I do not say that a counter-revolution was not always to be dreaded, that the invading armies were not at all events to be resisted; but I say that the Girondists, from the first, contributed to increase and produce the very difficulties and dangers by which they can alone attempt to defend their conduct; that they never were the friends of the constitution of 1791; that they, on the contrary, insensibly, and at last visibly, brought about its overthrow, and were, therefore, the real enemies of the liberties of France, as matters then stood; that they so conducted themselves, that they have generally been considered as Republicans, as even disposed to introduce a republic into France from the first: however this may be, I contend that to conduct themselves in such a manner as to be so considered, to be insensible to the very popular nature of the constitution, as it was left by the Constituent Assembly, to the very great importance of some return to peace and order, to be so indifferent to the dangers and calamities that were to be expected from the violence and disposition to anarchy which they saw in the Jacobin party, all this, I contend, was a blindness and a rage of enthusiasm, to say the best of it, which should for ever operate as a warning to all who engage in political concerns, more particularly when any alterations in the constitution of their country are intended.

I will now, before I conclude, remind you of the Memoirs of Dumourier. You may begin with the fifth chapter. I will give you an extract from his work, which will show you but too plainly the dreadful perplexities and even agonies of mind that must have belonged to these unhappy times.

Dumourier was called into power, with Roland and the Girondists, with what was called the Jacobin or Sans-culotte ministry; and I see not how we are to deny him the praise of having first made every effort to save the monarch, and this being, as he thought, impossible, of having then endeavoured, by joining the army, to save his country from her invaders.

He became a minister on the 15th of March. The king and court were prepossessed against him. He declared to Louis from the first, "that he was the zealous servant of his majesty, but that he belonged to the nation; that he would speak no language but of liberty and the constitution." "I like

your frankness," replied the king; "I, too, wish only for the constitution." The queen next chose to see him. He found her alone, extremely agitated, her colour high; and he represents himself as deeply affected by what were evidently the sufferings of the unfortunate princess.

"You are all-powerful," she said, in a majestic and irritated tone, "but it is by favour of the people, who soon demolish their idols. Your existence depends on your behaviour. They tell me you have good talents. You must be aware that neither the king nor I can bear these novelties nor the constitution; I tell you so frankly: take your side." The queen must have here supposed that the allied powers were to interfere and to be successful. "I stand," replied Dumourier, "before the king and the nation, but I belong to my country. Your safety depends on the constitution. Far from being a calamity, it will be a happiness to the king and his glory." "It will not stand," said the irritated queen; "take care of yourself." "I am more than fifty years old," replied the minister; "my responsibility as such, is, I know, not the greatest of my dangers." "What can you say worse of me!" cried the queen; "do you think me capable of having you assassinated?" and the tears started to her eyes.

"God forbid," replied the minister, agitated as much as the queen herself, "that I should do you such cruel wrong. The character of your majesty is grand and noble; you have given heroic proofs of it, and they have bound me to you." The queen grew calm. This was in the main the conversation that passed, at least as Dumourier has related it; and the minister had then an opportunity of explaining what he thought was the situation of herself and the king; that there was no separating their interests from those of the nation: in other words, that the constitution must be made to stand, and that there must be no counter-revolution. The queen seemed at last to be convinced of the truth of what the minister said; but the horrible publications of Marat and the Jacobins soon revived all her unfortunate opinions.

They were but too natural. "I am quite overcome," said the queen to the minister one day in the presence of the king; "I cannot even show myself at the window. It was

but yesterday I did so, and to get a little air, when one of the cannoniers, after a gross insult, told me, it would be a pleasure to him to have my head on the point of his bayonet. That terrible garden there: on one side I see a man mounted in a chair, reading aloud all sorts of terrible things against us; on the other, some officer or abbé dragged into one of the basins in the midst of abuse and blows; and all this time you see others playing at football, quite unconcerned. What a residence to be placed in! and what a people!" Dumourier had nothing to answer; what could he answer? but still he returned always to the same point, and advised that a common cause should be made with the Assembly, always looking upon a counter-revolution as impossible. Now for Dumourier to think thus, and to act upon his opinions so early as the spring of 1792, was to show great sagacity and firmness.

The great question was, as you have already seen, what was the king to do on the subject of the two decrees; and Dumourier seems to have fought the battle of his unhappy master with great spirit and ability at the council board. He reproached the minister Servan for having proposed the decree of the camp, without having first taken the pleasure of the king, without having received even the sanction of his own colleagues; and he startled even the Girondists themselves, by remonstrating with them on their folly in attempting to bring twenty thousand federés to form a camp near Paris, nineteen thousand of whom would be Jacobins, of whom the first daring, ambitious man, would be able to avail himself, and probably destroy the authors of the decree themselves; and this troop too to be brought to Paris, while the armies were weak and the frontiers bare.

Such were the terms in which Dumourier expressed himself at the council board; and the result at last was, that Dumourier was summoned to the palace, and requested, both by the king and queen, to rid them, if possible, of their three insolent and factious ministers, Roland, Servan, and Clavière. Dumourier had not been on good terms with them for some time before, and they were now dismissed.

But Dumourier, as well as the ministers that succeeded, thought the sanction of the two decrees necessary, not only

to the king's safety but to their own, and indeed to their character, that they might not appear to have sacrificed their principles to their elevation.

But the king afterwards, though he would have sanctioned the decree for the camp, could not reconcile his conscience to the decree against the priests. Dumourier had to resign, and at length to render in his accounts to the king and take his leave. "You go then to join the army of Luckner?" said the king. "Yes, sire," replied Dumourier, "I am delighted to quit this frightful city. I have but one regret; you are in danger." "Yes," replied Louis with a sigh, "I certainly am." "Ah, sire," returned the minister, "you can no longer suppose that I speak from any interested motive; let me implore you not to persist in your fatal resolution." "Speak no more of it," said the king; "my part is taken." "Ah, sire, you said the same, when in this very chamber, in presence of the queen, you gave me your word." "I was wrong then," said the king, "and I repent that I did so." "It is now, sire, that you are wrong, not then. I shall see you no more. They abuse your religious scruples; they are leading you on to a civil war; you are without force, and you will be overpowered. History will accuse you of having caused the calamities of France: observe the ridicule attached to the character of James II." "God is my witness," said Louis, putting his hands on those of Dumourier, and in a tone of the deepest affliction, "God is my witness that I wish the happiness of France." "I doubt it not, sire," said Dumourier, the tears in his eyes, and overcome with his feelings, "but you are answerable to God, not only for the purity, but for the enlightened direction of your intentions. You think you are protecting religion, and you are destroying it. The priests will be massacred; you will lose your crown, perhaps your wife, your children." A short silence for a moment ensued; the king pressed his hand. "Sire, if all the French knew you, as I know you, our calamities would soon be at an end. You wish the happiness of France; it requires then the sacrifice of your scruples. You have been sacrificing yourself to the nation ever since 1789; continue to do so, and our troubles will at length cease; the Constitution be accomplished, the French return

to their natural character, and the rest of your reign be happy."

"I expect my death," said the king with a mournful air, "and I already forgive them. You I thank for the sensibility you have shown. You have served me well, and you have my esteem. If I am ever to see a better day, you shall have proofs of it." The king then rose hastily and went to a window. Dumourier gathered up his papers slowly, that he might have time to compose himself before he left the room, and as he opened the door, the king made an approach to it, and addressing him with great feeling, "Adieu," he said, "all happiness attend you!"

LECTURE XXVI.

KING'S MISSION BY MALLET DU PAN.

THE king might be sensibly affected by the generous devotion of Dumourier to his cause, but it was no longer in his power to adopt his counsels. He had taken other views of his own situation, and had of late hoped for relief under his misfortunes from another source. He had been led to consider what assistance could be derived from without. The armies of the German courts were in motion; war had been declared; every calamity was impending over himself and his country; and though Dumourier could see no alter native but resistance to all invaders, the king had entertained other hopes, and had thought, by a communication to the emperor and the king of Prussia, not only to prevent the horrors of war, but procure a situation of more dignity and repose for himself. But this was a strong measure, and one of doubtful policy; and the question that we have now therefore arrived at, is the conduct of the king with respect to foreign powers.

There can be no doubt, that the court and its adherents never could endure the Revolution from the first; and that they were always looking for assistance from the emperor and the German princes. But we have all through these lectures made a distinction between the king and his court, and we have continued this distinction down to the period before us. The Girondists, indeed, made no such distinction, at least never acted upon it; and the Convention afterwards put the king to death, on the plea, that he had intrigued with foreign powers, and been a traitor to the liberties of his country.

It is therefore a point of great curiosity and importance to determine, what were really the views and the conduct of this

unfortunate monarch at this particular period, the first half of the year 1792.

I consider Bertrand de Moleville as sufficient authority on a subject of this nature. He held the Revolution, and all its abettors, in such abhorrence, that he thought he could not do greater honour to any man, than by representing him as unfavourable to it; as endeavouring to stay its progress; as ready to restore the old régime by any means in his power; by force, if necessary, or even by calling for the invasion of foreign powers. He seems to me to disguise no project of this sort, that we can suppose to have been formed; and we need look no further than the account he gives for information of this kind. All through his work you will see the distinction exist which we have set up between the king and those around him. It was evidently a subject of much secret lamentation, that the king had such a horror of a civil war, and of shedding the blood of his subjects; and Bertrand de Moleville would have considered himself as adding to the respectability of the character of his royal master, if he could have described him as more indignant, than he appeared to be, with the patriots, as more shocked with the diminutions of his prerogatives, as more ready to call for assistance from whatever quarter it could be procured.

He says however positively, that the king, on being confidentially asked, gave his ministers to understand, on the opening of the Legislative Assembly, that he had adopted and meant to be faithful to the constitution; and in this frame of mind we must have supposed him to have remained at any period of time, during which Bertrand de Moleville says nothing to the contrary.

I hasten therefore to the period now more immediately before us.

Writing the history of March, 1792, "The king," says Bertrand de Moleville, "reduced to the fatal necessity of forming a new ministry (the Girondist ministry) at a moment, when it was impossible for him to call upon a single individual on whose attachment he could depend, appeared more affected and uneasy than ever, at the danger of his situation. Instead of the air of contempt and indifference with which he had till then borne the insults and outrages he had been exposed to,

by the audacity of the Assembly and the rage of the Jacobins, consternation and dejection were marked in his countenance during the melancholy council of the 10th of March, the last I ever attended."

"In the subsequent month of April," he says, "the answer of the Austrian court (referring to the note of the 18th of March), which the Assembly had indecently treated as evasive and insignificant, completely seconded the views of the factious, and concealed under the veil of public interests, and of the honour and dignity of the nation, the guilty motives of their wishing for war. They provoked it so eagerly, only that they might have more opportunities and means of attacking the king, and rendering him odious to the people, by accusing him from time to time of treachery, and of holding intelligence with the foreign powers. The scrupulous accuracy," he says, "with which his majesty, true to his oath, carried the constitution into execution, had hitherto disconcerted all the manœuvres of the Jacobins; and the charges they were continually making against him, of not liking it, and of wishing to overthrow it, in order to restore the old system, were no longer considered, but as calumnies too vague and worn out to produce any effect.

"War opened a vast field of new impostures, much more serious, and doubly dangerous, as the eager credulity of the people in tales of plots, treachery, and correspondence with the enemy, made it unnecessary for those who circulated such impostures, to adduce any proof of them, or even to support themby the least reference.

"The king," he continues, "was aware of these dangers, which alarmed him much more for his family than for himself. But his mind was affected in a still greater degree, at the melancholy prospect of any species of calamity which war would bring upon France, and he saw with the deepest sorrow that it was now become inevitable.

"All that the king could do, was to delay and impede, by every means in his power, the fatal decision of the council on M. de Noailles' last dispatches; nor did his majesty consent to propose to the Assembly to declare war against the emperor, till he had obliged all the ministers separately to give him their opinions written and signed."

From these extracts, and from all the particulars of the case, it is very clear, that the king gave no assent to this war; no assent, addressed either to the one party or the other. He saw in it no peace for himself, and no happiness for his people.

But information still more curious and important is soon after imparted to his readers by Bertrand de Moleville.

In the opening of the campaign, it appears that the Austrians had the advantage. The number of those who emigrated became daily more considerable; whole regiments went over to the enemy.

"They are only traitors who have deserted," said the war minister, Servan, in the sitting of May 14; "it is, perhaps, a blessing we ought to look for: nothing can be more fortunate for the troops than to see the filth, that may be among them, drained off."

"But the king," says Bertrand de Moleville, "far from yielding to this patriotic security, saw, with the deepest sorrow, France engaged in an unjust and bloody war, which the general disorganization seemed to render it impossible to carry on, and which more than ever exposed our frontier provinces to invasion. His majesty, above all, dreaded a civil war, and did not doubt that it would break out on the news of the first advantage gained over the French troops by the emigrant corps, which formed a part of the Austrian army. It was, indeed, but too much to be feared, that the Jacobins and the people, in their fury, would make bloody reprisals on the priests and nobles remaining in France. These fears," says Bertrand de Moleville, "which he expressed in a letter to me, were the occasion of my proposing to him (and you will observe this statement which Bertrand de Moleville is now making) to send a person of confidence to the emperor and king of Prussia, to endeavour to prevail on them not to allow their armies to act offensively against France, until they should be under the inevitable necessity of so doing; and even in that case, to let the entrance of their armies into France be preceded by a manifesto, in which they should declare, 'That forced to take arms by an unjust attack, they did not impute that aggression either to the king or to the French nation, but to a criminal faction, which oppressed both; that, conse-

quently, far from departing from the sentiments of amity which united them to France, their intention, on the contrary, was to deliver that nation from tyranny, and restore it to legal order and tranquillity; that they had no view of interfering with the form of government, but merely secure to the nation the right of adopting that, which suited it best; that all idea of conquest was foreign to their thoughts; that private property should be by them equally respected as national property; that their majesties took all peaceable and faithful subjects under their protection; that they considered as their enemies those only, who were the enemies of France, viz. the faction of the Jacobins, and all its adherents,' " &c. &c.

Such is the very remarkable account given by Bertrand de Moleville; and these must be considered as at that time (May, 1792) the sentiments of the king, since they were those which the minister proposed to him to adopt, in consequence of what he had observed to be passing in the king's mind; and they must be considered as benevolent and moderate, and on the whole as patriotic, in the king and his advisers, if it be remembered, as it must always be, that no one ever supposed (*they* at least did not) that any effective resistance could be made to the progress of the allied forces. All this is true; but, at the same time, you will immediately see, that there was here a distinct communication between the king and the allied powers, and you must be aware, that *this* was in itself a very objectionable measure.

"In consequence," continues Bertrand de Moleville, "of the manner in which I had often heard M. Malouet speak of Mallet du Pan, I advised the king to employ him on this occasion. The talents and probity of Mallet du Pan were not unknown to the king, who immediately agreed to my proposal."

After some other particulars, Bertrand de Moleville goes on to mention, that the instructions which related to this mission were drawn up by Mallet du Pan according to the king's directions; that they were composed, in the main, of seven articles, and were of the following tenor:—

"1. The king not only exhorts but beseeches the princes and the French emigrants to give no grounds, by a hostile and offensive concurrence on their part, for divesting the pre-

sent war of the character of a foreign one waged between different powers.

"2. He expressly recommends to them to leave to him and the interfering courts the consideration and care of their interests when the time for treating them arrives.

"3. They must appear only parties, and not arbiters in the dispute; as the arbitration should be reserved for his majesty, when restored to liberty, and for the powers requiring it.

"4. Any other conduct would produce a civil war; endanger the lives of the king and his family; overturn the throne; cause a massacre of the royalists; secure to the Jacobins all the revolutionists who have abandoned, and who are daily abandoning, them; rekindle a fire that seems dying away; and give great force to a resistance, which will yield at the first successes, if the fate of the Revolution shall appear exclusively intrusted to those (the royal family) against whom it was directed, and who have been the victims of it.

"5. To represent to the courts of Vienna and Berlin the propriety of a manifesto, in common for them and the other states who have entered into the confederation; the importance of drawing up this manifesto in such a manner as to distinguish the Jacobins from the rest of the nation; to encourage all those who may return from their error; or who, not wishing for the present constitution, desire a suppression of abuses, and a rational liberty, under a monarchy limited by law.

"6. To state in the manifesto the fundamental truth, that the war is directed against a faction destructive of society, and not against the French nation; that it is the defence of legal governments and nations against a furious anarchy, &c. to remove all fear of dismemberment; to impose no laws, but to declare with energy to the Assembly, administrative bodies, &c. that they should be held individually responsible, in their persons and property, for all outrages committed against the sacred person of the king, or those of the queen and their family, and against the persons and property of any citizen whatever.

"7. To express the king's wish, that in entering the kingdom the powers should declare that they are ready to agree to a peace, but that they neither can nor will treat but with

the king; that in consequence they require that he should be restored to full liberty; and then, that a congress be assembled, in which the different interests shall be discussed on the grounds already settled, the emigrants be admitted as parties complaining, and the general plan of reform negotiated under the auspices and guarantee of the powers."

Such were the instructions, according to the account of Bertrand de Moleville; and the king, he afterwards says, explained them in a most ample manner, and these explanations were communicated to Mallet du Pan; and Bertrand de Moleville disclaims on the part of his majesty all jealousy of the emigrants and princes, such as had been imputed to him; that he observed always, he says, in the king the most affectionate friendship for the princes; but, above all, an extreme horror at the least idea of civil war.

Afterwards it appears, that Bertrand de Moleville sent Mallet du Pan (who had proceeded on his mission) a detail of the occurrences on the 20th of June; and observed to him, that it was very much to be feared, that similar scenes would be repeated, and with consequences still more disastrous, unless the factious were restrained by the dread of a striking and speedy vengeance. "I dwelt consequently," says he, "with the greater force on the necessity of hastening as much as possible the publication of the manifesto, without which, I said, all was lost."

Bertrand de Moleville, in his history of July, observes: "The manifesto of the powers (the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto) at length appeared, and for a moment gave a pause to the manœuvres which agitated the capital. The manifesto so much expected, was not that, the plan of which had been proposed by Mallet du Pan and agreed to, but one drawn up by Dulimon, as dictated by the ministers of the emperor and king of Prussia; and the Duke of Brunswick, who signed it, as commander-in-chief, had not even been consulted upon it. The publication of it produced an effect the very reverse of what had been expected."

Such are the representations of Bertrand de Moleville, and these must now be considered as the facts of history; they are intended to be such by this confidential minister, and for the reasons I have mentioned, may as such be received.

Now, on the whole of this case it may be observed, that there is a great distinction to be made between originally exciting and calling upon foreign powers for assistance, and afterwards endeavouring to influence their conduct, when they had already been placed in a hostile attitude; when war had been already declared; when they were already approaching as enemies and invaders; when they were approaching, whether the king interfered and offered his own counsels and requests, or not. The king is entitled to the full benefit of all the observations that can be made, founded on this distinction.

The king, it must be again observed, meant not a civil war; he thought he could, by proper demonstrations of the strength and wishes of the foreign powers united to his own, awe the factious, and enable the well-disposed to support his cause, and in *that*, as he believed, the cause of the best interests of France.

But, on the other hand, it is clear that a counter-revolution was intended. There is nothing said by Bertrand de Moleville of La Fayette's constitution or the liberties of France; and the king, by sending a confidential agent to these allied sovereigns, showed that in his existing situation he was ready to receive assistance from them, and that he did not think their interference in itself unlawful, if they would take his advice; at least, there does not appear to have been any thing said of this nature to the allied powers, though there is to the emigrants: *they*, it seems, are not to press forward lest a civil war should be the consequence; but with regard to the allied powers, though they are not to impose any law on France, or proceed at all, but with the approbation and sanction of the king, still, on these suppositions and with these reservations, the national dignity is considered as uninjured, and the interests of France sufficiently consulted.

The character of the king must, I think, be submitted to any censure that is fairly deducible from these last statements. We do not say with the king's accusers, and even the historian Thiers, that he invited the allied powers into France, but that he communicated with them, when coming. He did not indeed prevent their coming; but invite them, or cause their coming, he did *not*.

But we will return to considerations of this kind hereafter; for I have now to mention to you, that though I think these are ample materials for the reflection of the student, thus furnished by Bertrand de Moleville, still, that materials even more ample than these exist; and I will now proceed to exhibit them to your consideration.

It has happened that the son of Mallet du Pan found, among his father's papers, a copy of the memorial which was actually presented to the allied sovereigns. This is the gentleman to whom I expressed my obligations in so strong a manner at the opening of these lectures, and he has kindly furnished me with this memorial, and allowed me to endeavour to turn it to the purposes of your information and instruction in any manner I can. This is the memorial to which Bertrand de Moleville alludes, and of which he means to give his reader a general representation by the seven articles I have quoted from him; but the memorial itself, though the main purport of it is very fairly given (a testimony this to the good faith of Bertrand de Moleville, as an historian) is far more full and circumstantial, and affords, as it appears to me, a very complete and distinct view of all the opinions, hopes, and fears that were entertained by the king at this critical period, not only with regard to his own situation, but to the characters and intentions of all the parties around him. I shall, therefore, give you the best notion of it I can, immediately, and I shall leave it on the table for the inspection of any one who would wish to consider it for himself.

In the first place, it is clear, from this memorial, that a counter-revolution was intended. The very first words are these (I translate from the original):—"Two inseparable objects present themselves in the management and aim of the approaching counter-revolution; first, the means of effecting it; and, secondly, those of maintaining it."

And again:—"The means of success," says the memorial, "exist in foreign combinations and forces; but we must not here confine ourselves solely to the consideration of the first resistance which will be offered by the armies of the Revolution." These are the words; so that a counter-revolution was the object, the allied armies the means, and the armies of the Revolution the difficulty—the enemy to be overcome.

And with respect to the new order of things that was to be introduced, it was not the constitution of La Fayette or any modification of it, but a limited monarchy: on the whole, the old régime cleared of its abuses, but the views of the king on this part of the subject will best be seen by attending to the various observations that are made by him on the parties then existing in the state.

"At the present moment," says the memorial, "the capital is almost entirely in the hands of the Jacobins, who possess the majority in the National Assembly, all important places, and the municipalities. His majesty's council cannot support itself another month."

You see here that no great distinction was made by the king between the Girondists and the Jacobins. Thus again:—

"The Jacobins," says the memorial, "are divided into two sections, which pursue the same ends by different measures, and which, often at variance, are always ready to re-unite when a fresh blow is to be struck at the royal prerogative, or some attempt made against the superior classes.

"The section now in power has for its chief president the Abbé Sieyes, who governs it, along with Brissot, Condorcet, Pétion, Gensonné, Vergniaud, Guadet, and Manuel." These, as the student is aware, were the leaders of the Girondists.

"This cabal," says the memorial, "had formed the late ministry. Besides its *own* adherents, it generally rallies to its side the great majority of two hundred and fifty political or cowardly knaves, who have classed themselves in the National Assembly under the appellation of Independents. The project of this cabal is to form a republic, not in name, but in fact; by a reduction of the civil list to five millions, by the retrenchment of most of the powers left to the king, and by a change of dynasty, in which the new chief should be a kind of honorary president of the republic, to whom they would give an executive council, appointed by the Assembly, that is, by their committee."

The description here given by the king of the Girondist party, as it stood at this period, cannot, I think, be considered as incorrect. The *motives* of their conduct would be the only point to be disputed. With some, they would be found in a lust of power and a taste for violent counsels; with others, in

a proper distrust of the king, and a patriotic determination to maintain their Revolution.

There will be no difference of opinion with the king on the subject of the lower section, the Jacobins.

"The second party," says the memorial, "which divides the Jacobins, is composed of rude agitators, of impatient Republicans, of wretches who, not being able to endure any government, desire eternal anarchy.

"By the help of their charter of the Rights of Man, they would extend their levelling principle over all legal preeminence, and over all property; they will have no king; and the only government they desire is the democracy of a deliberating mob. Robespierre, Danton, Chabot, Merlin, Bazire, Thuriot, and a hundred others of the same species, supported by the club of the Cordeliers and by the fraternal societies, manage this disorderly faction, which retains a very numerous party in the club of the Jacobins, which has the disposal of most of the popular libellers, of the pike-men, and of the scum of the capital."

I do not, I say, think that much objection can be made to this description of the dreadful men who are commonly meant when we speak of the Jacobins; nor, again, to what follows:—

"Both these parties," the memorial goes on to observe, "work by the same means, but the first (that of the Girondists) acts less openly, carries on its crimes with less impetuosity, has the advantage over the other of cunning, of some ability, of being directed by the Abbé Sieyes; but the vilest agents, rioters by profession, brigands, regicides, fanatics, villains of every kind, form the army, common to both, and they do not leave it a single day unemployed."

This statement, too, of the memorial, must, I conceive, be allowed. You will observe hereafter, if you read her Memoirs, an admission to this effect by Me. Roland. "The pack" she talks of, whose excesses, as she calls them, "were not at all what she could approve, or what should go unpunished."

After observing that the Duke of Orleans is connected with the lower Jacobins, the memorial proceeds to consider the party of the Constitutionalists and the Feuillans. And here I must remark, that on no occasion does the court or even the

king appear to such disadvantage, as whenever this intermediate party of La Fayette and his friends are concerned. As it strikes me, all reasonableness and candour are then at an end. That these patriots made mistakes, may be admitted; I have exhibited what I think they were, through the whole of these lectures: but that they were patriots, and did not mean ill to the monarchy, must surely be allowed. But no merit of this kind was sufficient; nothing could atone for the original crime of having been the first and great movers of the Revolution, and the antipathy of the queen and the court to La Fayette may be shown, in more instances than one, to have not a little contributed to their own destruction.

The conclusion (and it is a very mortifying one) is, that no principles of civil liberty can be endured by those rulers of the earth, who have been bred up under arbitrary governments; and if this was not also the case with Louis XVI., though it was with the queen and in general with the higher orders of France, it is a merit in him which should never be forgotten.

But to return to the memorial. " It is not easy," says the memorial, " to class the Constitutionalists and the Feuillans. They form an heterogeneous compound of motley characters; men of various inconsistencies, of dissimilar sentiments, of contradictory plans, of enthusiastic metaphysics, and of a disappointed ambition which seeks only to rise again."

The memorial then goes on to describe these men, and the different projects that they had attempted, but in a manner too detailed to admit of quotation, and, I must add, in a manner that appears to me unfair and unjust.

These men (La Fayette and his friends) rallied round the king on his return from Varennes; they saved him from the dethronement that would have been *then* the immediate measure of the violent party, of Pétion and others; they produced, and upheld, and insisted on the constitution; they thus gave the monarchy of France its last and only chance. It was impossible to do more, after the king and court had tried their own measure, and had failed, an attempt to escape; and, under these circumstances, it is not very agreeable to read the following paragraph, which appears in the memorial:—

" Next to these come the idolaters of the constitution, a species of maniacs, whom a factitious enthusiasm or political

affectation (bel esprit) attach to their superstition. They have persuaded themselves, that if it were not for the Jacobins, the constitution would prosper; and it has hitherto been impossible to persuade them that the constitution itself is the origin and support of the Jacobins, and that if those of St. Honoré were destroyed, it would produce others in the course of six months."

This, I must repeat, is not the paragraph that might have been expected in a memoir drawn up under the eye and direction of the king.

So much for what is said, in this memorial, of the Jacobins, the Girondists, and the Constitutionalists. It is, in the last place, curious to inquire what is said of the remaining party that first appeared in this Revolution,—the party of Mounier, Lally Tollendal, and his friends. These fare better; and the paragraph is indicative of the opinions of the king from the first breaking out of the Revolution to the period before us.

"We shall not speak here," says the memorial, "of that particular section, which previous to the crimes of Versailles had placed itself between the first two classes and the authors of the present constitution; that is to say, the partisans of a legislative body in two divisions, of which one was the Chamber of Peers. *They* are all agreed as to the necessity of re-establishing the royal authority in all the power and dignity, which are compatible with that degree of public liberty which the government of a great empire can admit of; they are unanimous in recalling the clergy, the national religion, the nobility, and the great tribunals. There is no fear of any kind of opposition from *them*, because there is not one of them who would not prefer an absolute monarchy to the monstrous laws of the present time, and to the authority of the men who have established them." This is just.

Such is the description furnished by the memorial of the parties by which the king was surrounded. Nothing is said by the king of the Royalists or his well-wishers, their number, or their influence; and this is creditable to the memorial. The memorial then proceeds in the following manner:—

"The political chart which we have just marked out should

teach us to foresee the different effects which will be produced upon the minds of men; the progress and the existence of the counter-revolution, according to the forms and measures by which it may be effected.

"Policy, therefore, prescribes to us a regard to such of these interests, as can be reconciled with the fundamental object of the counter-revolution, and the neglect of which might unite the whole mass of revolutionists in the wish and endeavour to carry on a prolonged opposition.

"Whatever serves to disarm resistance and to facilitate submission ought to be employed; but nothing would more effectually tend to prolong the one, and retard the other, than the furnishing all parties with equal motives for persevering in rebellion."

And now, it is at this point that I must request the student to recollect what the style and manner of the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto turned out to be—the manifesto which the memorial was sent to influence. He is to recollect the fury and violence of its language, its effects upon Paris and upon France, and indeed upon all the friends of liberty all over the world. It is of great importance to the character of the king and his advisers, to observe, how far this memorial, now before us, went to suggest or to countenance the expressions made use of in this manifesto of the duke. Hitherto the memorial takes good ground; it goes on thus:—

"These considerations (considerations of policy, as just described) are inapplicable to *some* of the Jacobins and to their leaders. *These* men can be conquered by fear alone. Their maxims, their plans, and their practice, forbid any species of confidence. Crime is their only interest, their only resource, their only thought. Any conciliating measure would appear to *them* an avowal of timidity, and would embolden their assurances. With respect to *them* therefore, power should show itself under its most formidable appearance. The manifesto should consider these corporations, which are the scandal and the horror of three-fourths of the nation, as excommunicated societies, for the members of which there remains no hope of escape, no toleration for their doctrines. The preservation of their lives is the only favour

which can be promised to such among them, as have not been led by fanaticism and error into the commission of crimes and are resolved to leave the standard of their unworthy chiefs. They alone have provoked the war, and it is fit that upon them should fall the punishment."

Now it might be very fit, as the memorial here declares, that the lower Jacobins should be punished; but the question is, how far it was prudent thus to denounce them. The Jacobins might be very proper objects of moral indignation, and not unfairly represented in the paragraph we have just read; but were they in force? were they formidable? Though three-fourths of the nation might regard them with horror, were they not likely to compensate for their want of numbers by their activity and energy? Were they, or were they not, in possession of the capital, where the king and royal family were imprisoned and in their power? What were likely to be the consequences of making those men desperate, of whom it was just before said, that crime was their only interest, resource, and thought? Would not silence with respect to such men have been the best line of policy for the memorial to take? The great fault, or mistake of this memorial, as of the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, and of the reasonings of the allied powers from the first, seems to have been, to suppose, that they could set off a part from the whole; that they could punish the Jacobins, without interfering with the feelings or violating the dignity and independence of the *rest* of the nation: a vain hope, which the general principles of human nature and the phenomena of the Revolution, as they saw them every day exhibited in the capital, should have for ever prevented them from indulging for a moment.

What the king and his advisers attempted to do, was, to excite terror in the evil-doer, and confidence in the well-disposed.

These were the somewhat inconsistent objects that they endeavoured to accomplish; and therefore the memorial went on in the following manner (but certainly not at all in the manner of the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto):—

"But this just severity, which cannot be announced in too threatening a manner, should leave an opening for the far

more numerous body of milder Revolutionists. It would be unjust and dangerous to confound them with the factious demagogues who domineer over the kingdom.

"Towards the majority, wisdom counsels us to employ at the same time, terror and confidence.

"Terror, because nothing else can destroy the illusions with which many persist in blinding themselves; nothing else inspire with some degree of courage those weak characters, who might be led by habit, or by a fear of the Jacobins, to rejoin the ruling party, if they did not see it on the eve of perishing; nothing else make a deep impression upon such as are in doubt, or still misled by errors, by showing them that such chimeras are passing away; nothing else overcome in others the false point of honour which leads them still to defend the constitution, and above all, take away from the different leaders of the Feuillans the hope which has been the grand object of their attention during the last six months, that of placing themselves in a situation which should enable them to treat with arms in their hands, and to finish by a capitulation.

"Confidence will strengthen the effect of terror, and lead it to the desirable result of confining all resistance to the Jacobins exclusively, and of counterbalancing their influence in the interior, which might lead to new catastrophes during the final struggles.

"This confidence is nothing else than security for the future. It will arise from the assurance, that there is no intention to class the factious, by whom nothing has been held sacred, with men who have been deluded, and to confound mistakes of the understanding with perverseness; errors of opinion, with a code of crime, immorality, and anarchy.

"This distinction," the memorial goes on to say, "will not flatter the self-love of the Constitutionalists, but will appear to them a proof of equity, and hold forth to them a safeguard; and we cannot suppose them foolish enough to partake in the resistance of the Jacobins, when they will no longer have to fear the same danger.

"Confidence will arise from the care that shall be taken to destroy the apprehensions which have been created of intended

vengeance, of implacable resentment, and of an oppression which would fall equally upon the mistaken and the criminal. It will finally and especially arise from the belief, that the king will be the only arbiter of the fate of the different parties, and the pacificator of the kingdom; that to him alone will be intrusted the destiny of the laws, as well as of individuals; in a word, that neither the one nor the other will be given up at discretion and exclusively to the emigrants and foreign powers.

"The tyranny of the Jacobins has compelled the Feuillans, and the greater part of the Revolutionists, who are ashamed or half converted, to look at the royal authority as their anchor of mercy. If they were to-morrow to triumph over their adversaries, there is no doubt that they would immediately strengthen the power of the king. For the last three months, the greater part would have arranged themselves around his majesty, if they had had as much courage as good will; and if the Jacobins, by their indefatigable activity, had not held the poignards of their assassins, and the torches of their incendiaries, over all who dared to avow any attachment to their monarch.

"The preceding arrangements depend upon the belligerent powers, and upon the French princes and emigrants; they agree with the wishes of the king, and with the opinion which positive information and the general interest have led him to form. His majesty attaches the highest importance to the careful consideration of his representations. He adds his prayers to his entreaties, that they may obtain the attention which he solicits. He solicits it in the full independence of his reflection and of his will. No foreign influence has prepared or produced his representations on this subject; they result from exact acquaintance which his majesty has, of the disposition of the public, by means of the daily accounts which are faithfully presented to him, of the capital and of the departments; so that no one within or without the kingdom possesses so much certain information, whereby to state and know, what is to be feared or hoped in the interior, according to the nature of the ways and means by which the exterior power will act.

"All will become easy for the present and for the future, if

the king's views are adopted; if not, all will probably become involved in peril, uncertainty, and difficulty. Force must again raise up the monarchy, but opinion must sustain it; it is in the hearts of the people that the roots of stability must be planted. The powers employed to produce a physical submission should also be directed to the attainment of a moral submission; and to the same point should be directed the efforts of all who wish to prevent any new shipwreck of the state."

These are the terms of the memorial; and they must be considered as creditable to the magnanimity of the king, and as indicative of benevolence and patriotism. This must surely be the conclusion, if it be considered, that the general belief was, that the allied powers could not be resisted; and again, if the unhappy circumstances in which the king was placed be also considered; the company and the conversation by which he was always surrounded; the opinions in which he had been educated; the disappointments he had sustained; the state of insignificance to which he had been gradually reduced; the outrages he had been exposed to, himself, his queen, and his family; the cries of fury, the menaces, the insults, that resounded loud around him, wherever he turned; the dreadful men that were rushing forward to pull him from his throne, to massacre him by their assassins, or tear him to pieces by their mobs. These lamentable circumstances and exigences of his case must be considered, and placed not only to the credit of the king, but of his advisers, and particularly of Mallet du Pan, who appears to have been on this occasion his chief adviser, and who had to rise superior to many personal irritations and resentments of his own, being at the moment all but denounced by the popular party (and at last he was denounced in the Assembly by one of its members), on account of a journal which he edited, and which they would have done better to have listened to, than to have proscribed.

Allowance, I say, must be made for all the circumstances of the case, as it at last existed; and it will then I think be admitted, that the good intentions and good feelings of the king and his advisers are seen in this memorial: and the only question remaining is, whether on account of the same

deplorable and irremediable circumstances of the case, the propriety and the wisdom of the whole measure may be also admitted, as well as the good intentions and good feelings. This is indeed a very different question; and it cannot be denied, that all general principles seem unfavourable. No maxim so undoubted, as that foreigners are never to be called in; and nothing could in itself be so imprudent, as to tamper with foreign powers: nothing so impossible, as to suppose, that the leaders of any revolution would allow for a moment their interference; would think for a moment, that any king and court could afterwards be either able or willing to control the foreigners they had once admitted to their assistance. Such are the general views and maxims that belong to any case like this in the politics of a country; and it remains for the student to consider, how far on this present occasion the king and his advisers were, or were not, justified in violating such general rules or maxims; or how far they did, or did not, persuade themselves, that such consequences, as are always apprehended by such general rules and maxims, were in their instance likely to ensue.

The distinction which the king took was this: that the allied powers were advancing in the usual form and manner of those who were waging war; that this war he had done every thing to prevent, but being unable to prevent it, he might fairly attempt to be a mediator between these powers and his subjects, a general pacificator; might save his country from anarchy and crimes; and putting down the Jacobins, make terms with the rest of the Revolutionists, and re-establish his former dignity and power, with such limitations as he thought the general happiness of his people required.

Reasoning in this way, he made a distinction between the allied powers and the emigrants. Any separate attack, any separate success on the part of the latter, he conceived could only be followed by a civil war,—the great subject of his horror at all times; and the mistake, the illusion, whatever it may be called, of the king, was, his supposing that any such distinction would be made by the patriots or people of France, or that every thing he was addressing in the memorial to these princes and emigrants would not be by those patriots

and that people, considered as applicable to invaders of every description, whether emigrants or not, whatever might be their manifestoes and declarations, under whatever palliatives and assurances they came forward, after first denouncing particular clubs and bodies of men, and marching on at all events to interfere in their Revolution, and to assail their country by arms.

It is, indeed, quite curious to observe, how little the king and his advisers took into their account (or at least the king) the general effect that would be produced on the country by any hostile aggression from Prussians and Austrians; how little they seem to have been aware, that what they thought the necessary effects of the hostile attack of the emigrants, would be equally so of the hostile attack of *all* foreigners whatever.

In the memorial appear (though I have not time to quote them) many other very remarkable paragraphs. Suppose them to refer not to the emigrants but to be addressed to the king himself, as reasons why he should not approach those allied powers with any advice and interference whatever,—as reasons why he could only implore them not to wage war against France at all, under whatever plea, whether just or not: supposing them *thus* to be addressed, and they are quite prophetic, they exhibit distinctly the effects that were afterwards produced by the hostile appearance of the foreign armies on the frontiers and in the kingdom; and they are the very considerations that, from the first, should have been urged at the courts of Berlin and Vienna, to have prevented, on their parts, all mention of clubs and Jacobins by name, and all war against their proceedings, if the future peace of France, if any tolerable adjustment of the Revolution, if the safety of any Royalists and priests yet remaining in the kingdom, if the lives of the king, the queen, and the royal family, were considered as objects of any importance.

No doubt the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto added new fuel to the flame that would naturally have been excited, and turned the flame into a conflagration that became furious and irresistible; but I look upon the denouncement of the Jacobins by name, and the apparent unconsciousness of the effects that could not but be produced by the invasion not only of emi-

grants but of foreign armies, under whatever plea or modification, as the important, though very natural, mistake of this very respectable and (all circumstances considered) patriotic memorial.

Such, then, as appears from this memorial, such were the sentiments entertained by the king, and perhaps by most of his advisers, of the different parties of the state, and the treatment they were to receive from the allied powers. The war was to be a foreign war; was not to be distinguished from any other foreign war; was not to be suffered to assume any other character: the king was to be a mediator and pacificator between the foreign armies and his own subjects; the Jacobins were to be put down, as men with whom no terms could be kept; any other description of patriot was to be conciliated and protected; the ancient orders were to be revived; the king restored to his former dignity and power, with proper limitations; and equal laws were to be introduced for the protection of property; on the whole, a counter-revolution to be effected, but *not* one that Mounier and his friends (the first most respectable patriots of the Revolution) would have been unwilling to accede to.

The memorial was presented to the king of Prussia on the 14th of July; the day following, to the emperor of Austria and the proper ministers. Mallet du Pan had before informed Bertrand de Moleville, that when he was properly accredited, the ministers of Vienna and Berlin conversed freely with him, and manifested to him intentions from which he conceived great hopes.

On the 20th of July it appears, from Bertrand de Moleville's account, that Mallet du Pan left Frankfort, considering his mission entirely at an end, by the acquiescence of the powers in all the king's views, and by their adoption of the manifesto he had been charged to propose to them. "He had so fully justified," continues Bertrand de Moleville, "the king's confidence in him, by the wisdom and success of his negotiation, that his majesty authorized me to testify to him, how much he was satisfied with it, and to tell him that he wished to have no other negotiator with the powers."

He was then recommended to return to Frankfort, but the minister's letter was received by Mallet du Pan, at Geneva,

at the moment when the Austrian and Prussian armies were on their march, and just when the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto, so different, it is added, from that proposed by him, was published; and these circumstances induced him to consider his return into Germany as useless.

To this manifesto of the duke I need not now allude. It is sufficient, at present, to observe, that the king is not responsible for it, nor even the court: it has seldom been mentioned, but to be lamented or reprobated.

We must rather turn now, finally, to enumerate what estimates we have made, what conclusions we have drawn, while we have been detailing the various particulars that have been exhibited to the student in the course of these three last lectures. The general principles that are applicable to political situations are, for the most part, sufficiently acknowledged, but the situations we are here concerned with are matters of great debate, and it is not easy to understand the characters and views of the different actors in the scene. No subject, however, can be so important, so singularly, so tremendously interesting.

From the nature of human beings and human affairs, questions like these are necessarily mingled and mixed questions; but it is our duty to endeavour to arrive at what decisions we can, proceeding with proper modesty and care, and at all events endeavouring to comprehend the feelings and the views of all who took a part in these memorable transactions.

Our first and main position is, that the king, and still more the court, were natural objects of suspicion and distrust, not only after the flight to Varennes, but before; still that the Girondists were wanting in proper confidence in the goodness of the king's intentions; that they continually made the Revolution more hateful and oppressive to him; and that they themselves created the evils against which they professed to provide.

That with respect to the great subject of the Austrian war, the points seem to be, that though the allied powers meant only to act on the defensive, they expressed themselves in a manner so offensive to the national dignity of France, and assumed to themselves such a power of interfering in the government of the country, that they left the popular party in

France a right to declare war if they thought it necessary to the interests of their country; and yet we afterwards contended that, under the circumstances of the case, the Girondists ought not to have made war, and that by doing so they could not but bring their Revolution into the greatest difficulties,—reducing every thing to the chance of despotism on the one side, or anarchy on the other.

We next held, that the king did every thing in his power to prevent the war, and was deeply affected by the calamities to which he saw France thus exposed, as well as clearly aware of the dangers that were thus made to threaten himself; that he was not wanting to the constitution, or indisposed to give it a fair trial, till the Jacobin ministry, as it was called, was forced upon him, and war declared against Austria; that from that time he turned to other counsels, as we have seen in the lecture I have now delivered; that not having called the allied powers into France, he thought he might be a mediator between them and his subjects; that a counter-revolution was now his object, but not arbitrary power; that his intentions were still benevolent and patriotic, but that his interference, or any interference with the combined powers, was exposed to the objection, that no foreign armies are ever to be suffered to intermingle themselves in the concerns of a country. We contended, however, that allowance must be made for the unhappy monarch: his country, he must have thought, had no other chance of escape from calamity, or himself from a scaffold; his family from assassination, or his friends from massacre.

On the whole, the great mistake seems to have been, on the one side and on the other, that the supporters of the old régime thought they could set the Jacobins apart, and make war upon the clubs and more violent Revolutionists, and not on the rest of the nation,—this seems to have been their mistake from the first; and that, on the other hand, the supporters of the Revolution kept no bounds in their spirit of proselytism, and justly alarmed every neighbouring country, after first violating the feelings of every one who differed from them in their own. And thus far, indeed, I see no reason to congratulate either of the parties on the wisdom or virtue of their proceedings.

In conclusion, it is truly melancholy to observe in mankind such a total want of all moderation, of all reasonable attention to the feelings and opinions of each other. The patrons of the old opinions, for instance, and the German courts, would have disliked the Revolution under any circumstances, and under any possible modifications; and the complaints and representations of the emigrants, and the sufferings of the royal family, when the Revolution turned out to be so very destructive of all established authorities and opinions, excited the strongest sympathy in all the governing classes. All this was very natural, particularly the sentiment of moral indignation by which they were animated; still, when every allowance has been made for their situation, the best *manner* of interference was evidently a question of the greatest difficulty; and some more prudence and discretion might have been expected, and some more attention than was, in fact, shown to the acknowledged rights of independent nations, to those especially of a great kingdom like France, under an acknowledged state of revolutionary excitement at the time.

And again, with respect to the patrons of the new opinions, they might look down with contempt on the old governments and the prejudices that supported them: they were free, no doubt, to follow where their reasonings seemed to lead them, in making up their *own* opinions; but why were they to be animated with such a restless, offensive, revolutionary spirit of proselytism?

Their principles and notions went certainly to the disturbance and even the subversion of the other feudal governments of Europe. Why were they to proclaim them every where, disseminate their revolutionary writings, and establish their clubs?

It afterwards appeared, that wherever the French armies went, the ground was prepared for them; the friends of the new opinions were found organized, the clubs in activity, and the foundations of society, as it had hitherto existed, subverted. But why all this aggression, this invasion, this war, this exterminating war, to be waged against all constituted authorities in the dominions of independent nations? The great truths of civil liberty, it will be said, as of religious

liberty at the time of the Reformation, are every where to be propagated, that others may participate of the benefits we ourselves enjoy, and that the happiness of mankind may be made progressive.

This is a principle (the dissemination of truth), no doubt, of the most sacred nature, one to which we owe every thing that has improved or dignified our nature; but it is a principle which, when opposed to established opinions, must always be exercised with circumspection and care. It can be exercised by no man, and by no description of men, without incurring the most awful responsibility, and a far greater responsibility than is generally supposed: certainly it must never be exercised without an examination of the new opinions, which are to be propagated, and the old opinions that are to be overthrown, far more grave and anxious than has been often exercised; without an attention to the particular circumstances of the case, far more provident and patient than has been often shown.

On this great occasion of the French Revolution, on this great crisis in the affairs of the world, the enthusiasm, the spirit of proselytism of the patrons of the new opinions, was totally ungovernable and unpardonable. They had neither sense nor patience in comparing the value of their own new opinions with the old, nor mercy nor forbearance in their conduct to those who differed from them.

With regard to the king, his case is exhibited in the memorial I have produced. What he hoped, and feared, and wished, and attempted, are all here. This document I consider as the very image and identification of his mind and nature. No doubt the general principle was against him; no communication whatever is to be held with foreign powers for the purpose of influencing the internal concerns of our own country. We dispute not a principle so universally salutary and important, so supported by experience as well as by theory. But what is to be our censure, if we consider that he had made every effort to prevent the war; that these foreign powers were approaching, as enemies, whether he interfered with them or not; that the popular party in the capital were pressing forward upon him to trample him down into the dust; that he had no other hope, no other chance

for his crown and dignity, but what he could derive from the assistance of the allies; that he not only saw them approaching, but had no doubts of their success? What is to be our censure, I say? Is it to be expected from human wisdom, from human feelings, that the king should, in this situation, adhere to a general principle in political science, when, by deviating from it, he only attempted to be a pacificator between his subjects and their invaders, turn his influence with the one to the best interests and purposes of the other, and endeavour to put an end to the calamities of his country, and if possible his own.

MEMOIR

PRESENTED BY MALLET DU PAN TO THE ALLIED SOVEREIGNS ON THE PART OF LOUIS XVI. ON THE 14TH OF JULY, 1792.

Deux objets inséparables se présentent dans la conduite et dans le but de la prochaine contre-révolution: d'abord les moyens de l'opérer; ensuite ceux de la maintenir. Sans leur connection mutuelle, les moyens de succès pourraient contrarier ceux de stabilité, et les victoires ne feraient que préparer bientôt de nouveaux dangers, ainsi que de nouveaux troubles.

Les moyens de succès existent dans les combinaisons et dans les forces étrangères; mais on ne doit pas se borner à considérer ici, et uniquement, la première résistance qu'opposeront les armées de la Révolution.

Il faut craindre les suites de leurs défaites; de leur dispersion au moment où elles se replieront dans l'intérieur: l'appui que ces masses indisciplinées promettent aux chefs des factieux, qui tenteront de les réunir dans les Provinces Méridionales; le passage de la présomption à la férocité; l'habitude des violences subites qu'on a fait contracter au peuple à chaque moment de crise; le deuil qu'un jour de frénésie ou l'ordre des démagogues, peut étendre sur la famille royale, et toutes celles dont les sentimens sont notés d'aristocratie ou seulement suspectes. Il faut prévenir encore une réunion des Révolutionnaires divisés, sans détruire les motifs de ralliement; et réduire les résistances au moindre terme possible. On doit même tendre à leur donner pour adversaires, et à se ménager comme auxiliaires de la sûreté intérieure ceux des Révolutionnaires que l'anarchie, la réflection, les désappointemens personnels et la tyrannie des Jacobins, ont soulevés.

Pour y parvenir, il paraît indispensable d'employer simultanément la terreur et la confiance; ou en d'autres termes, d'ôter aux uns l'espoir d'éviter les suites de la guerre qu'ils ont provoquée, de conserver aux autres l'espérance que ses suites leur seront moins funestes que l'oppression sous laquelle ils

gémissent, et qu'une constitution qui ne peut pas même les défendre contre la puissance des clubs.

On ne comprendrait qu'imparfaitement l'importance de cette séparation des intérêts, dont peut dépendre la sauvegarde de l'intérieur; et dont dépendra sûrement la facilité à faire rentrer le royaume entier dans l'obéissance, si l'on ne se forme une idée juste des différens partis qui agitent la capitale et s'y disputent l'autorité.

Presque toute entière elle est dans ce moment entre les mains des Jacobins; majorité de l'Assemblée Nationale, places importantes, municipalités: le ministère vient de leur échapper; aussitôt ils ont armée la multitude contre le roi: il est moralement impossible que le conseil actuel de sa majesté puisse se soutenir un mois entier.

Les Jacobins se divisent en deux sections, qui vont à peu près aux mêmes fins par des mesures différentes, et qui souvent brouillées par des *dissentimens* personnels, d'ambition ou de défiance, sont toujours prêtes à se réunir toutes les fois qu'il faut porter un nouveau coup à la prérogative royale, ou exécuter quelqu' attentat contre les classes supérieures.

La section actuellement dominante est présidée en chef par l'Abbé Sieyes, qui la gouverne avec Brissot, Condorcet, Péthion, Gensonné, Vergniaud, Gaudet, Manuel. Cette cabale avait formé le dernier ministère. Outre ses propres adhérents, elle rallie assez ordinairement à ses décisions la majorité des 250 fourbes, politiques ou poltrons, qui se sont classés dans l'Assemblée sous le sobriquet d'*Indépendans*.

Le projet de cette cabale n'est pas la république, nominativement, mais la république de fait; par une réduction de la liste civile à cinq millions; par le retranchement de la plûpart des attributs laissés au roi par un changement de dynastie dont le nouveau chef serait une espèce de président honoraire de la république; auquel ils donneraient un conseil exécutif nommé par l'Assemblée; c'est à dire par leur comité.

La seconde ligue qui partage les Jacobins, est composée des agitateurs grossiers, des républicains impatiens, des misérables qui ne pouvant supporter aucun gouvernement, désirent l'éternité de l'anarchie.

On ne leur découvre d'autre principe que celui d'une application immodérée et à rigueur, des *droits de l'homme*. A l'aide de cette charte ils aspirent à changer les loix et les officiers publics chaque semestre, à étendre leur nivellement sur toute autorité régulière, sur les eminences légales, sur les propriétés. Ils ne veulent point de roi: le seul régime

qu'ils ambitionnent est la démocracie de la canaille délibérante.

Robespierre, Danton, Chabot, Merlin, Bazire, Thuriot, et cent autres de cette trempe, soutenus par le club des Cordeliers, et par les sociétés fraternelles, administrent cette faction désordonnée; conservent un parti très nombreux dans le club des Jacobins, qui dispose de la plupart des libellistes populaires, des gens à piques, et de l'écume de la capitale.

La jalousie, une différence d'opinion au sujet de la guerre, jetèrent quelque désordre entre ces deux cabales: on vit le moment où elles allaient se séparer. La haine du gouvernement monarchique et la nécessité de tenir tête aux Feuillans ne tardèrent pas à les rapprocher.

L'une et l'autre opèrent par les mêmes moyens; avec cette différence, que la première marche moins à découvert, ménage quelques bienséances, et conduit ses crimes avec moins d'impétuosité. Elle a sur l'autre l'avantage des raffinemens, des talens, et d'un plan dont les principaux fils sont tendus par l'Abbé Sieyès. Les plus vils agens, les perturbateurs de profession, les brigands, les fanatiques, les scélérats de tout ordre, voilà leur armée commune: ils ne la laissent pas un jour dans l'inaction.

Le Duc d'Orléans a des rapports avec la seconde de ces deux ligues: la seule dont il lui reste quelque chose à espérer par un bouleversement complet.

Il est moins facile de classer les Constitutionnels ou Feuillans. Ils forment une complication hétérogène de vues croisées; d'inconséquences différentes; de ressentimens sans analogie, de plans contradictoires; d'une métaphysique enthousiaste; d'ambitions deçues, qui cherchent à se relever.

Faute de pouvoir et de force réelle, les plus apparens de ce parti ont eu recours à l'intrigue. Ils manœuvrèrent au château des Tuileries, dans l'Assemblée, dans les départemens, et cherchèrent à s'emparer du gouvernement et du corps législatif, avec l'argent du roi. Leur principal objet était d'écraser les Jacobins, de faire chasser les membres actuels par les départemens et par le peuple; de leur substituer une nouvelle assemblée à laquelle le roi eût appellé une partie des constituans; et de modifier alors la constitution en renforçant la prérogative royale, et en instituant une seconde chambre élective par le peuple, sous de certaines conditions.

Cette entreprise, dont quelques alentours de LL. MM. ont cru trop facilement l'exécution, en la regardant comme un port de sûreté momentanée a été bientôt connue et cul-

butée. Le seul effet de ces intrigues a été d'enfermer M. Delessart à Orléans, de créer au roi de nouveaux dangers, de fournir des armes aux Jacobins, et d'allumer entr'eux et les Feuillans une haine implacable.

Les deux Lameth, Beaumetz, Barnave, Duport, D'André, dirigaient ce projet. Ils tentèrent de rassembler aux Feuillans tout ce qui voulait la constitution avec un roi, ou plutôt tout ce qui voulait la constitution sans être Jacobins.

MM. de la Fayette, de Narbonne, et une autre société de manipulateurs, suivaient des vues analogues, mais par d'autres moyens, principalement tirés de l'armée. En conséquence, M. de Narbonne appuya la guerre dans les conseils. Ces mesures, conformes au génie de leurs auteurs, et conduites avec la dernière étourderie, n'ont pas eu plus de succès que les précédentes.

Sous ces deux ordres de chefs divers se range la masse des Feuillans de l'Assemblée, de la capitale, et des provinces; mais sans former un véritable parti; car on n'y distingue ni doctrine, ni plan commun, ni système de moyens, ni ressources calculées. Le penchant qui a toujours entraîné une partie de ces Constitutionnels aux démarches les moins périlleuses, lui a préscrit guerre offensive aux aristocrates, sans force, et guerre défensive aux Jacobins, puissants. Une foule considérable a arboré ce pavillon par politique, afin d'échapper aux fureurs qui poursuivent les désapprobateurs trop déclarés de la constitution. Beaucoup d'administrateurs, de nouveaux juges, de bourgeois, de propriétaires des villes et des campagnes, et environ 100 membres de l'Assemblée, sont dans cette première catégorie. Elle comprend, en général, les honnêtes gens du parti, et ceux qui, de bonne foi, s'avouent l'impossibilité de soutenir le nouveau régime.

Après eux viennent les idolâtres de la constitution; espèce de maniaques qu'un enthousiasme factice ou le bel esprit politique attachent à cette superstition. Ils se sont persuadés que sans les Jacobins, la constitution cheminerait; et il n'a pas été possible de leur faire apercevoir encore, que la constitution seule enfantait, soutenait des Jacobins; et que ceux de la Rue St. Honoré détruits, elle en ferait reparaître d'autres dans six mois.

Une troisième classe de Constitutionnels est inspirée par l'intérêt et par la vanité; par intérêt pour ceux à qui le régime actuel a procuré des places et des avantages; par la vanité, pour ceux à qui il a procuré quelque distinction. Une grande partie de la garde nationale non soldée, est dirigée par l'un ou l'autre de ces deux mobiles.

Presque généralement, on découvre dans ces trois catégories un mécontentement prononcé; une incertitude complette sur la durée de la constitution; un penchant d'instinct et de raison à se rallier au roi, et encore plus de haine contre les Jacobins que contre les aristocrates.

En avant d'eux, ainsi que nous l'avons dit, sont les esprits plus déliés, qui, avec l'ambition d'être chefs, n'ont jamais pu y parvenir du moment où ils ont délaissé les moyens pervers par lesquels ils ont concouru à opérer et à soutenir la Révolution.

Il est douteux qu'on rassemblât dix de ces démagogues détrônés concordans dans leurs vues, et dans leurs motifs de conduite.

Quelques-uns ont horreur des crimes, et veulent sincèrement sauver le roi et la monarchie. D'autres n'aspirent qu'à la domination, qu'à élever leur faction sur celle des Jacobins, et à se rendre maîtres de l'autorité. De troisièmes s'accommoderaient d'une contre-révolution qui leur laisserait une grande influence, ou qui, du moins, ne les replongerait pas dans l'humiliation et l'obscurité.

A côté de ceux-ci se trouvent des hommes, auxquels une conduite odieuse, pendant deux ans et demi, inspire, sinon des remords, du moins des craintes; qui, sans défendre leurs torts, appréhendent d'en être punis, qui frémissent à la vue du triomphe des classes envers lesquelles ils n'ont eu aucun ménagement; et dont la contre-révolution, sans beaucoup offenser peut-être leurs opinions actuelles, mortifierait toutes leurs passions.

Ces constitutionnaires, réels ou prétendus, embrassent la très grande majorité des citoyens de tout ordre qui ont voulu et adopté la Révolution: mais avec des opinions chancelantes; avec des idées irréconciliables entr'elles; avec la sottise de gémir des effets en jurant de maintenir les causes; avec un défaut total de caractère, d'union, de hardiesse, et ainsi mélangés de romanciers politiques, d'écrivains à système, de phrasiers, d'intriguans, de Machiavelistes sans vue et sans nerf, ce parti constitutionnel n'a jamais eu qu'une consistance artificielle et passagère.

On ne parlera point ici de la section particulière, qui, avant les forfaits de Versailles, s'était placée entre les deux premiers ordres et les feseurs de la constitution actuelle; c'est à dire, des partisans d'un corps législatif en deux divisions, dont l'une de chambre de pairs, sur la formation de laquelle les adhérens de ce système réprésentatif ne présentèrent jamais d'idée distincte. Quoique persévérant dans

leurs opinions, presque toujours aussi mal entendues que mal jugées; mais aujourd'hui modifiées par une funeste expérience qui leur manquait, ils sont tous réunis à la nécessité de rétablir l'autorité royale dans la force et la dignité compatible avec le dégré de liberté publique que peut supporter le gouvernement d'un grand empire. Ils sont unanimes à redemander le clergé, la religion nationale, la noblesse, les grands tribunaux. On n'a à craindre de leur part aucune espèce d'opposition, parcequ'il n'en est pas un qui ne préférât pas même la monarchie absolue aux lois monstrueuses du moment, et à l'autorité des hommes qui les ont instituées.

II.

La carte politique qui vient d'être crayonnée doit faire pressentir les effets divers que produiront sur les esprits, l'approche, les progrès, l'existence de la contre-révolution, suivant les formes et les mesures par lesquelles elle s'opérera.

Evidemment, elle frappera dans des sens différens ces tribus désunies, dont les passions, les principes, les intérêts, se rencontrent sur certains points et se divisent sur tous les autres.

La politique préscrit donc de ménager ceux de ces intérêts qui peuvent se concilier avec l'objet fundamental de la contre-révolution; et dont la négligence rendrait commun à la masse entière des révolutionnaires, le désir et le dessein d'une opposition prolongée.

Tout ce qui sert à désarmer les résistances et à faciliter la soumission doit être employé; hors, le vrai moyen de généraliser celles-là, et de retarder celle-ci, serait de fournir aux uns et aux autres des motifs égaux de persévérer dans la rebellion.

Ces considérations ne peuvent s'appliquer à la tète, et à une partie des Jacobins. On ne les subjuguera que par l'effroi. Leurs maximes, leur plan, leur exemple, ne permettent aucun procédé de confiance. Ils n'ont d'intérêt que celui du crime; d'autres ressources que le crime. Les ménagemens leur paraîtraient des aveux de timidité, et les enhardiraient. La force se montrera donc à leur égard dans l'appareil le plus menaçant; le manifeste considérera ces corporations, qui font le scandale et l'horreur des trois quarts de la nation, comme des sociétés excommuniées, auxquels on ne laisse aucune espérance d'échapper, ni de grâce pour leur doctrine. La vie sauvé est le seul prix qu'on puisse promettre à ceux d'entr'eux dont l'égarement ou le fanatisme n'ont pas commandé des forfaits; et qui quitteront les drapeaux de leurs indignes chefs.

Eux seuls ont provoqué la guerre : sur eux doit en tomber le châtiment. Mais cette grande vérité qu'on ne saurait annoncer d'une manière trop comminatoire, doit ouvrir une issue au reste beaucoup plus nombreux des révolutionnaires mitigés. Il serait injuste et dangereux de les confondre avec les factieux effrénés qui maîtrisent le royaume ; car alors, par nécessité ou par faiblesse, ils se rejetteraient dans leurs bras, et se rendraient vraisemblablement, ne fusse que par inertie, les complices de leur opposition et de leurs entreprises ultérieures. Envers cette majorité, la sagesse conseille l'emploi simultané de la terreur et de la confiance.

De la *terreur*, car elle seule peut détruire les illusions dont beaucoup d'entr'eux persistent à s'étourdir ; inspirer quelque courage aux âmes faibles que le peur des Jacobins, ou l'habitude, redonneraient à la faction dominante, s'ils ne la voyaient pas à la veille de périr : faire une impression profonde sur des esprits flottans, ou séduits par des erreurs en leur montrant le dernier jour des chimères : balancer chez d'autres le faux point d'honneur qui les entraîne encore à la défense de la constitution ; et surtout enlever aux chefs des Feuillans l'espoir sur lequel ils ont porté toutes leurs vues depuis six mois ; celui de se mettre en état, de faire un accommodement les armes à la main, et de finir par une capitulation.

La *confiance* soutiendra l'effet de la terreur, le conduira au résultat désirable, de réduire les résistances exclusivement à celle des Jacobins, et de contrebalancer dans l'intérieur, durant les dernières crises, leur influence, qui peut amener encore de nouvelles catastrophes.

Cette confiance n'est autre chose que la sécurité pour l'avenir. Elle naîtra de l'assurance qu'on ne prétend pas confondre des factieux, pour qui rien n'a été sacré, avec des hommes abusés ; les égaremens d'esprit, avec la perversité ; des opinions erronées, avec un code de crimes, d'immoralité, d'anarchie. Non seulement cette distinction flattera l'amour propre des constitutionnaires ; elle leur paraîtra, de plus, une preuve d'équité ; elle leur montrera une sauvegarde ; et on ne peut les supposer assez insensés pour partager la résistance des Jacobins, lorsqu'ils n'auront pas les mêmes dangers à craindre.

Elle naîtra du soin que l'on prendra de détruire les appréhensions répandues, de vengeances méditées, d'implacables ressentimens, d'oppression, qui envelopperait également les torts et les délits.

Elle naîtra enfin, et plus particulièrement, de l'opinion que le roi seul sera l'arbitre du sort des différens partis, et le paci-

ficateur du royaume; qu'on réserve à lui seul la destinée des lois ainsi que celles des personnes; en un mot, que les unes et les autres ne seront pas livrées à discrétion et éxclusivement aux émigrés, ni aux puissances étrangères.

La tyrannie des Jacobins a forcé les Feuillans et la plus grande partie des révolutionnaires honteux, ou à-demi convertis, de considérer enfin l'autorité royale comme leur ancre de miséricorde. Si demain, ils triomphaient de leurs adversaires, nul doute qu'ils ne fortifiassent sans délai la puissance du roi. Depuis trois mois la plupart se fussent rangés autour de sa majesté s'ils avaient eu autant de courage que de bonne volonté; et si les Jacobins, par leur infatigable activité, n'eussent suspendu les poignards de leurs assassins, et les torches de leurs incendiaires, sur quiconque osait avouer son attachement pour le monarche.

III.

Les dispositions précédentes dépendent des puissances belligérantes et des princes et émigrés Français. Elles sont le vœu du roi, le conseil que lui dictent des lumières positives, et l'intérêt de tous. Sa majesté attache la plus haute importance à ce que ses représentations soyent méditées. Elle va jusqu'à joindre ses prières aux instances pour obtenir la déférence qu'elle sollicite. Elle la sollicite dans la pleine indépendance de sa réflection et de sa volonté; nulle impulsion étrangère n'a préparé ni produit ses recommandations à cet égard: elles résultent de la connaissance exacte qu'a sa majesté des dispositions publiques, par les comptes journaliers qui lui sont fidèlement rendus de la capitale et des départemens; ensorte que personne dans le royaume ou au dehors, ne réunit autant d'informations certaines, pour constater ce qu'il faut craindre ou espérer de l'intérieur, suivant la nature des formes et des mesures par lesquelles on développera la force extérieure. Tout deviendra facile dans le présent et l'avenir si l'on concourt aux vues du roi: tout se compliquera, peut-être, de périls, d'incertitudes, de difficultés, si l'on s'en écarte.

La force doit remettre la monarchie debout; mais c'est à l'opinion à l'affermir: c'est dans les cœurs qu'il faut planter les racines de stabilité; c'est à féconder une soumission morale que doivent se diriger les moyens de soumission forcée, et les efforts de quiconque veut prévenir de nouveaux naufrages. On ne considérera dans cette note que les motifs de persuasion qui concernent les royalistes expatriés; sa majesté attend leur condescendance à ses intentions éclairées,

de la magnanimité et de l'attachement des princes de son sang, ainsi que des sentimens de la valeureuse noblesse qui a tout sacrifié au désir de sauver la monarchie, et des citoyens de tous ordres qui ont partagé ses souffrances et son exil.

Le roi désire que par un concours offensif et trop distinct, leur participation à la guerre actuelle ne lui fasse point perdre le caractère de guerre étrangère, faite de puissance à puissance. Sa majesté n'a jamais mis en doute une résolution unanime de leur part de lui confier le soin des intérêts compromis, ne que les princes se considéreraient comme parties lésées dans un différent dont l'arbitrage sera exercé par sa majesté lorsque le sort des armes aura fait rendre la liberté nécessaire à l'exercice de la puissance royale.

Sans doute de trop justes ressentimens appelleraient les princes et la noblesse à venger trois ans d'outrages et à attaquer, eux-mêmes, d'aussi criminels usurpateurs: sans doute il fut un moment où la guerre civile n'eût été de la part des opprimés que l'exercice du droit de repousser la force par la force. Les calamités publiques et particulières auraient peut-être été moins longues sans être plus affreuses.

Mais la guerre extérieure, dont la Providence inspira la déclaration aux factieux, est destinée à faire, maintenant, avec moins de périls, de malheurs, et d'incertitudes, ce qu'on pourrait espérer de la guerre civile.

Détournons de dessus la France la cumulation de ces deux fléaux. Ils s'étendraient de la manière la plus affreuse sur trois cent mille familles dispersées au milieu d'un peuple frénétique: ils mettraient en danger les jours du roi, ceux de la reine et de la famille royale: ils feraient renverser le trône, livrer la propriété au pillage, égorger les royalistes, les prêtres restés dans le royaume et menacés: ils rallieraient aux Jacobins les révolutionnaires moins forcenés: ils ranimeraient une exaltation qui tend à s'éteindre, et rendrait plus opiniâtre une résistance qui fléchira devant les premiers succès décisifs; lorsqu'on verra des intermédiaires entre les émigrés armés et la partie de la nation à réduire.

Le cœur humain ne change point. On craint de ceux qu'on a cruellement offensés: on n'espère de pardon de ceux envers qui on fut impitoyable. Le peuple est incapable de s'élever à l'espoir d'une générosité dont il n'à pas le sentiment.

Les différentes factions qui ont bouleversé l'empire redoutent, en conséquence, de rencontrer dans les princes et les

émigrés, des ennemis dont ils ne doivent attendre aucun ménagement. Ils ne les entrevoyent qu'entourés de chaînes, de bourreaux, de flétrissures, d'instrumens d'oppression.

Ce préjugé a été fomenté sans relâche par les libellistes de la Révolution, par les harangueurs à la tribune, par les efforts des assemblées et des clubs: et s'il faut le dire, la légèreté des discours de quelques têtes jeunes et ardentes, la virulence maladroite et toujours menaçante de quelques écrivains royalistes, qui ne parlent que potences; enfin le silence de longanimité que les princes ont cru devoir à leur dignité, au milieu des imputations renaissantes et des proscriptions de l'Assemblée, ont envenimé, enraciné cette prévention. Il est aisé d'en apercevoir les suites, dans le cas, où les émigrés, réunis en corps, dirigeraient des opérations offensives contre les frontières du royaume.

La fureur, la résistance, la soif du carnage, se porteraient contr'eux: on laisserait les autres points à découvert; on abandonnerait la France aux étrangers afin de la fermer aux émigrés. Si l'on n'égorgeait pas les prisonniers, il n'est aucun genre de violence dont ils ne devînssent les victimes. Le stoicisme des braves militaires qui marcheront sous les étendards des princes serait à pure perte contre des hommes qui ne respectent ni les lois de la guerre, ni celles de l'honneur. Qu'on n'allègue pas la crainte des représailles. A-t-elle prévenu le meurtre des Tyroliens? La férocité populaire; celle des soldats licencieux qui ont brisé tous les freins, furent elles jamais subordonnées au calcul de la prévoyance?

La première nouvelle d'une action entre les royalistes et les troupes de l'Assemblée Nationale, deviendraient le prétexte de nouveaux forfaits et le signal d'une boucherie dans tous les lieux où les clubs dominent les autorités administratives.

En attirant eux-mêmes les armées étrangères sur le royaume, les Jacobins ont affaibli l'opinion que cette invasion résultait des efforts des émigrés. Contre leur intention, cette extravagante démarche a procuré quelque sauvegarde aux royalistes de l'intérieur. Le peuple des départemens a cessé de menacer de massacrer et de piller les adhérens de ceux que les siens allaient combattre sur la frontière. L'approche prématurée des royalistes du dehors, et leur réunion distincte pour s'ouvrir, séparément des forces étrangères, un passage dans le royaume, redonnerait à ces dispositions populaires toute leur énergie.

Il ne faut pas s'exagérer les effets de la terreur. Cer-

tainement si le peuple est effrayé, ses excès ne sont pas aussi probables; mais ce n'est chose ni aussi prompte, ni aussi facile qu'on se l'imagine d'inspirer une crainte salutaire à des chefs dont tout atteste l'ignorance et la présomption; qui sont eux-mêmes dupes des illusions qu'ils ont crées; qui se croyent invincibles derrière leurs énumérations civiques; et qui calculent la guerre comme ils ont calculé la législation, par l'argumentation des nombres. Sans doute la réflexion et la raison peuvent les désabuser; mais s'ils étaient raisonnables et réfléchissans, leur conduite offrirait-t-elle depuis six mois une suite d'actes de fureur?

On ne réussira pas plus facilement à pénétrer le peuple d'une épouvante efficace. En général, il n'existe pour la multitude d'autres dangers que ceux dont elle touche les instrumens et la présence matérielle. Plus spécialement encore, ce caractère appartient au peuple de Paris, dont l'ignorance et l'inconcevable crédulité sont le jouet des prestiges les plus grossiers: qui, journellement, est obsédé d'écrits, de fables, de discoureurs publices, de présidens d'attroupemens, de lecteurs de cabarets et d'atteliers, associés pour l'entretenir de ses victoires, de ses conquêtes, de la détresse de ses ennemis; de l'immensité de sa puissance, des talens de ses chefs, de l'enthousiasme que la liberté Française inspire à tous les peuples et à toutes les armées. Quiconque n'a pas suivi ces rendezvous d'instruction où l'on aiguillonne sans cesse les préjugés populaires: quiconque n'a pas questionné les divers états; à commencer par ce qui s'appelle la bonne bourgeoisie de Paris, et à finir par la populace, n'aura qu'une imparfaite idée des succès de la démagogie en ce genre, comme dans tous les autres.

Ces réflexions, fondées sur des observations suivies, commanderont peut-être aux augustes frères de sa majesté, à leur conseil, et aux royalistes, de subordonner leur courage impatient à la prudence; et une fois armés, de n'agir qu'avec les précautions, à l'époque, et par des mesures, qui puissent prévenir les malheurs inséparables d'un plan différent.

Par les mêmes motifs, il paraîtra sans doute convenable que dans le cas où les princes feraient précéder leur mouvemens d'une déclaration, ce manifeste soit calculé sur celui des puissances; qu'on s'y renferme dans des assurances générales, en évitant tout ce qui prêterait aux commentaires perfides des factieux; qu'on y présente les princes comme les libérateurs du peuple; qu'on prômette paix, sûreté, liberté légitime; qu'en fin l'on écarte tout ce qui manifesterait une volonté de faire prévaloir telle ou telle forme de gouvernement; et qu'on

se borne à déclarer que l'on agit pour faire rendre au roi sa liberté; et pour rétablir le gouvernement monarchique, tel que sa majesté a entendu le circonscrire.

Sa majesté très chrétienne, pleine de confiance dans les sentimens généreux et dans la sagesse des cours de Vienne et de Berlin, se plaît à espérer qu'elles considèrent du même œil sa situation, celle de la monarchie Française, et les moyens de terminer la guerre actuelle, sans exposer l'intérieur du royaume à de nouvelles catastrophes.

Elle désire, elle sollicite, que le manifeste qui précédera les opérations, soit établi sur des bases analogues à celles dont on vient d'exposer l'importance; et que la promptitude de sa publication prévienne des calamités imminentes.

Elle se persuade que les effets à attendre des craintes à inspirer résulteront d'abord de la certitude qu'acquerront les factieux, qu'en déclarant la guerre à sa majesté apostolique, ils l'ont, par le fait, déclarée à l'Europe même; et que le manifeste des cours de Vienne et de Berlin exprime des sentimens ainsi que des projets communs aux différentes puissances qui ont formé le concert.

Le peuple mesure toujours ses dangers sur le nombre de ses ennemis: ses chefs perdront la ressource de le tromper, comme ils l'ont fait jusqu'à ce jour, par l'assurance que ni le corps Germanique, ni les puissances du Nord, ni celles du Midi, n'épouseraient les intérêts de la querelle actuelle; une réunion si menaçante déchirera le bandeau des illusions; et en imposera avec d'autant plus d'efficace, que ni l'Assemblée, ni le peuple, n'y sont préparés.

Dans le même but, il paraît essentiel que le manifeste ne laisse aucun espoir de voir poser les armes avant que le roi soit mis en liberté, et son autorité légitime rétablie.

Tout ce qui laisserait entrevoir la possibilité de se soustraire au sort de la guerre, par des négociations dilatoires, ou par des accommodemens imparfaits, retarderait la soumission, et préparerait au roi de nouveaux dangers; car on ferait servir de nouvelles violences, auxquelles il succomberait probablement, à le forcer de rallentir l'activité des puissances belligérantes.

L'impression de terreur résultera encore, et principalement, d'une déclaration énergique à l'Assemblée Nationale, à la capitale, aux corps administratifs, aux municipalités, aux individus, qu'on les rend personnellement garants, dans leurs corps et biens, du moindre préjudice apporté à la personne de leurs majestés, de leurs familles, et aux citoyens quelconques.

Cette déclaration doit frapper encore plus particulièrement sur la ville de Paris.

On soutiendra la terreur par la confiance, en déclarant qu'on est armé contre les factieux, non contre le roi et la nation; qu'on prend la défense des gouvernemens légitimes et des peuples, contre une anarchie féroce, qui menace la tranquillité de l'Europe entière, prépare les plus horribles calamités, et brise, entre les hommes, les liens sociaux.

Cette forme enlevera aux factions un argument dont elles ont tiré et dont elles chercheront encore à tirer le plus grand avantage; savoir que c'est ici la guerre *des rois contre les peuples.*

La confiance, ainsi fondée sur cette distinction entre les factieux, maîtres du royaume, et la reste de la nation, serait fortifiée encore par l'attention à ne proposer, à n'imposer aucune forme de gouvernement; et à déclarer qu'on s'arme pour le rétablissement de la monarchie; pour la liberté du monarque; pour la réstauration de la paix.

Cette mesure fléchira la plupart des révolutionnaires lassés ou incertains, qui, sans vouloir la constitution actuelle, craignent le retour des grands abus, les vengeances, l'oppression, et qui savent que S. M. T. C. sera leur plus sûr protecteur contre ces dangers; et desquels on peut attendre la soumission dès qu'on leur présentera une issue sans ignominie, une monarchie sans arbitraire, des loix protectrices des personnes et des propriétés.

La profonde sagacité de LL. MM. J. et R. leur aura sans doute fait déjà pressentir ces observations: la destinée du roi, de la reine, de la famille royale, du trône, de tous les propriétaires et du royaume en général, peuvent en dépendre.

Mais l'accélération du manifeste est en ce moment l'objet principal de la sollicitude de S. M. T. C. Elle l'invoque avec des instances redoublées: tout ce qui l'entoure, tout ce qui juge sainement les mouvemens de Paris, est unanime dans cette invocation.

La guerre est en ce moment oubliée à Paris et dans les provinces: on ne s'en occupe, on ne s'en intimide pas plus que des batailles des Anglais dans l'Hindostan. Les Gazettes ont beau annoncer la marche des troupes étrangères: cent libelles populaires rassurent chaque jour les Parisiens. Le silence absolu des puissances depuis la déclaration hostile de l'Assemblée; la guerre défensive du Brabant, des revers sans conséquence, des affronts qu'on ne sent point; la formation nécessairement lente des armées; le délabrement, la dispersion, la détresse où l'on a vu rester les émigrés Français; tout

a concouru, à accroître l'étourdissement. Les appréhensions des plus timides ne vont pas au-delà de l'idée, qu'avant d'oser les combattre, on leur proposera un accommodement dont ils se moquent, ainsi que du danger que paraît courir leurs frontières.

C'est à ces différentes causes de sécurité qu'on doit les progrès de l'autorité des Jacobins, leurs dernières entreprises, et l'affreux attentat du 20 Juin. On leur a laissé le tems de mûrir la combinaison de nouvelles catastrophes : le moindre délai leur donnera celui de les exécuter.

On ne doit pas s'y méprendre. Si cette épouvantable journée du 20 Juin : cette inouïe scène au milieu des forfaits de la Révolution, où l'on a vu LL. MM. livrées à des outrages, exposées à des périls qui font frémir l'imagination ; si ce jour de deuil et d'opprobre ne s'est pas terminé par deux régicides, il faut en rendre grâce à une seule circonstance.

LL. MM. ont été uniquement sauvées par une de ces impressions populaires que l'habileté des démagogues ne peut prévenir.

Ils n'étaient pas maîtres de tenir en garde cette populace contre l'ascendant de la majesté royale, de la présence de ses souverains, de l'effroi involontaire qui enchaînait leurs bras régicides, à la voix des augustes personnes dont l'héroïque fermeté désarma ces âmes sanguinaires.

Dans l'alternative de consommer leur crime en rallumant la fureur de la multitude, ou de la réserver à de nouveaux attentats, la politique dicta aux chefs, de ne pas se découvrir aussi manifestement ; de ne pas prendre sur eux la responsibilité exclusive du dernier forfait à commettre, et de ne pas s'enlever la ressource de la rejetter sur l'égarement du peuple.

Depuis cette époque les mêmes périls demeurent suspendus sur la tête de LL. MM. Ce n'est qu'à force d'artifices et de moyens précaires qu'on défend encore leur existence. D'un jour à l'autre la France et l'Europe peuvent être dans le deuil. LL. MM. comptent les minutes jusqu'à la publication du manifeste : leur vie est une affreuse agonie.

Dans le courant de ce mois, les factieux rassemblent à Paris une nouvelle fédération de leurs satellites. Si les dispositions extérieures ne contrebalancent pas la hardiesse de leurs complots ; si le courage du roi dans cette fatale extrémité n'est pas secondé par la déclaration des puissances, et par la rapidité d'opérations actives, il faut s'envelopper la tête et se soumettre à la Providence.

L'assassinat de LL. MM. serait le signal d'un massacre

général: les ressorts qui supportent encore en France la société ne tiennent plus qu'à un fil: un bouleversement effroyable la menace, et dans moins de cinq semaines elle sera peut-être dans un état pire que St. Domingue.

Quelle réstauration opérer alors sur un pareil entassement de calamités! La guerre, son but, ses effets, tout changerait de nature. Mais il suffit d'avoir présenté ce tableau avec la franchise d'une rigoureuse vérité, pour placer une confiance entière dans l'humanité, et dans les lumières des cours de Vienne et de Berlin.

Présenté au Roi de Prusse le 14 Juillet, 1792; et le lendemain à Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale, ainsi qu'à Mons. le Vice Chancelier d'Etat, Comte de Cobentzel, et au Baron de Spielman, Premier Référendaire de la Chancellerie d'Etat.

LECTURE XXVII.

TWENTIETH OF JUNE.

THE student will now observe, how critical is the state of affairs every where presented to his views. Let him suppose himself (as I have often recommended him to do) ignorant of the events, and nothing can be more interesting than the scene before him. War is declared, and the Austrians and Prussians are approaching. The wishes and the intentions of the king I have just exhibited to you, but how various were the chances against their accomplishment! These allied powers were to succeed: this was the first point necessary. To say nothing of La Fayette and the armies that were to be opposed to them in the field, what was in the mean time to be expected from the Girondists and Jacobins, the desperate men whom they had denounced; men of great talents, many of them, and all of them men of the most furious energy: in possession of the capital and of the populace, what prodigies of resistance, what outrages were not to be expected from them, what rage, what revenge, if they found the Prussians were to be successful; and how were the king and queen to be protected, who would all this time be supposed the guilty traitors, that had caused the ruin of their country, and even preparing to inflict condign punishment upon them as rebels to their legitimate authority? And if, on the contrary, the Prussians were driven back, what chance for the monarchy and the king amid the exultations and triumphant uproar of a furious mob and their leaders, who had been insulted by invasion, as they would have said, and been brought themselves, their wives, and children, into the hazard of their lives, by the machinations of a tyrant and his blood-thirsty courtiers? But what hope, then, from the intermediate party, from La Fayette and the Constitutionalists? Surely but little. How

great were their difficulties! They were resolved, in the first place, to beat back the invaders of their country: so far they were united with the Girondists and Jacobins. But on this account they could little harmonize with the king, who did not exactly wish the allied powers driven back, though he meant them not to exercise any rule over his people. On the other hand, La Fayette and the Constitutionalists were entirely attached to the king and the monarchy, and so far could little harmonize with the Jacobins, who thought only, in the first place, of their own safety, and of the success of the Revolution, not at all of the king and the monarchy.

In a conjuncture of circumstances so untoward, it was not easy for La Fayette and his friends to serve their country; for they had to keep the Jacobins in check, and to support the king, whilst they defeated the armies of the allied powers; and even then, they had to return and enforce the constitution. Nor was it, in the mean time, very easy for any one to decide, which of the two the army would obey, their general or their Legislative Assembly, if these authorities came to be opposed to each other; and again, whether by far the majority of the respectable part of the community were not tired of the Revolution and its horrors, and wishful only that the king might extricate himself from all his various enemies and opponents, recover his power, and a limited monarchy be the result. All was uncertainty wherever a speculator turned his view, but all was apprehension and terror; all depended upon the efforts of the different parties, and each was furnished with his great principle and war-cry against his opponents. "It is the cause of freedom," said the Jacobins; "our Revolution shall not be put down; no despots, no tyrants; war, war!" In like manner said La Fayette and his friends, "No Prussians, no Austrians;" but again, "No Jacobins, no Anarchists; there is no hope for freedom where such men bear sway: down with these clubs, these hotbeds of sedition and confusion, of licentiousness and crimes; it is in vain that we oppose our enemies in the field; liberty has no enemies like those who are behind us in the capital." "No Jacobins," in like manner, said the court and the friends of the king; "but neither Jacobins nor Constitutionalists for us; there can be no government, no peace, no order, where either of

these parties prevail; they are revolutionary—all; no Revolution! France has known no happiness since it began, nor ever will till it has ceased; the king, the king, *vive le roi*,—the cry and the principle which has never wanted an echo and a refuge in the heart of every Frenchman that deserves the name."

Such were the different interests and views of the different parties of the state,—such was, alas! the unhappy situation to which the affairs of this great kingdom were at last brought; but what must have been the terror and anxiety of any intelligent man at the time! Good or bad, he would have said, the cause of this Revolution in France is the cause of freedom all over the world; let it not be put down, at least not by the interference of Prussians and Austrians: it has been disgraced by its supporters, but it must not be trampled down under the feet of armed soldiers, and those, foreigners and invaders. But again, what hope for freedom from the triumphs of these Jacobins and their clubs, who seem to have no wish but to deride and destroy whatever has hitherto been an object of authority or respect amongst mankind. Such must have been, at the time, the anxieties of any philosophic reasoner; and even those who were less animated by any general sympathy with the interests of their fellow creatures, must have been struck with the important events that were now pending. Were the Prussians and Austrians to reach Paris? Were the king and royal family to perish in the general confusion; to be massacred, or to escape? Was there to be a counter-revolution affected at once, or was there to be a civil war? Was Europe to catch fire, and the conflagration of France to become universal? Were these new opinions to reach every portion of the civilized world? Were other countries to exhibit similar scenes to those which had been already witnessed in France? These were practical questions rushing upon the thoughts of every man; and their solution entirely depended upon the turn which affairs might take at this particular moment, this month of June, 1792.

You must observe, then, the conduct of the great parties, the measures that they pursued, and the memorable events that followed. You see the state of things: the foreign armies are advancing to put down the Revolution; the Girondists

and Jacobins are furious to defend it; La Fayette and the Constitutionalists are determined, if possible, to save their country from all its enemies,—from the invaders on the one side, and the anarchists on the other; and the king and his confidential friends are waiting, if possible, to mediate between all parties, effect a counter-revolution, and establish a limited monarchy.

Now, I confess, that at this particular juncture the wishes and sympathies of the student ought, as it appears to me, to be entirely with La Fayette and the Constitutionalists. Was it not possible, that the king and monarchy should be preserved, and at the same time the cause of freedom? Long and bloody wars, foreign and domestic, were sure to ensue if the king and monarchy were destroyed; and the same, in all probability, if the Revolution was to be put down for a time by foreign interference; at least, such a termination of so distinguished a struggle for the liberties of France, would in itself be considered by every friend to humanity as the greatest of calamities. Was it not possible, therefore (how devoutly was it to be wished), that the king and the monarchy, and at the same time the cause of the Revolution, might be made to exist together, might be made mutually to contribute to the best interests of each other, and that this happy result of the whole might be accomplished by the patriotic efforts of Frenchmen themselves, not by the interference of foreigners?

Now you will observe, that a very great effort, as we have just seen, was made to this effect by Dumourier, a man of very extraordinary powers; but it failed. What was then to ensue? The foreign armies were approaching, the popular or republican party in Paris becoming every day more violent; the king and the monarchy, and the constitution of 1789, placed on an isthmus between, exposed to the storm that was on either side resounding every moment with louder and fast increasing fury. Dumourier had failed. The next effort then was made by La Fayette, who on this occasion united himself to Lally Tollendal and some of the more early patriots.

"It was about this time (June, 1792)," says Bertrand de Moleville, "that M. de Lally Tollendal, who had become an English subject, returned to France with the hope of serving

the unfortunate Louis XVI. He informed me, that the basis of the plan which had been entered into by himself and his friends was to crush the Jacobins; to render his majesty the mediator between France and the rest of Europe, and between the French and the French; then to reform the constitution, limit the popular power by means of the people themselves, and ensure to Louis XVI. the happiness he so much desired, of uniting the liberty of the nation with the prerogatives of the monarch. Though I admired the plan," says Bertrand de Moleville, "I doubted the means proposed for effecting it, when I heard that it depended on M. La Fayette; who, M. de Lally endeavoured to convince me, was both willing and able to put it into execution. The project was afterwards transmitted by me to the king.

"In a subsequent conversation, M. de Lally completely removed my doubts respecting the sentiments and intentions of M. La Fayette."

Paragraphs to the same effect with those I have now quoted from the Annals, appear also in the *Memoirs* of Bertrand de Moleville.

"Justice and truth," says he, "compel me to acknowledge, that from the end of March, 1792, M. La Fayette's eyes seemed to have become open to his past errors (his present situation and the misfortunes of his family forbid any harsher expression); the dreadful progress of the Revolution alarmed him, and he seemed sincerely resolved to try every means to save the king."

Bertrand de Moleville then subjoins the following remarkable paragraph:—"Although he did not possess all the firmness requisite for such an attempt, perhaps he would have succeeded, had it not been for the extreme reluctance of their majesties to every vigorous measure, and their unwillingness to owe such an important service to a man whom they had so long considered as their enemy."

This paragraph is remarkable on many accounts; amongst others, on this: that it may serve as a sort of explanation of the failure of La Fayette at this period of the Revolution, whilst he was endeavouring to support the monarchy. Of all the desiderata connected with the story of the French Revolution, there is none greater than the want of memoirs

from La Fayette. He acted a most distinguished part. On many critical and delicate occasions, his conduct has been variously censured: his intentions, his understanding, each have been questioned; yet has he never given the world any explanation of his views and motives; what he conceived to be the circumstances under which he acted, or what the reasons of his disappointments; nor do I understand that he has any work of the kind in contemplation. No doubt, when a man has been unsuccessful, whether in life or in politics, reminiscences are not pleasant. No doubt, La Fayette may be aware, that he can depend upon being considered by posterity as a man of integrity and honour, as a man of benevolence, and as a real friend to liberty; but he is probably entitled to much more than this, great as this praise may be; and to be silent, is not to show sufficient respect either to mankind or to himself.

On the occasion now before us, there is something of mystery, as it appears to me, and something unknown, and Bertrand de Moleville gives us no proper explanation.

Some plan was talked of by Lally Tollendal; it was communicated to M. Malouet; it was transmitted to the king, but all that followed was a letter from La Fayette to the Assembly: something more must surely have been originally intended. Observe what appears to have passed in the conversation between Lally Tollendal and Bertrand de Moleville. "All this is very fine," said the latter; "but for the execution of the first step, the king's deliverance, what means have you?"

"La Fayette with his national guards," was the answer, "or with his army, or with both."

Now any measure of this kind was very different from the one adopted by La Fayette,—a letter from his camp. Any distinct measure of energy and decision would have been far more creditable to his understanding; nothing can be less so than the letter; and there must be something here for La Fayette to explain, if he would but condescend to do so. As this letter, however, is all that appears on the face of history, it is all that we can now consider. This letter was dated on the 16th of June, and read in the Assembly on the 18th.

The letter appears to me to be loaded with sentences of a

vague and general nature, and therefore objectionable in point of composition; but I will select such paragraphs as will, I think, give you the meaning of the whole.

"Your situation," says the letter, addressing the Assembly, "is an arduous one. France is threatened abroad and agitated at home. Whilst foreign powers avow the intolerable project of assailing your national sovereignty, and thus declare themselves the enemies of France, internal enemies, intoxicated with fanaticism or pride, cherish a chimerical hope, and still tease us with their insolent malice. Gentlemen, you ought to repress them; and you will not be able but by being constitutional and just. You, no doubt, intend it; but turn your eyes on what is passing in your bosom and about you: can you dissemble to yourselves, that a faction, and that I may avoid all vague denominations, that the Jacobin faction, have caused all the disorders? I openly accuse them. Organized as a separate empire in its head and in its members, blindly directed by some ambitious leaders, this party forms a distinct corporation in the midst of the French nation, whose power it usurps by subjugating their representatives."

So far the letter. Foreign powers therefore you see, according to the letter, were to be put down; *their* project was declared to be intolerable; but the Jacobin club was denounced as the origin of all the disorders. Again. "I stand forth," says La Fayette, "to declare, that the French nation, if it is not the vilest in the universe, can and ought to resist the conspiracy of kings which has been projected against it. . . . .

"But to enable us, the soldiers of liberty, to combat for her with effect, it is necessary that the number of the defenders of the country should be immediately proportioned to that of its adversaries," &c. &c.

"Above all, it is necessary that the citizens, rallied round the constitution, should be assured, that the rights it guarantees will be respected with a religious fidelity, that shall strike its enemies, private or public, with despair. . . . . Let no encroachment be made on the royal power, for it is guaranteed by the constitution: let it be independent, for that independence is one of the springs of our liberty: let the

king be revered, for he is invested with the national majesty. . . . . . In fine, let the reign of clubs, annihilated by you, give place to the reign of the law; their usurpations, to the firm and independent exercise of the constituted authorities; their disorganizing maxims, to the true principles of liberty; their wild fury, to the calm and persevering courage of a nation, that knows its rights and defends them.

"Such, gentlemen, are the representations and petitions, submitted to the National Assembly as they have been to the king, by a citizen, whose love of liberty no one will seriously dispute."

These are, I think, the important paragraphs selected from a composition, in other respects far too vague and too long, yet in the sentiments and intention very creditable to La Fayette.

The letter was very much applauded by all the côté droit, and by a considerable number of the côté gauche. The order for printing it was passed by a great majority, but the motion for sending it to the eighty-three departments, produced the most violent remonstrances from the heads of the Gironde party, and was at last *not* carried.

It was not difficult for some of the able and eloquent men, of whom the party was composed, to destroy the effect of it, by asking what the counsels of the general of an army were, if they were not laws; by historical references to our own Cromwell; and by availing themselves of some awkward additions to the letter, that had been injudiciously made, not by La Fayette, but subsequently by La Fayette's friends in Paris, on the subject of Dumourier and his ministry: and as this part could not have been written by La Fayette, they questioned the authenticity of the letter altogether, and they inveighed against it, and endeavoured to expose it, as if it had been an impudent forgery, the author of which ought instantly to be punished.

In the result, as I have said, the letter was *not* sent to the departments; and La Fayette must be considered as having failed in this attempt to control the Jacobin party. Certainly this was not a party likely to be disposed of by any effort of this kind, by any paper bullets of this description. The truth was, that this measure of La Fayette, though generous in

itself, and honourable to his patriotic feelings, was vain and insignificant, and amid the violent excitement of the minds of men at the time, was not likely to be otherwise.

What was worse, the general from that instant became unpopular. Men of sense, the Girondists themselves, could not indeed suppose that La Fayette was capable of betraying his country, because he had by a letter from his camp attacked the Jacobins; but the multitude did, particularly after hearing it asserted so repeatedly in the clubs, the journals, and in public places. To the alarm which the court of itself inspired, was now added the *new* alarm, that arose from the supposed treachery of La Fayette; and it became the object of the popular party to strike at the court by some immediate and desperate effort, before its plans, or those of the general, could be matured. An insurrection had been for some time meditated: the materials for the insurrection were abundant. Many powerful, and many ambitious, and many furious men, were now found in this popular and republican party; some desperate and atrocious, some eloquent and respectable, some young and enthusiastic; all animated in the most extraordinary degree by what they considered to be the situation of the country; and amid a thousand wild and conflicting opinions, all united in a resolution to beat back all foreign invaders, and as a preparation, and in the first place, to sweep away the present government and all its upholders.

Robespierre had already become distinguished at the Jacobin club, Danton with the Cordeliers. In the faubourgs was seen the brewer, Santerre, who, by his popular qualities, had acquired a perfect domination over the tremendous faubourg of St. Antoine: the butcher, Legendre, and others were in motion. By men like these, it was at any moment easy for the chiefs of the revolutionary party to create a popular movement, exasperate it into an insurrection, and give it what direction they pleased.

It is at this point of our progress that I may again remind you of a young man, whom I mentioned when adverting to the Memoirs of Me. Roland; I mean Barbaroux: he has written Memoirs, and to them we may now again turn. In his fourth chapter, he describes what were about this period

his ideas of the situation of France. "Three parties," he says, "divided us; the court, the Feuillans, and the Jacobins." He describes their different views much in the manner you would expect. La Fayette he considers as leagued with the court; the refusal of the king to sanction the decree for a camp, as a proof that the intention was, to leave the way open for the advance of the Austrians. The Jacobins he considers as *alone* defending the people; the counter-revolution as advancing fast upon them from all sides; "and under these frightful circumstances," he says, "we turned our eyes towards the south, where we sought for a point from which resistance could be made."

Whilst occupied with these notions, he had a conference with Roland and his wife; and while under the apprehension of the approaching fall of liberty, they interchanged, as I have already mentioned, their mutual feelings, and dissolved into tears amid the enthusiasm of their mingled emotions of patriotism and despair.

I did not allude before, nor do I now, to a scene like this, for any unworthy purpose of deriding any paroxysms of sentiment like these in the cause of liberty, but to note the nature of the feeling, and to mark its possible excesses.

"But all this time," continues Barbaroux, "we meant not to leave Paris and the north to their fate. We were resolved on the contrary, to attempt every thing for their preservation. The surest way was, to take care that the decree for the camp should be carried into effect, in despite of the veto of the king, of the petition of the Etat Major of Paris, and of the opposition of Robespierre.

"I lost not an instant," he says; "I wrote to Marseilles to send us up to Paris six hundred men 'who knew how to die.' I wrote, and Marseilles did send them."

Such are the notices to be found in Barbaroux. The first body of these Marseillois seems to have arrived at Paris on the 19th of June, the day before the insurrection, and just after the Girondists and Jacobins had got rid of the letter of La Fayette, and foiled him in his attempt to overthrow them.

This desperate band of the Marseillois was instantly made use of against the king and his supporters. They came forward with a petition, and presented themselves before the Assembly.

"Legislators," said these addressers, "the French liberty is in danger; the freemen of the south are ready to march to defend it: the day of the people's wrath is at length arrived; that people, whom it has always been the plan to butcher or enslave, is tired of parrying blows, they will strike them, and annihilate the conspirators. It is time for the people to rise: that generous lion, provoked too far, is going to rouse from his slumber and spring upon the pack of conspirators. The popular force constitutes your force; make use of it: give no quarter, as you have none to hope. The French people ask of you a decree, which shall authorize them to march in more formidable forces than those you have as yet decreed: give the word, and we will march towards the capital and towards the frontiers. The people are determined to conclude a revolution, that is to ensure their happiness, their safety, and their glory; they are determined to save you in saving themselves. You will not refuse the authority of the law to those who would die to defend it."

Such was the address of these terrible men, an address which was immediately sent by the Assembly to all the departments, and which must have become an alarm bell through the kingdom. The minds of men must have been from that moment prepared for some approaching attempt against the authority of the king, an attempt which the Assembly seemed to sanction, by printing and circulating the address. We are now to observe the progress of this insurrection. So far the Girondists and Jacobins had succeeded, and succeeded even with the Assembly. They met, however, opposition amongst the constituted authorities of Paris, and in the following manner. Some pretext was to be made use of by the conspirators, and the pretext adopted was resisted. For instance; the workmen of the faubourgs St. Antoine and St. Marceau, requested permission from the commune to assemble on the 20th of June (the anniversary of the day of the Tennis Court in 1789): this was the pretext under which they were to assemble, and with their arms go and present petitions to the National Assembly and the king. This, however, the council general very properly refused. The directory of the department, however, were informed that preparations for this armed assembling were, notwith-

standing, still going on in the fauxbourgs; and they therefore became apprehensive, that this would ripen into some insurrection, would be assisted by the Marseillois, and that the most serious outrages would ensue.

They therefore came to a resolution, that the mayor, the municipality, and the commander-in-chief of the national guard, should take proper measures to prevent all assembling contrary to law. Finally, they printed their resolution, and sent it to the Assembly. And now, if the Assembly had behaved with proper spirit, and with a due interest in the public peace, the Girondists and Jacobins would have been, for the time at least, foiled, and some other pretext must have been resorted to.

But the Assembly did not; and on the day of the 20th of June, an irruption of the mob into the king's palace took place. The Assembly did not behave with proper spirit; for when this resolution of the directory of the department was brought to them, instead of its being received with applause, and proper measures carried to support it, the Girondists and Jacobins did not suffer it to be read at all, till after the most violent opposition. It gave rise to no discussion, and the Assembly passed to the order of the day.

Now this indifference in a regular legislative assembly, this indifference to the exertions of the department to maintain the peace of the community, on the very eve of an insurrection (for it broke out the next day, the 20th), must be considered as a conduct most indecent and most culpable. And it is inconceivable how the Constitutionalists in the Assembly could have been so supine, and not have instantly exerted themselves to the utmost, and patronised and sanctioned by all expedients in their power, every appearance in the constituted authorities of regard for peace and order, the proper execution of the law, and resistance to all armed assembling of the people. It is true that the municipality of Paris were not so faithful to their duty as was the directory; still there was a sufficient demonstration of proper feeling for the Constitutionalists to have availed themselves of. But they made no exertions till the next day, when it was too late.

We will now enter a little more into particulars. Unfortunately Pétion was mayor, Pétion, who, even whilst

returning with the royal family from Varennes, could calmly declare, that for his part, he was for a republic. But it must now be remembered, that it was the court that had made him mayor, in preference to La Fayette, with their usual intolerance of freedom, and they were now to suffer the punishment of their fault. The Jacobins and the violent party had also contrived, under various pretences, to dismiss in the month of May, the guard of one thousand eight hundred men, which the constitution had allowed the king. They had evidently been long meditating some violent measures. Their intention was, the subversion of the throne; and the king's deposition, or forced abdication, in some way or other, was to be accomplished. The mob was their means; and if in the course of any resistance that might arise, if amid the fortunes of an insurrection, the king was killed, no great anxiety was felt on that subject; the republic, or some new dynasty or mode of government, some popular alteration of the system, was but the more immediate consequence, and their success the more speedy. There can be no doubt that Pétion participated in a general way with these views; and it is quite evident, that not only he, and the Jacobins, and the Anarchists, but the Girondists, were ready to expose the king, the royal family, and the community, to the irregular violence of the people, and that they were disposed to defend their Revolution by such unlicensed means, rather than trust to their armies, or any regular efforts of the constituted authorities; that is, they had no proper horror of anarchy and bloodshed.

These were the unfortunate circumstances on the one side; but on the other, in the first place, the law was clear, that the citizens could not assemble and go armed to present petitions; and the directory of the department insisted that the law should be maintained; but the municipality deserted them, and they and Pétion contented themselves with an expedient, and it was this: they called upon the battalions of the national guard to turn out and join in this procession. The citizens, as they were denominated (that is, the conspirators), were then required to fall in under their colours, and the whole (thus neutralized and made orderly) were to proceed in an united mass. After this disposition of things and disposal

of difficulties, Pétion, it seems, could see no further inconveniences, and no infringement of the law; and the project of the conspirators was rescued from its difficulties. The Constitutionalists, however, appear to have been at last roused from their trance of carelessness and folly, and to have exerted themselves on the morning of the 20th, though now too late.

Great debates arose in the Assembly, when these armed petitioners were to be received. But it was in vain that the Procureur Syndic, in the name of the directory, addressed himself to the Assembly, reminding them that the law forbade all armed assemblings of the people for the purpose of petitioning; that to-day armed men assemble on civic motives, but that to-morrow the ill-designing may assemble. Vergniaud, the most distinguished orator of the Gironde party and of the Assembly, debased himself so far, as to oppose these prudent remonstrances in favour of the law. "Why should we wonder," he said, "that a collection of armed men should request admission into the hall, when we have already admitted several sections; when yesterday we received a battalion? The example was set you by the Constituent Assembly. It would be wronging the citizens, who now request to pay their homage to you, to suppose that they have ill designs. It is said that they intend to present an address to the king: it is my opinion, that they will not ask to be admitted to him in arms, but that, conformably to the law, they will appear before him without arms, and as simple petitioners. But if the king is thought in danger, you ought to protect him, and I move that you send sixty commissioners to the palace."

"Thus Belial, with words clothed in Reason's garb,
Counselled ignoble Ease and peaceful Sloth."

"Ease and sloth," when the question was, whether the mob was to rule or the Assembly; whether the law and the constituted authorities were, or were not, to be supported; whether the king was, or was not, to be assailed by an insurrection, and very probably massacred in his palace.

You will easily conceive the violence of the debates on the one side and the other, particularly as these armed peti-

tioners approached, and were at last collected in force at the very gates of the hall, to the number of eight thousand. Of the sentiments of these petitioners you may judge from a few sentences taken from their address.

"In the name of the nation," they said, "whose eyes are fixed upon this city, we come to assure you, that the people are alert; that they are equal to the situation of things, and ready to make use of grand means to avenge the majesty of the outraged nation. Vigorous means are authorized by the second article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, 'resistance to oppression.'

"How unfortunate, however, is it for free men, who have committed all their powers to you, to see themselves reduced to the cruel necessity of steeping their hands in the blood of conspirators! We can no longer deceive ourselves; the plot is discovered; the hour is come; blood shall flow, or the tree of liberty, which we are going to plant, shall flourish in peace."

This you will see was a menace sufficiently distinct and dreadful. "We complain, gentlemen, of the inaction of our armies: we require of you to find out the cause; and if it be owing to the executive power, let it be annihilated: the blood of patriots shall not be shed to gratify the pride and ambition of the perfidious palace of the Tuileries. What then can stop us? If the first defenders of liberty had thus temporized, would you now have been sitting in this august Areopagus? Reflect well upon it: nothing can stop us; liberty cannot be suspended. If he, the executive power, does not act, there can be no alternative; it must be suspended: if, through respect, we maintain him in his post, it is on condition that he fill it constitutionally; if he does not, he is no longer any thing to the French nation. Are the people to be forced again to the period of the 14th of July; again to take the sword of justice into their own hands, to avenge at a single blow the outraged law, and to punish the guilty and pusillanimous depositaries of that very law? Legislators! we request to continue armed till the constitution be enforced."

Such was the address of these armed petitioners. That the king was in immediate danger was very evident. The harangue was very often interrupted by the plaudits of the

galleries, and a great part of the côté gauche. The president could only answer in return, that the Assembly would render the plots of conspirators abortive; that they would consign such men to the laws, because the laws alone were empowered to avenge the people, and because it was only in them and by them, that the people could find that constitution and that liberty which they sought; that they called upon them to respect the law and the constituted authorities, and this in the name of the country and of liberty."

But this sort of admonition and request was now too late, and at best but a feeble measure; the Assembly had been too long torpid, and culpably so.

You are now to observe the progress of the insurrection. The petitioners and the citizens, male and female, in the first place, filed off before the Assembly, armed with pikes, muskets, axes, cutlasses, spits, knives, bludgeons, &c. &c. preceded by musicians, playing the national air of ça ira; the march directed by Santerre.

The detachments of the national guard, that by their intermixture were to have rendered every thing, according to Pétion, orderly and secure, were of course lost in the crowd; and this army of patriots of both sexes crossed the hall dancing and shouting, "Vive la liberté!" "Vivent les Sans-culottes!" "Down with the veto!" The symbols which they held aloft were appropriate, and one of them, a calf's heart, inscribed with the words, "the heart of an aristocrat," was so horrid, as at last, on the representation of some of the members of the Assembly, to be withdrawn; but it afterwards appeared at the Tuileries. These are among the facts of the Revolution, and must not be forgotten; and they are lessons alike, though in different ways, to the supporters of arbitrary power and the lovers of freedom.

Every thing had remained quiet in the palace till about three o'clock, when the petitioners were seen coming out of the hall and joining the immense populace, who were waiting for them without. They were observed by the unfortunate king from the window. They immediately swarmed over the garden of the Tuileries and the Square of the Carouzel, and moved tumultuously towards the doors and iron gates of the palace, which the king had ordered to be locked; these they

shook with violence, calling out loudly to have them opened. The crowd and the vociferations increased; and while a municipal officer from without was endeavouring to reason with the leaders of the mob, and apparently with some success, another municipal officer from within, ordered the iron gate to be opened which led to the terrace in the garden, and the multitude rushed impetuously into the palace, making it echo with the shouts of "Vive la nation!" "Vivent les Sans-culottes."

These shouts were heard in the Square of the Carouzel, on the other side of the Tuileries, and were repeated by thousands of brigands, who immediately forced the gate of the royal court, that they might join their companions, whom they saw masters of the palace.

The king was all this time in company with his family, whom he was comforting and encouraging by his own untroubled aspect, while he turned and looked patiently at the storm that was now seen so fast approaching: he had long expected it, and he was prepared to die. Some little time before he had sunk into a total abandonment, as it were, of his own existence, and had sat motionless and silent even while surrounded by his family; for ten days together he had uttered not a word, except when a word was necessary to carry on the little game of chance, with which the Princess Elizabeth endeavoured to amuse him. Mortifications and disappointments following each other in a succession so long and invariably continued, nothing seeming to prosper, and every thing appearing out of his control,—circumstances like these at last had produced their effect: he had at last been brought to think, that for *him*, at least, there was, on the whole, no rational conclusion but despair; and he had turned sickening and disgusted alike from every promise of hope, and every counsel of the wise. Those may blame him who have not known what misfortune is; what it is, to seem wedded to calamity; what it is, to be apparently under the influence of some malignant planet that marks us out from our fellow mortals for failure and for ruin; what it is, to feel how little comfort or support on these occasions can be drawn, *after* the event, from reflecting within ourselves, or from being told by others, how great have been our mistakes, and how evident our want of judgment.

The queen was not unworthy of herself during this particular period of gloom and torpor; she exhibited the virtues of her sex, and was a faithful helpmate to her lost and desponding husband; she threw herself at his feet, she knelt, and she implored; she roused him by describing to him the crisis in which they were placed, the importance of every moment that was passing by them; she terrified him by the pictures she presented to his imagination; she melted him by the expression of her devotion and regard; she remonstrated with him on what was due to his family and to himself, and called upon him, if he was to perish, to perish with dignity and with honour, and not to remain helpless and submissive, without sense of insult or of wrong, till he was strangled or cut down by the refuse of mankind, and his children, his sister, and his wife, scattered dead and dying around him, on the miserable floor of their apartment. Efforts of this kind, the virtuous efforts of his queen and fellow sufferer, could not be without their effect on the unfortunate monarch.

The representations of Me. de Campan may be readily received. By exertions of this kind, it seems, on the part of his queen, he was extricated from his lethargy, and restored to a sense of his duties. He had continued to oppose his veto to the two decrees, as he had judged it right to do, and when these armed petitioners, mixed up with the lowest of the populace, from which they were not to be distinguished, were now seen breaking in upon his palace, he was prepared for any event, and was collected and serene. Noise was heard proceeding from the doors of the inside, which were violently attacked: they were beaten in by hatchets and iron crows.

"Keep the queen from following me," said the king to his attendants; and he advanced to meet the assailants. He was now separated from them only by a single room, and at the moment the further doors were broken and fell in. "Open those doors before me," said the king; and in rushed men of horrid aspect, with pikes in their hands. At this instant of their entrance, the king appears to have narrowly escaped from more than one of these ruffians, who thrust at him, but the pike was turned aside by the attendants. The mob was met boldly by Aclogue, one of the few citizens of Paris who, though of the faubourg St. Marceau, had been touched by the virtues and misfortunes of his royal master. "Citizens,"

said this intrepid man, "here is your king; what do you want with him? Respect this good king." "Vive le Roi," was the answer mechanically returned by these brigands, so unexpectedly checked and resisted; "Petition and address," was roared by others; and the king, whose chief care was to keep these furies at a distance from his family, advanced further, under the pretence of showing himself in a larger room, and receiving there the petition he was told of. This perilous, but on the whole, wise resolution, was formed, announced, and executed at the same instant. Time was gained, and something was done and doing, while every moment was a question of life or death, a question of assassination.

The king then, accompanied by the virtuous Aclogue, the Maréchal de Mouchy, M. D'Hervilly, and a few grenadiers of the national guard, with great difficulty, made his way through the crowd, got to the middle window of the large apartment, and availed himself of a chair, which was placed on a step within the recess, and which thus fortunately raised him above the multitude. Aclogue and those other faithful men, gentlemen and grenadiers, who were ready to share the fate of their sovereign in this hour of his extremity, placed themselves as a rampart between him and the multitude. All was now uncertainty, confusion, and terror; but the mob seemed to want leaders, and to be ignorant what they were to do: they were ready for any act of violence, and were loud in their execrations, but appeared without any fixed plan or purpose; a most happy state of ignorance and irresolution at this particular and most dangerous moment of their first eruption.

Incidents now occurred which were honourable to the royal party, and when these are told, as they are by Weber, François Hue, and others, history seems to have nothing more to relate.

The ever faithful Princess Elizabeth made her way to her brother, but she was obliged to take her place at some little distance, having been hurried away by the crowd (what a scene does this suppose!) into the recess of another window. She was mistaken for the queen, and overwhelmed with execrations; those around her were naturally stepping forward to undeceive her assailants; "No, no," said the magnanimous

princess, "tell them not my name; let them take me for the queen."

"Cry, 'Vive la nation!'" said some of the banditti to the king, advancing with their pikes towards the window where he was sitting, "cry, 'Vive la nation!'" "Well," replied the king, "Vive la nation! the nation has no better friend than myself." "No veto," said others; "give us back our ministers. No veto; sanction the two decrees." "This is not a time for making such a demand," replied the king, "nor the way in which it should be made." No answer could be more dignified nor more honourable to the king in every respect. "Put on this red cap," said one of the brigands, pushing through the crowd: the king assented, and quietly placed it on his head. His life was often in the most immediate danger, but he seemed to disconcert his assassins, and to be his own protection, by the tranquil and undaunted look which he continued to maintain. The red cap remained long upon his head, and was forgotten by the king, till it was observed when the mob had retired. It was offensive to those who saw it, and the king declared, that he remembered the incident well, and that he was quite sure that if he had hesitated, the fellow would instantly have plunged the pike into his body.

About the moment of this outrage, a soldier of the national guard, who happened to be near him, could not but remark to him the terror that he must be in. "No, no," said the king, "I am in no terror; I have meant well; I have no fear. Give me your hand; here," said he, putting the soldier's hand upon his heart, "feel here, does it beat as if I was afraid?" The king was not afraid; for he had turned away from earth, and neither violence nor death could now disturb the "constant mood of his calm thoughts;" like the high priest in the beautiful drama of Racine, he feared God, "and fearing God, he knew no other fear."

It appears (from a letter of Malouet to Mallet du Pan), that he had written the day before to his confessor, on the 19th of June. "Come, and see me," he said, "never had I such need of your consolations; I have done with this world now, it is to heaven that I direct my regards: great calamities are announced for to-morrow; I shall not want courage."

Such was his letter; and he did not want courage, when the season of his trial came. The calamities gathered round him, the tempest broke upon his devoted head, as he had been told to expect, but he was not cast down; "the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, and it fell not, for it was founded upon a rock."

It is astonishing that the king, amid the press and medley of an insurrection like this, escaped with life. The Marquis de Ferrieres relates, that while all these things were passing in the apartments of the palace, the leaders were felicitating themselves, as they stood at the outside in the garden of the Tuileries, on the success of their enterprise. "It must have a droll effect," said Manuel, the procureur of the commune, with a brutal laugh, "it must have a droll effect, that red bonnet which we have mounted on the head of the king." "How fine," cried the painter David, fixing his eyes upon the mob, who were swarming through the windows and over the roofs, and making their way into the apartments, "how fine a sight is this," he cried; and then stretching out his hands, with fury in his gestures, "Tremble, tremble, ye tyrants!" he vociferated. "Well, well, they are going on well," repeated the ferocious Gorsas; "we shall see heads on pikes." The Marquis de Ferrieres here proceeds even to say, that there was an Orleans faction in the gardens that expected every moment the assassination of the king; that there was a false cry to that effect,—"Louis XVI. is dead; long live Philip!" and that the answer from the garden was, "It is over with them, then; throw us out the heads! down with the veto!" Certainly there were many during this dreadful day that took the chance, and would have been well pleased, if in some way or other the king had been put to death. The Girondists wished to have him, at least, dethroned; and whoever contributed, positively or negatively, to an assembling of the populace like this, with an intent afterwards to let loose their ignorant and brutal fury upon the palace and person of their sovereign, must be considered as responsible for all the atrocities that did or might ensue. It is very awful to see such men as Vergniaud, men of eloquence and genius, to see them and others not struck back with horror at the very idea and possibility of scenes like these.

The queen, while the king was thus exposed to the capricious passions of the multitude, had been left behind, surrounded by the ladies and gentlemen of the court, embracing her children, and with difficulty persuaded to remain where she was. M. d'Aubier had been sent to her by the Princess Elizabeth with secret orders, at all events to prevent her coming. "But I cannot stay here," said the queen; "it is my duty to die with the king; to prevent me thus from joining him is to cover my name with infamy." "But, no, madam," said M. d'Aubier, "if the king should see his queen in the midst of these men with their pikes, he will fly to her assistance, and he will perish." The queen shuddered; the moment was taken advantage of, and every representation was made to her, and every appeal, as a mother, who was to be responsible for the safety of her children. The faithful attendant on the dauphin, François Hue, then proceeds to recount the exertions he made to place the queen and her children in places of safety, and their narrow escape from the ruffians who were roaming about the palace, and who, breaking down and bursting through one door after another, were on the point of discovering the last asylum to which the queen had been induced to retire.

At last, it should seem, that one of the attendants of the king, M. Bligny, contrived to escape from the apartments, and looked about for some assistance: this assistance was found in the devotion and loyalty of the battalions of the Filles St. Thomas, conducted by M. Boscary de Villeplaine.

The grenadiers appeared in some force, got possession of the council chamber, and were not without their effect on the multitude. The queen was violently called for: with her children in her hands she appeared, surrounded by the persons of distinction, who had never left her. A large council table was pushed forward, behind which she was placed, and the grenadiers were ranged at each side; and while sitting within this sort of barrier, she saw defile before her the populace, under the conduct of their leader Santerre. "Princess," said Santerre, shaking the table with violence, "they deceive you; the people have no wish to shorten your days; I promise you this in their name." "It is not from such as you," said the queen, "that I judge of the French people; it is from brave

men like these," she cried, pointing to the grenadiers, who were ranged beside her. The compliment was deeply felt, and certainly had been well deserved.

But she had to allow the red cap, for the satisfaction of the mob, first to approach her own head, and then to be placed on the head of the dauphin.

It appears, too, that some little time before this sort of assistance was brought to the queen, the minister of war, M. Delafaire, seeing the extreme peril of the king, sitting as he did, in the window, with a few attendants between him and the mob, and the red cap on his head, had contrived to descend one of the staircases, and persuade about twenty grenadiers to return with him to the succour of their sovereign. It was with great difficulty they made their way through the crowd; but they did so, and were of great assistance while the mob was, if possible, to be kept off, during the sort of loitering and endless procession that they made for nearly four hours through the apartments. Some aid, too, however late, was procured from the Assembly.

When their armed petitioners had left the hall in the morning, an adjournment had taken place; but as the situation of the king had become known every where in Paris, the Assembly had, at five o'clock, resumed its sittings, and though remaining in the most disgraceful and culpable indifference, the members of it were at least at their post. They were actually, as if in mockery of all that they knew was passing at the Tuileries, occupying themselves with a report from the committee of the finances, when M. Beaucarm interrupted the reading of it, declaring aloud, that the life of the king was in danger, and that the whole Assembly must instantly go in a body to his assistance. "Bah! bah!" was all the reply from one side of the Assembly. "The king," said M. Thurot, "can be in no danger in the midst of his people: I do not, however, oppose the motion." "People!" replied M. Beugnot, "it is not people, it is brigands he is in the midst of." The deputation was then voted. M. Dumas, with a few others of the constitutional party, now arrived from the Tuileries, and he made his appeal to the Assembly in the warmest terms. M. Charlier denied the danger of the king; "He can be in none." "He *is*, I tell you," said Dumas; "the

king, I tell you, is surrounded by men, furious, lawless, and not sane; he is assailed and menaced, degraded by the symbol of a faction; he has the red cap upon his head." "The cap of liberty can be no degradation to him," rejoined many of the deputies. But Dumas, and his friend Jaucourt, and Dumoulard, were not thus to be put down; and notwithstanding the murmurs of the tribunes, and the efforts of the Orleanists, they obtained an order, not only that a deputation of twenty-four members should be sent to the palace, but that this deputation should be renewed every half hour. The king was thus probably saved from destruction. Santerre is said by the Marquis de Ferrieres to have cried out, when he saw the first deputation enter, "We have missed our blow, but we must be here again." And one of the deputies (the marquis adds), seeing men of ferocious aspect pressing forward upon the king, threw himself before them, crying aloud that they should not reach the king without passing over his dead body. Of these deputations, part remained with the king, and part ranged themselves around the queen.

Pétion, whose conduct from the first was as unfeeling and as unworthy of the chief magistrate of a great city as it could possibly be, seems, during the peril of the king, to have deferred his visit to the Tuileries as long as decency could possibly admit. He at length appeared: the crowd opened to let him pass; he mounted on a chair; and though it may not be very prudent for a speaker to censure a mob, whom he means at the time to influence to better purposes, and though they must be flattered, it is not very easy to sympathize with the speaker, when he addressed them in the following manner: "Friends and brothers! you have shown me every confidence and kindness; give not the ill-disposed an opportunity to put an unfavourable interpretation on this memorable day: you have commenced it with dignity and wisdom; terminate it in like manner; and for this purpose let us retire. I now set you the example which I hope you will follow." No disciplined army could have been more obedient to the orders of their general.

They filed off immediately in a manner sufficiently composed. The emblems and inscriptions, however, of their banners were but too ominous and repulsive. "The sanction or death," was one; "Tremble, tyrant, thy hour is come,"

was another; "Recall of the patriotic ministers," was a third. At the end of a pike was a bloody heart, with the words, "Heart of tyrants and aristocrats:" a piece of wood was cut into the shape of a gallows, from which was seen suspended a female form, the words, "Beware the Lanterne:" a guillotine was carried along, the words, "The justice of the nation for tyrants; Down with Veto and his wife:" and at intervals were observed men that appeared to act as officers to this disorderly band.

Such are the particulars of this insurrection, and I mention them as descriptive of insurrections and of the times; yet some there were, in addition to the generous and gallant men we have already alluded to, even amid this frightful assemblage (it is some comfort to be told), not insensible to the spectacle before them; some there were, who were melted into tears at the sight of the queen and her children, thus fallen from their high estate; and they addressed to her the sentiments of their homage, intermingled with the warmest wishes for her happiness. The demeanour of the queen was all this time affable to the populace, and courteous, nor did the scene before her appear to disturb her. Such was the power of self-control, and such the success with which she endeavoured to maintain the superiority of her high birth, and the tranquillity of an elevated mind. At length her internal anxieties and agonies were destined to be comparatively at an end, for the Princess Elizabeth came running to her, to say that all was now well; that the king was safe; that he was surrounded by the national guard, who would answer for his life and person. Soon after, the king was brought to her under the care of one of the deputations of the Assembly and of the national guard; and though exhausted with heat and fatigue, he was at last restored to the bosom of his family. What a contrast, what a happiness must it now have been to mingle together their embraces and thanksgivings, after five such lengthened hours of disgust, uncertainty, and terror; after the overpowering tumult and confusion of a brutal crowd like this, with their cries of insult and of menace; their pikes and symbols of revolutionary fury; at length to feel around them stillness, vacancy, repose; to see no objects but those that were dear to them, and to hear no sounds but those of mutual congratulation and love.

LECTURE XXVIII.

AFTER TWENTIETH OF JUNE.

ON the 21st of June, Bertrand de Moleville had a conference with the king. "To my congratulations," says he, on his having escaped the dangers of the preceding day, "his majesty answered, 'My uneasiness was entirely on account of the queen and my sister; for myself I had no solicitude.' 'But it seems to me,' said I, 'that it was chiefly against your majesty that the insurrection was directed.' 'I know it very well,' answered he; 'I saw that their intention was to assassinate me, and I cannot conceive why they did not do it; but I shall not escape them another day, so that I am not the more fortunate: it is much the same whether I am murdered two months sooner or later.' 'My God!' cried I, 'does your majesty then really believe that you will be assassinated?'

"'I am convinced of it,' replied he; 'I have long expected it, and I have made up my mind to it. Do you think I fear death?' 'No, certainly; but I wish to see your majesty less convinced that you are near it, and more disposed to adopt the vigorous measures from which alone you can expect safety.'

"'There may be a possibility of my escaping,' said the king, 'but still there are many chances against it, and I am not lucky. I might risk another attempt, if I were alone! Oh, if my wife and children were not with me, it would soon appear that I am not so weak as is imagined; but what would become of them if the measures you allude to should fail?'

"'But if your majesty should be assassinated, do you think that your family would be in greater safety?' 'Yes, I think they would; I hope so at least; and if it should be otherwise,

I could not be reproached with being the cause. But what do you think I can do?' 'I think,' answered I, 'that your majesty could now get out of Paris with less difficulty than ever; because the events of yesterday have made it too clear that your life is not in safety in the capital.' 'Oh, I will not attempt to escape a second time; I suffered too much on the last occasion.' 'I am of your majesty's opinion,' replied I, 'that you ought not to think of escaping secretly at present; but the general indignation which is raised by the events of yesterday offers in my mind a very favourable opportunity for your leaving Paris openly, and without opposition, not only with the consent of the great majority of the citizens, but even with their approbation. I beg that your majesty will give me leave to take the measure into consideration, and afterwards to submit my ideas to you, respecting the mode of executing it.' 'You may do so,' replied the king, 'but you will find it more difficult than you imagine.'"

The king was but too reasonable in his apprehensions, though the minister was equally reasonable in supposing the general indignation that these outrages could not but excite.

The events of the 20th of June had certainly produced a great sensation in Paris, and through the whole kingdom of France. Some years before there were those (and men of rank and consideration in the state) who held that a king of France derived his power from God only, and his sword. But now, it appeared that a king of France found not even in his palace the common asylum and protection which are afforded by his own house to the meanest individual. Doors had been broken open, the privacy of apartments had been violated, the royal family insulted, the king's life menaced, more than once endangered; armed men were in undisturbed possession of the king's palace for some hours; these had been the melancholy facts: Frenchmen appeared no longer to retain their nature; even society itself seemed at once dissolved, if measures of state (and this was to make the best of the case) were to be carried by outrages like these. Sentiments of this kind could not but be entertained by thinking and good men of every description; and the king had exhibited virtues, well fitted not only to attract the affection

and respect of his subjects, but such as the violent party had not at all expected. The moderation he had often displayed seemed now not necessarily to have arisen from weakness, but rather perhaps from reflection; and both his friends and enemies could perceive that he wanted not presence of mind in moments of danger, nor fortitude in the hour of trial. To the Girondists and Jacobins the issue of this lawless enterprise had been a complete failure: neither had the king perished, nor had he been terrified into a recall of the three ministers, or an assent to the two decrees. On the whole, therefore, a new crisis appeared to have taken place, and there seemed an opportunity afforded of some effort to be made in favour of the monarchical part of the constitution, now, while the wishes and opinions of all men were so strongly excited in its favour, and while its enemies were checked by defeat, and covered with shame and disgrace.

We will slightly, therefore, allude to the main facts that now occurred. Immediately after the day of the insurrection, the king sent a message to the Assembly, which, considering how culpable had been their conduct, was very dignified and judicious; "that France would hear of the events of the 20th with astonishment and sorrow; that he was very sensible of the zeal which the National Assembly had testified to him on the occasion; that he left it to their prudence to discover the causes of those events and take the measures necessary for maintaining the constitution; that as to himself, nothing should prevent his acting at all times according to the duties imposed upon him by the constitution which he had accepted, and the true interests of the French nation." This was followed by a proclamation of the same proper and dignified cast, addressed to the French people. The outrages committed were shortly stated; and the king then observed, "that violence, to whatever excess it might be carried, should never force from him a consent to any thing he should judge injurious to the public interest; that if they who wished to overthrow the monarchy had need of one crime more, they might commit it, but that in the present critical situation of that monarchy, the king would to the last moment set all the constituted authorities an example of that courage and firmness which alone could save the empire."

These addresses of the king, and the insults he had been exposed to, were not without their effect. Resolutions appeared from different Assemblies in the provinces, replete with testimonies of zeal, respect, and devotion, of admiration of his conduct, and indignation against the authors and instigators of the outrages he had endured. "The king shall be presented," says the resolution of the directory of the department of the Somme, "with the thanks of this department for the firmness which he displayed on the occasion of the seditious mob of the 20th; for having supported the dignity of the nation by refusing, at the risk of his life, to yield to the threats of a crowd of unknown persons unlawfully armed; and for having undauntedly made use of the right given him by the constitution." The assistance of their national guards, of the two hundred battalions of their department, was then offered, if the national guard of Paris was found insufficient to ensure the life of the king and the liberty of the legislative body.

The minister of the interior, Ferrier de Monciel, was very indefatigable in the service of his master. All the petitions and resolutions that appeared were immediately printed and circulated. The leading men in Lyons, Rouen, and other capital towns and cities, sent petitions individually subscribed; and a similar petition, called the Petition of the Twenty Thousand, was got up in Paris. The number of signatures was not so great, but it was openly and freely signed, after having been left at the houses of the different notaries by those who might be considered as the bourgeois, as the most respectable part of the inhabitants of Paris. "The National Assembly were required to display all the energy of their zeal, to wash away from the nation the foul stain that it had incurred from the outrages that had been committed; that these outrages had been the result of a conspiracy formed against all the established authorities of the constitution, and the constitution itself. The Assembly were called upon to oppose some invincible barrier against all machinations of the kind."

On the whole, the general testimonies in favour of the king and of the constitution, and in reprobation of the atrocious behaviour of the violent party, were very distinct and

very general. Sixty-nine out of eighty-three departments are stated to have expressed themselves in favour of the king, as well as several large cities and towns, in addition to those we have already mentioned.

But the violent party consisted of men not easily to be either daunted or overpowered. They soon recovered from the first effects of their failure on the 20th; they were soon heard in the Assembly, as loud and determined as before, as hostile to the king, and as fierce in the expression of any sentiment of a republican nature. Many addresses of this kind were sent to them, and were received with the warmest applause. Accommodation in their galleries and the most grateful acclamations were ready for every one that appeared from the provinces, or the sections of Paris, in their favour. Hardy spirits were not wanting, both within and without the capital, even to outdo them in the display of republican sentiments and expressions of menace and hostility to their fallen sovereign. A second attempt on the Tuileries seems to have been in contemplation almost immediately after the outrage of the 20th, but to have been stifled by Pétion, probably on prudential motives, lest a second failure should be incurred; and in the MS. on the table you will see that M. Malouet writes to his friend, M. Mallet du Pan, on the 27th of June, in the following manner:—

"The scene of Monday, the 25th of June, has been almost as audacious as that of the 20th. People have come to the bar of the Assembly; 'You are looking,' they cried, 'for the authors of the 20th: here we are; we, we were the authors;' and they have immediately received the honours of the sitting. I was at the Tuileries: every thing was prepared to defend it, somewhat better than on the 20th; but on the cannons in the court was mounted the red bonnet. You see here the spirit of a large part of the citizens, not merely the Sans-culottes. The right side of *this* Assembly is treated just as was the right side of the last; that is, considered as made up of scoundrels and aristocrats. They can no longer speak without being hooted. Jaucourt (La Fayette's great friend) has been well nigh assassinated.

"What is one to suppose from all this," continues Malouet, "what, but that not only among the factions, but

through the whole mass of the people, wherever found, such a revolutionary spirit prevails, that even those who are not Republicans will rather choose to unite themselves to those who are, than to any whom they suppose only moderately attached to the constitution."

Such were the views of Malouet. In this situation of things intelligence was brought that the army had broken out into the most violent indignation at the account they had received of the occurrences of the 20th of June; that several corps had been very eager to march to Paris, to chastise the brigands; and that M. La Fayette had been able to prevent them only by undertaking to come himself and express the wishes of the soldiers to that Assembly. And so, indeed, the fact turned out to be, for in the morning of the 28th, La Fayette appeared in Paris, declaring that such was the case, and such the object of his mission.

Now here was evidently a great crisis in the history of the Revolution. A great effort was now possible in favour of the constitution. La Fayette had long been the idol of the national guard at Paris and of the Constitutionalists there and all over the kingdom. These were still the predominant party, as far as numbers went, even in the Assembly. The question then was, Are the Girondists and Jacobins now to be put down or not? "The king," says Bertrand de Moleville, "on being informed of the object of La Fayette's journey, conceived at first the greatest expectations from it." Certainly it was possible that some great turn might have been given at this moment to the Revolution, and men at the time were overpowered with anxiety, while unable to conjecture what the event might be.

It is now that we again have to deplore the want of memoirs from La Fayette. To have put down the Girondists and Jacobins at this particular moment was a great object to a virtuous and patriotic man like himself, but was an enterprise of no ordinary difficulty, and was not to be attempted without a reasonable prospect of success. Revolutions in favour of liberty have so generally ended in the domination of some military chief, that there was every presumption against any interference of *his*. He was at the moment commander of the armies of the state, had been long their idol,

and was employed at the time in his proper office of beating back the invaders of his country. He had been already foiled in one attempt to influence the Legislative Assembly and to control the violent party. The word "Cromwell" had been already pronounced by a very distinguished member there; "dictator" and "traitor" were the terms applied in the clubs and streets of Paris. Even as a friend to liberty, it behoved him to come to some distinct understanding with the court, to ascertain what their views were; whether he and his army or the Duke of Brunswick and the Prussians were to be preferred, whether the constitution, or an entire counter-revolution. He had as yet experienced no favour; and the very fury and violence of the Republican party, which he himself abhorred, could not but have rendered the court, as he must have been well aware, more disposed than ever to turn to the allied powers, and to hate the constitution and himself, and every person and thing that could be associated with the very name of liberty.

Reflections of this kind must have necessarily occurred to La Fayette, but he had no time, or he must have thought it not in his power, to attend to them. We hear nothing of them. Alone, and depending, it must be supposed, on his influence with the national guard and people of Paris, and his own friends and the friends of the constitution, in the Assembly and out, on the morning of the 28th he appeared there alone, the representative of the army, and, as no doubt he very sincerely believed, of the liberties and best interests of France.

In despite of all the denunciations that every day had been made against him, since his letter to the Assembly, he still retained popularity enough to determine the applauses in his favour, and to reduce his enemies to silence. Scarcely had he appeared, when the tribunes that afterwards hooted down every one who spoke in his defence, resounded with the most enthusiastic acclamations.

"My presence here," said he, "does not at all compromise the safety of our armies. The outrages committed at the palace on the 20th have excited the alarm of all good citizens. I have received addresses from the different corps of my army, officers, subalterns, and soldiers, who on this occasion

are one man: all have in their addresses expressed their detestation of the factions.

"I have engaged to them to convey to you the sentiment common to all; a sentiment I cannot but approve. Already do they ask, whether it is liberty that they are defending. It is high time to guarantee the constitution from all attacks, as well as the freedom of the Assembly and of the king; their independence, and their dignity. I supplicate the Assembly to order the authors and instigators of the 20th of June to be prosecuted as men guilty of high treason; to destroy a party, whose public debates leave no doubt of their evil intentions. I supplicate the Assembly also, in my own name and in the name of all honourable men, to take proper measures to make the constituted Assemblies respected, and to keep the armies assured that no injury shall happen to the constitution from within, while they are shedding their blood in defence of it against the enemies from without."

Such was the spirited and manly address of La Fayette. The spectators continued to applaud with enthusiasm. One part of the Assembly applauded also; silence was observed by the other; and it was Guadet (the Girondist) who at last arose, to turn, if possible, the current of public opinion, which was thus running so strongly in favour of the general.

"When the arrival of M. La Fayette," said he, "was announced to me, how agreeable were all my first reflections! Our enemies then, I thought to myself, have disappeared; the Austrians are vanquished. But this illusion has been of short duration: our enemies are still the same; no change has taken place in our situation without; and yet M. La Fayette is in Paris. What motives can have been strong enough to bring him here? Our intestine disorders? He fears then that the National Assembly has not the power to repress them. He constitutes himself the organ of his army and of honourable men. And these honourable men, whence are they? And this army, how is it that it has been deliberating? I do not now examine, whether he who now accuses us of seeing in the wishes of the brigands who surround us, the wishes of the French nation, may not himself, in the wishes of the Etat Major, by which he is himself surrounded, see the wishes of the whole army. I do not examine this point, but I say this, that he himself forgets the constitution, when he makes

himself the organ of honourable men, who have given him no mission of the kind; and that he violates the constitution if he has quitted his post without leave from the ministers. I demand therefore, in the first place, that the minister of war should be interrogated to know, whether he has, or has not, given this leave; and that our extraordinary commission of the 12th should to-morrow make a report on the danger of allowing to generals the right of petitioning."

This able attack made on La Fayette, and in his presence, was followed by the most lively sensation. Gaudet was applauded in the loudest manner by his own side of the assembly, and in the tribunes. The most violent agitation ensued; but it was at this moment that Ramond, the former secretary and intimate friend of La Fayette, was not forgetful of the duty which on every account he owed him. "Such," said he, "are the peculiar circumstances of our situation, so great are now the dangers of liberty, that it may well be doubted whether most are to be dreaded, our enemies without, or our enemies within. In a crisis like this, it is not every one who will express himself with the same courage. It is quite necessary, that the same voice which France has been so accustomed to recognise in her moments of difficulty, should now be heard once more. M. La Fayette then denounces to you the real enemies of the public weal. Faithful to the law, he has stayed the expression of the wishes of his army, an army that, though ready to sacrifice itself for the constitution, can sacrifice itself for no other object but the constitution; and he comes himself to announce their sentiments and his own, and to avow a letter, on the authenticity of which there are those who have affected to throw doubts. The life of M. La Fayette has been only one continued series of combats with tyrannies of every description. To the Revolution he has devoted his life and his very existence. You who murmur, do you render the same services to your country, and you will then have the same right that he has to be heard." Ramond, after this timely and skilful address, demanded that the petition of the general should be referred to the committee, who might charge itself with finding the proper remedies for the disorganization which had been denounced both in the letter and in the petition.

The Assembly was now divided into its two great parties,

the Feuillans and their opponents, and both were highly excited. One clamoured for the motion of Guadet, the other for that of Ramond. The appel nominal was called for, probably that the violent party might mark out their opponents for the assaults of the populace; and in the result the motion was carried in favour of La Fayette by three hundred and thirty-nine to two hundred and thirty-four, about three to two. With this decision in his favour, and at the same time with this opposition of the violent party publicly expressed against him, the question was, what was La Fayette now to do? The Girondists had taken their part, a part most disgraceful to them; they had entirely turned aside from him and the constitution; they had entirely adopted the Jacobins and the proceedings of the 20th of June. What measure was there left, but to put down the whole of this combined party by force, shut up the hall of the Jacobins, put an end to the domination that was exercised over the Assembly, and call upon all good Frenchmen to support the majority there that was still faithful to the constitution, and averse to these counsels of insurrection and blood; what measure was left but this? But where was the force to carry it into execution? It is at this moment that is seen the perverse conduct of the court, or rather the inveterate nature of its prejudices; and again, the objectionable nature of the projects in which the king had been lately, and was at that very time, engaged.

The queen and the court could never endure La Fayette, as having been the first great mover and origin of the Revolution; the cause, as he thought, of the liberties of his country, but a cause with which *they*, unfortunately, had no sympathy. The king, in the mean time, as you have seen, had committed himself on the subject of the constitution to the allied powers, in the instructions he had given to Mallet du Pan, and was no longer at liberty, even if he had been disposed, on account of any such object as the constitution, to have united himself to La Fayette; not even though La Fayette was endeavouring to accomplish the great point, of all others, to be most desired, the overthrow of the Girondists and the Jacobins. On the whole, the court must be considered as now preferring the chance of the invasion of the allied powers, and the king the chance of some mediation

between them and the people of France; that is, the chance of better terms than the constitution offered. This must, I think, be supposed the line of policy that was now adopted. It was one full of danger, and on the whole a mistake; but with the expectation that was then so generally entertained of the certain success of the allied powers, a mistake not unnatural.

The Marquis de Ferrieres expresses himself at this point of the history in the following manner:—

"La Fayette obtained the honours of the sitting, and took his place amid the acclamations of his partisans. This barren advantage, far from contributing to give any new strength or consequence to the Constitutional party, had no effect but to hasten its fate, and with it the fate of La Fayette.

"The Girondists and the Orleanists, who were apprehensive of the consequences of his stay in Paris, denounced him at their clubs, intrigued in the faubourgs, and were raising the populace in insurrection against him. The national guard was divided; the grenadiers and the chasseurs declared in his favour, and conducted him, at the close of the sitting, in triumph to his hotel. This was enough to strike terror into the Girondists and Orleanists; and if the court and the people attached to the king had but resolved to support La Fayette, there was force to have annihilated the two factions. But the queen recoiled from every idea of owing her safety to a man whom she had determined to ruin. He was, however, well received. The king expressed his acknowledgments for the interest he had taken in his favour, as did the queen; but they refused to enter into his views, and they thus rejected the only means of safety that Providence offered them.

"Inexplicable blindness," continues the historian, "if an explanation were not afforded by the approaching entry of the foreign troops, and the confidence reposed in them."

Such is the representation of the Marquis de Ferrieres, of the order of the nobility in the Constituent Assembly, and though a candid and reasonable yet decided royalist.

The account given by the historian Toulongeon is as follows:—

"Retired to his hotel, La Fayette set himself to consider what was the force of which he could avail himself. A review

of the first division of the national guard, commanded by Aclogue, was fixed for the next morning at break of day; the king was to pass along the line, and La Fayette was then to harangue the troop. But the mayor, Pétion, was advertised of their movements by the queen (this is scarcely credible), who feared the success of La Fayette even more than that of the Jacobins, and a counter order was given, and the review did *not* take place.

"La Fayette then assembled at his hotel all the national guards he could collect. Great movements, however, required great room, and so the Champs Elysées were fixed upon as the place, and the evening as the time for a fresh muster. But scarcely one hundred men appeared, and an adjournment was then agreed upon to the next day, when if the number reached three hundred, they were to march against the hall of the Jacobins; but there came scarcely thirty. Their proceedings were just enough to save La Fayette from being arrested himself. He saw the king, who thanked him, but profited not of his offers of service.

"He returned to his army, left a letter for the Assembly, and had done," says the historian, "on this occasion every thing that became him, but had neither the time nor the means to do what the public service required. From this moment his destruction was resolved on by the Jacobins, and he was burnt in effigy at the Palais Royal the very evening of his departure."

Such is the reasonable account of Toulongeon.

Bertrand de Moleville is unfeeling and unjust enough to describe the affair in the following terms:—

"M. La Fayette was at first loudly applauded, and the Assembly granted him the honours of the sitting; but he had scarcely taken his seat, when his conduct was reprehended with the greatest vehemence by several members, and particularly by Guadet and Vergniaud.

"They censured him for quitting his post without leave, and coming merely for the purpose of intimidating the Legislative Body by indecent threats in the name of his army, and they even insinuated that there were grounds for decreeing his impeachment.

"At these violent declamations, which were applauded by

the galleries, the general seemed to be struck dumb, and sat as if he had been petrified; suffering the favourable effect that his conduct had at first produced to be so entirely lost, that the Assembly would not have hesitated to decree his impeachment, had they not been restrained by apprehensions arising from the distinguished reception which the national guard and the people of Paris had given their old commander; who, incapable of making an advantageous use of their regard, was reduced to the necessity of moving away from Paris that very night, and going back to the army."

M. Bertrand de Moleville may surely be asked on this occasion, what resource was left for La Fayette but to move away from Paris, if the king and the court, for whom he was hazarding both his fame and his safety, would not honour him with the slightest countenance? Was it to be endured, that they were to be seen neutral and indifferent (at the least), and sitting with folded arms, while he was to be left to rush into a combat in the Assemblyand in the streets of Paris, with their furious and murderous enemies, and with the men who had just been assailing the king in his palace, and who evidently only waited for an opportunity to rob him of his crown and take away his life; was this, I repeat, to be endured? Many are the sensations by which the heart of man may be alienated and embittered, but there are few more fitted for the purpose, than to find indifference to services offered, and ingratitude for sacrifices made.

In a subsequent paragraph, M. Bertrand goes on to observe, "that M. La Fayette seemed not to have been quite discouraged by the ill success of his embassy; for on the 10th of July," he says, "M. de Lally came to me with a long letter written by M. La Fayette from his army, in which he drew a plan (ready, as he said, for execution) to open the way for the king through his enemies, and to establish him in safety either at Compeigne or in the north part of France, surrounded by his constitutional guards, and by his faithful army." All this was to be done constitutionally.

"I transmitted this letter," he continues, "to the king, who, notwithstanding his distrust of La Fayette was considerably abated, could never believe that he had it in his power to accomplish the restoration of the monarchy, like

another Monk; and besides, he deemed the plan now proposed but feebly calculated for that purpose. His majesty therefore sent me an obliging but a negative answer, 'That he was sensible of his attachment in proposing to incur so much danger, but that it would be imprudent to put so many springs in motion at once, and that the best way he could serve the king was to continue to make himself a terror to the factions, by ably performing his duty as a general.'"

That this was a negative answer there can be no doubt, but how far it was an obliging answer is another question.

It was not very possible for the king, as I have already intimated, to commit himself to the guidance of La Fayette after the instructions he had given to Mallet du Pan; but that there should be no more sympathy expressed by Bertrand de Moleville, by the king, or by the royalists, ever after, with the elevated nature of the principles of La Fayette, or the steadiness of his loyalty, whenever he saw, as he thought, the king in danger, is quite intolerable; and there are *no* occasions on which the royal party appear to so little advantage, as when it is desirable that they should show some little candour, some common justice, to La Fayette.

With the Constitutionalists, therefore, all alliance was avoided, and every plan that was founded on the supposition of the establishment of *their* scheme of government was declined. But what a fearful month must this month of July have been to the king and his family, and even to their confidential ministers! They must all have had many secret misgivings on the chance arising from the interference of the foreign powers, seeing themselves, as they did, cooped up and surrounded in the palace of the Tuileries by a violent party, and a giddy, bloody populace, who had already assailed them, and from whom they had, after the most imminent hazard, only just escaped. Their friends were approaching, but their enemies were already upon them,—enemies who had been denounced themselves, and were not likely to want either vigilance, ability, or vindictive feelings. It would evidently be owing to some extraordinary indulgence of fortune (and, as the poor king observed, he was not lucky) if they perished not in the storm. How could they expect any other fate?

"Immediately after the 20th of June," says M^e^. de Campan, "the queen lost all hope but from foreign succours. She wrote to implore her own family and the brothers of the king; and her letters became," she says, "probably more and more pressing and expressed her fears, from the tardy manner in which the succours seemed to approach. Her majesty read me a letter from the Archduchess Christina, governess of the Low Countries, assuring her, that out of France they were as much alarmed at her situation, and that of the king, as they themselves could be; but that their safety or their destruction depended on the particular manner in which the succour was brought, and that charged with interests so dear, the coalition must be prudent."

It is surprising to see remarks from the archduchess so reasonable as these, and to think of the denunciations that had been, and were afterwards issued by the allied powers against the violent party who had the command of the mob of Paris. A power of self-delusion seems to have been exercised by all concerned on this point, this rescue of the royal family, that is quite astonishing.

The 14th of July approached, the day of the federation; the king and queen were to appear there. "Knowing," says M^e^. de Campan, "that the outrage of the 20th of June had meant their assassination, they had no doubt that their death was intended on the 14th, and the queen was advised to get the king to wear a quilted waistcoat, which might resist the first stroke of any poignard by which he might be assaulted, and give his friends time to rally round in his defence."

Now it appears from M^e^. de Campan, that all this time, while they were depending on the interference of foreign powers, such was the durance in which the king was held, and so vigilant the spies by which he was surrounded, that the difficulty now was, how the king could find an opportunity to try on the waistcoat, without running the immediate risk of being discovered; and M^e^. de Campan tells us, that she wore this waistcoat about her own person three days before the king could, one morning in the queen's apartment, contrive to put off his own dress and try it on.

"The queen" she continues, "was not yet up; the king pulled me gently aside, as far as he could from the bed, and

whispered me to say, "It is merely to satisfy the queen there that I submit to all this: they will not assassinate me; their plan is changed; they will put an end to me in a different manner."

The queen questioned Me. de Campan when the king was gone, and, being told what had passed, observed, that the king had long remarked to her, that the proceedings in France were but a copy of the Revolution in England under Charles I., and that he never ceased reading the history of that unfortunate monarch, that he might conduct himself better than Charles had done under similar circumstances. "I begin to fear," said the queen, "that they will bring the king to a trial; me they will assassinate. I am a foreigner; what will become of our poor children?" But no entreaties could prevail upon the queen to make use of a defence similar to that provided for the king. "If they assassinate me," she said, "so much the better; they will rid me of an existence that is painful."

"During the whole of the month of July," says Me. de Campan, "I was never once in bed; I always dreaded some night attack. There was an attempt made on the life of the queen that was never known to the public. It was about one o'clock in the morning, I was alone with the queen, and we heard footsteps in the corridor. I found the groom of the chambers, and a loud struggle ensued. 'What a situation,' said the unhappy princess, 'outrages by day, and assassins by night!' 'I have the villain,' said the groom of the chambers; 'I know him well.' 'Let him go,' said the queen; 'open the door; he came to assassinate me, and to-morrow will be carried in triumph by the Jacobins.'" This wretch, it seems, was a young man about the person of the king, and had stolen the key of the corridor from his pocket when the king had gone to bed, apparently for no purpose but that which Me. de Campan supposes.

"They were constantly telling us," she goes on to say, "that the Faubourg St. Antoine was on the point of attacking us. This intelligence was brought me about four o'clock one morning, about the close of July. I found upon further inquiry, that we should have an hour's interval at least. There was no need of waking the queen if all the rest of us were

awake. I stole into her chamber, and found her fast asleep. We waked the king and Me. Elizabeth. The queen, overcome by her sufferings, had, in a very unusual manner, now slept for nine hours. I told the king that I had not disturbed her: he thanked me, observing, 'that as all the palace was awake she ran no risk; and it is very delightful,' he said, 'to see her get a little repose; her sufferings double mine.' But what was my chagrin," says Me. de Campan, "to find the queen reproach me bitterly for not having waked her! It was in vain that I again and again told her that it was but a false alarm, and that she stood in need of every opportunity to recruit her exhausted strength. 'My strength is not exhausted,' she replied, 'affliction sustains me: Elizabeth was with the king, and I was all the time sleeping; I who wish to perish by his side! I am his wife, and he must run no danger that I do not share.'"

Such are some of the particulars to be found in the account given by Me. de Campan. But what scenes of affliction and terror are these; and how light may our censure fall on those who suffer so much!

In a subsequent chapter, Me. de Campan proceeds to relate, that on account of the continual alarms from the faubourgs, the queen had to change her bed-room, and that she ordered the window-shutters to be left open, that her sleepless nights might not appear so insupportably long. Once in the middle of one of these nights, she assured Me. de Campan in confidence, that in a month more she should not see that moon, the soft light of which she had been sitting to contemplate, without being disengaged from shackles herself, and without seeing the king set at liberty also. Every thing, she said, was going on now for their deliverance, but that the opinions of her most intimate counsellors were dreadfully divided; that some of them were ready to answer for a success the most complete, while others pictured dangers to her, in the mean time, quite insurmountable. She added, that she had got the itinerary of the march of the princes, and of the king of Prussia; that on such a day they were to be at Verdun, on another day at such another place; that Lisle was to be besieged, but that she had been made to feel much alarm on that point, and that she was much disquieted with respect to

what might pass in the interval at Paris. "The king wants energy," she said, "not that he wants courage; he has great courage, but it is passive; he has no trust nor opinion of himself, all arising from his education; he has a perfect terror of commanding, and nothing he dreads so much as speaking to people collected in a body; he lived a sort of child, and not a happy one, under the eyes of Louis XV., till he was one and twenty, and this has made him timid. Situated as we are, a few words well pronounced and addressed to the Parisians, who are devoted to him, would increase the strength of our party an hundredfold; but he will not say them. I could act myself, I could mount on horseback, if it were necessary; but were I to do so, it would only be to furnish fresh arms to the enemies of the king. The cry against the Austrian, against the rule of a woman, would be universal over France, and I should extinguish the consequence of the king in bringing forward myself in such circumstances. A queen, who is not regent, must remain inactive, and must prepare herself to die."

Such is the melancholy picture of what was passing *within* the palace; *without*, nothing was to be witnessed but affronts and outrages, cries directed to the windows, and indecent prints and pamphlets, of which the queen was the subject, hawked about and sold within sight and hearing of them. The Assembly and the court were at last obliged to come to a sort of arrangement; and the neighbouring terrace was supposed to belong to the Assembly, and the public were excluded from the main area of the gardens.

Whilst the king and the royal family were in this afflicting situation, declining all offers from La Fayette and the Constitutionalists, and suspending their fate on the interference of the foreign armies, you will now observe how formidable were the movements of the popular party. There is something of mystery still hangs over the intentions of Vergniaud, and the more civilized portion of them, as far as the king's life was concerned: they would probably have suffered him to rule, if he would have ruled according to their directions, but they had united with the Jacobins against La Fayette and the Constitutionalists, and as the king would not give them their measures and their ministers (the two decrees, and the three

patriots, Roland, Clavière, and Servan), they proceeded to oppose the allied powers in their own way; they resolved to seize upon the government, and, as a preliminary step, they immediately set about dethroning the king.

The first point to be carried was a declaration that the country was in danger. Under colour of this plea, any revolutionary measure was possible; and you will now observe, as you read the history, the tremendous speech of Vergniaud. You will acquire a sufficient idea of it from the books within your reach, from the History by the Two Friends of Liberty, from Mignet, and more especially from Thiers, but above all, from the appendix to Bertrand de Moleville's Annals.

Vergniaud was the next great orator of the Revolution, in time and merit, immediately after Mirabeau, and, like him, he could always carry along with him, by the mere effect of his reasoning powers and his eloquence, that large mass that is floating and uncertain in every public assembly, while it is in a revolutionary state and has not yet subsided into regular trains of self-interest or party attachment.

This speech is so fully given in the Moniteur, and in the appendix to Bertrand de Moleville's Annals; and the French orators, with the exception of Mirabeau and the Abbé de Maury, were so much in the habit of reading their speeches, that we may here suppose ourselves in possession of the speech as it was delivered. In general, and in the case of speeches that are really spoken, we read in a few minutes, when we read only reports of them, what may have taken hours in the delivery. We have a skeleton laid before us, not a form presented to us beaming and instinct with all its original life and beauty; and we are then to endeavour, by our own powers of reflection and imagination, rather to conceive what in reality the orator must have made of the main hints and topics that are now exhibited to our view and rather to imagine what the speech must have been, than to suppose that we see what it really was. But in the present instance we are more fortunately situated; we have the speech as it was delivered. Much had been expected from it. A great crowd was collected: the two opposite sides of the Assembly were quite at issue. Was the country properly defended, or not? Such was the question. The Prussians were in the

mean time in full march. It seemed a question of life and death. Were the king and the ministers faithful, or were they traitors? Not a moment was to be lost.

I will endeavour to give you some notion of this address to the Assembly and to the galleries, that you may turn to it hereafter yourselves. The orator drew a picture of the situation of France, the armies falling back, and foreign invaders advancing, reaching the frontier. "And is this, then, the moment," said he, "chosen for dismissing the popular ministers, and rejecting the measures which they thought it necessary to propose?

"We have dangers from within, we have dangers from without. To secure us from the first, a decree has been proposed against the priests. (This, you may remember, had been resisted by the king.) Does the genius of the Medicis still wander about the precincts of the Tuileries? Is Le Tellier *still* there? Are we to see again the night of St. Bartholomew, and the dragonnades of Louis XIV.? This cannot be the meaning of the king; he can wish for no religious troubles. He is assured, therefore, that the existing laws are a sufficient protection for us. The ministers, therefore, must answer for our safety with their heads.

"To secure us from the dangers without, a camp of reserve has been proposed. The king has produced his veto. It is not to be supposed that he can mean to deliver up France to the enemy. He is assured, then, that he has a force sufficient for our protection. Once more, then, let the ministers answer with their heads for the safety of the public.

"But hear me further," said the orator (he had been speaking now some time): the audience were breathless. "It is in the name of the king that these French princes have endeavoured to raise Europe up in arms against us; it is to avenge the dignity of the king, that the treaty of Pilnitz is concluded; it is to maintain the splendour of the throne, that the king of Bohemia and Hungary wages war against us, and that Prussia is on our frontiers. Now, what do I read in the constitution? The article I read is this:—'If the king shall put himself at the head of an army, or direct the force of it against the nation, or shall not oppose himself by a formal act ('par un acte formel') against every enterprise of the

kind that is executed in his name, he shall be considered as having abdicated the throne.'

"What, then, is this formal act? If one hundred thousand Austrians are marching upon Flanders, and one hundred thousand Prussians on Alsace, and should the king oppose to them ten or twenty thousand men, would this, then, have been a formal act of opposition to them?

"If, again, the king, charged to notify the approach of hostilities, shall be instructed of the movements of the Prussian army, and yet make *no* communication to the National Assembly; if a camp of reserve, necessary to stop the progress of the enemy in the interior, should be proposed, and this, too, be rejected by the king, and a plan substituted, uncertain in itself, and taking a long time to execute; and if the king leave the army to be commanded by a general (La Fayette) who is an intriguer, and an object of suspicion to the nation; and if another general (Luckner), brought up far from the corruption of a court and familiar with victory, should ask for a reinforcement, and if the king, by refusing it, should seem to say, 'I forbid your conquering;' why then, I ask again, would all this in the king be formal acts of opposition to the enemy?

"I have spoken in an exaggerated manner," resumed Vergniaud, "that no applications may be made of what I put merely in the way of hypothesis; but I must develop the true nature of the case.

"If, now, such should be the result of any conduct like this, that France should be deluged in blood, the constitution be overthrown, and a counter-revolution take place, and the king should then come forward and say, It is true that the enemy pretends to act only in assertion of my rights and dignity, but I have proved that I am not their accomplice; I have sent armies against them, they were not strong enough to oppose them, but the constitution has not determined what the strength of the armies I was to send should be; I assembled them too late, but the constitution has said nothing of the time of their assembling; the Assembly has sent me decrees that would have been serviceable, and I rejected them, but I had the right to do so. I have done every thing that the constitution has prescribed; how is it possible, then, to

doubt my fidelity?—If this should be his language," (and applauses were heard while the orator continued in this strain,) "should we not have a right to answer, What! is it then to defend us, to oppose to the enemy forces whose inferiority ensures our defeat? Is it to defend us, to nullify all projects that would fortify the interior? The constitution has left you the choice of ministers, but is it for our happiness or our destruction? has made you the head of the army, but is it for our glory or our disgrace? has given you the right of veto, a civil list, and so many prerogatives, but is it to enable you, in a constitutional manner, to destroy both the constitution and the empire?

"No, no! Man! whom the generosity of the French has been unable to affect, and who can be touched by the mere love of despotism alone, you are no longer fit for the constitution that you have so unworthily violated, nor the people whom you have so basely betrayed."

The historian Thiers here stops, and then proceeds to give an account of the measures which Vergniaud proposed, discontinuing his analysis of the speech; but when you come to look at the appendix of Bertrand, you will find the remainder of this terrible harangue, not less powerful nor less eloquent than that part which preceded it. I have, however, pointed out the whole to your curiosity, and I cannot dwell upon it much longer. Knowing as you now do the particulars of the mission of Mallet du Pan, and what really was passing between the king and the allied sovereigns, there were several observations made by Vergniaud, that you will perceive, were of a fearful nature.

"As it is of consequence," said he, "to the personal safety of the king, as well as to the tranquillity of the realm, that his conduct should be no more encompassed with suspicions, as the most perfect openness in his movements and explanations can alone prevent the measures of extremity and the bloody contentions that such suspicions are fitted to produce, I shall propose a message to his majesty, which will apprize him of the truths I have been developing, which will show him that the system of neutrality which they seem to have wished him to adopt between Coblentz and France, would be in itself a treason, unworthy of the king of the French; that

from his neutrality there would result to him no other glory than the deepest horror on the part of the nation, and the most notorious contempt on the part of the conspirators against us; and that having already decided for France, he ought to proclaim aloud his unalterable resolution with her and her constitution to triumph or to fall."

Fearful expressions these! And again: — "You must declare the country in danger," said Vergniaud, "and you will see renewed the prodigies which have covered with glory so many of the nations of antiquity. Why are the French to be supposed less elevated than they? Will they not have objects equally sacred to defend? Is it not for their parents, their children, and their wives, is it not for their country and for liberty, that they will have to contend? Has the lapse of ages, then, enfeebled in the human heart those sublime and tender affections, or has it enervated the courage which they inspire? No, no; doubtless they are as eternal as the nature from which they spring.

"But the declaration must be made. See you not the smile of our enemies here within, which announces to you the approach of the tyrants that have coalesced against you from without? Whence comes it that the constituted authorities are at variance with each other; that our armed force forgets that its very essence is obedience; that soldiers and that generals undertake to influence, and to carry along with them in their measures, the Legislative Body? Is it a military government that we wish established? We hear murmurs arise, and they are directed against the court; and who will venture to say they are unjust? The court is suspected of perfidious projects; and what traits are there in its conduct to show that such suspicions are unfounded? Popular movements are spoken of and a law martial. The imagination is to be familiarized, then, to the shedding the blood of the people. The palace of the king of the French is on a sudden to be changed into a fortress and a stronghold; and where, in the mean time, is the enemy, and against whom are pointed the cannons and the bayonets? The cohorts of our invaders are already, in their presumption, parcelling out our territory, and we are meanwhile divided among ourselves. Intrigue and perfidy are weaving their treasons; and when

the Legislative Body opposes to their machinations decrees that, though rigorous, are necessary, an all-powerful hand interferes, and tears them to pieces. Our fortunes, our lives, and liberty itself, is menaced; anarchy approaches; and despotism alone lifts up its head (though so long bowed down), enjoys our miseries, and waits only to devour its prey. Call, then, while it is yet time, call, I say, upon all Frenchmen to save their country.

"You, at least," addressing himself to the Assembly, "*you* have it always in your power to show your hatred to despotism, and to give to courage an exaltation that will render success certain. You may be worthy of the generous people of whom you are the representatives; you may imitate the Spartans who died at Thermopylæ, and the Roman senators, who would have died at their post. And suppose not that you will want avengers. The day that sees the earth dyed with your blood, will see tyranny with all its arrogance, its defenders, its palaces, and its satellites, swept away and dispersed for ever from the sight by the omnipotence of the nation; and if it is indeed to be a sorrow, which is to poison the last moments of your existence, that you have not made your country happy, you will at least bear away with you the consolation that your death will precipitate the downfall of the oppressors of the people, and that by your devotion liberty will be saved."

"The emotion," says Thiers, "was general."

It had been all along, you see, taken for granted by Vergniaud, that the king was the real instigator of the war, and wished the allied sovereigns entire success. His endeavour to modify the nature of the war by the mission of Mallet du Pan was possibly not known, was certainly not acknowledged, by Vergniaud. The effect of the speech was of the most powerful nature.

"The tribunes," says Thiers, "the côté-gauche, the côté-droit, all the Assembly, united in their applauses; every one pressed round the orator as he descended from the tribune."

"The reiterated applauses," says Bertrand de Moleville, "bestowed on the speaker by a great part of the Assembly, and by all in the galleries, showed beforehand who were to be his future accomplices. M. Dumas, although interrupted

at almost every sentence by murmurs, clamours, or insolent questions, refuted all Vergniaud's arguments with as much energy as solidity, and with as great effect as it was possible to have, in respect to all his hearers over whom truth and justice preserved any empire." "M. Dumas," says Thiers, "was desirous to answer Vergniaud, and instantly attempted to follow him; but he addressed himself to those who were already too much occupied with the speech they had just heard, and had neither silence nor attention to bestow upon any speaker that succeeded." This account of Thiers can readily be supposed by any one who has ever witnessed the effect of a great orator on a public assembly, when the subject itself is interesting to their feelings. On this occasion, M. Dumas, a Constitutionalist, seems to have said all that was reasonable (his speech is given at great length in the Moniteur), all that was fitted to have influence on those over whom, as Bertrand de Moleville observes, truth and justice preserved any empire. But what were truth and justice after the speech of Vergniaud had just been heard? Suspicion (the very passion of the French people), and terror, and the sentiment of national honour, and indignation, and every domestic feeling of the heart, and the enthusiasm of freedom, had been excited, and what were reasoning and logic now? M. Dumas was pouring oil, as if upon the waters of a crystal lake, while it was a wild ocean by which he was surrounded, where the billows had been rolled into mountains by the tempest that had passed over them.

I have given you these extracts, not only from M^e. de Campan, that you may comprehend in some degree the situation and sufferings of the king and royal family, but I have also given you these large quotations from the speech of Vergniaud, that you may at the same time comprehend in some degree what were also the irritations and suspicions of the popular party. You yourselves know how far there was a real occasion for them. You can readily conceive how great would be the impatience, the apprehension, the fury, that would be necessarily produced; the speeches of violence, exaggeration, and menace, that must ensue.

You are not to suppose the popular party without good reasons of distrust and of alarm for their liberties; this is not

the question now: the question is, how far, from the first, of late, and even now, they conducted themselves, while under the influence of such sentiments, like wise and good men; and this is to make the best of their case.

You will continue to observe the history, and if you can but succeed in placing yourselves in the scene before you, ignorant of the future, and sympathizing with all the hopes and fears of those who were engaged in it; if, by this happy power of the imagination, you can but for a time forget all reality, and identify yourselves with those whose story you read, no period in the history of mankind, for uncertainty and importance, was ever like this month of July and beginning of August; the period now before you.

LECTURE XXIX.

BEFORE TENTH OF AUGUST.

IN the last lecture an allusion was made to the state of Paris during the month of July, 1792, and beginning of August; but how little can this state of Paris and of the French nation be now conceived! Think of a people of their sensitive, electric, theatric nature; think of such a people being roused from a state of servility and ignorance, told of their sovereignty, and indulged in the lawless and often bloody exercise of it now for three years together; think of every needy man of talents now with a prospect of elevation in the state, of affluence, and honours, and, above all, of fame and the gaze of the multitude, if he could but overpower and depress those who were already above him; think of the new opinions, what they at the time were; think of the sacred flame of liberty and the cause of the rights of man, how worthy to animate, how fitted to betray into excess, not only the feelings of the daring and the lawless, but the understandings of the wisest and the best; and in the mean time think of foreign armies approaching, united evidently in wishes and opinions with the king and royal family, openly even denouncing and coming professedly to destroy a certain portion of the popular party; think of the king surrounded by confidential servants, in whom the speakers and leaders in and out of the Assembly placed no confidence, but the reverse; while the French armies were all this time not successful, and while the armies ranged against them were the regular troops of the first military powers of Europe.

This was a situation fitted to excite and exasperate a people like this (a military nation, too,) into a state of perfect frenzy; and even the events that followed, appalling as they were, can convey to us no adequate apprehension of the

scene that existed, at this particular period, in this revolutionized kingdom, and more especially in its revolutionized metropolis.

And now I must digress for a moment, to mention a particular circumstance that occurred. I have represented to you the state of awful uncertainty in which every thing was now placed; and I have intimated to you that this uncertainty, great as it would be, whoever had been the actors, is rendered even still greater by the very sensitive and electric nature of the French people. It is for the purpose of turning your attention to an instance of this last kind, that I am now digressing.

Can you conceive it possible, that the very next scene you are to remark, after what you have just had described to you of the situation of the country and of its different parties and interests, is the opposite leaders and members of the Legislative Assembly rushing into the arms of each other, all distinctions of parties and opinions at an end, the right side and the left side confused and mixed together, and all this, merely because the Abbé Lamourette had on a sudden appealed to the good feelings of the Assembly, and had made a sort of petition, expostulation, and remonstrance with all and every person and party before him? "Who," he called aloud, "who is there for a republic, and who for the two chambers? There is no one," he cried, "there can be no one. What cause, therefore, for our dissensions? He who unites us, is the vanquisher of Austria and Coblentz. Let us devote to execration both the republic and the two chambers. One hope, one sentiment,—eternal fraternity,—and our country is saved."

A few words of this kind were all the magic he had used; and the Assembly had started up as I have intimated, and eternal fraternity had been sworn, and the provinces were to be informed, and the army, and the king, of this new oblivion of every thing but the interests of the country; and the king was sent for, and he and the Assembly dissolved in the interchange of their expressions of sympathy and joy, their sentiments of affection and respect, and their mutual felicitations on the future happiness of France.

This is really one of the facts of the history; and design,

contrivance, hypocrisy, all suppositions of this kind, are quite out of the question.

Brissot was obliged to alter his intended speech on account of what had passed, and a man of genius (if Louis had been of this temperament), it is quite to be believed, might have now put himself at the head of the general emotion, and, by persuading the allied sovereigns to withdraw their armies, or even marching himself against them, might yet, it was possible (for any thing was possible in such a country), might yet have saved his crown and dignity, and given freedom and happiness to his people.

But the genius, the electric flashes, the high and sudden resolve, the daring, the impetuous, the elevated, the sublime, whatever was fitted to affect a nation of mere feeling and impulse like the French nation, every thing of this kind was always found, if found at all, on the popular side, and never seemed for a moment to have reached the court, or visited the cold region of its counsels. But how soon was this happy amnesty, this generous effusion of kindness and forgiveness, this pleasing dawn of brightening and of better days, how soon was it to disappear! It scarcely lasted to the next sitting.

> "Swift as a shadow, short as any dream,
> Brief as the lightning in the colly'd night,
> That in a spleen unfolds both heaven and earth,
> And ere a man hath power to say, Behold!
> The jaws of darkness do devour it up."

Only two days after this oath of union and peace had been taken with so much unanimity and enthusiasm, the Girondist party returned to the charge, and Brissot delivered the speech which he had adjourned, and which had little appearance of having been moderated by the author and cleared of its violent passages. It lasted three hours, and nothing can be more violent than several of the sentences extracted from it and given in the Mercure. He numbered up the enemies of France, described the neutrality of other powers; then pictured the situation of kings: that it was between them and the Revolution a war of life and death; that the courts knew well that the Jacobins were no constituted power, and

had neither money nor means, nor even emissaries; but that they had assemblies, which were volcanoes that never ceased to shower down lava on the heads of tyrants; that poignards they had none, but they had the gospel of their constitution, and that it was with that they fought, and could make more proselytes than ever tyrants could.

"But our country," he continued, "must be declared in danger; extraordinary measures must be resorted to; the nation must rise, as one man, if the executive power refuse to unite with you. Here I pause. The good of the people will inspire you. I have well reflected on these measures. Silence would in me be a crime. I will picture the executive power—the evil that it hath done. Men change not their natures in a day: I should consider myself as a traitor if I believed so unheard-of a conversion. Strike the court and the Tuileries, and you will strike all the traitors at once. The abscess is in the head."

Brissot then proceeded (according to the account in the Mercure) to propose various decrees of a revolutionary nature.

The same speech is given in a more regular form by Bertrand de Moleville, but is not less hostile to the king; on the contrary, it is more distinct and more immediately directed to procure his overthrow. "Our country is in danger; our strength has been paralyzed; and to whom is this fatal lethargy owing? To a single man, whom the nation has made its chief, and whom perfidious courtiers have made its enemy. There is a plot, of which the heart is at the court, and all our dangers, internal and external, are the fruit of that plot. If the king be guilty, let it be said frankly; all composition with the executive power would be a crime."

These are expressions to be found in Bertrand de Moleville's version of the speech, accompanied by some of those, the most violent, found in the Mercure; and in conclusion, Brissot moved, and in the name of the king, that his conduct should be investigated, and that the article of the constitution should be considered, which ordained, that in case of the king's not formally opposing any enterprises entered upon in his name against the constitution, he should be deemed to have abdicated.

After such a speech, the meaning of such a motion was

sufficiently clear. Ere the middle of July, there remained little trace of the great indignation that had been raised by the outrages of the 20th of June, still less of the union effected by the Abbé Lamourette.

Another circumstance occurred. Pétion had been suspended by the directory; the king had very unwillingly taken a part, and had confirmed the suspension; and then the Assembly immediately after, though they had themselves desired the king to interfere, actually restored him. This was again a pretty clear indication that his services would be soon wanted, and that they had been found important on the 20th.

The federation was on the 14th of July, and the violent party had summoned to appear there, under the denomination of Federates, men chosen generally from among the most furious members of the clubs of the provinces. At the federation, though the king was not assassinated, as the queen had expected, the great idol of the day had been Pétion. Nothing could be more mournful and discouraging to the king and the court, than the ceremony and all its circumstances; and the king's danger had not at all passed away with the day of the federation. The Federates could be easily retained in Paris; more of the Marseillois had been sent for; many had before arrived for the federation; and Barbaroux was ready for the insurrection: and violent speeches and motions were continually made from time to time by Brissot, Guadet, and the rest of the Girondists. The decree that the country was in danger had produced the greatest effect all over the interior; Paris was in a constant state of alarm and agitation; the abdication or deposition of the king was every where the common topic of conversation, was every where the measure of the clubs and sections, and was the point laboured by all the revolutionary demagogues out of the Assembly, and by many of the leading orators within.

In the mean time, it appears from Bertrand de Moleville, that the minister had (for his own part) taken heart when he saw the federation of the 14th had produced no commotion, and that the concourse of the Federates had been less than he had expected.

"These circumstances," he says, "gave a little relief to the fears of a general confusion, which the violent ferment of

the capital had raised; and the good news I received, a few days after, from Mallet du Pan, relative to the disposition of the emperor and king of Prussia, revived my hopes. I thought all would yet be saved, if we could manage to counteract the plan of the factions, sufficiently to prevent the execution of it, till the combined armies had entered France."

Such were then the sentiments of Bertrand de Moleville. But, as I must again and again observe, what a fearful interval have we here! The violent party preparing their insurrection, and the royal family, in the mean time, sitting in the Tuileries without effort, and waiting to be first rescued by the interference of the approaching armies of the allied sovereigns. You have already had to consider this extraordinary case in that distant and general manner in which alone it can be described to you; and with respect to one great cause of this universal fermentation, this general distrust, it could not be exactly said, as I must always remind you, that the king had no connexion whatever with the approaching armies of the enemy; that was the great misfortune of all; in a certain sense of the words he undoubtedly had. I have been fortunate enough to have had it in my power to exhibit to you very distinctly what this connexion was. You have had the particulars of the mission of Mallet du Pan laid before you: the king's views and opinions you exactly know; they were not those imputed to him by the popular leaders, but they were not such as could have been avowed. Though the king did not call upon the allied powers to invade France; though he meant them not to exercise any domination over the country; though his intentions were of the most benevolent nature with respect to his people, still it is clear, that, in a certain sense of the word, he wished for a counter-revolution; that he had no desire for the continuance of the constitution, no love for its original promoters or present abettors; that he had no hope for his own personal comfort, safety, or respectability, but from some new system, to be founded, in the first place, on the success of the combined powers; that so far he was in connexion with them; that so far they had his wishes in their favour; and that any such connexion and such wishes would have been at the time, if known, considered, not only by the popular leaders, but by the majority of the people of France, as

treason to the state. In this situation of things, it is too much for Bertrand de Moleville, or the royalist party, to talk, as you will see them do, of the mere suspicions, conjectures, declamations, and absurdities of the popular party. These are the terms used.

The fault of that party was not in now suspecting the king, but in having, by their behaviour from the first opening of the Legislative Assembly, and subsequently by not joining La Fayette, reduced themselves and the king to the awful crisis in which they were both now placed. Neither party could be considered as blameless; far from it. It was not for the king ever to have tampered with those who were, after all, upon every supposition, to invade his country with arms in their hands; and of the popular party, on the contrary, it was the duty to have acted from the first on a system of conciliation and indulgence to their sovereign; while to act as they did, and never to leave it honourable to him, according to his own natural opinions, to be a constitutional king, was to adopt a system of conduct unfeeling and irrational, and one that could only lead to bloodshed and to crimes,—crimes to be by themselves committed.

Now in this state of things, it was impossible for the king, as you have seen, to pacify the popular leaders, who kept pressing upon him with such terrible motions and speeches as I have already alluded to,—those of Vergniaud and Brissot, and such as I shall hereafter allude to; nor was the king, still less the queen, disposed to try the chance of a second flight, for both had expectations, though probably not exactly the same, from the immediate approach of the allied armies; so that on the one side, as you have seen, the popular leaders were determined to find or make an opportunity of dethroning the king as soon as possible, and the king, and his ministers, and the court, persuaded themselves, as Bertrand de Moleville expresses it, "that all would yet be saved, if they could but manage to counteract the plan of the factions, sufficiently to prevent the execution of it, till the combined armies had entered France."

Now it is this that makes the period of the history before us so painfully interesting. Not only have we to consider how far are the popular leaders justified or not in their terrors

and reproaches, but is the king to be dethroned before the Prussians reach Paris? Even if the allied powers should be successful, and on their immediate march to Paris, are not the king and royal family likely to be first assassinated?

Observe, therefore, a few of the particulars that may be gleaned from the history; a history which you will no doubt read with the greatest attention in all and every part. I have already mentioned to you the Memoirs of Barbaroux; I must again allude to them. I shall do so, not only that you may see the state of Paris, but that you may judge of the case of the Girondist party, and *that* on their own showing.

In the first place it appears, though not very distinctly from this work, that from the very beginning of July, forty-three of the Fédérés had assembled every day in the correspondence room of the Jacobins, and a directory of five had been chosen, called the committee of insurrection; to them five others were afterwards joined; and Barbaroux, in the course of his fourth chapter, makes the following observations:—

"There were then three parties; the court, the Feuillans, and the Jacobins. The court laboured to overthrow the constitution, for the purpose of establishing despotism; the Feuillans wanted its revision, that two chambers might be obtained, and an order of patricians; the Jacobins had not, all of them, exactly the same object, though they acted in concert, for the Cordeliers among them wished for bloodshed, for money, for places, and the Duke of Orleans; the Republicans, for a republic, and a corresponding system of morals. The two first parties, the court and the Feuillans, were agreed and ready to admit the Austrians, and they were reinforced by all the timid people, who are always enemies to revolutions; and this powerful coalition threatened to enslave the people, who were defended only by the Jacobins; with different intentions indeed, some from ambition, others from a love of gain, very few from principle. We had not then any written proof of the manœuvres of the court (they have been since found in the Tuileries, in the iron closet); but a crowd of circumstances gave us a moral certainty on the point." He then alludes to the silence of the court on the subject of the treaty of Pilnitz, the conduct of La Fayette, the two decrees, the dismissal of the ministers, as proofs of the perfidy of the king and

court. He next proceeds to his interviews with Roland and his wife; their doubt and despair of their Revolution; their resolve that Paris must be saved; and their sending to Marseilles for six hundred patriots, "who were ready to die." Afterwards he alludes to the 20th of June; the suspension of Pétion; the federation of the 14th of July; and his hint to this magistrate (Pétion) that he might soon be kept a prisoner in his house. "But we shall confine your husband," he said, turning to M^e^. Pétion, "by the ruban tricolore." An insurrection, as the magistrate was to be kept out of the way, was therefore intended.

"In Paris," he then continues, "the deposition of the king became the great subject of discussion. This measure, in giving the throne to the prince royal, would have given the regency to the Duke of Orleans." He then describes the efforts of Marat and the Cordeliers to procure this measure; their vehemence and their activity; and the cooperation of patriots more pure; and, he says, "that the Jacobins, all the popular societies in Paris, and the forty-eight sections, had held deliberations to present a petition to the same effect: but a few wiser men," he continues, "of the committee of general defence, tried other expedients, and had it not been for them (that is, for the most violent of the party), we should have passed from the domination of a feeble monarch, to be submitted to the plunder of the prince's friends." Barbaroux must here mean the friends of the Duke of Orleans; and now comes his defence of himself and his own friends.

"It is true," he adds, "that France in avoiding these evils has not escaped the evils of anarchy; but are those to be blamed who laboured, and with perfect sincerity, to found a republic? The court," he goes on to say, "on its side, made every preparation. No one who witnessed these unhappy times would deny, that the court marched on with the most perfect hardiness to effect a counter-revolution; and this fact, well settled, justifies the insurrection of the 10th of August. All Paris was in motion on the one side and on the other. The Fédérés assembled at the house of Gorsas, at the house of Carra, a central committee at the Jacobins (this is his indistinct allusion to the conspiracy), under the presidency of Vaugeois. On the contrary, that of the Tuileries was directed

by the most impudent counter-revolutionists; there was continual fighting in the Palais Royal, at the cafés, and at the spectacles; half the national guard was for the court, half for the people; the mob of the patriots were in a constant uproar; some were busy intriguing, scarcely any laboured on with proper steadiness. Pétion alone, placed at the head of this general movement, calculated the shock it was to produce with perfect discretion; retained it, let it loose, as the court or the patriots prevailed; defeated the perfidies of the one, and saved the other from mistakes; and placed in the midst of the excesses of both, proscribed by the court and calumniated by the selfish, but loved by the people, who were not as yet depraved, he conducted the Revolution to its term; and neither can the bad men, who have destroyed the Revolution, deprive him of the glory of it, nor can good men impute to him the calamities by which it has been followed. And such," concludes Barbaroux, "such was the state of Paris when the Marseillois arrived (at the close of July)."

Such are the views and reasonings of Barbaroux, such the case of the Girondists. We may now turn to Bertrand de Moleville, and judge of the state of Paris by referring to the representations made from an opposite quarter.

"The king," says he, "having sanctioned the decree, which declared the country in danger, it was proclaimed in the capital with all the form and ceremony suited to make a great impression." An amphitheatre, it appears from his account, was then constructed, and an officer was appointed to receive the names of those who were disposed to march to the frontiers. "These patriotic enrolments," he says, "continued a week, and in this manner went off thousands,—fifteen thousand, as it was computed. But (he adds) that some of these miserable citizen-soldiers presented themselves at the bar of the Assembly, demanding, they said, in the name of the country, which they were going to save, the deposition of the executive power, or at least that it should be made subordinate to the legislative body." A frightful specimen this, it may be observed, to show how unpopular was the king, how popular the Revolution. "The Assembly applauded their zeal," continues Bertrand de Moleville, "and had given the same reception to a band of Federates, who, professing to represent

the eighty-three departments, had come to make the same demand? 'Determine (said they) to suspend the executive power; there is not a moment to be lost; have a care of drawing upon yourselves a terrible responsibility.'

"The deposition of the king," says Bertrand de Moleville, "was certainly the wish of all the Jacobin clubs, and consequently of all the furious demagogues. Their manœuvres," he says, "which I watched with all possible vigilance, became daily more alarming. I was informed that a clandestine meeting had been held at Charenton, and that the projected insurrection was ultimately fixed for the 9th or 10th of August."

Such is the representation of Bertrand de Moleville.

I must now call your attention, for a moment, to a very curious circumstance that occurred, and which, like the particulars I have just mentioned, is very strongly illustrative of the critical situation of the king, and of all the parties concerned, during this month of July. It is a letter which appears to have been written by the chiefs of the Girondist party to the king, to explain to him their opinions on the measures to be adopted for his own safety, and the welfare of his country. There is something of obscurity with regard to the first origin of this letter, and the precise views of the Girondists are not very clear; but I see not why we may not suppose them to have been what the letter itself describes them to have been. "The chiefs," says Bertrand de Moleville, "of the Gironde faction, who had planned the insurrection, did not at that time intend to overset the monarchy; their design was to dethrone the king, make the crown pass to his son, and establish a council of regency, to be composed of their own creatures." And in a corresponding part of his Memoirs, he mentions that Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonné commissioned one Rose, a painter, to deliver to Thierry, the king's valet de chambre, a letter to the king, which he calls an imprudent and insolent letter, and to which the king replied, "that no answer could be returned." But it is a letter which my hearers will, perhaps, think well deserved every consideration that could be given to it. The very existence of such a letter on the state of the country from such men, at the time, I must again intimate, is a very remarkable circum-

stance; it is alluded to by the historian Thiers, in his second volume, and is given in the notes. "The Girondists," says Thiers, "though they had started in so hardy a manner the question of the deposition, still hesitated when they came to the eve of an insurrection; and though the court was now almost disarmed, and all power in the hands of the people, still the approach of the Prussians, and the dread of a long established authority (however now disarmed), inclined them to think, that it was better to come to terms with the court, than to expose themselves to the chances of an attack on the palace. Even if this attack were successful, the Prussians might afterwards arrive and exercise a terrible vengeance. They did not, indeed, under the influence of these and other considerations, begin a negotiation with the court, but they listened to a painter of the name of Rose, who, terrified at the situation of public affairs, engaged them to give, in a letter, their opinion of what could now be done for the safety of the king, and the preservation of liberty." Thiers then proceeds to a brief abstract of the contents of the letter. But mark several of the expressions of this letter.

"It ought not to be dissembled," says one of the first paragraphs, "that it is the conduct of the executive power that is the immediate cause of all the evils with which France is afflicted, and of the dangers with which the throne is surrounded. They deceive the king who would lead him to suppose that it is the effervescence of the clubs, the manœuvres of particular agitators and powerful factions, that have occasioned and continue those disorderly movements, of which every day increases the violence, and of which no one can calculate the consequences. Thus to suppose, is to find the cause of the evil in what are really only the symptoms. The only way to re-establish the public tranquillity, is for the king to surround himself with the confidence of his people. This can only be done by declaring, in the most solemn manner, that he will receive no augmentation of his power that shall not be freely and regularly offered him by the French nation, without the assistance or interference of any foreign powers; and what would be perhaps sufficient at once to re-establish confidence, would be for the king to make the coalesced powers acknowledge the independence of

the French nation, cease from all further hostilities, and withdraw the troops that menace our frontiers. It is impossible that a very great part of the nation should not be persuaded that the king has it in his power to put an end to this coalition; and while that coalition continues, and places the public liberty in a state of peril, it is in vain to flatter the king that confidence can revive. To consider distrust as a crime, when the danger is real, is but to augment it. While there is an action against liberty, a correspondent reaction is inevitable. Why does not the king choose his ministers among those who are clearly in favour of the Revolution?

"Whatever," says the letter, in conclusion, "whatever has a tendency to banish suspicion and to reanimate confidence neither can nor ought to be neglected. The constitution is saved, if the king resolves with courage and persists with firmness."

To these very weighty observations the king returned four common-place remarks, which showed he would do neither the one nor the other.

I cannot but consider this letter as favourable to the Girondists; in all fair construction, it surely meant well; and one is disposed to welcome anything that appears favourable to the character of a man of such talents as Vergniaud.

We will now turn to other particulars, still illustrative of the critical situation of the king, and indeed of all parties.

The letter from the Girondists was sent to the king about the close of the month of July. Whatever might be its intention, it had failed; and on the 26th, Guadet, one of the writers of it, read an address to the king, as reporter from the extraordinary commission. Paragraphs of the following nature appear in it:—"By what fatality, sire, is it, that our enemies are men who pretend only to serve you? The constitution has charged you to watch over the external interests of the nation; yet the ally for whom we have lavished our blood and treasure is become our enemy, and it is in your name that he has raised against us a league of kings, hostile to that liberty which you have sworn to maintain, and protectors of an authority which you have often solemnly renounced. You complain, sire, of the distrust of the people, but what have you done to remove it? Your palace is filled

with the families of the rebels at Coblentz. It would be in vain to look near you for a man who has been useful to cause of liberty, or who has not betrayed it. But all divisic are about to cease. When an empire is threatened by foreign armies, and attempts are made to change its laws by force, there exists but one necessity, one duty, that of repelling the enemy. All difference of party or opinion must be suspended, and there remain but two classes of men, citizens and traitors.

"You may yet save your country, and your crown with it. Dare at length to determine upon it. Let the names of your ministers, let the sight of men who are about you, inspire public confidence. The nation," the address concluded, "is no doubt able to defend itself and to preserve its liberty, but requests you once more, sire, to unite with it to defend the constitution and the throne."

Expressions of this kind, to be found in different parts of the address, were of a very menacing nature; and it behoved the king and the court immediately to come to some decision, either to try once more the experiment of a flight, or entirely to adopt the Revolution, and persuade the allied powers to withdraw.

In the existing state of Paris, there seems to have been no chance for the lives of the royal family, but one or other of these alternatives; on any other supposition they must apparently perish, and this, whether the allied powers succeeded or not. This alternative became more and more pressing, for the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick now appeared; and "was not," says Bertrand de Moleville, "was not that manifesto, the plan of which had been proposed by Mallet du Pan and agreed to, but one drawn up by Dulimon, as dictated by the ministers of the emperor and king of Prussia; and the Duke of Brunswick, who signed it as commander-in-chief, had not even been consulted about it. The publication of it," he continues, "produced an effect the very reverse of what had been expected. All parties, some violent Royalists excepted, were provoked at the boastings of the Duke of Brunswick, or laughed at them. The factious did not fail to attribute to the suggestions of the king all the menaces respecting the safety of himself and his family, and

thence concluded that his majesty was in correspondence with the enemies of the nation."

Such is the notice taken of this declaration by Bertrand de Moleville. He seems to have been more struck by the imprudence and folly of it, than by the spirit of injustice and inhumanity which distinguishes it. You will of course read it very attentively. You will find in it the following passages:—

"That the national guards are called upon to preserve provisionally tranquillity. . . . until the arrival of the troops. . . . That, on the contrary, such national guards as shall fight against the troops of the two allied powers, and who shall be taken with arms in their hands, shall be treated as enemies, and punished as rebels to their king and as disturbers of the public peace."

Again. "That the inhabitants of towns, boroughs, and villages, who shall dare to defend themselves against the troops of their imperial and royal majesties, and to fire upon them, either in open country or through half-open doors or windows of their houses, shall be punished instantly according to the rigorous rules of war, or their houses shall be demolished and burnt."

Again. "The city of Paris and all its inhabitants without distinction shall be called upon to submit instantly and without delay to the king, to set that prince at full liberty, and to ensure to him and to all royal persons that inviolability and respect which are due by the laws of nature and of nations to sovereigns; their imperial and royal majesties making personally responsible for all events, on pains of losing their heads, pursuant to military trials, without hope of pardon, all the members of the National Assembly, of the department of the district, of the municipality, and of the national guards of Paris, justices of peace, and others whom it may concern. And their imperial and royal majesties further declare, on their faith and word of emperor and king, that if the palace of the Tuileries be forced or insulted, or the least violence be offered, the least outrages be done to their majesties, the king, the queen, and the royal family, if they be not immediately placed in safety and set at liberty, they will inflict on those who shall deserve it the most exemplary and ever memorable avenging punishments, by

giving up the city of Paris to military execution, and exposing it to total destruction; and the rebels who shall be guilty of illegal resistance shall suffer the punishments which they shall have deserved."

These are paragraphs to be found in this declaration, and it was in vain that in other parts of it a distinction was made between the "sober part of the nation and the faction that enslaved them;" that it was declared "that the two allied powers had no other object in view than the welfare of France, without any ptetence to enrich themselves by making conquests;" "that they did not mean to meddle with the internal government of France; that they wished only to put an end to that anarchy which prevailed in the interior parts of France, to restore the king to his legitimate power." Professions of this kind were in vain, when made by those who were advancing with arms in their hands to invade the country, and accompanied by such menaces as those just enumerated. The greatest sensation was produced in our own country of Great Britain, and all over Europe, by a manifesto like this, which went in truth to say, that two military powers were to march into a neighbouring and independent kingdom, to settle the civil dissensions there as they thought best, and to punish by military law, as rebels and traitors, all who presumed to resist them. No friend to freedom or the general rights of mankind could for a moment tolerate a procedure like this; and even the success of the Jacobins and Anarchists was thought preferable to the triumph of invaders like these. In Paris, indeed, from the light-heartedness of the French character and the supposed distance of the danger, this denunciation was at first only laughed at or despised; but it was soon seized upon by the popular party, and made a most effective engine to accomplish their designs; and no doubt the imprudent nature of it, to say the best of it, must have been deeply lamented by the king and all his more rational friends and advisers. It must have been even a most cruel disappointment.

Mallet du Pan had retired to Geneva, because, as he had understood, the king's views were acquiesced in, and the manifesto he had been charged to propose to the allied powers adopted. "He had so fully justified the king's con-

fidence," says Bertrand de Moleville, "by the wisdom and success of his negotiation, that his majesty authorized me to testify to him how much he was satisfied, and that he wished to have no other negotiator with the powers; and he was ordered to return to Frankfort. The letter was received by Mallet du Pan at Geneva, just as the manifesto from the Duke of Brunswick was published. It was in vain for him now, he thought, to return to Frankfort; as undoubtedly it was."

On the part of the king, however, some notice was to be taken of this manifesto, and a letter was presented by the ministers to the president of the Assembly on the 3rd of August.

The king mentioned "the necessity of union; the sorrow that he felt at the disunions that existed; that they who knew of what value in his eyes were the blood and the fortune of his people, would give credit to his uneasiness and his grief." He mentioned his love of peace, his efforts to avoid the war; but that "when it had been declared, he had neglected," he said, "none of the means of assuring its success." Here a nerve was touched that vibrated to the very heart of but too large a part of the audience; violent murmurs arose, and the reading was interrupted. So again in similar passages of the letter:—

"I accepted the constitution," said the king; "from that moment I imposed it as a law upon myself to be faithful to the constitution." "Not true, not true," were the words now heard.

"Never shall I be seen," he went on to say, "compounding the glory or the interests of the nation; never receiving the law from foreigners or from a party. It is to the nation that I am bound; I will maintain the national independence with my last breath."

These were the king's expressions, and, as he understood them, they were sincere. He meant no other by his mission to the allies; certainly not to receive the law from foreigners, to compound the glory, the interests, or the independence of his people. He meant no treason of this kind, however he might in truth be *hazarding* such calamities.

"The people," he concluded, "will perhaps one day know

how dear to me their happiness is, how much it has always been my sole interest, my first wish;" and this, too, the unhappy monarch could say with sincerity. "How many griefs," he added, "might be effaced by the slightest mark of its returning!"

But even this last affecting expostulation, this petition, as it were, for a little kindness, could not now be heard. Interests too deep were at issue, and passions too violent had been excited. The furious Isnard rushed into the tribune to move, that the conduct of the king was as contrary to the constitution, as his language was conformable to it; and Pétion, a formidable actor in the drama at this period, appeared at the head of a deputation from the commune. By a decree of the 25th, all the sections of Paris had been declared permanent, that is, had been rendered always ready for any revolutionary movement; and they had just united, it seemed, in charging the mayor to present at once a petition in their name for the deposition of the king, and with this petition he now came forward and addressed himself to the Assembly.

He spoke of the conduct of the king from the first opening of the Revolution; of the benefits, as he called them, conferred upon him; of the return which had been made. He described the dangers of the country: strangers coming to invade; no defence prepared; a general revolting from the Assembly; and terrible and absurd menaces issuing from the camp of the Duke of Brunswick.

"From a remaining inclination," the petition concluded, "to indulgence, we could have wished it were in our power to ask of you only the suspension of Louis XVI. while the danger of the country existed; but this the constitution forbids. Louis XVI. incessantly invokes the constitution: *we* invoke it in our turn, and demand his deposition. Meanwhile let our enemies assemble; let three hundred thousand slaves advance: they shall find before them ten millions of free men, ready for death or victory, fighting for equality, for their paternal roofs, their wives, their children, and their aged friends."

This address excited the most rapturous applauses; and the commune having thus with impunity given the signal of

rebellion, the example was soon followed by all the sections of Paris, with two exceptions; and the deposition of the king was not only the object of the numberless petitions daily presented to the Assembly, through the means of the Jacobins, but it had become the general cry of the populace. Pétion had presented the petition of the commune on the 3rd of August, and it was the common conversation at Paris at the time that something was to happen on the 10th. "At Paris," says Me. de Stael, "there never can be a conspiracy; every one follows the majority, the fashion, and no one keeps a secret." So it happened on the present occasion. The day, the hour, the final arrangement of the general insurrection, were fixed, and the king and court were informed of it, as was every one else.

But Bertrand de Moleville had, it seems, been suffering day and night, for the last six weeks, the most dreadful anxiety. He must have been aware, as he saw the storm so deepening in darkness and so fast advancing, that flight was, for the king and royal family, the best and only chance.

On the 19th of July, it seems, he had been informed of an insurrection intended for the 29th. This he contrived very ingeniously to defeat; but he instantly urged the king to take measures for his safety. With Malouet, Clermont, Tonnerre, and Montmorin, he digested a plan for the king's escape to Normandy. You will see the particulars in his Memoirs. The scheme was communicated to the queen, the king approved it, and M. Leport was sent to make proper inquiries and preparations. In the mean time, the insurrection intended for the 10th of August was intimated to the ministers of the king, as we have already mentioned, and M. Leport was only expected back from Normandy on the 5th.

On the 5th, however, at night, he seems to have arrived. "M. Leport," says Bertrand de Moleville, "came to my house the next morning, the 6th, at seven o'clock. He gave me the most satisfactory account of his mission. I sent his report to the king, strongly urging the necessity of his majesty's immediately fixing the day of his departure. The gentleman I had intrusted with the letter did not return till one. I had waited all the morning with extreme impatience. The king was to send an answer, he told me, at five. I was

not alarmed at this delay; but at six my hopes vanished. The king and queen sent me word to suspend my preparations for their departure till further notice, as it was their majesties' intentions to reserve that step for the last extremity.

"These fatal words," he says, "were like a thunderbolt to me. What do they mean by the 'last extremity?' I cried, with as much rage as despair. Who can the idiots and traitors be who have suggested such a pernicious resolution?"

A sentiment like this it was but too natural to utter. M. Bertrand wrote, and implored, and expostulated, but in vain. To talk of "the last extremity" on the 6th, when the insurrection was to take place on the 10th!!

It was the queen, he afterwards made out, that set his majesty against the scheme of retiring to Normandy, where the Duke of Liancourt commanded. "M. Bertrand does not consider," she said, "that he is throwing us into the hands of the Constitutionalists." The duke, in the mean time, it must be observed, had made the most generous sacrifices; had already lent his majesty ninety thousand livres, and promised nine hundred thousand more, and was no reasonable object of distrust, but entirely the contrary.

"Besides," says Bertrand de Moleville, "they had just heard that the Prussian army was in motion. Nobody doubted but that the Duke of Brunswick's plan was to march straight to Paris; and it was thought that the French army were too weak and too ill commanded to resist the disciplined Germans, led by so experienced a general, and that our troops would take flight at his approach. Some private advisers of the queen wished this too much, not to believe it; and it was on these chimerical conjectures that the deluded court founded their hopes.

I will now digress for a moment, to mention a particular circumstance.

You already know, what I shall have hereafter to state, that on the 10th of August the Tuileries was attacked, the monarch obliged to retire, to take refuge in the National Assembly, and that he was then dethroned.

Observe now what passes on the 5th, five days before. Bertrand de Moleville was very ill. "But I collected all my

strength," says he, "to attend the king's levee on that day, on Sunday, the 5th of August. Never was the court," says he, "more brilliant, or rather, never more numerous." Such are the words of the minister. But what a scene then was here! a levee, a court; and in five days the court, the palace, and the king (the office at least), at an end; and even at the very moment all the materials of their destruction prepared!

"The inquietude," continues Bertrand, "which the king and queen's situation inspired, and the grief, from the idea that it might be the last time they should ever see their sovereign, was strongly expressed in the countenances of many present." Well indeed might the unfortunate monarch have said, in the words of our own Richard,—

"Cover your heads, and mock not flesh and blood
With solemn reverence; throw away respect,
Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty,
For you have but mistook me all the while:
I live on bread like you, feel want, taste grief,
Need friends."——— "Subjected thus,
How can you say to me, I am a king?"

"I could not long," says the minister, "support this affecting scene; I left the palace, my eyes running over with tears; yet I was far from imagining, at that moment, that I had seen the royal family for the last time." But it *was*, alas! the last time that he ever saw the royal family, or that they were ever seen but amid terror, distraction, and sorrow; amid the insults of the populace, the triumphs of their enemies, the dungeons of imprisonment, and the ministers of death.

The crisis of their fate, as you already see, was fast approaching. They could not be persuaded by Bertrand de Moleville to attempt flight even on the 6th; they preferred the chance of the interference of the allied powers. These allied powers were as yet only approaching. The Jacobins and Girondists had been, in the mean time, through all the month of July, preparing their insurrection; the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto showed them that no time was to be lost. All was now ready; and on the 10th, exactly as it had been announced, the insurrection broke out.

It is to this insurrection that I must, in the lecture of to-morrow, entirely direct your attention.

In the remainder of this lecture, therefore, of to-day, I shall mention some books and memoirs that may be consulted and read.

We naturally, in the first place, turn to the Memoirs of Barbaroux; and the recital of Barbaroux will, on the whole, disappoint you. It is chiefly valuable as showing the manner in which the mind, in pursuit of its end, may become unconscious, or at least frightfully insensible to the horrors by which that end is to be attained. This is always the case with these enthusiastic, dangerous men, on great public occasions; and such examples should be held up and remembered, that men may be taught to pause in time, and to see crimes at a distance, while they are as yet *not* under the supposed necessity of committing them.

Barbaroux was (and the character in all its points is by no means an uncommon one) a young man of genius, and fine affections, and noble sentiments; yet from the first he seems never to have hesitated at the expedient of an insurrection, the expedient of letting loose the savage populace of Paris, bringing up five hundred desperate men from the other end of the kingdom, and entering upon a scene of bloodshed, where his fellow creatures were to perish, their wives to be widows, their children to be fatherless, and no one competent to say where the commotion was to end, or when the blood was to cease to flow. No present terrors, no possible consequences, appear to have affected his imagination; every thought, feeling, and wish, was occupied and absorbed by one great leading idea, the idea of liberty; and his mind, as is always the case in instances of enthusiasm, was incapable of estimating the relative importance of any other consideration, however weighty, however sacred. Some traces of humanity indeed appear in his account, when instances of the sufferings of particular persons are alluded to, when he is writing as a private individual; but the description given of this insurrection in these Memoirs by the patriot, is much what would be given of a battle by a military commander. The wounds and death are of course, the field is the bed of honour, and the victory is glory and renown. The nature of

the cause, the motives of the combatants, "nil horum," not a word of these.

We see in the narrative the palace carried by assault, the king deposed, the three ministers recalled; and in the next chapter Barbaroux returns to his family and the acclamations of Marseilles, for "his mission," he says, "was ended, tyranny being now put down."

I must again observe to you, as I leave, for the present, these Memoirs, that I consider them valuable, not only as connected with the 10th of August, but as a specimen of the nature of political enthusiasm, not only in Barbaroux, but in others; and, therefore, as a specimen of the men and the times in which he lived, and of all such revolutionary men and such revolutionary times.

Observe the narrative for one moment more.

"The news of my return," he says, "being every where spread, the best patriots hasted to embrace me. My house was surrounded and crowded with citizens; a band of music was brought, Provençal songs were sung that had been made in my honour, and the Marseillois Hymn. I often think," he says, "and am quite melted when I think of the last couplet, and the manner in which the citizens dropped upon their knees in the house and in the street. I was standing on a chair, where they forced me to remain. Good God! what a spectacle! The tears started to my eyes. If indeed I really did at that moment serve them for a statue of Liberty, certainly I may at least take to myself the honour of having defended liberty with all my courage."

What a spectacle! as Barbaroux truly says; but what a spectacle of political enthusiasm! a man worshipped in the streets as a statue of Liberty!

Something, however, remains to be told. Barbaroux, you will observe, was a Girondist, and the party were all, like the king, in their turn, afterwards deposed, and had to fly or perish on the scaffold. The next words that follow this passage in the Memoirs, are, therefore (as the Memoirs were subsequently written), these: "Liberty, virtue, sacred rights of men! to-day you are but empty names." And how had they become empty names? Others had been, it seems, as ready with measures of insurrection and violence, as were

before Barbaroux and the Girondists; and they had, therefore, to fall by the example they had set, and see, not themselves, but their opponents, now worshipped in the streets, while they themselves were led along to execution.

Turning now from the Memoirs of Barbaroux, and always, if possible, to the accounts of those who have been eye-witnesses or actors in the scene, we may read about thirty pages, on the subject of the 10th of August, in the Memoirs of François Hue. He was in the palace during the attack, and afterwards attended the king and the royal family in their imprisonment. At the moment when the defence was no longer possible, and when the carnage began, he jumped out of one of the windows of the palace, as did many others, crossed the gardens amid the fire of the musketry, and having no other resource, threw himself into the Seine. Just as his strength was exhausted, he reached one of the boats on the river, and the waterman being a man of humanity, he escaped.

Weber, in like manner, must be read. His account is very interesting, from his deep attachment to the royal sufferers. He accompanied them to the Legislative Assembly, and was honoured with many marks of their personal regard. But the notes given at the end of the volume are particularly deserving of attention. In one of these notes there is a good description of the courts and terraces of the Tuileries as they then stood, and other local circumstances, necessary to those who would understand the detail; but, above all, a very good narrative of the whole affair is to be found at page 352, drawn up by one of the Swiss officers who was actively engaged. This narrative is on every account extremely valuable; it was published at Lucerne in 1819, and must be read.

In the twenty-first chapter of her second volume, Me. Campan, who was also in the palace, gives some very interesting particulars, and an extract in one of the notes from the history of the queen by Montjoie.

I forgot to mention, that in the notes to the Memoirs of Barbaroux is given an account of the honours paid by the National Assembly to those who fell on the 10th of August; and again, of the honours paid by the Swiss cantons to the Swiss guards and officers who perished and who survived.

The Marquis de Ferrieres dedicates about thirty pages, the close of the twelfth book, to the 10th of August. His observations are sometimes checked, and often assisted, by valuable notes from the editors, at the bottom of the page; but in the notes at the end of the volume are given, 1st, a very full recital of the events by the royalist Peltier, which you must consider, and which seems to offer much the same account that is found in Bertrand de Moleville; 2ndly, a very curious account, by Carra, of the first organization of the insurrection, and for the merit of which insurrection he claims his share.

Afterwards, in page 501, is given another very curious extract, from a work of Pétion on Robespierre and Marat. "The men," says Pétion, "who have attributed to themselves the glory of this day, of the 10th of August, are those to whom it belongs the least; it is due to those who have prepared it, to the imperious nature of things, to the brave Fédérés and their secret directory, who had so long concerted the plan of the insurrection; it is due to the people, and, in short, to the tutelary genius which has so long presided over the destinies of France from the first meeting of its representatives." Such is the avowal of Pétion.

I have been furnished, by the kindness of M. Mallet, with some narratives that were sent his father by three of the different Swiss officers who survived. They sufficiently agree with the narrative of the Swiss officer furnished in the notes to Weber. The author of this last narrative in Weber, was by the side of M. Durler, M. Mallet du Pan's correspondent, all the time of the action, and engaged in defence of the great court before the palace. There is an account of the 10th of August by St. Croix: it is referred to in the Annual Register. I inquired for it in vain in Paris, and I afterwards found it in the Lansdowne collection in the library in the city of London. The author was a minister at the time, but he afterwards became an émigré, published his account in London, and the book, representing rather his own national feelings on the Revolution than the scenes of the 10th of August, quite disappointed me. If we look at the histories of the French Revolution that have as yet appeared, we shall find some very good remarks, and a short and fair account of the 10th of August in the history of Toulongeon.

Again. There is a very full and very good account in the history by the Two Friends of Liberty. The account given by Montgaillard, in the third volume of his late history, should be read: the abbé is more angry with the poor king than is exactly necessary. You will of course read the history of Thiers, and you will find the part of it relative to the 10th of August very fair and good. The detail given by Bertrand de Moleville is very full, and not unfair; he was not in the palace, but must have had ample opportunities of receiving information. But the account given by the historian Mignet appears to me the most remarkable; it is so very short, and yet so comprehensive. Read every thing you can meet with on the subject elsewhere, and then turn to Mignet, and you will find all your main impressions revived by the brief, accurate statement of a few pages: were they written in a dark, sententious manner, they would constitute the best imitation of Tacitus that could be either found or well conceived.

Among our English writers, the account given by the Annual Register is full, and on the whole, reasonable and fair. It is the conclusion of that part of the history of the French Revolution which was furnished by Dr. Lawrence. The reader sees here the conclusion, and he sees it with regret. He has lost the assistance of a diligent inquirer, and the instruction of an elegant and intelligent writer; in general, and on the whole, a faithful guide; and though not sufficiently on the popular side, always friendly to the best interests of mankind.

Dr. Moore published the journal he made during his residence in France, from the beginning of August to the middle of December, 1792. It is worth your reading. Dr. Moore was an agreeable companion; lived as a man of letters in London; had seen much of the world; was shrewd, and very competent to make proper inquiries, and very likely to receive extensive and good information. His account seems confirmed by such subsequent books and memoirs as I have been able to consult. Being naturally of a sarcastic turn, and meaning his publication to sell, he is too much disposed to be pleasant and to amuse, and he makes remarks that do not always harmonize with the dreadful scene before him.

These parts of the books and memoirs which I have recommended will not occupy much time. Each supplies some par-

ticulars not mentioned by the rest; and on a subject like this, no recital can seem too long, and no detail too minute; the main event is so important, the incidents so terrible.

On this day of the 10th of August, the king was driven from his palace and dethroned.

"Hæc finis Priami fatorum."

Through the fiery clouds and rushing storm of a popular insurrection, descended the setting monarchy of France; and, but a century before, Louis XIV. had seen his greatness imaged, by a sun that beamed with meridian splendour,—a splendour that was only to sink, as it was then fondly supposed, with the sinking fabric of the world.

LECTURE XXX.

TENTH OF AUGUST.

THE main events of this dreadful day of the 10th of August are sufficiently ascertained. There is some difference between the accounts of the opposite parties on one point, whether the Swiss or the assailants fired first, but on all the other leading facts they are agreed. They may be differently coloured or explained, but an inquirer will find no difficulty in satisfying himself what they really were. They are a tremendous specimen of the bloody fury of which human nature is capable, and a mortifying part of the history of mankind to have occurred in the metropolis of one of the first kingdoms of the civilized world so late as at the close of the eighteenth century.

It appears, as I have already mentioned, that through most of the month of July a regular committee had been sitting in the correspondence room of the Assembly of the Jacobins, and at Charenton, a small town near Paris, the object of which was to recall the three ministers, and depose the king; and this object was to be accomplished (as the effort on the 20th of June had failed) by a more distinct and decisive insurrection, by an attack on the Tuileries. In that palace the king and royal family remained, as in a last fortress which only waited its fall; and Barbaroux had some time before agreed to send for six hundred of the Marseillois, a desperate band, to be the life and soul of the enterprise. After traversing the kingdom from the 5th of July, they arrived at Charenton on the 30th.

"We flew," says Barbaroux, "to receive them. I cannot describe our mutual congratulations. We gave and received a thousand testimonies of affection: we had a fraternal repast."

Barbaroux, however, and his friends had no sooner retired from their fraternal repast, and held their little cabinet council,

than the representations of those of the conspirators who came from Paris inspired them with a delusion, which is edifying in its way, as all instances of self delusion are; and this was no other, than to appear themselves and their friends in Paris in such force, that the king was to be deposed, and liberty established without a struggle.

The fauxbourgs, it was agreed, were to march and lead on the Marseillois. Santerre had assured them, that they might depend on being met by forty thousand men. They were then to take possession of the principal posts and places in the metropolis, and finally encamp in the gardens of the Tuileries. Thence they were to notify to the Assembly, that the people of Paris encamped in the Tuileries, would not lay down their arms till liberty had been secured by what they called grand measures, and till the departments had approved them. "It was our wish," says Barbaroux, "that this insurrection in the cause of liberty should be majestic, as is Liberty herself; holy, as are the rights which she alone can ensure, and worthy to serve as an example to every people, who, to break the chains of their tyrants, have only to show themselves."

These idle dreams, however, of Barbaroux, and perhaps of his friends, were soon dissipated; for Santerre, instead of meeting them at the time and place appointed, with forty thousand representatives of the national will, appeared with scarcely two hundred; most of them not Parisians, but Fédérés of the 14th of July, from the different departments. Nothing could exceed their astonishment. "But Santerre," says Barbaroux, "was not then known to be a heavy fellow, proud enough, but incapable of the grand. The moment was melancholy. Our hopes," he says, "were deceived; but we followed the Marseillois, who filed off to the town house in the most beautiful order."

Barbaroux then gives an account of the quarrel between these Marseillois and a part of the national guards in the Champ Elysées, and then interrupts an interesting narrative like this, in the most cold-blooded manner, to give descriptions of Marat and Robespierre. The remainder of the chapter is occupied with the insurrection, of which the account is neither very clear, nor fair, nor valuable. The conspirators were disposed of in different places it seems: Bertin, in the National

Assembly; Aubert, at the faubourg St. Antoine; Carrière, with the Marseillois. Barbaroux and Rebecqui appear to have reserved to themselves the office of observing events from some secure point of distance, and superintending the movements of the whole.—The rise, then, the intention, and the names and characters of some of the first and chief movers of this insurrection are clear from this account, however short, of Barbaroux.

We will now turn from these memoirs, and advert to the main general results furnished us from all our other sources.

Barbaroux and the Marseillois were disappointed, in what they represent as their first notion of appearing with Santerre and his Parisians in such force, as to overcome the Assembly and the metropolis, and depose the king, by an intimation of their sovereign will. This could not be done; but force remained as a measure to be resorted to, and to the employment of such an expedient every thing seemed favourable. That an insurrection was intended for the 9th or 10th of August was a matter of perfect notoriety. It was evident, from what was daily passing in the Assembly, that no resistance would be made from that quarter; Pétion (the mayor), as the conspirators knew, was heart and part in the enterprise; the department, unpopular and disorganized by the resignation of all the members of the directory, was without power; the commune and sections, who alone might have been able to restrain the populace and brigands, had joined them in demanding from the Assembly the deposition of the king; of the forty-eight battalions of the national guard, there were not more than three or four well inclined to the king; and the artillery (a most important point) were all, without exception, furious Revolutionists.

This was but a melancholy prospect for the king and royal family, and the other inhabitants of the Tuileries. They saw around them the Swiss guards, some of the national guards, and a body of noblemen and gentlemen, who came in this last extremity, and came (they could suppose no other) to die, with their swords in their hands, the last ensign of honour left them, in defence of their royal master. These were to be his protectors, evidently not sufficient for the office: the Swiss, about nine hundred; the national guard, of doubtful fidelity;

the gentlemen and noblemen not properly armed, and very offensive, as decided Royalists and Aristocrats, to all the national guard, who were at best only Constitutionalists. And this was not all that was to be lamented.

This insurrection, this 10th of August, was a crisis in the king's fate for which the unhappy monarch was in no respect fitted. He feared not death; he wanted not understanding; he was not without the softer, or even many of the respectable virtues of the human character: but he was not endowed with the high and commanding qualities that his situation now, more than ever, required; with the prompt, decisive, resentful energies, that enable a man to maintain his authority against the fierce, unfeeling, unjust assaults of those who invade it. Men of gentle dispositions and mere passive courage, if they voluntarily present themselves in public situations, are to be blamed if they fail; their situation has been their choice. But it was not so with Louis: he was born a king; and his failures, therefore, are a just cause of compassion to the considerate and the good.

As this attack was every hour expected, the king spent a sleepless night; sometimes in his own room, sometimes in the council room, where the ministers were assembled, and constantly receiving fresh intelligence of what was passing out of doors: at other moments he retired with his confessor, turning away from all human hopes and aid, from all human arbiters of his motives and conduct, to that Almighty Being who could now best furnish him with courage and resignation, and of whom, as an equitable judge, he would have no reason to complain. The queen, in the mean time, who was as unconcerned for her own danger as anxious for all that might affect the king's, frequently went to his room, and to her children's, accompanied by M^{e}. Elizabeth, and then returned to the council chamber; while the enthusiasm and fidelity of all who saw her were animated by the presence of mind, the greatness, and the intrepidity she displayed, in the slightest things she said; and not less affected by the countenance of M^{e}. Elizabeth, where visibly were expressed, her sisterly tenderness, her grief, her piety, and all the virtues which belonged to a mind so eminently softened by the feelings of humanity, and strengthened by the sentiments of religion.

But the dawn appeared, the night had worn away, and the palace had not yet been attacked. The tocsins, however, had been sounding since midnight, the dreadful notes of preparation had never ceased, and the assault was not likely to be long deferred. The committee that was charged with the insurrection had, in fact, formed itself on three points: Fournier and others were at the Faubourg St. Marceau; Santerre and Westermann, at the Faubourg St. Antoine; Danton, the chief agitator, Camille Desmoulins, Carra, were at the Cordeliers with the bataillon from Marseilles, where Barbaroux was also, provided with poison, if necessary, and waiting the result of the insurrection.

Some measures, however, had been taken for the defence of the palace: a reinforcement had arrived from the Swiss barracks at Courbevoye; some battalions of the national guard had been collected; the cannoniers, with their artillery, were in the court; and, above all, the commandant, Mandat, was faithful to his trust, and had disposed of his force, which was in numbers at least very respectable, in a regular manner, occupying the proper posts, and making every provision for repelling the invaders. It was thought advisable therefore, early in the morning, that the king should go down into the courts, attended by a few general officers, and by the queen and the royal family, to review the troops, and to animate the soldiers in his defence.

This was a scene in which the king was little formed to shine. There had been no war on the continent during his reign; he had seen no field of battle, had no taste for the military profession, had sacrificed little to the Graces, was awkward in his carriage and manner, and had the air rather of a man of thought than of energy and spirit. He descended therefore among the soldiers with but ill effect; he received, indeed, their acclamations, and addressed them in a few broken sentences, which were sensible, but no more; and on the whole, he went through the part he was recommended to act rather as a duty he had to perform, than as a pleasure he had to enjoy. How do we not wish on this occasion that we could but have given perfection to the character of an amiable man like this, who had fallen on these evil times; that we could

have assimilated him to the hero of Agincourt, as seen in the beautiful description of the poet:—

"Oh! now, who will behold
The royal captain of this ruined band,
Walking from watch to watch, from tent to tent,
Let him cry, Praise and glory on his head;
For forth he goes, and visits all his host,
Bids them good morrow, with a modest smile,
And calls them brothers, friends, and countrymen;
Upon his royal face there is no note
How dread an army hath enrounded him,
Nor doth he dedicate one jot of colour
Unto the weary and all watched night;
But freshly looks, and ever bears attaint,
With cheerful semblance and sweet majesty;
That every wretch, pining and pale before,
Beholding him, plucks comfort from his looks;
A largess universal, like the sun,
His liberal eye doth give to every one,
Thawing cold fear."

Alas! alas! this portrait of a warrior king was little suited to Louis, who came, not in the national uniform, a dress he had once worn, and should now have worn, but in his evening suit, in the ominous colour of violet, the royal mourning. But the queen should have been the hero on this occasion. Her bosom was observed to be labouring with contending passions: her Austrian lip, it seems, and the turn of her features, gave her eagle countenance a majesty which, it is said, could only be seen, not conceived.

"I was in the window," says Me. de Campan, "that overlooks the garden. The king was pale, as if life was no longer left in him. The royal family returned to their apartments. "All is lost!" said the queen to me; "the king has shown no energy. A review like this has done us more harm than good."

I must here digress for a moment to observe, that it is in general a needless office to excite in men the fierce and resentful passions; they need no instructor of this kind. But as

I lose no opportunity of recommending to you the softer virtues, I must not now forget to bear my testimony to the severer and the manly virtues of the human character. Their value, their dignity, their indispensable necessity, is but too evident; it was but too evident on this critical occasion, when the unhappy king stood so much in want of them. "As it must needs be, that offences will come," we must have active courage as well as passive, spirit to contend as well as fortitude to suffer; and the world must not be abandoned to the ruffian and the oppressor; to those (and such there will ever be) who can only be brought to observe the rules of justice and right, by some mere physical force superior to their own.

I must not, however, bear too hard on the unfortunate monarch. I have mentioned to you, in a former lecture, the explanation of his character, as given by one who must have studied him thoroughly, the queen; and I have just offered to you the excuse which he has a right to claim, that his station in life was his misfortune, not his choice; that he was born a king, and would never willingly have obtruded himself into a situation, where the commanding qualities which he possessed not, were required. On the present occasion, however, I have more to say, which it is but justice to say, in mitigation of our censure. Such occurrences took place as were enough to damp and dishearten the boldest minds. It was true that the king was received with "Vive le roi" by the Swiss guards and the national guards more immediately about the palace; but the artillery and the battalion of the croix rouge shouted only "Vive la nation." Two more battalions of the national guard arrived while the king was in the courts, and they, too, cried out, "Vive la nation, vive Pétion." The king was afterwards persuaded to review the reserve, who were posted at the far end of the garden, at the Pont Tournant. It was not without danger that he even reached it. "Down with the veto, down with the traitor," was the cry. Two battalions marched out of the garden through the gate facing the Pont Royal, took their cannon with them, and drew themselves up along the railing, to wait for the assailants and to join them. The same thing was done, and almost at the same moment, in the royal court before the palace by the two other battalions, who in like

manner had but just arrived; they separated, and many of the soldiers fixed themselves in the Carousel, stopping the fresh battalions that were coming to reinforce the guard of the palace. "I saw," says Me. de Campan, "the cannoniers quit their posts, clench their fists, thrust them into the face of the king, and insult him in the grossest terms. M. de Salvert and M. de Briges exerted themselves with vigour, and kept them off." What conclusion was the king to draw from appearances like these,—what but this, that from within and from without he was surrounded by enemies; that all Paris was coming to dethrone him; and that he had no adequate means of resistance? What could be done against troops of insurgents if the artillery deserted him, if it was clear that they would even turn against him? What adequate defence but artillery against the armed populace of a whole metropolis? Above all, there was no longer a master mind to superintend the whole defence, and keep every man to his duty; there was no one now in authority. Mandat, the commandant-general, was no longer to be found; he had been sent for by the common council at the Hotel de Ville, and had not returned.

Every thing was, therefore, in a state of confusion, and was likely to remain so. It would have indeed required a vigorous mind and a military sovereign to have made head against circumstances like these; and they must be duly weighed when we are going to censure the dejected looks of this most unfortunate of kings.

Mandat, the commandant-general, I have just said, had been sent for, and did not return. This I must explain; and the explanation will enable you to understand how dreadful was the nature of the desperate men to whom the king was now opposed.

The conspirators did not think that the council general of the commune of Paris was sufficiently favourable to their designs; Mandat, the commander-in-chief of the national guards, was known to be faithful and loyal: it was resolved, therefore, that the council general and the commandant should be got rid of. In the night, therefore, while the tocsin was sounding, the générale beating, and the citizens of course under arms at the alarm posts, a few of each section,

under the pretext that the present common council had lost the confidence of the people, assembled and elected new members for the council to the number of near two hundred, and these new chosen counsellors went directly to the hall where the old council had assembled, declared themselves the real council, and actually drove out all the other, except Pétion, Manuel, and Danton, and began the exercise of their functions, as if they were the true and only legitimate authority.

This was the first point. The disposal of Mandat was the second. They therefore sent for him from the Tuileries; and when he entered their hall, and was surprised and totally confounded to see a different assembly from what he expected, and people he knew not, they instantly accused him of a design to attack and slaughter the people, ordered him to the Abbaye, and had him murdered at the top of the staircase.

Such were the men the king had to contend with.

But it is now to be observed, that these daring measures of these bloody demagogues had but too decisive an influence on the events of the night. The arrangements of Mandat were set aside; the party of national guards that he had placed on the Pont Neuf, to prevent the communication of the opposite sides of the river, was ordered off. The officer and the guard were withdrawn from the arsenal, and muskets were distributed amongst the people. No one knew the act of usurpation that had been committed, and the orders of the new council were obeyed as of course. When Mandat went from the Tuileries to the Town Hall, as he designed to return immediately, he left no particular directions. Various detachments of national guards, which at his requisition were assembled round the palace and in the different courts, were long in impatient expectation of seeing him. In his absence, they knew not whom to obey or how to act; were more exposed to the influence of the disaffected; and, as in every army and in every enterprise mutual confidence is the soul of it, nothing could be so fatal to the defence of the palace as the distrust, uncertainty, and confusion that now every where prevailed.

The king wanted not sense, and could observe these things.

It can be no matter of surprise that he considered the palace as without any adequate means of defence.

This was between seven and eight in the morning. Even at a much earlier hour, and before the review, Me. de Campan mentions, that the queen came out of her room and told her that "there was no hope for them; that Mandat had gone to the Hotel de Ville to receive fresh orders, had there been assassinated, and that they were then carrying his head about the streets."

Something, however, was done to make resistance, and drive back, if possible, the assailants; and the fault of the king and court was not so much a want of presence of mind *now*, as a want of forethought and decision, which might have induced them to have made proper preparations several days before.

The noblemen and gentlemen, and the officers of the constitutional guard, which the Assembly had disbanded, formed themselves into two companies, under the command of Mareschal de Mailly. To this veteran chiefly, and to three or four other general officers, were intrusted by the king, on the loss of Mandat, the command and direction of the whole defence. Several national grenadiers joined these two companies. The queen addressed them, as did afterwards the king, and with the greatest effect. These noblemen and gentlemen had indeed only their swords in their hands, but they had loyalty in their hearts, and were ready to die. Their spirit pervaded all the national guards at the posts *within* the palace.

But here again occurs a trait, that shows the untoward nature of the circumstances by which the king and the royal family were surrounded. The national guards at the *outside* of the palace could not bear, as I have already intimated, these minions of a court, for so they thought them, men who would not wear the national uniform, these aristocrats, thus assembled for its defence: they desired that they might be dismissed, and sent a message for the purpose. It was brought by one of their commanders. "No," answered the queen, "nothing shall separate us from these gentlemen; they will share the dangers of the national guards. Do you order them," she said to the officer, "do you order them to the

cannon's mouth, and they will show you how they can die for their king."

On these gentlemen, then, on those of the national guards within and without the palace that were yet faithful, and above all, on about nine hundred Swiss guards, who were, and who continued to be to the last, "without fear and without reproach," the defence now depended.

The palace was too large to be easily defended: an extensive front, large open gardens behind, and on one side the long endless gallery, by which it was united to the ancient Louvre. In front of the palace was not, as there is now, a large open area, but there were several courts, the court royal in the middle, and beyond, and separated from them, the Place de Carousel. Behind the chateau were five terraces, running round the great, open, but ornamented space of the gardens; the Terrace of the Feuillants was on that side which was connected with the ancient manège, or riding house of the palace, where the Assembly were then sitting; and on the whole, there were twenty different posts at which it was necessary to place the Swiss: and this was a most perilous dispersion of a force originally so small, and afterwards so diminished, when all the populace of Paris were approaching, with the Marseillois at their head.

The system of defence was extended by the commandant Mandat to some distance beyond the chateau itself; and his meaning in making his dispositions may be now understood, and they were very good, on the two suppositions,—1st, that the national guards and gendarmerie would have done their duty; and, 2ndly, that he had remained to superintend the operations of the whole: but neither of these suppositions were afterwards realized. He was put out of the way by the conspirators early; and the gendarmerie, the cavalry, the national guards, were soon infected, partly through fear, partly by example, with the spirit of the crowd that surrounded them. Mandat's arrangements were broken up by the new commune of the conspirators and destroyed; and it will be easily conceived, that if the defenders of the chateau, who had been pushed forward to the Louvre and into the city, were once passed by and left behind by the assailants, they were, under the existing circumstances of general disaffection, from that moment cut off and lost.

The army of the insurrection, that had been expected all the night, began to march about six in the morning. Every account that was now brought confirmed their approach. There were about fifteen thousand in the body which had formed in the Faubourg St. Antoine; they were armed with pikes and muskets taken from the arsenal, which, by order of the new council, you may remember, had been forced. The body from the Faubourg St. Marcel was much fewer in number, about five thousand, but both were more than doubled by the brigands and by the mobs, that were continually joining them.

This totally immense and indescribable multitude, headed by the Marseillois, advanced nearer and nearer to the palace, and at last, a little before eight, the vanguard had arrived at the Place de Carousel, within the immediate sight of it.

And now there came on another crisis in the fortunes of the king and his unhappy family; the last, and, in the event, the most fatal of all. It was this. The Procureur Syndic of the department, the chief magistrate, M. Rœderer, endeavoured in vain to convince these furious men, who came to storm the palace, that so great a multitude could not have access either to the king or the Assembly, and that they must name twenty deputies to present their petition. They would hardly listen to him. Again: on his calling upon the troops to defend their post conformably to the law, and repel force by force, he was attended to by only a small part of the national guard. The artillery, whom he only exhorted to be orderly, made him no other answer than that of actually unloading their guns before his eyes. Finding, therefore, that no dependence was to be placed on the troops stationed to guard the palace, M. Rœderer, with other officers of the department, obtained immediately a private audience of the king and queen, and declared to them that the danger was imminent and beyond expression; that the greater part of the national guard was corrupted, and would fire upon the palace; that the king, the queen, the children, and every one about them, would certainly be massacred, unless the king instantly decided upon taking refuge in the National Assembly.

What was now, therefore, to be done? This is the crisis

I allude to. "Go to the Assembly?" "Never!", said the queen; "no, never take refuge there!" She had before said, when such a measure had been suggested to her, "I will on no account leave the palace; I would rather be nailed to the walls of it: I will never leave it." "But, madam," expostulated Rœderer, "would you be answerable, then, for the death of the king, your children, and all the faithful servants waiting here to defend you?"

This was a cruel moment for the poor queen. She must have been conscious that the means of defence were insufficient; but to fly to the Assembly, to the very men whom she disdained and abhorred, and who had already, and even during the last few hours, treated with neglect and indifference, the requests that had been made to them for protection and assistance—this was indeed a humiliation to which she found it hard to submit. And what hope of safety even after such a humiliation? Better die at once, since to die was all that remained, and death was at least not disgrace. Such were no doubt the suggestions of her indignant spirit; such would have been no doubt her resolve: nor is it clear that her resolve might not have been the best, as it certainly would have been the most elevated measure to have taken. "Is the king, then, going to the Assembly?" said an old Swiss officer; "he is lost, then, for ever."

What courage might have done; what turn this affair might have taken, if the king had been ready to die at the head of his Swiss guards (the witness and the rival of their virtues and their fame); what a versatile multitude, like the assailants, would have done, when they were repulsed, as they were sure to be, in the first instance, by the regular troops in the palace, and saw the king amid those troops acting the part of a hero, or even visibly at the head of them; how far the disaffected might have been shamed into their duty, and how far the Assembly, who sat close at hand, might have been roused into some decency of conduct, when they heard firing from the palace, and understood that the king was defending himself, and his queen, and children, against ruffians that, from Marseilles and the Faubourg St. Antoine, had come to massacre them; what might have been the transition, the movement, the result, amid an electric people like this, on suppositions like

these, and even at this moment of the insurrection, it is quite impossible to say. But it is not, I think, too much to say, that if this resolve of decided and desperate defence (at first the only proper one) had been, from the first, the resolve; had been so, many days before; and if the king, in a firm and active manner, had made proper intimations and proper preparations for the attack, the attack would have failed; and by this second outrage on the king and his palace, in addition to the day of the 20th, by a regular, determined, bloody insurrection of this kind, the army of La Fayette might have been so excited, that the general might have found no difficulty in marching them to Paris, and realizing all that he had before in vain attempted for the preservation of the monarchy, and the welfare of the state.

But far from any reasonable resolve of this kind having been made in time, and measures taken in consequence (it was always the only chance to have stood a siege till La Fayette's army came up), such an indispensable point as that of the artillery was so neglected, that, as you have seen, the cannoniers were all disaffected; of the national troops that were produced, it could not be told which were loyal and which were not—with the exception of the two battalions of Petits Pères and the Filles St. Thomas, none could be depended upon; and finally, and above all, though nothing could be so clear as this, that the palace should be so provided as to be enabled to stand a sort of siege, the Swiss soldiers had only fifteen rounds a man—it is never stated that they received above thirty when they left their barracks—and the palace was, at last, lost not a little from the mere want of ammunition.

But at this dreadful moment, while the king was impressed with all he had observed and suffered during his review and his return through the garden, while the Procureur Syndic, was urging him to retire, and while the vanguard of the assailants were now arrived before the palace, the natural course for him to take was to escape from the present uneasiness, at all events to avoid the immediate shedding of blood, to take the chances of the future, whatever they might be, and to retire, as he was entreated to do, to the National. Assembly. This was at all events to avoid the shedding of blood, the blood of his gallant defenders and of his people.

"Be it so, then," said the queen; "it is the last sacrifice." "There is nothing more to be done here," said the king, as he was leaving the palace; and a party of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred of the Swiss guards, and another of the national guard, with the greatest difficulty, and amid the insults, menaces, imprecations, and opposition of the thronging and armed populace, conducted him and the royal family along the terraces to the neighbouring hall, where the Assembly was sitting.

Here we must leave this unfortunate family. The mortifications and sufferings of every kind, mental and physical, which they had to endure while they were detained in the logographe, a sort of small room at the back of the Assembly, where they were for the time disposed of, you will see detailed in the Memoirs, and I cannot now advert to them. We must return to the palace.

The first part, as it may be called, of this afflicting history of the 10th of August we have now passed through; we must next, therefore, turn to the second,—what passed after the king had left the palace.

When it was resolved that the king should take refuge in the Assembly, I have mentioned, as you may remember, that he said, "There is nothing more to be done here; let us go." And thus occurred, at this moment, when he was parting from his palace, the most unhappy inadvertence, the greatest misfortune, perhaps, and calamity of his whole unfortunate life.

With some words, of the general nature we have mentioned, he left the palace, meaning, no doubt, that every one should follow his example and leave it too; conceiving that nothing more in the way of command was necessary, no intimation of his will more distinct, no further positive orders. Amid the anxiety, affliction, and confusion of the moment, this important point was probably not at all considered. No proper proclamation was made. It was not even known, either to the assailants or the Swiss in the courts, that the king was gone to the Assembly; and the best excuse for the king is, that the point seems not to have occurred to any of his friends, or the military men around him, who certainly, if it had, would have procured from the king, what he would so readily have

granted, a positive order for the evacuation of the Tuileries; that no resistance was on any account to be made, every one to retire, and the Swiss and national guards to march off instantly to their barracks. Coupled with orders like these, the measure taken, of retiring to the Assembly, was, perhaps, under the cruel circumstances of the case, and at the existing moment, the least objectionable that could have been adopted. He might retire as the king, not without dignity, from a rude and lawless combat, if the combat was thus to be prevented; but unless orders of the kind just mentioned were first distinctly given, unless the immediate chance of bloodshed was provided against (for this was the great recommendation of the measure), the measure became, on the contrary, the worst possible.

"I came here," said the king to the Assembly, "to prevent the commission of a great crime." This was very true, and the best explanation that could be given of his appearance in the Assembly at all. It was reasonable enough to suppose, that he and his family would have been massacred in his palace if he had stayed there.

But, alas! it was soon perceived, that others might be massacred in the palace as well as the king; and that those who were left behind were not in a state of security, whatever the royal family might be. Dreadful firing was heard, small arms and artillery; the hall was shook, and consternation spread through the Assembly. "I gave orders for the Swiss not to fire," said the king. He had supposed so, no doubt; but the point, it was now apparent, had not been sufficiently attended to, and the confusion and misery of the royal sufferers were now more agonizing than ever.

This situation long continued. The difficulty, the impossibility, was, how to convey any order to the palace while the continued fire of the besiegers and the besieged prevented any one from approaching it.

At last one of those gallant spirits, which human nature sometimes supplies on such occasions, M. D'Hervilly, offered to carry any order which the king might wish to send. The king and queen were unwilling thus to expose the life of one of their most valuable and faithful servants; they seized his arm to prevent his moving, as did the Princess Elizabeth.

Distinguishing marks of regard like these only animated him the more. "It is my duty," said the soldier; "my post is amid arms and firing; it is not for me to fear these things." He received the order, and hasted to the scene of action.

Here we must awhile leave him. He lost not his life, his escapes were wonderful; but he came too late, the Swiss had been *too* long and *too* fatally engaged.

You will see in the histories the melancholy detail of these transactions. We will allude to them a little hereafter. For the present, you will easily understand, that almost immediately after the king had left the palace, the assailants had so approached it, that they got into contact with the defenders of it, more particularly the Swiss, who would neither give up their arms nor resign their post, not having been regularly ordered, as they believed, by their king to do either the one or the other; and that a very unequal but very bloody conflict ensued, ending, though not immediately, yet at last ending, as you will readily conceive, in the destruction and massacre of the greatest part of them, overpowered as they were by numbers, and their ammunition failing: all this you will readily imagine. We will advert a little more to the detail hereafter.

But I must hasten first to observe, that of all the personages concerned in this most melancholy drama of the 10th of August, it is these unfortunate Swiss guards that most entirely interest our sympathy, and engage our respect. Whoever were right, or whoever were wrong, *they*, at least, are without blame, and only to be admired. Their noble history can soon be told. They were soldiers to whom a post was intrusted, and they died in defence of it. Who or what were their assailants? what their numbers, or what their force? what the chances in their own favour, or what was to be their reward? These were questions not to be thought of: *there* they were, they were to do their duty, and if necessary they were to die; and they did die.

Men like these we would follow, if we could, through every change of their unhappy fortunes in the whole course of this disastrous day. There is not an individual among them that is not elevated into a hero, and that fills not, in our imagination, the space of the most perfect of heroes. Men have died

in battle in defence of their country, Spartans have fallen at Thermopylæ, these are great passages in the history of our kind; but here we have men dying, not for their wives and their children, their firesides and their altars, but for their characters as soldiers and as men, their principle of honour and duty only; a calm and deliberate valour, indifferent to the approach of an overpowering destruction, and faithful to its promise and its pledge. We have here the triumph of every thing that is elevated over all that is lowly, or recreant, or base, in our imperfect nature.

It is soothing to find, that every testimony was paid by their fellow-citizens to the memory of men who were an honour to their country, and worthy to be held up as models to future ages.

At the high diet of the Swiss Cantons, it was decreed, "to hand down to posterity by inscribing in the federal archives the names of those who fell in the field of battle; of those who for their fidelity were afterwards massacred; of those lastly, their brothers in arms, who survived; and to decorate all of the regiment who still lived, and who were present at the attack of the Tuileries on the 10th of August, 1792, with an iron medal, with the inscription, 'Fidelity and honour.'"

At Lucerne is to be seen the affecting monument that has been erected to their memory: on the chapel near it are the words, "Invictis pax;" and again, the line—

"Per vitam fortes, sub iniquâ morte fideles."
"Unconquered living, dying faithful found."

Such is the inscription which the traveller may see, and it is sufficient; he must meditate the rest. Admiration at human virtue, melancholy at the fate of it, these are the tributes he will offer; and a sigh, perhaps, for the wild conflicts of mankind, where not the base and the guilty are alone to perish, but the innocent also, the high-minded, and the brave.

We will now allude to a few of the particulars of this memorable insurrection. It is not very easy to find a very distinct account of what passed in the attack and defence of the Tuileries. We have narratives from the Swiss officers, but soldiers always tell their story in a very imperfect manner, and eyewitnesses cannot be in every place, or give a very

connected or intelligible account; we can, however, easily comprehend the main events of this unhappy combat. The Swiss were materially weakened by the loss of the detachment (one hundred and fifty or two hundred strong) that escorted the king to the Assembly, were at last without ammunition, and were overpowered by numbers; having first shown, by repulsing their assailants in their first attack, and driving them from the courts before the palace, that if they had not been so unfortunately circumstanced, they would have mantained their post against the second attack, and every succeeding one. This is the general description of this unequal combat. More minute particulars are of the following nature.

The assailants having made their preparations, and their ammunition being arrived, got through the gates of the royal court, and advanced to the palace. Some efforts were made by them, according to their own account, to fraternize with the Swiss, and friendly answers and signs were returned from the palace; but it was soon clear, however these things might be, that the Swiss were to lay down their arms, and surrender their post; and it is but an idle discussion who fired first, if the assailants came to get possession of the palace, and on such terms. It appears, however, that there were Swiss sentinels at the vestibule, and on the great staircase, and Swiss in the windows, and that a scuffle having ensued below, which was sure to be the case if the assailants pressed forward in the way they are admitted to have done, and a pistol having been fired at the chateau from one of the leaders of the Marseillois, then in the court below, the Swiss gave fire from the staircase and the windows, and with such effect, that they descended into the courts, and by the regularity of their movements and their discipline, soon cleared the areas of all their opponents, and the victory was at the moment entirely on their side, and was complete; and so it might have remained if they could have served the artillery, which they seized upon, and had also been in sufficient force to present a front not only in the courts before the palace, but on the terraces in the gardens behind. This, however, with their numbers, and the disaffection of so many of the national guards, of nearly all but the two faithful battalions we have

mentioned, was physically impossible. According to the last arrangements after the king's retiring, seven hundred and fifty Swiss had actually twenty different posts to maintain; and when, therefore, the assailants at length returned, aware no doubt of these circumstances, and furnished with pieces of artillery, the combat became so unequal, that the unfortunate Swiss, their ammunition expended, had only to cry for quarter, and to be massacred, wherever they could be found, by the thronging crowds of their exasperated enemies.

In was in the midst, or at the commencement of this second attack on the palace, that M. D'Hervilly reached the combatants. You will see, in Bertrand de Moleville, his extraordinary adventures before and after he joined the Swiss; but instead of giving the king's order not to fire (it was a vain order now), he set himself to make good the defence by every effort in his power; and having, in pursuance of this plan, posted what Swiss could be found in the most advantageous manner, he proceeded to the interior of the palace, and ascended the great staircase. He was met by a Swiss soldier, who told him that an immense armed populace had penetrated into the palace by the gallery of the Louvre, and were massacring every one they met in their way. The Swiss were evidently too few to continue the defence in front on the side of the Carousel, and to repel the numbers that had rushed in on the side of the Louvre; M. D'Hervilly, therefore, produced the king's order, and ordered these brave but unfortunate men to follow him to the National Assembly, where their royal master was. This is the account given by Bertrand de Moleville.

The Swiss officers in their narratives mention M. D'Hervilly, but not exactly in this manner, and not as taking the command, but they speak of him as coming with an order from the king, before or about the commencement of the second attack. M. Durler, the gallant officer who was defending the front of the chateau, speaks of his followers as being mowed down on the second attack by artillery, that had been brought up by the Marseillois, and that now commanded the courts. It is clear that the assailants multiplied about the Swiss on all sides, from the gardens of the Tuileries in the rear, as well as the courts in front; and as their ammunition

failed, even with those who survived, the defence must on these accounts, and about the period Bertrand de Moleville speaks of, be considered as having ceased.

We have now then to advert, as well as we can, to the fate and fortunes of all the devoted actors that yet remained of this afflicting drama.

M. Durler seeing the defence hopeless, and receiving from M. D'Hervilly the king's order to cease firing, submitted to retreat with his followers to seek the presence of his royal master, and if such was his pleasure, to resign his arms. All the Swiss were, therefore, every where collected, as well as circumstances allowed, and a retreat was attempted. The soldiers, about a dozen officers, and M. D'Hervilly were the party; but unfortunately their only way was by the garden of the Tuileries, and there they had no sooner appeared, than they were exposed to the fire of the cannon that were planted in it, and of the disaffected troops that were ranged on the different terraces. On leaving the palace their numbers amounted to a hundred, but only sixty reached the Assembly. Arrived at the corridor of the Assembly, the advice, the remonstrances of the deputies were all in vain, and lost upon M. Durler; but having been brought to the king, " Sire," said the officer, " I am desired to give up my arms; but though there are few of us left, this cannot be done without your orders." " Lay them down, then," replied the king; " I cannot choose that brave men like you should all perish."

These gallant men were now soothed and rewarded by every inquiry and attention paid them by the queen, the Princess Elizabeth, and all the unhappy group of nobles and gentlemen around them; who, fallen as they might now be, their royal master at their head, were still, and not the tumultuous Assembly (their oppressors around them), were still *alone* the objects of all the affection and respect of M. Durler and his brother soldiers, their magnanimous defenders. They retired, and a note was sent to M. Durler by the king, written to him, as he says, by the king's own hand, and in consequence he persuaded his followers to ground their arms; with some difficulty, for these heroes told him, that though their ammunition was gone, they could still defend themselves with their bayonets.

The division we have now alluded to consisted of the Swiss who had been engaged in or about the courts. Those who were at their posts within the palace, or who could not be collected by M. Durler at the moment of his retiring, seem to have retreated to the great staircase, and to have gathered about the vestibule; they were in number about eighty: they defended themselves for more than a quarter of an hour, and after selling their lives most dearly, after destroying at least four hundred of their opponents, fell every man on the spot.

The assailants (who were now no longer opposed) rushed forwards into all the apartments of the palace, seeking for and butchering all the Swiss they could find, cutting them down or throwing them alive out of the windows. Seventeen who had taken refuge in the vestry, were seized and immediately massacred. A party of about one hundred attempted to escape by the Court de Marsan; they were soon in the midst of an immense and furious crowd, who called aloud, "Down arms." Thinking to appease the people by submission, they surrendered without further resistance. Eighty of them were, however, massacred in the Rue de St. Echelle; the rest had the good fortune to escape by running into shops, hiding in cellars and under staircases, remaining some of them several days without nourishment, and furnished by humane people with clothes (for the red uniform wherever it appeared was fatal) to enable them to get away unknown. Another detachment of eighty, under the command of four of their officers, were endeavouring to return to their barracks at Courbevoye, but they were surrounded in the Champs Elysées by the base gendarmerie, the recreant cavalry who had deserted them, and there seized upon by the people, who soon came up to conduct them to the Hotel de Ville, promising to save their lives; but the moment they came to the Place de Grêve they were torn in pieces by the populace.

We hear not much in the narratives that are given us of the noblemen and others of the old court, who had repaired to the palace for the defence of their king. They had no fire-arms, only small swords, and had rather the air of coming to die with their master than to defend him; they could not well find an opportunity of contributing to the common defence. If the king had stayed, they might have formed a

rampart around him and the royal family; but when he went, they must have thought their office at an end. It was with difficulty they could be prevented from accompanying the king, only by the representations of M. Rœderer, that they might thus occasion the destruction of the royal family, and the failure of the whole attempt to reach the Assembly. The king, the queen, the dauphin, had all to interfere. The queen dropped some words, as if she would return. They seem to have expected this, to have stayed waiting in the apartments, to have been very uncertain what to do, and at last, probably when they saw that all was lost, some of them, to have made an attempt to escape through the Louvre side of the palace; but it was an unsuccessful one: the remainder, and indeed the greater part, seem to have determined on going, at all events, to the king. "When they left the palace," says Bertrand de Moleville, "they were three hundred; but very few escaped, for the garden and terraces through which they had to pass were in possession of their enemies." Among these noblemen and gentleman was the Duc de Choiseul, the gallant man who is so deserving of admiration for his address and courage while the king was detained at Varennes.

"The Swiss and the gentlemen," says Bertrand de Moleville, "rallied by the Duc de Choiseul, were received at the bottom of the steps leading to the Feuillans with so brisk a discharge of small arms, that they found it impossible to get up to the terrace. The Duc de Choiseul, thinking they were following him, opened a way for himself, sword in hand, to the door of the hall. He was dismayed, as well as surprised, when he turned round and found himself there alone; but he went forward, and was thus preserved."

Such are the appalling scenes of this dreadful day.

In the Memoirs to which I have referred, you will find many details of a more individual nature. No tongue could then, no pen can now, adequately describe them—

"Crudelis ubique
Luctús, ubique pavor, et plurima mortis imago."

I had drawn up some accounts of this kind from the narratives of the Swiss officers on the table, from Me. de Campan, and from such sources as I have pointed out; but I must

omit them, my lecture would be too long. Before, however, I conclude, I will make one observation.

All war is dreadful, even regular and honourable war; the result, a field of battle, whatever may have been the noble qualities exhibited by the combatants, is still a scene of horror. But what are we to say of political convulsions like these, and of the enormities that attend them; not occurring at Rome under a Nero, or under the government of Turkey, where neither human wisdom nor human nature knows what course to pursue, or has any regular principle left to stand upon? I am not going to speak of such cases of despair, but speaking of European governments and of civilized men. What are we to say of convulsions like these, in the midst of such governments and such men? What are we to say of insurrections, regularly planned and brought forward as proper expedients to procure their particular ends, by men engaged in political warfare. They are no proper judges who have not been unfortunate enough to witness them.

We may be little affected while we read of them in histories and memoirs; the mind is at ease, the scene at a distance: it is repulsive, and we turn away. To estimate them properly, we should have seen with our own eyes, and heard with our own ears; we should have seen the uplifted weapon of the ruffian, and heard the terrified shriek of his victim; we should have seen men running in troops after some breathless, helpless fugitive, who totters and sinks on his knees before them, receives a thousand wounds at once, and on whom they fall, dispatching and tearing him to pieces, like savage animals worrying and devouring their prey; we should see men breaking open the doors of houses, rushing up stairs, ransacking every hiding place, and we should see a crowd, with fury in their looks, their hands and garments covered with blood, waiting with impatience in the street, and we should ourselves wait, with whatever different feelings, till we hear the cries of those whom they, who have gone into the house, are now in the act of murdering; we should wait till we see them thrown through the windows, to be stabbed and mutilated, and their fragments to be left scattered on the pavement, or carried away upon pikes, in a sort of procession, amid unhallowed shouts of revelry and triumph. These are the scenes we should

witness; the streets, the public places, stained with blood, and dead bodies, with all their ghastly appearances, under our feet as we walk along, and meeting our eyes wherever we turn them. When such horrors have been really witnessed, we shall then, and not before, for no imagination can conceive them, we shall then only be fit to judge of scenes like these; what the meaning of that which is called an insurrection of the people really is; what it is to expose our fellow creatures to be thus frightfully transformed into beings no longer human; and we shall then be competent to estimate, and it is on this account that I make the observation, what it is, to carry political measures by calling in the mere physical strength of the people; what it is, to exasperate them into fury, and urge them on to vengeance, whether by practising on their base or appealing to their nobler feelings; what it is, to leave them to consider themselves as without law and above it; to suppose that they have a right to make an insurrection when they think good, while in the mean time, it is clear from all experience, that there is nothing in savage cruelty like men exposed to the delirium of civil or religious hate; and then, above all, we shall be fitted to judge what is the real nature of the counsels of those who are so ready on all occasions to urge every thing on to violence, precipitation, and force; who turn away from all proposals of conciliation and forbearance; who despise all sentiments of caution; who are impetuous, irritable, and daring; who will make no sacrifices to the opinions or interests of others; and who do not scruple about their means, if they think their end good. I speak not of men whose proper element is tumult, who seem able, in some unnatural manner, to behold the shedding of blood without emotion. I speak not of Danton or others; they are fiends in human shape, and we need say no more of them. I speak of men like Barbaroux, and even Vergniaud, and the other Girondists, men of very enlightened and very powerful minds, and I would say of such men (and they are continually appearing in every country, whenever their voice can be heard), that scenes like these are to be their warning and admonition, and that they are not to suppose, that all means are lawful to procure an end because that end is lawful. Making the best of their case, and as far as they are actuated by moral considerations, it is the custom for men like these to conceive any

thing justifiable which may, according to their notions, ultimately produce the general good; they resolve every thing (as do the French popular historians) into a calculation of utility, and full of their principle, and inattentive to its proper interpretation, they weigh, in a sort of sacrilegious balance, present crime against future happiness; they dye the hands of a populace in blood, that their country hereafter may have a better system of rule; they unchain the savage passions of mankind; they destroy their moral feelings, to take the chance of *future* law and order; and they regularly sit and calmly plan and organize a bloody insurrection, of which no one can tell the result, as an allowable means of clearing away the government they see before them. Of such proceedings no one, as I have just said, can tell the result; but be the result what it may, this is not the way in which mankind can be served, this is not to understand the doctrine of utility, and it is to caricature, not exemplify it. Society can never be safe, countries can never be reformed, the cause of improvement can never be patronised, or even tolerated, by people of influence or good sense, if men in pursuit of their political ends, and under the influence of their supposed patriotism, are not to hesitate about their means; if they are to allow themselves, while they refer every thing to utility, to sink the consideration of all present crimes and horrors for the sake of future good: a future good, of which they, in their own inflamed and enthusiastic state of mind, are to constitute themselves the judges, and which, at all events, they have no right whatever, in this manner at least, to attempt to procure.

As in private dissensions there are points at which every sane mind stops; as we do not poison our opponents or assassinate them in the dark, whatever may have been their conduct, and however they may be the objects of our just indignation; so in public concerns—the reformation of the state, the resistance to a bad government, the management of a revolution (if any charge so awful should be at all within our competence), on all such occasions, there are points, there are landmarks and boundaries, at which we must necessarily stop. Crimes we must not commit; horrors and atrocities are not to be our expedients; these are to be banished at once as pollutions, to which we are not to familiarize our thoughts for a moment. Our country, if she is to be served at all, must be

served in some other manner, for she never can be served in this,—this is not the worship to be offered at the shrine of Liberty. "O Liberty!" said M^e^. Roland, as she looked at the statue of Liberty, just at the moment she was to be herself executed, "O Liberty! how many crimes have been perpetrated in thy name!" It will be ever thus. She had herself heard of insurrections without reprobating them. The enlightened men, who with real aspirations after their country's welfare, the first patriots, who first allow crimes to be perpetrated, forget that they are thus setting examples which are sure to be followed by men at every turn, even more and more lawless and inhuman; they forget that crimes produce crimes, with accelerated fury and enhanced guilt; that the man who in private life becomes even a murderer, or in public life, like Robespierre, even a monster and a destroyer of his species, only becomes so, because he proceeds from step to step, because he has not originally stopped in time, because he has not had, from the first, landmarks in his mind of right and wrong, of guilt and innocence, which his mind is on no account ever to be suffered to pass.

It is idle to speak of the good intentions of men; that they endeavoured, at least, well; that their feelings were benevolent; that they were disinterested and pure; that they had hoped better of mankind. Excuses of this kind come too late. Crimes have been committed, horrors and atrocities have been witnessed; their Revolution fails; a country has been stained for ever in the annals of mankind; the sacred cause of liberty has been made an object of suspicion and terror to the wise and good, and that for ever. These are the events, these the results; and they are the guilty men, they, first and principally, who have tampered with their own moral feelings, who have not recoiled with instinctive abhorrence from the first approach and view of crimes and bloodshed, and who have adopted counsels which could only lead to scenes like these; scenes which it has been our melancholy office to shadow out thus indistinctly to your reflection; scenes which soon exhaust the sensibility of those who attempt to follow them; degradations to our common nature, sufferings, agonies, abominations, which the mind must not be permitted to conceive nor the tongue to tell.

NOTE.

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"Such are the appalling scenes of this dreadful day."

Of these scenes you will, perhaps, derive a better notion from a few particulars mentioned at the end of one of the narratives of the Swiss officers in my possession, than from any general description that can be given you.

"When the Swiss who were engaged in the court," says M. de Forestier, "were entirely destroyed by overpowering numbers, those who were in the chateau endeavoured to escape by the garden and the Champs Elysées. My brother had fifty under his command at the Queen's Gate. Unable any longer to maintain his post, he sallied out, his faithful comrades first, and about three hundred gentlemen after him; but a cross fire from the two terraces very soon killed about twenty. My brother ordered the rest to make for the great trees, near the basin, on the right. They found M. de Gross, a Swiss officer, with his thigh broken; they carried him some distance, and left him reared against one of the marble statues. M. de Vivemeuil was wounded in the knee; Monlarbi carried him twenty paces on his shoulders.

"But my brother, with his followers, had scarcely reached the great trees, when he found that they were fired upon by people concealed behind them. As they dropped fast, he saw their only chance was to gain if possible the terrace close to the National Assembly. The passage was still guarded by the Swiss that had escorted the king; but these Swiss, seeing a crowd of three hundred people coming upon them, and unfortunately in the confusion not observing the few Swiss uniforms, fired at the whole body with the most dreadful effect, one hundred being killed upon the spot. Some of the party again repaired to the trees, but in the greatest disorder. My brother, with all he could rally round him, made for the gate of the Orangerie, but had scarce cleared it, with about one hundred gentlemen at the most, when they saw a party of five hundred, with two pieces of cannon, drawn up by the statue of Louis XV., and groups of people in the four courts of the place. The two cannons were loaded with grape shot,

and made a dreadful carnage. Those who were left fled behind the walls and into the fosse of the Pont Tournant. My brother, who had not as yet received the slightest wound, called aloud to his soldiers, who knew not where to go, 'Those who love me, follow me;' but the carnage was terrible, and almost all fell. Twelve of the Swiss were made prisoners; unable to contend any longer, they surrendered their arms, and were massacred upon the spot. My brother, fighting on with his sword broken, and perceiving that the cry was to make him prisoner, that he might suffer as an officer some frightful death, took a pistol from his pocket and shot himself.

"The tragical end of my brother," says M. de Forestier, addressing his correspondent at the conclusion of his narrative, "cannot be of use to you as a piece of history; it is mentioned to you only as to a friend. He had the honour of being known to you. You will give a sigh to his memory, and judge how far he is worthy of the tears which every day we shed at the remembrance of him."

Such were the events of this dreadful day.

Again. M. O'Brian, lieutenant of the king's guard, is mentioned by M. Forestier as seeing no way of escape, while in the appartments of the chateau, but that of mixing with a small party of the Marseillois, and taking their direction, whatever it might be. They passed over one of the terraces to the Place Louis XV., and then went up the street of the Champs Elysées; there they saw a couple of Swiss grenadiers with their backs to the wall, and the Marseillois instantly sprung upon them, crying to them to ground their arms. This was done; and one of these brutal men, who was by the side of M. O'Brian, instantly levelled at one of the Swiss grenadiers, and shot him through the heart. O'Brian, no longer master of himself, snatched out his couteau and ran the assassin through the body. Both fell, and at the same moment. O'Brian instantly ran, the Marseillois pursued. The fugitive, amid the cross-streets, just escaped.

Such were again the events.

Again. "M. de Reding, a Swiss captain," he says, "had his arm broken in the court, received also three sabre cuts on the head, and was left for dead on the field of battle. Some woman, who knew him, searched for him long, found him at last, and had him carried to the street opposite the Hotel de Malthe. He gave signs of life; she had his wounds dressed and his arm set.

"The surgeon the next morning denounced him. The national guard immediately came, and carried him off to the Abbaye prison in some rough manner, and re-breaking his arm in the way; but the same faithful female soon made her appearance disguised as a nurse, and contrived to get admission and to be received as his attendant. She transmitted me, eight days afterwards, a letter from this poor captain, written with his left hand, begging for some intelligence of his comrades; saying he was so ill that he could digest nothing, yet that he was insulted, while endeavouring to eat, by the national guard, who told him that he well deserved all he was suffering. On the 2nd of September he was brought out, laid on a blanket, by four monsters, and massacred at the gate of tke prison."

These are accounts, each differing in its kind, that will but too forcibly picture to you what must have been the various horrors of this dreadful day. There must have been many scenes like these that are thus particularized.

The fate of those who were in the interior of the palace may, in like manner, be best conceived from a few of the particulars mentioned by Me. de Campan.

"The doors," she says, "were burst open by the cannon, or cut down by hatchets; the people precipitated themselves over every part of the palace; almost all the Swiss were massacred. The nobles, who were flying through the gallery leading to the Louvre, were cut down or shot; their bodies thrown through the windows. M. Pallas and M. de Marchais were killed before the door of the council chamber. Many others of the king's servants fell, the victims of their attachment to their master, but I mention these two, because with a praiseworthy though useless valour, 'We will live no longer,' they cried, drawing their swords; 'here is our post, and here, then, we die.' M. Diet in like manner: and his fate the same. Madame, the Princess of Tarente, had fortunately thrown open the door of her apartments, otherwise the horrible band, seeing so many ladies together in the queen's saloon, would have concluded that the queen was among us, and, on the slightest resistance, we should have been all massacred: so we should have been notwithstanding, if, just at the moment, a man, with a long beard, had not come crying aloud, on the part of Pétion, 'Spare the women; dishonour not the nation.' A particular circumstance placed me in greater danger than the rest. Just before they came, I had thought my sister not among us, and had run to an upper room to beg her to come

down, where she would be more safe. I found her not, only two of the women and one of the men servants of the queen, a man very tall, and of a very martial appearance; he was pale, and sitting on the bed. 'Save yourself!' I cried; 'all the valets, all our people, are safe.' 'I can do nothing of the kind,' replied the man; 'I am dead with fear.' Just as he spoke, the ruffians rushed up the staircase, fell upon him, and I saw him massacred. They then left him to seize me. The other women threw themselves at their feet, and laid hold of their sabres; the want of room on the staircase impeded the assassins, but I had already felt the terrible hand of one of them fastened upon me, when a voice was heard from the bottom of the staircase, 'What are you doing above there?' 'Hum!' cried the horrible Marseillois, who was just going to put me to death; a sound I shall never forget. 'No killing,' said the other voice, 'no killing of women.' I was on my knees, and my murderer loosed his hold. 'Get up,' he cried, 'the nation pardons you.' The grossness of the terms he at the same time used, prevented me not from experiencing that inexpressible feeling, which belonged almost as much to the mere love of life, as to the idea that I was again to see my child, and all that was dear to me.

"Five or six of these men then took the direction of me and the women: they made us cry, 'Vive la nation!' I passed over many of the dead bodies; I recognised that of the old Viscount de Broves, to whom, as to another of their victims, I had carried at the beginning of the night a message from the queen, ordering them to retire home. These orders, they told me, must for this first time be disobeyed; but that the goodness of her majesty should never be forgotten. As we went along from the palace to my sister's house, we saw many of the Swiss killed as they were endeavouring to escape; the musket shots crossed us on every side. We passed by the gallery of the Louvre. They were firing into it from the parapet of the walls, through the windows, at the Chevaliers du Poignard; such was the appellation they gave to the faithful men who had united themselves at the Tuileries to defend the king. In one of the streets was a group of cannibals carrying the head of poor Mandat on their pikes. Near the bridge I saw my sister going up the steps, surrounded by the national guard, who were taking her to prison; I called to her, and she turned round. 'Do you want her to go with you?' said my conductors. 'Oh, surely!' I cried. They called to the national guard, and my sister was suffered to

join me. As I passed the Carousel, I saw my own house in flames: but my own calamities were not now to be thought of; I thought of nothing but the situation of the queen. At my sister's house we found all the family lost in despair, for they had never supposed they should see us again; but here I could not venture to remain; the mob got to the door, said that one of the confidants of the queen was in the house, and that they would have her head."

Such is the account of M^{e}. de Campan. She had to disguise herself, fly to a friend's house, and escaped with difficulty.

It is understood, that on this fatal day six and twenty Swiss officers and seven hundred and sixty soldiers were killed; only sixteen officers and three hundred and fifty soldiers escaped, including even those who in the first instance were moved away from the contest, and escorted the king to the Assembly; about five hundred of the Marseillois, and about three thousand of the people. On the whole, of different descriptions, about four thousand six hundred human beings perished on this memorable occasion, in this insurrection of the 10th of August.

LECTURE XXXI.

MASSACRES OF SEPTEMBER.

SUCH observations as we made at the close of the last lecture, on the subject of the 10th of August, and its moral and political consequences, were but too dreadfully illustrated by the scenes that followed. Barbaroux had not called up the Marseillois in vain; the Girondists succeeded in their object of dethroning the king. You will see what passed in the Legislative Assembly: Vergniaud brought in his decree: a National Convention was to be called, and the king provisionally suspended, and in the mean time he and the royal family were lodged prisoners in the Temple. Whatever, therefore, were their objects, the Girondists could meet with no further resistance from the power of the court; and they had only to recall their three proscribed ministers, Roland, Servan, and Clavière, and defend their country, and reform its constitution, in the manner they thought best.

But the victory thus obtained over the royal power had been purchased too dearly: it had been obtained by mixing themselves with the Jacobins; by assimilating themselves to these furious men in their opinions, and their practice; by making speeches, by adopting and proposing motions favourable to their views; by preparing the way for counsels of violence and blood; by indifference to principle; by forgetting the nature of their means, while ardent for the accomplishment of their ends; and this was to purchase their victory too dearly. It must ever be so. This species of conduct had been unhappily too much the fault of the patriots from the first; and the Girondists, like their predecessors, were destined afterwards to witness, and themselves to feel, the effects of all their desertions of duty, their flattery of the populace, and their lawless measures of the 20th of June and 10th of August.

For you will now see in the histories, first what miserable scenes were witnessed with regard to the unfortunate Swiss, who had survived the attack on the Tuileries; and you will next see the Legislative Assembly itself, totally overshadowed and set aside by the new commune, which you may remember, in the course of the night of the 10th, usurped the powers of the existing commune, sent for Mandat from the palace, and murdered him on the staircase. And in the course of the history of a few weeks more, you will have to hear of atrocities, such as no age and country had ever before exhibited: men regularly massacred to the amount of many hundreds, day after day, for four days together; the city of Paris looking on, and the Assembly not succeeding in any efforts they were able or willing to make, to put a stop to such scenes of guilt and horror.

These are very dreadful illustrations of such observations, as we have made, of the manner in which men may be hurried on, from one crime to another, the loss of all moral sensibility that soon takes place in the mind, that has once submitted to a guilty impulse, and the extreme caution with which the principle of the public good is to be appealed to, more particularly in seasons of a revolutionary nature; the principle itself being indisputable, the principle of benevolence, and a moral principle, but one, the nature and application of which it is of the utmost moment properly to understand, and very easy to mistake.

The Girondists and others, though ready to accomplish their measure, the dethronement of the king, by the insurrection of the 10th of August, or by any violation of law and order that might be necessary, were desirous to have law and order restored, when they had effected their purpose; and therefore it was among the first objects of the Legislative Assembly, to get rid of the new commune, which, in the night of the 10th of August, had erected itself in so illegal a manner. To this, however, the commune itself was not disposed to agree; and the first great subject to which your attention should be directed, is the struggle between the commune and the Assembly.

The Assembly attempted, as you will see, to create a fresh commune, and in a regular manner. But no; the existing

commune maintained its usurpation, and came forward with an address to the Assembly, full of that sentiment which we have noticed, as so liable to be abused and misapplied. You will see all through the address, that the plea of the public good was thought a sufficient solution of every difficulty. Identifying themselves with the people, taking that question, as usual, for granted, the commune in their address to the Assembly observed: "The people, obliged to watch over its own safety, has provided for it by its delegates: obliged to have recourse to the most vigorous measures to save the state, it is necessary that those, whom it has chosen for its magistrates, should have that plenitude of power which befits the sovereign. When the people have saved the country, when you have decreed a National Convention, what have you to do but to attend to their wishes? 'Are you afraid of reposing on the wisdom of the people, who watch over the safety of the country, a safety which cannot be accomplished without them?"

This was the language; and the address ended by desiring that no new commune should be attempted. The Assembly gave way. Its leading statesmen and orators had promoted, directly or indirectly, the insurrection of the 10th of August; and the commune, so instrumental in its success, could not now be put down. But to what a state of degradation was the Legislative Assembly of a great kingdom thus reduced—to be rivalled, or rather themselves to be put down, by a set of nightly ruffians, who assume the municipal authority, and begin their proceedings by sending for the existing commandant, and shooting him as he leaves their room, that they may appoint another more fitted for their purposes.

From the day of the 10th of August, the first result of the sacrifices that had been made to procure the events connected with it, was, that the commune of Paris became the true sovereign, under the direction, chiefly, of Danton, Tallien, Manuel, and Robespierre; and that the National Assembly might be said to have expired. These were, indeed, but the beginnings of sorrows. We are at last to be conducted to the massacres of September. But the revolutionary march of lawless men, the struggle between the Assembly and the commune, is among the lessons of these times; and the stu-

dent must, therefore, in the first place, observe it very carefully. The commune having maintained its usurped existence, the two great points to be next accomplished were, first, to get possession of the police, and then to erect a revolutionary tribunal. All power, with the power of life and death, would be thus lodged in their hands.

The way had been prepared for them, unfortunately, as I have already remarked, by all the deviations from the law, on the usual plea of necessity and the public good, of which the Legislative Assembly itself had been guilty; and these bad men of the commune availed themselves of the faults that had been thus committed. All their measures were carried; the revolutionary tribunal of the 17th of August was established; and in the hands of the commune was placed that iron sceptre which so long weighed down and crushed into total insignificance, and the most unparalleled wretchedness, the insulted and suffering people of this unhappy kingdom.

In my first sketch of the lecture I am now delivering, I had employed many pages in endeavouring to give you some general notion of the struggle, that for some time existed, between the Assembly and the commune, in fact, between the Girondists and the Jacobins; but I am obliged to omit them, or my lecture would be too long. But you ought carefully to study this part of the subject for the reasons I have mentioned.

In general, you will now understand, that the commune entirely prevailed. The revolutionary tribunal soon proceeded to the exercise of its functions under the direction of the leading members of the commune, Danton and others.

Royalists and conspirators, as they were called, of the 10th of August, were seized and put to death; some of them under very affecting circumstances.

But the danger of the country, and the approach of the combined armies, enabled Danton to call aloud for measures still more furious, and the tribunal to proceed to acts of violence still more revolting.

On the 26th, the news of the surrender of Longwy had reached Paris, and the general agitation was extreme. Danton was instantly in motion, and on the 28th he came to the Assembly, and required a decree for domiciliary visits all over

the kingdom, with pain of death to all who obstructed the officers employed. "We must have a national convulsion," he said, "to make these despots fall back; the people must be rolled in mass upon the enemy, and exterminate them at one blow; and at the same time all conspirators must be secured, and put into a state which will render it impossible for them to hurt us."

These last words had but too fearful a meaning. The Assembly, terrified and subdued, assented to the requisition, and passed the decree. The immediate consequences were so dreadful, that as you will see in the history, the Assembly made an attempt at resistance, and an effort for the formation of a new commune, but in vain. From the evening of the 29th the domiciliary visits were commenced. Every one who had belonged to the court, by employment, by rank, by attendances at the Tuileries; every one who had on any occasion appeared to be a royalist; every one, of whatever party, who had any enemy base and cowardly enough to denounce him; all such men were thrown into the prisons and places of confinement, to the amount, it is understood, of from twelve to fifteen thousand individuals.

The dreadful massacres of September, that you have heard of, you will now perceive are fast approaching; the prisons are filled, domiciliary visits begun, terror the order of the day. You will see, as you read, those lurid flashes, the heavy clouds, and the muttering thunder in the horizon, which too certainly portend some tempest in which you are to see the community overwhelmed. You will observe its progress, as it comes nearer and nearer, in the speeches of Danton, the Jupiter of the storm—

"Mediâ nimborum in nocte, coruscâ
Fulmina molitur dextrâ: quo maxima motu
Terra tremit."

Terror every where prevailed, and in this state of things the Committee of General Defence, that had been formed in the Assembly, summoned a meeting, and called to its assistance the executive council, to deliberate on providing means for the public safety. The moment was critical. Servan, the minister of war, had no confidence, he said, in the protection of the

armies, and saw not how Dumourier could make any stand. There was nothing, he conceived, between the enemy and Paris; and others thought with him, and it was proposed to call out the population of Paris to fight the battle of despair, and to place them between the invaders and all the constituted representatives of the national sovereignty, who were to retire to Saumur. Such was the general notion of the council; but Vergniaud and Guadet very properly combated all idea of quitting Paris, and the terrible Danton was now heard in words, that are but too memorable in the history of these unhappy times.

"They propose to you to quit Paris," said he, "but you surely are not to be told, that in the opinion of the enemy Paris is France, and that to yield them that point is to yield them the Revolution; to fall back, is in us at once to destroy ourselves. We must here then maintain ourselves, and by every means in our power, and it is by a bold daring that we must save ourselves.

"The 10th of August has divided us (we must not dissemble our situation) into republicans and royalists; the latter very numerous, the former not so. We then, we the republicans, are between two fires; we have the enemy without, the royalists within. There is now secretly sitting in Paris a royalist directory, that is in correspondence with the Prussian army: to tell you where it is sitting, and how composed, the place, and the people, this it is quite impossible for ministers to do; but to disconcert its plans, to put an end to this destructive correspondence with the stranger, it is necessary, yes, it is necessary to strike terror into the royalists."

At these words, accompanied as they were by a significant gesture, consternation was painted in every countenance.

"Yes," rejoined Danton, "it is necessary, I tell you, to strike terror into them; the first and the indispensable thing of all others, is to maintain yourselves in Paris; and it is not by wasting yourselves in combats, where it is quite uncertain whether you may or may not prevail, that you can here succeed."

A sort of stupor spread itself over the Assembly; not a word was added; and every one retired, without seeing, very distinctly, or daring well to examine, what might be the intentions of the minister.

The historian Thiers, who is not a little disposed to favour his countrymen whenever it is possible, and sometimes when it is not, continues at this point of the history to give his readers information, which, coming from him, and more particularly as he is an able writer, and among the last writers, must be received as authentic and the best; and he confirms the general notion entertained by all prior writers and historians, that the massacres which you are now to read of, were not a mere blind, senseless ebullition of the cowardly cruelty of a few savage miscreants, suddenly starting out from amidst the low populace of Paris, but were actually the result of a regular plan, prepared and organized in the most deliberate manner, by men who were legislators and magistrates, by Danton and his associates.

" Danton," he says, " immediately after the speech I have alluded to, repaired to the Committee of Surveillance, formed by the commune, that disposed, in an arbitrary manner, of the person of every citizen, and where Marat reigned in triumph; and *there* were meditated by Danton, in conjunction with Marat and others, whom the historian mentions, those projects of horror which now are to occupy your attention, directed against those unhappy men, who had been lately crowded into every place of confinement in Paris. Danton," says the historian, " lent all his fearless energy to assist the dreadful reveries (as they are called very strangely by the historian) of Marat; and they formed a plot, of which many other ages have given examples, but which can no longer, at the close of the eighteenth century," he says, " be explained by the ignorance of the times and the ferocity of the manners.

" Maillard, who had already made such a figure on the days of the 5th and 6th of October, collected about him a band of low wretches equal to any enormity; of this band he was considered as the head; and if we may credit," says the historian, " a late communication that has been made to the public, he was desired to keep himself ready to act at the first signal, to place himself where he might be useful, provide executioners, take precautions to prevent the cries of the victims from being heard, engage carts to carry away the bodies, quick lime for interment; *these* and other horrible preparations are mentioned.

"But from this instant," continues the historian, "the notion of some terrible execution that was to take place every where prevailed; the relatives of those detained in the prisons were in agonies; and the plot, like that of the 10th of August, that of the 20th of June, and every other that had preceded it, was in a general manner already known. Every where it was continually repeated, that it was necessary, by a dreadful example, to strike terror into the conspirators, who, from the depths of their prisons, kept up an understanding, it was said, with the enemy; every where the slowness of the tribunal that was to punish the criminals of the 10th of August was complained of, and a more prompt species of justice was loudly demanded. M. de Montmorin had been acquitted by the tribunal of the 17th of August; and the notion, therefore, was, that treason was to be found every where, and every where might be sure of an acquittal. One of those condemned, it was reported, had made discoveries, "that the prisoners were to escape in the night from their dungeons, arm themselves, spread themselves over the city, exercise every sort of vengeance, and at length set the king and royal family free, and throw open Paris to the Prussians (such was the general understanding); and yet," says the historian, very properly, "during all this time, those who were detained and accused were trembling for their existence, their relations in a state of the utmost consternation, and the king and royal family, from the depths of the Tower of the Temple, had no expectation but that of death."

These are the instructive parts of history; instructive, however revolting. A plot is first supposed, and when the plot is once taken for granted, it is easy to accuse, try, and convict the most innocent persons (the same was the process in the days of our own Charles II.), and absurdities the most ridiculous are on these occasions believed—prisoners storming a capital, or any other. It could not be that Danton and his associates gave a moment's credence to the follies they propagated.

It is not easy to imagine, by what motives, by what species of reasoning, beings like ourselves, human beings, could ever arrive at such a project, as the massacre, in cold blood, of many hundreds of their fellow creatures, then helpless and confined in the prisons of the city. Plunder, power, personal

ambition, impatience of opposition, above all, the enthusiasm of a revolution, these may have been among their motives, but undoubtedly with them were mixed a ruthless, cowardly anxiety about their own personal safety. Their notion must have been to plunge their country so deep in guilt, that no mercy could be expected from the allied powers; no desertion of the commune and of the Jacobin party practicable; no possibility of distinguishing them from others, and making them a separate sacrifice; no delivering up of offenders, like themselves, possible; no recoil from the Revolution; no composition with royalty to be thought of. Death or the repulse of the invaders the only alternative; no other chance, hope, or prospect; no other safety to be supposed by the people for their country or themselves.

This was most probably the main reasoning or impulse of these dreadful men; and it is a most appalling specimen of the manner in which men may abandon all consideration of the means they resort to; of the manner in which the feelings and reasonings of the atrocious being who is going to commit a murder may be realized, not by one desperate man but by many, and those legislators and magistrates, openly acting upon them in the broad sunshine of a great city, in the face of the world and of posterity, and *that* for many days together. Never was there a specimen of what the human mind may be brought to, so awful; never was there a lesson to human nature, so tremendous.

The 1st of September came; and it was then reported, that Verdun, like Longwy, had been treacherously surrendered. Danton therefore got a decree from the commune, that the tocsin should sound and the alarm guns be fired, and that every citizen should the next day appear in arms in the Champ de Mars, and the day following march to Verdun. Every one saw that by these preparations more was meant than a levy en masse; and circumstances occurred to confirm such conclusions.

Madame Fausse-Lendry was determined to share the captivity of her uncle. "You are wrong," said Sergent, who was one of the associates of Danton, "you are wrong; the prisons are not safe."

The 2nd of September was a Sunday, and all Paris was in

the streets: the enemy was expected in three days. The commune reported to the Assembly the measures taken for the common defence; Vergniaud called forth all his eloquence to show his countrymen that they had nothing to fear but from sudden panic. To the measures which he proposed, Danton rose and added others, that every citizen should be obliged, under pain of death, to serve in person, or give up his arms. "To conquer, to annihilate the enemy, nothing is wanting," he cried, "but to be bold and daring; dare—dare—never cease to dare."

Danton was rapturously applauded, and the Assembly decreed what he had proposed, and that all who impeded the orders of the executive power should be declared deserving of death; and this was, in fact, to confer the power of life and death on the executive council, or rather on Danton, who took upon himself the whole exercise of it. Nothing was now wanting to this dreadful man and his dreadful associates. Agitation, anxiety, alarm, were every where in the streets; but in the prisons the most profound sensation of dismay: the different jailers seemed in some inexplicable state of consternation; dinner had been served two hours sooner than usual; the knives removed; and when questions were naturally asked for the reason of such unexpected occurrences, no answer could be obtained. But the générale was at last heard to beat, the tocsin to sound, and the alarm guns to fire, and the truth began to be but too apparent.

It happened that at this time, about two o'clock, on the 2nd of September, there were at the Hotel de Ville some priests, who had been arrested and detained there till they could (very illegally) be sent to prison. By accident or design, this was the moment chosen for transferring them from the one place to the other: they were put into coaches, escorted (a sad escort) by the Breton Federates and the Marseillois; they were slowly moved along, and surrounded and insulted by the crowding populace. "Here," said the Marseillois, "here are the conspirators who are to cut the throats of our wives and children while we are on the frontiers." Amid these ominous insults they reach at length the prison of the Abbaye, and there they find an immense crowd already assembled. Maillard is arrived and ready; the door is opened,

and the first priest is getting out, when he is instantly dispatched by a thousand wounds; the second shrinks back into the carriage, but is pulled out by force, and dispatched also; the two remaining in like manner; and the assassins then fly from the carriage they have thus emptied, to fall upon those that follow. Twenty-three out of the twenty-four priests are thus, one by one, murdered in the midst of the howlings of the infuriated populace.

" It was at this moment," says the historian Thiers, " that Billaud-Varennes appeared. He was a member of the council of the commune, and the most ferocious and shameless of all the conspirators; he came invested with his official scarf, walked through the blood and the dead bodies, with which the court of the prison was covered, and addressing himself to the assassins, ' People,' he cried, ' people, thou hast sacrificed thine enemies, and thou hast done thy duty.' Another murderous voice was now heard, the voice of Maillard, ' But here there is nothing more to be done; let us go to Carmes.'

" In the church of the Carmelites had been shut up, as a place of confinement, two hundred other priests; and these unhappy men were the prey that these monsters now expected.

" In this manner these days of massacre began; and how they could be continued all the afternoon and night of this 2nd of September, and for several days after, is inconceivable.

" It is allowed that there were not more than a few hundreds of the populace who were seen actively engaged in these labours of horror, the rest of the multitude looked on; but so did all those who should have protected the community, and summoned to their aid the first indignant feelings of insulted nature.

" About seven o'clock in the evening of the 2nd, Fauchet announced to the Assembly, that two hundred priests had been massacred at the church of the Carmelites. He, or rather all the Assembly, affected not to know that the blood had been flowing in the prisons, now for five hours together. Commissioners were, however, appointed to go and calm these disorders. The deputation returned; and the report that their organ, Dussaux, made, was, ' that they with difficulty had got to the doors of the Abbaye; that they had endeavoured to

make themselves heard; that they had some of them mounted on chairs; that M. Bazire had attempted by a feint, in an unexpected manner, to gain an audience, all in vain; that they had spoken in every direction to every one that was near them, but that the pacific intentions of those whom they had influenced by their remonstrances could not be communicated to the thousands that were assembled; and that they therefore retired, and the darkness prevented them from further seeing what next ensued.'

"And this report being made, the Assembly," says the historian, "was satisfied, and passed to the order of the day."

Such was the Assembly.

But this was not all. On the 3rd of September, the next day, about half-past two in the morning, the commune appeared at the bar. "Gentlemen," said their orator, Truchon, "the prisons are now for the most part empty; about four hundred prisoners have perished at the prison of La Force; I dismissed those who were confined for debt, and afterwards the women; at St. Pélagie I did the same."

These were, I suppose, thought acts of humanity, to be put to the credit of the account. And to Truchon succeeded Tallien, who took but too distinguished a part in these horrible proceedings.

The massacres continued through the 4th, 5th, and 6th of September; and to finish the disgrace of the French nation, and the character of the instigators of these enormities, there actually appears, among the common documents of history, a circular address of the 3rd of September, which was countersigned by Danton, then the executive minister of justice, and by the members of the Committee of Public Safety, by Duplain, Sergent, Marat, and others, to the number of seven, and sent to all the departments of the kingdom, and which concludes in the following manner:—

"Aware that hordes of barbarians are advancing against us, the commune of Paris hasten to inform their brothers of all the departments, that a number of the ferocious conspirators confined in the prisons have been put to death by the people,—an act of justice, which appeared to them indispensable,—to restrain by terror those legions of traitors lurking within the walls, at the moment that the citizens were going

to march against the enemy; and no doubt the whole nation, after the long series of treasons which have led them to the brink of the abyss, will be eager to adopt these means, so useful and so necessary, and all the French will cry, like the Parisians, Let us march against the enemy, but do not let us leave behind us these brigands to cut the throats of our wives and children."

There is here no concealment of the great revolting fact which history commemorates, that men were put to death by public authority; it is distinctly avowed in a general manner; history supplies only the details. Seven known and acting functionaries at the time, here distinctly state a reason to justify this enormous proceeding; they distinctly recommend it to the imitation of all the departments of France, to men whom they call their brothers, and they sign their names to the document. We have here the regular organization of an extensive system of murder, thus generally intimated and proposed to the whole of a great kingdom in this amazing state paper, actually drawn up and sent on the day after the massacres had begun (on the 3rd), and followed up, and all its unspeakable effrontery of guilt immediately after illustrated, by three more days of these scenes of authorized and savage cruelty, continually repeated and renewed in a manner of which no human nature, and no possible portion of civilized man, could have been conceived capable.

We will now pause for a moment before we proceed further in any allusion to the facts of these days of September.

It seems, at first sight, one of the misfortunes of our nature, but it may be one of the many moral trials to which the great Almighty Master has subjected us, that there is no case or cause so bad, that some plea or other may not be urged in favour of it. On every occasion there is a sort of hearing to be gone through; and often, while our hearts are boiling over with indignation, we are required to listen to some apology or defence, some reasoning that is urged, to stay us in our career, and temper our abhorrence. We are even confronted with argument, and called upon to consider the weight of the considerations that may be produced in opposition to what we are advancing, and we are admonished not to speak in a manner so unqualified. In private and in public we

have a misery of this kind continually to experience. Leave science and mathematics, and there is no declaimer that can be silenced, if it please him to go on. And even on this subject of the massacres of September, something of the nature we are now describing has occurred.

A conspiracy, as you have already heard, was pretended. Men who had been dragged to prison were to start up from their dungeons, with arms in their hands, and destroy the wives and children of those who had left Paris to encounter the enemy. Tallien could rise up in his place in the Convention, and manufacture a speech out of such absurdities. He had even the effrontery to pretend, that it was the people who had risen up to defend themselves, and had justly avenged themselves of traitors who were going to fall upon them. There are those who can speak even to this hour, as if they thought that proceedings like these saved the country, and are therefore to be admitted.

It happens, however, that history on this occasion has presented to us sufficient materials for our judgment, and we need not be deceived. All eyewitnesses at the time speak the same language, as among others, Me. Roland will be found to do. All historians are agreed on the main points: that it was the aged and the helpless who were massacred; that it was not the people, but Danton and his associates, who planned and executed these murders; and that when the Duke of Brunswick thought proper to retreat, the duke did so for reasons very different from any consideration of the atrocities that had been committed by a gang of cut-throats in Paris. These atrocities gave him his best chance of success. Had they occurred still earlier, they might have enabled La Fayette to have marched his army to put down the Jacobins in Paris; and they so revolted the heart of every man, that, far from aiding the cause of the Revolution, they long united all Europe against it.

I turn from such disgusting pretences; and we will now attempt some further detail of these unnatural, unmanly proceedings, not of heroes and defenders of their country, but of base and cowardly assassins. You must know what they were, that proper reflections may be awakened in your minds. Never may men again thus profane the most sacred names,

the most honourable duties,—the cause of liberty, and the defence of their country; presuming to talk of the public good, and yet outraging every tie and feeling that is necessary to its existence.

Among the Memoirs that are now printed by the Baudouin Frères at Paris, you will find one dedicated to this particular subject, of the days of September. At the end of it you will see a statement of the sums disbursed by the treasurer of the commune for expenses occasioned by the Revolution of the 10th of August; and again, under proper disguises of different pretences and phrases, you will see that the whole of this very massacre was systematically arranged and paid for. Thus at page 314, it is is ordered, " That one thousand four hundred and sixty-three livres should be advanced to —— to pay those who were working to preserve the salubrity of the air (this was the phrase used) on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of September, and also those who presided at those dangerous operations, according to the memoir annexed," &c. " Those who were at work," " travailleurs," was a cant phrase to describe the assassins during these days of massacre. Women were seen bringing their dinners to their husbands who were at work, as they called it (were " travailleurs ") in the prisons.

In other articles of the account, you will see regular sums charged for carriages to carry away the dead bodies, quick lime with which to bury them, &c. &c.; and though these last items may or may not be (I think they are) of themselves decisive evidence, yet, coupled with other facts that are acknowledged, they become so, and are quite sufficient to show that the whole was a system—assassins hired, carts provided, preparations of every kind made for the disposal of the dead bodies. Never was such a ledger of horrors!

In the same publication are also to be found three Memoirs from different individuals who were in the hands of these ruffians for a considerable time, but who in the event were not massacred. These individuals describe what they saw and felt, and their recital will be a sufficient description of what was seen and felt by many others, and of the whole scene. The common histories, it is true, mention particular persons, give the numbers that perished, and represent, in a general

manner, the barbarities that were exercised on the sufferers; but the authors of *these* three Memoirs enter more into detail than the writers of history can possibly do, and by the assistance of the one and the other, the information of the student will be rendered complete. He should read these accounts—all of them—attentively, and at whatever expense of his feelings, that when he hears political reasoners, in alleviation of these horrors, dare to speak of them as having saved the country, he may have some conception, however imperfect, of what they really were, and he may judge for himself how far such atrocities could be of service to any cause, and, even if they could, how far any cause is to be so defended.

I will offer you a specimen, for the present, of what you will have hereafter to read for yourselves. The first memoir is from M. de St. Meard. He was a royalist, and arrested on the 22nd of August, and conducted to the Abbaye.

I will mention a few particulars that appear in his narrative. He was imprisoned there with nineteen others; and on the first day, just as they sat down to table, M. de Chantereine seized one of the knives, struck himself with it three times, crying out, "We are all to be massacred: O my God, to thee I fly!" and died immediately.

Again. "On the 2nd of September, the turnkey served us our dinner sooner than usual: His air and looks made us presage something ill to happen to us. He returned at two; we surrounded him, but he was deaf to all our inquiries; and, taking away all the knives, which he always used to place regularly in our napkins, he disappeared.

"At half-past two we heard violent noises, shouts from the people, drums beating, the cannons fired, the tocsin sounding. Soon after, we understood that they were going to massacre the bishops and priests.

"About four o'clock, we were all brought to our window by the piercing cries of a poor man they were cutting down with sabres. We saw, near the wicket of our prison, a man stretched dead on the pavement. An instant after they massacred another;" and so of the rest.

"It is impossible to describe," continues the narrative, "the horror of the profound and sombre silence which reigned during these executions. It was only interrupted by the

shrieks of those whom they were massacring, and by the sounds of the sabres as they struck the head. When the victim was cut down, a murmur arose, soon strengthened by cries of 'Vive la nation!' a thousand times more horrible than even the silence.

"About seven, two men, with hands covered with blood, and armed with sabres, entered our room, preceded by the turnkey with a torch, who showed them the bed of the unfortunate Reding, the Swiss officer. His limb was fractured, and he was carried off on their shoulders to be put to death. We looked at each other in silence, embraced each other, and sat fixed and gazing on the floor, on which the moon shone through the triple bars of the windows; but we were soon roused from our trance by the cries of new victims, and we recalled to our minds the last words of Chantereine, 'that we were all to be massacred.'

"At ten, the Abbé L'Enfant, confessor to the king, and the Abbé de Rastignac, came to announce to us that our last hour approached, and to invite us to receive their benediction. An electric impulse that I cannot describe precipitated us on our knees. The moment, though consoling, was even more awful than all the rest. We were just on the point of appearing before the Supreme Being, bending lowly before two of his ministers. Their age, their position before us, death hanging over us, encompassing us on every side, all contributed to throw over the ceremony a mournful air of grandeur; it brought us nearer to the Divinity; it inspired us with courage. All reasoning was suspended, and the most cold and most sceptical would have been impressed as strongly as those of minds the most ardent and the most sensible. But another half hour and these venerable men were massacred. We heard their cries."

The Memoir proceeds in the following dreadful manner:—
"Our most interesting occupation was to make out how we were to place ourselves, so as to suffer the least, when we went out to be massacred. We sent our comrades from time to time to the window, to observe and to make a report. They told us that those who held out their hands suffered the longest, the blows of the sabres upon the head being thus broken; that sometimes the arms and the hands fell first;

that the best way was to place the arms on the back behind us. Such were the horrible details on which our deliberations turned. We made our calculations, and counselled each other what it were best to do when our turn came.

Again. " About midnight, the agitation of the people augmented every instant, and was at its height when they came for M. Defontaine, of the body guards, and we soon after heard his cries of death. Soon after they dragged two more of our companions from us, and I saw that my hour was fast approaching. At last, at one o'clock in the morning of the Tuesday, after an agony of thirty-seven hours, to which no death can be compared, after having a thousand times drunk to the dregs the cup of bitterness, the door of my prison opened; I was called for, I appeared, was seized upon by three men, and hurried away through the dreadful wicket. By the light of two torches, I perceived the terrible tribunal on which life and death were now to depend. The president in a grey coat, a sabre at his side, was rested against a table, on which were papers, a writing-desk, pipes, and some bottles. The table was surrounded by ten persons, sitting down or standing; two were in a sort of jacket and apron; others were stretched out and sleeping upon the benches. Two men, in shirts all stained with blood, sabre in hand, guarded the door of the wicket. An old turnkey had his hand on the bolts. In presence of the president, three men had then hold of a prisoner, who appeared about sixty. They put me aside, while two national guards presented to the president a paper from the section of Croix Rouge, claiming the prisoner. 'It is in vain,' said the president, 'these demands for people who are traitors.' 'This is frightful,' cried the prisoner; 'your judgment is an assassination.' 'I have washed my hands of it,' said the president; 'conduct M. Mailli.' The words were scarcely pronounced when they pushed him into the street, and through the opening of the door I saw him massacred."

M. de St. Meard then gives the particulars of his own trial, which you will find very characteristic and interesting. He saved himself by his courage and presence of mind.

The next day, he says, he took a walk in one of the public gardens. He saw some rub their eyes to make out whether

it was he; he saw others start back, as if they had seen a spectre; others ran up and embraced him, even those he knew not.

Such are some of the particulars in the sort of narrative or journal delivered to us by M. de St. Meard.

The next narrative is by Me. de Fausse-Lendry, the lady whom M. Sergent warned, when she wished to go to her uncle, that the prisons were not safe. This uncle, it seems, the Abbé de Restignac, whom we have just mentioned, was seized, on the 25th of August, by a multitude of armed men; and this venerable man, who was now to be dragged to prison because the Prussians were coming, was an aged ecclesiastic, who generally kept his bed, and could with difficulty walk. Not much more dangerous to the state must have been the generality of those (priests and royalists of the court) who were now to be sacrificed.

To the Abbaye, however, this helpless, pious sufferer, the uncle of Me. de Fausse-Lendry, was taken, and she succeeded in her request to share his imprisonment. She describes what she saw and endured in the prison in the manner you would expect.

Her uncle and she were at last separated, and she had thought him safe. She was then brought to her own trial, and was dismissed by the president of the tribunal. "You are free, madam, and may go out." "Do not go out," said one of the judges, "this is not a good opportunity." She had now a narrow escape. She was all impatience to rejoin the abbé, her benefactor and second father, and some ruffian near her was urging her to go, which in her ignorance she was pressing on to do, and which if she had done, she would have been instantly massacred. She was now at the fatal wicket, when her arm was seized. "You shall not go," said a voice, and a struggle ensued which lasted several minutes, she seconding with all her strength the cut-throat who was pushing her through the wicket, and repelling the humane man who was endeavouring to save her life. At last, as the wicket was opened, and she was passing through, "Loose her instantly," said her protector, "or I will shoot you." The assassin did not stay to be threatened twice, and let go his hold.

The noble minded man (M. Pochet) who thus exerted himself, evidently at considerable risk, in favour of a fellow creature, at so perilous a moment, discharged every remaining office of humanity, got a regular order from the president, and conducted the lady he had thus preserved, through the fatal court-yard, where she had to step, she says, through the blood and over the limbs of those who had been slaughtered, and brought her safe, supported by himself and a friend, to the bosom of his own family, where she was implored to remain and find an asylum, for no other, she was told, was now left her—her uncle had been massacred.

Such are the dreadful scenes of revolutions: a dark and frightful spectacle of crimes and horrors; but occasionally touched, as in the last instance, with light from heaven.

It might but serve to harden the heart to dwell longer on scenes like these. Some incidents that you will see in the histories, like those I have occasionally mentioned, are of a more consoling nature.

Mademoiselle Cazotte, bursting through the crowd of assassins at the moment they were going to kill her father, and throwing her arms round the neck of the venerable old man, by her cries, her expostulations, her entreaties, her resolution to die with him, so wrought upon these monsters and the bystanders, that they forgot their bloody business, resumed the common feelings of human nature, and loaded the father and the daughter, who were carried off in triumph, with their acclamations and caresses.

Mademoiselle de Sombreuil, in like manner, saved her father, but after submitting to a disgusting whim of the savages that were going to cut him down.

The Princess de Tarente saved herself also by the heroism of her sentiments and a courage that could not be overcome. She would *not* criminate the queen, would confess to no plots, refuted the calumnies brought against her, demanded immediate death or liberty; and the people were at length so transported with admiration, that they proclaimed her innocence, and carried her home with shouts of joy and applause.

The most afflicting recital that the student will have to endure, is that of the fate of Me. Lamballe. For no other crime but that of attachment to the royal family, she was first

imprisoned, and then brought before the tribunal of one of the prisons, where she sunk into a swoon, when she saw herself surrounded by men whose faces, hands, clothes, and weapons were covered with blood, and when she heard the shrieks of those whom the executioners were murdering near her in the streets.

When at length she was able to speak, her judges asked her if she knew anything of the plots of the court on the 10th of August.

"I am ignorant," she replied, "whether there were any; I am sure I know of none." She was then told to swear liberty and equality, and hatred to the king and queen and royalty. "I will readily swear the two first," said she, "but I cannot swear the last; it is not in my heart." "Swear," whispered a bystander; "you are dead if you do not." She made no reply, but, covering her face with her hands, made a step towards the gate; she passed the threshold, was struck by a sabre, dragged over the dead bodies, swooned away, and was then massacred.

Barbarities followed, exercised upon her lifeless remains, that are not to be told. As a last specimen of infuriated malignity and brutal vengeance, her head was brought on a pike to the windows of the Temple, that the royal sufferers there (the unhappy prisoners) might see, in the instance of this unoffending lady, how fatal was the distinction of having been the ornament of their court and the associate of their domestic pleasures; how sad were the consequences of being cherished by their love and faithful to their fortunes.

It seems not possible for human brutality to go further. Civilized man and savage man, if uniting to produce a deed of horror, could not go beyond this.

And are these, then, the means by which the sacred cause of liberty is to be asserted, by which a country is to be defended, by which invaders are to be repelled, by which a Revolution is to be endeared to a people, or recommended to the respect and imitation of mankind?

The historians and the writers of memoirs connected with this period of the Revolution, generally preface their accounts by saying that a veil must be thrown over the frightful scenes that took place during these massacres of September.

No doubt, the laws of public decency must be observed; there are excesses of guilt and brutality that must not be thought possible amongst mankind, and must, therefore, not be mentioned, lest the human heart should lose, by any familiarity, that first instinctive recoil of horror and disgust, which, as we now unhappily see, is its best protection.

Still, however, the crimes, the outrages that were committed, must not be concealed. It is for history to admonish mankind, to warn them of their nature, and to show them what they may become.

I am concluding my lecture, but I will first mention an incident that I observed in one of the histories of the times.

When the Convention met after the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, it was accustomed to hold two sittings every day; and in one of the evening sittings, some time after these dreadful massacres, when the hall was but feebly lighted, Danton was in the tribune and speaking, while scarcely seen, and in the shade. He was vaunting the services he had rendered the country, and in his turn spoke aloud of reason, of justice, and of humanity. The sounds were scarcely uttered, when from a distant part, and athwart the obscure gloom of the hall, a loud and thrilling voice pronounced the word "September."

The fable of antiquity seemed now to be realized. As if the head of a Medusa had been seen, the deputies sat petrified, and the orator was struck dumb. At the word September, reason, justice, and humanity, profaned by the breath of Danton, obtained a short but memorable triumph; the hearers could no longer listen, and the speaker faltered as he endeavoured to proceed. The assembly (and that assembly the Convention) had felt the common workings of our nature, and in the bosom of the ruffian demagogue the strangled scorpions of his conscience had suddenly revived and stung him.

Something of the nature now described seems to have taken place in the sentiments even of others, who may be thought in many respects but too much to resemble him. No declaimer for the authority of the people, however wild, no demagogue, no revolutionist, that would not be checked and reduced to his limitations and apologies when reminded of the

scenes that took place on these days of September; and no Frenchman, however democratic, that would refuse to acknowledge, that, during this fatal period, his Revolution and his country incurred a stain that can never be obliterated.

But the great practical lesson of these massacres of September is the precipitous nature of human guilt.

Are the authors and perpetrators of these appalling crimes, are they our fellow mortals or not? They are men of like passions with ourselves.

See, then, to what a state of degradation a community may be reduced, to what extravagances of horror men may be excited, when each and all of them have been accustomed to tamper with their moral feelings.

In public as in private life, this is not to be done. Crime leads on to crime, probably in ourselves, certainly in those who follow us.

It is not too much to say, that they who tolerated the people in their excesses on the 5th and 6th of October, 1789, prepared the way for those of the 20th of June, and so of the 10th of August and of the rest; and that all the popular leaders who from the first shut their eyes on the licentiousness of the people, are thus gradually brought within the character of guilt, and must all, in whatever varied proportion, take their share even in the guilt of the massacres of September.

NOTE.

In the Memoir on the massacres of September, there is a detailed and most affecting account of the perils and sufferings of the Abbé Sicard. The abbé was one of the refractory priests, but was the celebrated teacher of the deaf and dumb. His narrative is very descriptive of what passed at this period.

Tallien makes a dreadful appearance in these scenes. He stands before the Legislative Assembly of his country, talking of assignats and barriers, and of the justice of the people; of the honour of the people, and of the just vengeance of the people; while all these foul butcheries were perpetrating, and while he was one of those who had regularly planned, prepared, and organized them.

Me. Roland describes her sufferings, and the efforts of her husband, then minister, to avoid the guilt and shame, she says, of being in any measure an accomplice in such transactions.

LECTURE XXXII.

LA FAYETTE. FAULTS OF ALLIED POWERS, ETC.

IT is impossible to speak of the scenes and characters, to which I have alluded in the two last lectures, but in the terms I have made use of; it is impossible to feel any other sensations but those of reprobation and horror. We should be as inhuman as themselves were we to think with any other sentiments of these furious and unfeeling men, of their counsels of blood, of insurrections and massacres: insurrections against a helpless king and his family, his insulated friends and guards; and massacres of priests and aged men. And I may go still further, and protest against the employment of mobs, and all base and unprincipled pandering to the licentious passions of the people. Resistance may be made, it may even grow up into a civil war, and sad may be the scenes of private and of public wrong that may thence ensue; but what is even a civil war, compared with insurrections and massacres? Many a good and brave man may lie slaughtered in the field, and many a widow may have to mourn, and many an orphan to be desolate; but what are even these calamities (the afflicting scenes and results of honourable warfare), when put in comparison with the atrocities of the 10th of August and the 2nd of September? Who ever compared the civil wars of England with scenes of guilt and cruelty like these? We, too, have had our civil dissensions, our struggles for liberty, our Hampdens, and even our Cromwell; but not our processions of murder and assassination, our massacres in palaces and prisons, our Marats, our Dantons, and our Robespierres. The assertors of freedom are not to be the ministers of Moloch. Resistance is to be honourable and manly; it is not to be made at all but in the last resource, and after every moral and constitutional resist-

ance has been tried in vain; but even then it must not be made in the murder of a few faithful guards, and the butchery of men confined in public prisons—in the commission of crimes and atrocities, which can only render the very name of freedom hateful to mankind; which can only serve to reconcile them to any species of rule, however arbitrary, which leaves them any tolerable enjoyment of their lives and property.

Through these two last lectures, and through the whole of these lectures, wherever I presume to breathe the accents of censure on popular leaders at all, I speak not to censure the cause of freedom, for it is the cause of human nature, but to censure the conduct of those on whose caution and moderation its success depended, a caution and moderation on which its success must ever depend.

And having now made these general observations, I must announce to you that a painful duty immediately presents itself. I must turn from the faults, and excesses, and crimes of the assertors of the new opinions, to the faults of those who were their opponents, the followers of the court and the supporters of the old.

It is the melancholy situation of an historian or commentator on human affairs, when they at all assume a revolutionary aspect, to be placed between the contending offences and mistakes of the patriots and rulers of mankind. He has to censure each in their turn, and to be himself very often exposed to great misapprehension; for while he is speaking with just indignation of the criminality of the one, he may appear to have quite forgotten, to be even insensible, to the faults of the other. This is especially the case of all who have to speak of the French Revolution. I must entreat my hearers not to do me this injustice. I would fain teach them—it would be the pride and honour of my life, it may hereafter be my comfort, to have taught them—that as they belong to the educated classes of the community, they are the proper guardians, not only of the institutions of their country, but of the liberties of their country; that they must never abandon that sacred cause; but that it is a trust, delicate as it is important; and that they are not to let it descend, either by their own inertness or their own violence, to the licentious

management of those below them. This I would fain teach them: but I would warn my hearers also of the little feeling which the high but too often show for the low; and as they are to be intermingled with the higher orders, many of them, and some to constitute a part of them, I would rouse them, if I could, to a sense of the temptations of their particular situation; of the carelessness with which they are apt to turn from the ignorance and sufferings of those with whom (happy and improved themselves) they suppose they have no immediate concern; of the unblushing profligacy with which they too often indulge their own vices, expecting, however, the virtues of their proper station in those below them; and, on the whole, of the little sympathy and respect which too many of them appear to have for the rights and fair claims of the lower orders. This is their remaining duty and lesson; a duty and lesson that is more and more observed and practised as the government is free, and again, as men are more and more actuated by the influence of Christianity. Of later years this duty has been very eminently felt by the people of condition in this country; but I am speaking not only of this country and of these times, but of all times and of all civilized Europe together. In prior lectures on the Constituent Assembly, and more particularly on the Legislative, I have had to hold up every warning of the first kind, the faults of the friends of freedom, and I must now direct your attention to the other; not exactly to the vices and profligacy of the higher orders, such as I had to notice when alluding to the times of the regent and Louis XV., but to the callousness, the indisposition to the cause of freedom, the total want of sympathy with the rights and interests of the community, which was so constantly shown by the royal party in France (with the exception of the king himself), and afterwards by the continental powers, through the whole of the history of the Revolution.

Observe the distinction I make between the king and his court. " A less patriotic king," said Bailly, "and we should have had no Revolution." It is of the court, the court of France and the German courts, that I mean to speak all through this lecture.

Consider, then, the conduct of the higher orders in France

and on the continent. They never could bear the Revolution from the first, in whatever shape it approached them. I speak not of distinguished exceptions among the privileged orders of France, nor, as I must repeat, of the king himself, for he never was wanting in sympathy for the people, but of the court that surrounded him. I cannot now go through the detail; I must refer you to the historians: but in the mean time, and before you consider it, I will, in the remainder of this lecture, direct your attention to the general style and manner of their behaviour, and allude more particularly to a few points, which may rest upon your minds as specimens of the whole subject.

For instance, they interfered with the views of Necker, and ruined his measure of the 23rd of June, 1789, a fault that was ever after irreparable.

Again. They actually summed up all the wisdom and patriotism of the case, as it appeared to them, into three words, "Tout ou rien;" this was always their motto: in other words, that the government was to remain arbitrary, and every thing be submitted to their will and pleasure. What conduct, in the then situation of France and of the world, could be more intolerable?

Again. The allied powers, in like manner, might be justly indignant against the Jacobins of France; but they received Mallet du Pan, considered all the particulars of his mission, saw distinctly what the unhappy king wished and advised, and wisely wished and advised, and then what was the result? The manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick. What but a total want of sympathy with freedom, total ignorance of the nature of it, could have produced such a state paper? How are we to look with patience on these rulers of the continent, when such is their conduct; how, when one cannot wish them to succeed, even though they are opposed to the dreadful men who urged on the democracy of Paris to every deed of violence, to insurrections, and to massacres? Yet such is the case. The mistakes of the popular leaders from the first may be acknowledged; their later fury and unreasonableness reprobated; at *last*, their tyranny, cruelty, and crimes detested and abhorred: still, when it comes to the question, Are the allied powers, preceded by such a manifesto as this of the

Duke of Brunswick, to succeed — is the Revolution to be left at the mercy of conquerors like these? What could be the answer then, and what can be the answer now, of any friend to freedom? It could only be, that at all events invaders of this description were to be driven back, and the chance taken, whatever it might be, of some other conclusion of this dreadful drama.

Of the indisposition, then, of the rulers of the continent to *all* freedom, and of their general modes of thinking and feeling, I produce as striking specimens this interference with Necker in his measure of the 23rd of June; their standing, avowed maxim of conduct ("tout ou rien"); and, finally, the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick. These I produce as specimens, among many, of the whole subject; for I cannot, as I must repeat, travel through the history; but the whole of the history tells the same story, and it constituted the great difficulty of the Revolution, and it was often the cause of the mistakes; it served always as a plea for the violence of the popular leaders. These leaders would have done well to have distinguished the king from his court, and to have seen the benevolence and patriotism of the one, though they found not such virtues in the other. But in the consideration of this great subject of the French Rèvolution, the insensibility of the rulers on the continent, and of the court and privileged orders in France, to the rights and fair claims of the people, is a most conspicuous element, and one that influenced most materially the course of events, and as it still exists, and must always be expected more or less to exist, in some or other of the individuals of every country, as it then influenced events most unfortunately, and can never influence them favourably, it becomes a warning to those rulers and to mankind, and to the privileged orders more especially, a warning which must on no account, by any historian or commentator on history, be either forgotten or concealed.

I have just said that I cannot allude to the particulars of the history; but I will add to the instances I have already selected, another,—the fate and fortunes of La Fayette.

One of the most memorable specimens of the nature of the rulers of the continent, and, I am sorry to add, of the nature of those who are the assertors of high principles of govern-

ment, even in this country, is their treatment of La Fayette, their treatment from the first; and to this subject, therefore, I shall, in the remainder of this lecture, more particularly address myself. I shall first lay before you the sentiments of the regular historians, that you may not take my own opinion of La Fayette for granted; and then refer you to the story of his misfortunes, and to the debates in our own House of Commons, all illustrative of the propriety of the representation I have just made.

I have already more than once lamented our want of memoirs from La Fayette. He never tells his story, he never exhibits his case. All through these lectures I have kept him within your view, and you may, I think, form a sufficient estimate how far his mistakes and faults are a proper subject of the reprobation of wise and good men; yet has he been reprobated by men, whom far be it from me to exclude from the character of wise and good men on other occasions, and reprobated merely because they were deeply imbued at the time with high notions of government, and because he was the champion of freedom in the old world, as in the new. He was even treated with the most unpitying cruelty by those allied powers, and entirely, as I must contend, because they could not bear the cause of freedom, or bear its assertors for a moment, under whatever form presented to them. For my own part, I have observed, as well as I could, the conduct of this distinguished man, while I have been reading the histories and memoirs of the Revolution. With one exception, I see not where moral blame can be affixed to him. On one occasion he disarmed and dismissed from the Tuileries some gentlemen, who, in a moment of alarm, had come to the king's assistance, and this in a manner that hurt and incensed the king; and this conduct in him was at all events unfortunate, and may have been very inconsiderate and blameable. I have such confidence in the patience and good temper of the king, that I am driven to suppose that La Fayette was in fault; I am obliged to give up (whatever might have been his intention) his manner of expressing it. Yet I know not how to think him capable of meaning to insult or give pain to the king unnecessarily, whose virtues he never ceased to respect, and for whom he more than once

hazarded his life. La Fayette has never stated what his views and feelings were on this occasion; and though I think I see them (that he thought, for instance, this sort of interference in the palace was in every way dangerous, and could best be put down and prevented for the future by present harshness), yet his case is not known. With this exception, however, give it what importance or colour we may, I see nothing in his conduct, from the first, that (all his difficulties considered) would not either be admired or excused by all who have any sympathy with freedom; but *there*, indeed, lies the point. He is not forgiven, he is not treated with proper candour, because he was one of the first movers of the Revolution· and with those who have no sympathy with freedom, this is a crime that nothing can expiate. And this hatred of freedom in those who are bred under arbitrary governments, this indisposition to freedom in too many of those who are more fortunately situated and should have been taught better, while it is deeply to be deplored, must for ever be taken into account by all who speculate upon the past, or who would wish to improve the future fortunes of their species.

You remember the particulars of the conduct of La Fayette. His object, as you know, always was, a free monarchy. He was the hero of the constitution of 1789 or 1791; the hero and the victim. His fault was the fault of all the patriots of the time; it was this: that to secure, as he thought, freedom, he made the executive power too weak; and this fault in him and in the patriots (but aggravated and assisted by the faults of the court party), produced, in a great degree, the earlier calamities of the Revolution. This is, in a word, the history as you see it; but surely some distinction might and ought to be made between the first and the later leaders of the popular party, between La Fayette on the one side, and the Girondists and Jacobins on the other. For the constitution of 1789, and the king at the head of it, he was ever ready to risk his life, and what was more, even to sacrifice his popularity. The occasions on which he stood forward were the critical turns of the Revolution:—the 5th and 6th of October; the attempt of the king to go to St. Cloud; the attempt of the Jacobins to dethrone the king on his return from Varennes in 1791; the 20th of June, 1792; and the 10th of August.

To his conduct immediately before and after the 20th of June, 1792, I have already alluded. He wrote a letter from his camp, on the 16th of June, to denounce the Jacobins and agitators of Paris; on the 28th, he appeared himself at the bar, requiring, in the name of his army, the punishment of the authors of the 20th of June. On different occasions, as is seen in the accounts even of the minister Bertrand de Moleville himself, he proposed plans for the king's escape, in which his own life would have been at issue; and on the occasion of the 10th of August, though the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick had appeared, he kept no terms whatever with the Legislative Assembly, and endeavoured to animate his army into total rebellion against their authority. The particulars are well known, and not at all denied. Even Bertrand de Moleville himself is obliged to speak in the following manner: —"M. La Fayette was the only one of all the generals who dared to attempt realizing in his army what M. de Montesquieu had asserted, but unfortunately it was no longer time: so true is it, that the greatest fault that can be committed by the head of a party in a Revolution is that of delaying to take advantage of an important success when he is sure of it. But if M. La Fayette," continues this writer, "has more than once given occasion for this censure, at least he does not deserve that of not having done, on this occasion, all in his power to crush the Revolution of the 10th of August; and the more precise I have been," says Bertrand de Moleville, "in exposing the faults of this constitutional general, the more incumbent is it upon me to be so too in relating those parts of his conduct which redound to his honour."

Bertrand de Moleville then goes on to state, that La Fayette prevailed upon the municipality of Sedan to arrest, on his own responsibility, the commissioner coming from the Assembly, and that an address was even circulated by him through the camp. "Citizens!" it said at the close, "you have no longer any representatives; the National Assembly are enslaved, your armies have lost their chief, Pétion reigns, the savage Danton and his satellites are masters. Do you wish to re-establish the inheritor of the crown upon the throne, or will you have Pétion for king? Soldiers! you must choose."

"The whole army," Bertrand de Moleville says, "appeared extremely exasperated at these outrages; and if at that moment M. La Fayette had shown himself at the head of his troops, it is more than probable," he thinks, "that he would have determined his army to march immediately to deliver the king and the National Assembly."

But of this probability La Fayette must be considered as a much more competent judge, he and his confidential officers and friends, on the spot and at the time, than Bertrand de Moleville can possibly be, writing from his closet in London, and judging after the event. La Fayette had but a few weeks before repaired to Paris, for the sake of putting down the Jacobins and Girondists, alone and unattended, at the hazard of his own life, and never showed any want of enterprise when that of the king was in danger. But the very interference at all of a general at the head of the army of the country, was in itself a measure very objectionable, and evidently appeared so to La Fayette himself. This is a part of the case which a man like Bertrand de Moleville does not understand.

We will now turn to another historian,—that I may not, as I have said, take my own opinion of La Fayette for granted, one, who is a much better judge than Bertrand de Moleville of concerns like these,—M. de Toulongeon. "The commissioners," says he, "from the Legislative Assembly, brought with them to the armies the new oath of liberty and equality. Dumourier took it without hesitation, and made his troops do the same. On the contrary, Dillon, while he was expecting the arrival of the commissioners, renewed the constitutional oath; but he afterwards retracted and submitted on the appearance of the commissioners. La Fayette had them arrested, and thus raised at once the standard of insurrection. Dumourier," says the historian, "was politic and adroit; La Fayette had no wish but to be consistent and high-minded. Lukner wrote to La Fayette that he might depend upon him; but he was incapable of forming any opinion, or of being steady to it for two days together; and at Metz he immediately afterwards said to the municipality every thing to the contrary of what he had written. The plan of La Fayette," continues Toulongeon, "in a business of such high importance, was to rally around him many of the depart-

ments, and to form with the members of the constituted authorities a sort of congress, to which he hoped many dissentients from the Legislative Body would come and unite themselves. Sustained by this *civil* force, of which he would have required the orders, and seconded by the armies of the Moselle and the Rhine, an opposition might have been made, as he conceived, which the *general* wish of France would have sanctioned and assisted, and the constitution might then have been re-established as it stood at first. But all circumstances," says the historian, "were unfavourable, and failed at once. The enemy was at the gates, and occupied every thought; the shifting conduct of the king and court banished all confidence, and destroyed every possible measure. The soldiers had been accustomed to see and to acknowledge no authority but that of the decrees of the Assembly. Every thing contributed to the failure of an enterprise which the rapidity of events left no time to mature and prepare, of which the partial success would have only opened the frontier to the enemy, and of which the *total* success was impossible after the events of the 10th of August. La Fayette soon saw himself abandoned by his soldiers; no pains had been omitted to detach them from him. He might have secured his retreat by a few corps that were well inclined to him, but he generously chose rather to have as few associates as possible in calamity; and having provided for the safety of the army, he retired with a small number of his friends, to whom the title of friend left now no other security but flight."

Toulongeon then goes on to describe what passed after the arrest of La Fayette and his friends; and it is much to the disgrace of those into whose hands they had fallen, the Prussians and Austrians. The historian closes his account thus:—"The long course of sufferings and barbarous treatment which La Fayette, Pusy, and La Tour Maubourg had to endure till the time of their deliverance, belongs to that part of the history. They were transferred successively from Magdebourg to Glatz, Wesel, Neisse, and Olmutz; deprived of the first necessaries of life, of all intercourse with each other; and hatred," says Toulongeon, "while refining in its vengeance, lost sight of all policy. Policy in vain proclaimed that an excess of barbarity like this was but a warning for all

those whose opinions were similar to those of La Fayette and his friends, to expect no safety but from resistance and from arms; and that the passions of sovereigns were too implacable to leave any other mode of treaty possible."

Such is the account of Toulongeon.

I will now advert to another authority. In the History by the Two Friends of Liberty, the detail, as usual, is very full and distinct. In the first place, the situation of the Assembly and of La Fayette in his camp, after the 10th of August, is described. He held, it seems, that it was not for him to despair of the safety of the monarchy; and his general order to his army is then given. "We are not," he said to his soldiers, at the end of it, "we are not to be discouraged by any of the efforts which the enemies of liberty may make to diminish our zeal; on the contrary, we are, like good citizens and brave soldiers, to rally round the constitution, and to swear to live to observe it, and to die to defend it."

What passed on the arrival of the commissioners at Sedan is then detailed: the spirited resolution of the commune and their proclamation; and afterwards that of La Fayette, which must be considered as his declaration of war against the Assembly.

"Soldiers," he concluded, "under what standards will you march—those of the law or of Pétion? Restore to his place the hereditary representative of the nation, and renew to your general your oath to defend the constitution: if you do not, you have at this moment Pétion for your king, and you will soon have your enemies for your masters. You must choose."

The army of La Fayette is represented as at first tumultuous in his favour, but the exertions of the Assembly are then described, and they were not likely to be either faint or inefficient. At length it appeared, according to the historians, that the army had taken part against La Fayette; that different departments, to which he had appealed, returned a hostile answer; that he had been denounced as a traitor by the Assembly; above all, that Dumourier had gone over, and was in consequence placed at the head of the army; that the General Dillon had done the same; and that the die being now cast, all further effort on the part of La Fayette was vain, and his only measure was flight to America. The

rigours of the confinement of La Fayette and his three friends are then noted, in violation, say the historians, of every right of the unfortunate and every dictate of humanity.

The account in Thiers, another historian, is short and clear, and it does proper justice to La Fayette: "that his position was one of difficulty, of difficulty too great to be overcome; that it was impossible, merely by means of his own popularity with his army, to bear up against the authority of the interior and the revolutionary impulse at Paris. But the example of Dumourier carried every thing along with it. Great was the joy," continues the historian Thiers, "in the camp of the coalesced powers, when the name of La Fayette was sounded as a prisoner. To torture one of the first friends of the Revolution, to impute to the Revolution itself the persecution of its first authors, to see verified all the excesses they had predicted—all this diffused the most universal satisfaction amongst the aristocracy all over Europe. Compare," says afterwards this historian, "the defection of La Fayette with that of the Marquis de Bouillé, retiring from France to return with the sovereigns that were its enemies, with that of Dumourier, who goes over to them only because he is out of humour with the Convention he served, and one shall render justice to the man who abandons not France till the opinion which is dear to him, and which he thinks right, is proscribed, and which he neither goes to reprobate in the armies of the enemy nor to disavow, but which he professes and maintains in their dungeons."

I will now allude to one historian more; I will allude, after Thiers, to the Abbé de Montgaillard. He speaks on the subject of La Fayette at considerable length, and, in one part of his account, in the following words:—

"La Fayette and the three Constitutionalists were detained as prisoners, and successively transferred to Wesel, Magdebourg, Glatz, Neisse, and Olmutz, where they experienced the most rigorous captivity. At the place of their last destination, it was declared to each of them, on the part of his apostolic majesty, while shutting them up in their separate cells, that they were hereafter to see only the four walls (these particulars are given by the abbé in the form of a quotation, as if from some official document), that they were to hear no news

of persons or of things, their names were not to be pronounced even by the jailers, and that in dispatches addressed to the court, they were only to be designated by the numbers on their cells; that they were not to know what was become of their families or of each other; and this situation being one likely to suggest thoughts of suicide, they were to be debarred the use of knives, forks, or other instruments of self-destruction. It is difficult," says the abbé, "to weigh beforehand and to estimate all the different degrees of cruelty with a more ferocious Machiavelism; and the Austrian ministers rivalled, on this occasion, the very committees and Jacobins of 1793."

The abbé, in the remainder of his account, seems quite alive to every fault, failing, and mistake, that can be imputed to La Fayette, and he does not omit to state them,—"that his speculative notions were ill digested; that he wanted energy, was sanguine, confident, fond of celebrity, too ready to assimilate his countrymen to the Americans, but at the same time," he observes to his praise (I quote the words), "that he never violated any moral principle, would enter into no association with bad men, no connexion with Mirabeau; that he kept the Duke of Orleans in order; opposed steadily all the agitators who sheltered themselves under the authority of that prince; saved the royal family on a night of disorder and bloodshed; in the midst of the commission of crimes, was guilty of none himself; resisted them, prevented many of them, grieved deeply over those which he could not prevent; that he endeavoured to protect Louis XVI. when attacked by the Girondists, but saw all his advances repelled by the confidential counsellors of that feeble monarch; that when proscribed and obliged to fly, he fled not, like another Arnold, for vengeance to the enemy; that when at the height of his popularity, he never abused it; that, sprung from one of the most noble families, he made every sacrifice of his privileges and feudal rights to liberty and the welfare of his fellow citizens; that his voice was always raised, in the most disinterested and courageous manner, in favour of the oppressed; that his conduct, truly national, was never otherwise for a single day during thirty years of revolution; and the abbé therefore concludes, that in this citizen is to be found one of the most noble characters of modern times. These

are the expressions of the Abbé de Montgaillard, not an historian on the popular side, and after he had carefully enumerated and censured fully all the faults that can be objected to La Fayette.

Such, then, are the sentiments of historians and writers who treat of the Revolution of France,—Bertrand de Moleville, Toulongeon, the Two Friends of Liberty, Thiers, and, lastly, the Abbé de Montgaillard.

We will now turn from France to England. Observe what passed, on the subject of La Fayette, in our House of Commons. The constitution of government in our own country being mixed, there must necessarily be found high principles of government and low in the houses of legislature and in the nation; and as I am now endeavouring to illustrate the nature of the former (the high principles), and to show how unjust, how unfeeling, they may sometimes become, and have always a tendency to become, I shall refer you to the motions made by General Fitzpatrick on the subject of his friend, La Fayette. On the 17th of March, 1794, he moved an address to his majesty, requesting his interference with the king of Prussia. What then, it may be asked, in the first place, said the minister, the son of the great Lord Chatham, and who had begun his political career with the most furious invectives against the authors and conductors of the American war?

He said everything that it is painful to read. All that can be alleged for him in excuse is, that he had scarcely appeared as a patriot, when he became a minister; and that by habits of office, and the alarm occasioned by the progress of the French Revolution, he was rendered insensible, on this occasion, to all the better notions of his education and natural intuitions of his understanding. There is no pleasure in reading the short abstract of his speech, given in the debates; it might have been made by the most vulgar minister that ever appeared. He argued, in the most unfeeling manner, against the impropriety of an interference, so unusual and extraordinary; but this paltry reasoning was well dismissed, when he proceeded to say, that he could never admit that La Fayette and his three friends ever were the friends of true liberty, or deserved well of their country or of Europe. It would have been more manly to have rested his opposition at

once on this issue, than to have talked of the impropriety of our setting ourselves up, as he called it, as the guardians of the consciences of foreign states; it would have been more manly, for it would have been more consistent probably with his real feelings on this occasion, and he needed not to have degraded his own free country to the level of the arbitrary governments of the continent, and supposed the rights of human nature, and the cause of freedom, were no better understood in the one than in the other.

Mr. Burke was not likely, at this period of the Revolution (in 1794), so late a period, to be behindhand in unreasonableness on an occasion like the present; and he considered it as fair to observe, that there were upwards of six thousand prisoners, men, women, and children, lying on straw, and perishing in the prisons of France and of Paris for the want of the necessaries of life; that La Fayette was the principal author of all their misfortunes, and of all the misfortunes that had befallen France, and therefore however much other gentlemen might pity him, he certainly was not the object of *his* compassion; that this extraordinary affectation of sorrow for the lot of one culpable individual was ill-placed, ridiculous, and preposterous; that with regard to the right this man had to rebel against his lawful sovereign he would say nothing, but that the ruin, of which he had been the promoter, had, at length, overwhelmed himself, and he trusted that his downfall would be a lesson to mankind, how any of them attempted to overturn the fabric of civilized society, lest they should also become the victims of their own rashness; that La Fayette had brought back the king and queen from Varennes, had imprisoned them at Paris, and had thus sown the seeds of republicanism, which were to ripen to his own destruction; that he had never supported royalty; that he was the first who had led an army of Sans-culottes against that king who had released him from a prison, and sent him to America to command his armies. And he concluded with observing, that the present was the most extraordinary application he had ever heard made; that it was made in behalf of the author of numerous horrors; that the Abbé de Foulon, son to M. Foulon, was now in London; that he often declared, " that he would be revenged of La Fayette; that it was he that had had his

father murdered; that it was he who tore out and devoured his heart." "I would not," concluded Mr. Burke, "debauch my humanity by supporting an application like the present, in behalf of such a horrid ruffian."

Such were the reasonings and expressions of Mr. Burke on this striking occasion. So entirely was the mind of this extraordinary man now (in 1794) over-excited and overthrown; so entirely estranged from all those elevated feelings, and that spirit of philanthropic wisdom, which have made his speeches in the American contest, and many paragraphs of his Reflections on this Revolution of France, so justly the admiration of mankind.

The motion of the general was negatived by one hundred and fifty-three to forty-six; and it was nearly three years before he ventured again to address the house in the cause, as it must surely be now thought, of humanity and freedom. During this period the case had become more shameful. A history of cruelties was now to be given (you will find them in the general's speech), cruelties shown not only to La Fayette, but to his faithful wife and affectionate daughters; cruelties the most vexatious and unmeaning, and yet of the most exquisite kind, such as it is unaccountable how they could have been even conceived, much less perpetrated, by the regular ministers of any civilized European government. It cannot be supposed, that the emperor himself could have known them; and General Fitzpatrick had a perfect right to say, that he argued this measure on the ground of policy as well as humanity; for it was a fatal policy, he said, for those who were desirous of creating a preponderance of opinion in favour of monarchical forms, to exhibit to the world flagrant instances of barbarity and oppression, which could not fail to excite an indisposition towards those governments under whose authority it was exercised. He proceeded to state the case as it then stood; and it is one only fitted to be brought forward by demagogues and Jacobins in alleviation of their own excesses. See, they would say, what these regular governments are; see what are their cruelties and oppressions, committed deliberately and in cold blood, not as ours are, when we are goaded to madness by the approach of invaders, who would rob us of our liberties and our lives.

It is astonishing to find a man like Mr. Pitt consent to have his feelings and his understanding so submitted and chained down by the trammels of his connexions at home and abroad, as to continue to hold the same disgraceful language that he had before done; disgraceful alike to his own free country, and his own superior mind: "that the house was in possession of no facts which authorized them to take any decided step on the occasion; that there was nothing to satisfy them that the detention of La Fayette was a circumstance at all to be influenced by their authority; that however their humanity may be interested, considered as a question of political relations, it was not one which came at all within their cognizance."

Well, indeed, might his high-minded opponent, Mr. Fox, observe, "When a war is pretended to be undertaken to defend religion, justice, and social order, is it possible, while such unheard-of cruelty exists, while it is perpetrated by one of the allies co-operating for these objects, and exercised towards the person of a warm friend to limited monarchy, a martyr to that cause and to his principles, is it possible that these objects can be prosecuted with success; that the confederates can merit any confidence in their sincerity? It is *not* enough to vindicate the honour of this country from a partnership in so vile a transaction, that we are told by the right honourable gentleman that Great Britain is perfectly free from any part of the blame. We should declare by that intercession, which we ought to make with our ally, that we are wholly unconcerned; that, so far as lies in our power, we have done every thing to vindicate ourselves from the infamy, and to remedy the injustice. Is it contrary to the rights of independent states, and the usage of nations, to intercede with an ally in the cause of humanity? Many instances have occurred, where the intercession has met with success, and none is to be found where it gave offence. Will the house look to the treatment of General La Fayette without emotions of sympathy, or turn from his sufferings without feelings of execration? If they refuse to yield to those natural and generous sentiments, which his history and his misfortunes are calculated to inspire, they are callous to every feeling which can dignify the human character. To La Fayette can be

imputed none of the horrors which have disgraced the Revolution in France. He acted only in the first times of the Revolution; he participated in none of the atrocities which succeeded. If the minister should show himself dead to humanity and to the glory of the country, I hope the house will feel with their constituents, and rescue from oppression a person so long the sport of adversity, and the victim of despotism."

To this speech of Mr. Fox, and a most powerful speech it must have been, Mr. Windham replied, taking much the same ground that Mr. Burke had done on the former occasion; and having now at this late period (1797), like Mr. Burke in 1794, lost, it may be supposed, all his original sensibilities in the cause of freedom, he exhibited the high principles of government in the same or even in a still more disgusting form: "That La Fayette had brought himself into that state, into which all fomentors of great and ruinous revolutions must necessarily fall; that he had betrayed and ruined his country and his king; that he was the author of infinite calamities; that this no one would deny; of what his motives had been, that there was no proof; that there was no more presumption in favour of his innocence, than there was in the favour of any other persons who were concerned in that horrible transaction; that there were many besides La Fayette who, viewing their sufferings in naked abstraction, would excite compassion; for instance, the gentleman, named Collot d'Herbois: he was condemned to Guiana. If we were to abstract the sufferings of the wretch from the crimes that led to it, we could not but wish him rescued from such misery. We would say (perhaps as others may say in nearly similar cases), 'It is true, Collot d'Herbois killed many thousand people; it is true, that when the guillotines were insufficient, and the executioners were fatigued with putting them to death, he sent them, for more speedy dispatch, into a great square, where he fired upon them with cannon, and ordered in a party of cavalry to cut and trample to death the few who had escaped the guns; but it is also true, that the thing is passed, and that the men are in their graves, and cannot be brought to life again. Poor Collot! He is not the better for being in Guiana: what is the use of it? Let us send for him

and bring him home. How can men of feeling think of prolonging the punishment of poor Collot d'Herbois?' This," Mr. Windham said, "was a perfect illustration of that false humanity by which gentlemen wished the house now to be guided." And at the conclusion of his speech he observed, "that the most just vengeance was due chiefly to those who, abounding in all good things, would, for their own vile purposes, sport with the happiness of mankind, and play the deep and damnable game of ambition. He would not be sorry, indeed he should rejoice, to see such men drink deep of the cup of calamity which they had prepared for the lips of others; and that he never would consent to do an act which would put a premium on revolution, give the example of sanction to treason, and of reward to rebellion."

The debate was concluded by Mr. Dundas, who thanked Mr. Windham for his very powerful speech, and the division was little better than before, one hundred and thirty-two to fifty, instead of one hundred and fifty-three to forty-six.

The references that I have now made (not wishing to take my own opinion for granted), first to passages in the historians of the Revolution, and lastly to the fate and fortunes of La Fayette, and the treatment he received, not only on the continent, but in our own House of Commons, will, I think, sufficiently illustrate my position:—first, of the indisposition, the dislike, the hatred, which the rulers of mankind show to the general principles of freedom, those rulers who bear sway on the continent; and secondly, I am sorry to say, of the same indisposition to the cause of freedom shown even by those who are the assertors of high notions of government in our own country. What but this indisposition to freedom can account for such large divisions against General Fitzpatrick's motions? It is to be observed, indeed, that though a motion may not be carried, one can often see clearly that the sense and independence of the house is with the minority; but in this case, the proportions were much the same as on other questions during the revolutionary war, and the house tolerated such passages as I have quoted from Mr. Burke, and even those from Mr. Windham. The question must have been made a mere party question, and the supporters of the government must have voted with them in spite of every

consideration of justice and humanity: they might, at least, have absented themselves from the division.

The unhappy queen of France may be forgiven if she shows no proper comprehension of a great subject like this—of the nature of freedom and the rights of its assertors; but what are we to say, in the first place, to the statesmen of the continent, men who should meditate and understand the nature of human affairs and human passions, of government and its concerns; and still more, what are we to think of the very eminent men of the popular assembly of our own country, our ministers, our cabinet, our distinguished orators, setting all candour, and reason, and philosophy, and history, at defiance; making no distinctions of persons, places, or times, and libelling, by their sweeping invectives and anathemas, all the virtuous assertors of liberty not only in France, but all the wise, and the good, and the brave, of our own free land; which neither is nor ever could have been free, if the sentiments that degrade their speeches had been generally admitted into the bosoms of our forefathers? The truth is, that as democratic men disgrace the principles of freedom by their wild and declamatory invectives against all men in authority, whether civil or religious; as they disgrace their principles by their employment of mobs, and by their counsels of blood, their insurrections, and their massacres; so do men like those I have been alluding to, the assertors of high principles of government, men who suppose themselves the defenders of order, of the peace of the community, of the morals, virtues, and religion of mankind, so do these men disgrace their cause, by denouncing the assertors of freedom under whatever form they appear; and by imputing to them exclusively, the evils which may be produced by various untoward and unexpected contingencies, such as occur in human affairs, and such as are mainly produced, it must be added, by the assertors of high principles themselves, who will show no timely sympathy with the best interests of the community; who will improve nothing; who neither know nor can be taught their own duties, and the rights of their fellow creatures; who are callous to every representation that can be made to them; and who exercise their ingenuity, like Mr. Windham, only to justify abuses, disguise oppression, and ridicule those sacred feelings

of the human heart, for which men have died in dungeons, or perished on the scaffold or in the field.

Of this unhappy indisposition to all generous and elevated wisdom in those who bore rule in France and on the continent, the whole of the history of the French Revolution gives ample testimony; the whole is unintelligible without taking this circumstance into account. I cannot exhibit to you the detail, but I would wish to leave upon your memory the leading points which I have mentioned:—that, first, the maxim of the higher orders was, "all or nothing," "tout ou rien," that is, at all events, a counter-revolution; secondly, that they ruined Necker's measure of the 23rd of June, 1789; thirdly, that they produced the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick; and fourthly, that La Fayette was never treated, neither his motives nor his conduct, with even the common decency of candour and justice. Dumourier, indeed, who joined the Jacobins in the crisis of their fate, after the 10th of August, and was the chief reason why La Fayette failed, and was obliged to fly, Dumourier, indeed, was received, and died in honour, or something like it, in England, for he had not originally asserted the cause of freedom; but La Fayette, who had been guilty of first feeling for the situation of his country, though he hazarded his life afterwards for the monarchy, was left unpitied in his dungeon, from which he was only at last rescued by the very republicans of France, whose opinions he had endeavoured to put down.

Such was then the general tone and manner of the rulers of France and of the continent, whenever their real dispositions could be seen. We say, that this conduct never ceased to be blamable in the high party of France from the first of the Revolution; in the allied courts, not clearly from the first, but decidedly more and more imprudent as the Revolution proceeded, and at last totally indefensible: for the publication of the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto, when coupled with a positive invasion of the country, left no hope in the minds of intelligent men for the interests of mankind, but in the disgrace of their counsels, and the defeat of their armies. And having called your attention to such particulars as I have mentioned, it is in vain to refer to the prior manifestoes and state papers that issued from the combined powers. Nothing

can be more reasonable and true than the descriptions they give of the ferocious party in France, and particularly in Paris; and nothing more reasonable and true than the observations they make in their able manifesto of the 4th of August, 1792, on the French Revolution:—

First, As it personally regarded his Most Christian majesty —which is the first part of the manifesto.

Secondly, As it respected the French nation.

Thirdly, As it respected the princes of Germany who have possessions in France.

Fourthly, As it respects the tranquillity of Europe, and the happiness of all nations.

You will see this state paper in the Annual Register, and it well deserves your study.

All this must be admitted; but observe what the whole comes to. After we have assented to the sentiments expressed, and to the blame imputed to the French patriots and rulers, observe the result; observe how frightful is the close of the whole subject, contained in the last paragraph. In this paragraph it is declared, "that the allied powers were resolved to procure to the king perfect security in some frontier town of his kingdom, and the means of collecting there his family, and the princes his brothers, until his Most Christian majesty could enter his capital, with honour, and enjoy there the satisfaction of seeing his subjects repent, of conferring new favours upon them, of granting them real liberty, and consequently of finding them submissive to his supreme authority." This was to say, in other words, that they were resolved upon effecting an entire and unlimited counter-revolution; and it well behoved those of the king's subjects, who were not disposed "to repent," or be "submissive to his supreme authority," to consider how they or their country were likely to be affected by such a change, as would evidently be produced by the success of the arms of such mediators between them and their sovereign.

And now I must make one observation more, not on the want of all elevation in the sentiment, but on the want of all policy in the conduct of the combined powers. Could any thing but these continual denunciations, issued against the popular party; could any thing but the expected invasion;

could any thing but the visible and immediate approach of the combined armies, have enabled the Girondists, and still more the dreadful demagogues of Paris, to have created such a fervour of opposition, such a determination from the first to resist, and successfully to resist, or to die?

In writers on each side of the question, the revolutionary tide is said to have continually rolled on, so that all opposition to it was vain; and the more modern writers, Mignet and Thiers, the most able of all, have even resolved the whole, very strangely, into a sort of necessity, from which it would have been as useless for the actors in the scene to have endeavoured to escape, as from a decree of Providence. But from whence arose this steadiness and impetuosity of the current; whence but from the language and practices, however intended, of the combined powers; whence but from the terror, that could thus be infused into the people, of a counter-revolution? How came it, that the revolutionary friends of Paris could always engage on their side the physical strength of the population; that even in the interior as well as Paris, imprisonments, murders, every thing and any thing was tolerated that was proclaimed to be necessary to what was called the public safety; in other words, that was necessary to the beating back the enemies of the Revolution, and to the prevention, at all events, of any counter-revolution? Men may lead assemblies and committees, but they must have some appeal to their hearts, some fulcrum on which to rest their engines.

The democratic writer, Bailleul, a member of the Assembly, and a sufferer for some time in one of the prisons, goes through all the dreadful scenes of the Revolution; seems calm and undisturbed; rejects all explanations; and continually refers to some mysterious solution of the whole which is present to his own mind, which seems to reconcile him to every event, and which he condescends not to impart to his reader. If there really be any sense or meaning in this species of ineffable secret (and he is an able writer), what is it but this—that the people had got so inflamed with the love of liberty, so determined on their Revolution, that no other notion could find access to their feelings, and that every other consideration, human and divine, disappeared at the very

approach of it; that the whole community had got into this tremendous situation by the incessant action of hope, of irritation, impatience of opposition, terror of the loss of their object, indignation and rage at their enemies; that the popular leaders and the populace on this occasion were as little in a state of sanity or reflection, as those who are goaded on by the fury of delirious feelings.

I do not think this account at all unreasonable: it is the solution to which the phenomena lead. But in this solution is involved the impolicy, and the objectionable nature of the political opinions of the allied powers and the higher orders in France, who by their menaces, invectives, and hostile demonstrations, never suffered the French people to be at ease about their Revolution, never to get cool; kept urging on the tide with fresh waters of bitterness continually supplied; and at last, by the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto, and by their open invasion, summoned forth all the demons of the storm—terror, and indignation, and hate—to lash the waves into madness. This is no unfair picture of the state of Paris and of France during the months of August and September, 1792. And while the allied powers and all Europe expected that the Duke of Brunswick would have marched to Paris, the demagogues, in and out of the city, could have sent thousands and tens of thousands to perish; like insects that extinguish a flame by their expiring myriads, rather than a counter-revolution should have been effected.

This is not to justify the leaders of the Revolution at this period; this is not to say, that many motives may not have affected their conduct besides those now described; but it is to explain the sources of their influence and power; to exhibit the impolicy of their enemies; to show the means that were put unwarily into their hands; the appeal that they could always make not only to the wild and bad passions of their mobs, but to the reflection of the community. Nor is it now denied, that the early patriots originally, and from the first, gave occasion to irritated and very unfriendly feelings in the combined powers; but when these powers became in their turn unreasonable and violent, and hostile to the very name of freedom, making no excuses for the nature of human passions, and not understanding the rights and fair claims of

their fellow creatures, a reaction was produced, marked by the most tremendous excesses and astonishing events, and for which no solution sufficiently adequate and comprehensive can be given, but that which is thus submitted to your consideration.

From the whole of this lecture, then, you will bear away this impression: that while you are justly detesting the faults and execrating the crimes of the popular party in this French Revolution, you are not to be insensible to the faults of their opponents; that as freedom has had its friends, who managed its cause ill, I condescend not to allude to the low party of the Jacobins, so has it had its enemies, who would not have acceded to its cause, however managed and however recommended to them; that as there are in men popular feelings, that lead to nothing but disorder, misery, and bloodshed, so are there too often in men, elevated by rank, and improved by education, high notions of government, that are quite inconsistent with the rights of mankind; and finally, that as I have presumed in prior lectures to blame the faults of the former description of men, I have thought it but equal justice in the present lecture to bear my humble testimony against those of the latter.

LECTURE XXXIII.

TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF THE KING.

WHEN the Duke of Brunswick, to the astonishment of Europe, was repulsed, and the enemy was now cleared away, the cause of the Revolution was triumphant. The Convention were sitting undisturbed, and without an opponent; the republic was established; the cause of royalty at an end; the king and his family prisoners in the Temple. Here, then, was an opportunity for this great nation to have exhibited still further the virtues of the new character they had assumed, the character of a new republic. It was for the popular leaders now really to have displayed in practice, those high qualities of grandeur and magnanimity which resounded in their speeches, and which, they knew, had so often distinguished those free governments of antiquity which, they affected to imitate and admire. But nothing could ever less deserve the name of magnanimity, than the conduct they now pursued. Their king, surrounded by his family, was before them, disarmed and helpless: they had dethroned him, and committed him to one of their prisons. They had appealed to the nation, and the answer had been, the Convention; an assembly where, as they saw, his name could no longer be even mentioned: the victory was their own, and complete. And what, then, was the course which these new Romans pursued? Did they dismiss their Tarquin? Did they desire him to fall back into the rank of private citizen? Did they throw wide his prison doors, and say, that though he had offended, the nation forgave him, and he might retire; that he would go to America if he was a wise man, and, happy in the enjoyment of his private virtues, trouble them, no more; that he might go to Vienna if he was a bad man; but that they feared him not. Was this their language and

their conduct? Was it in this way that they evinced how deeply were impressed upon their minds the elevated sentiments of the first great exhibitors of vindictive liberty among mankind? How lamentable, how miserable was the reverse! They instituted a public trial; they deliberately put their king to death: neither in their justice nor in their humanity could they find any other alternative. He was a tyrant, and must therefore die; he had been guilty of treason, and could only expiate his fault by his blood. His queen was afterwards to be executed and his sister; and the weak constitution of his child was to be taken advantage of, and he was to be slowly murdered in the prison by ill usage.

Such is the general history. But you must hear the detail of these things; those of you more particularly who are of ardent minds, and of impetuous passions, "proud of imagined right," and capable, perhaps, of the noblest efforts; you must hear the detail of these things, that you may mark the progress of the new opinions, that at this period of history had got possession of this great kingdom; how, as you have seen in the Constituent Assembly, from unnecessary opposition to the crown they first mounted into unreasonable jealousy; then hurried, in the Legislative, into undistinguishing hostility; and at last in the Convention, as you will now be called upon to see, sunk into counsels of brutality and blood.

These terms are not too severe, when applied to the conduct of the Convention on the present occasion.

It may be said, indeed, that as the course of the Revolution, right or wrong, had produced a republic, there was no alternative remaining but to put the king out of the way.

The fact, however, was, that the particular character and virtues of the king left a milder alternative not only possible, but far more politic, even if humanity and justice were out of the question. He and the family might have been transferred to America with perfect safety to the new French republic; and this was the course recommended by Paine, who will not be suspected of any inordinate attachment to royalty. The royal cause could not perish with the life of the king; his brother was even then in Germany; a civil war was much more likely to break out in consequence of the king's barbarous execution, than of his peaceful banishment. The

foreign powers, whose armies had invaded France, and been once repulsed, were far more likely to return with inextinguishable fury in the former case than in the latter; and England, the only power whom the revolutionists wished to propitiate, was sure to join the general confederacy if the king was put to death, though very possibly not otherwise.

On the whole, the revolutionists might choose to outrage, as they did outrage, the feelings of every thinking man out of France, the most ardent friends of freedom included; they might be hurried on by I know not what blind and remorseless spirit of revolutionary fanaticism; but their counsels are then not those of policy or state necessity, but, as we have just termed them, of brutality and blood.

The great injustice of the popular party in France was from the first not to have distinguished the king himself from the court that surrounded him. Never was such an abuse of language as to denominate Louis a tyrant. Recall to your mind, for a moment, the principal measures of his reign; you will have to mark hereafter how they were misrepresented by the Convention in their act of accusation. Often may be seen, in the conduct of the king, a want of confidence in himself, a want of character; but the notions of a tyrant, never. We may mourn, we may be even provoked, to see his injudicious facility; but of the indignation that is to conduct a ruler to the scaffold, he is never for a moment the object.

It is indeed clear, from Bertrand de Moleville, that projects for a counter-revolution were formed, and presented to the king at different times; but it is quite certain that the king never meant a civil war, nor any thing that could in fair construction be considered as treason to the state. He thought, no doubt, that he could, with demonstrations from the foreign powers, awe the factious, and enable the well-disposed to come forward, and have their proper influence in his favour and in favour of the country; but he went no further. I have already admitted that even this was, in strictness, not only a mistake, but a fault. As Louis, however, was brought to a trial, his fate could only be determined by the evidence that could be produced. This evidence was vague, irregular, and inadequate to the charge; and the accusation of treason, whether legally considered, as it appeared on the trial, or

morally considered, as we can now survey it in our studies, will be found to have been exaggerated outrageously; and urged to his destruction most ferociously.

But before I allude to the trial and fate of the king, I must recall to your mind the observation I have already made, that Louis had not intruded himself into the high situation in which he was placed by any choice of his own; he was born a king, and had not become one voluntarily. The faults of his character, that in ordinary times might scarcely have appeared, should excite regret rather than indignation; certainly should not interfere with the compassion which his sufferings and his fate so naturally inspire. We may blame those who voluntarily assume high offices and are found inadequate to their duties, but this was not the case of Louis; he was born, as I must repeat, he was born a king.

When the Convention proceeded to the question of the treatment of the king, Morrison, a deputy from La Vendée, made a very able argument to show that the king could not legally be brought to any trial.

The strength of the argument lay in the terms of the constitution to which all had sworn. The words were as follows:—

"The person of the king is inviolable and sacred. If the king should put himself at the head of an army, and direct its force against the nation, or should not oppose himself by a formal act against any such enterprise if executed in his name, he shall be judged to have abdicated the throne.

"After the abdication, express or legal, the king shall be considered as in the class of citizens, and may then, like them, be accused or tried for all acts *posterior* to his abdication."

Nothing could be more clearly decisive of the whole question before the Assembly than these words. It might be matter of question, whether the Legislative Assembly was justified in imprisoning, and the Convention in dethroning him, particularly without any regular inquiry or trial; but even admitting that they could, their pains and penalties could go no further. He had fallen into the class of private citizens, and since the period of his abdication could have committed no offence, for he had been a prisoner vigilantly watched in the Temple.

The speeches that you will see follow are in fact employed only in endeavouring to escape from this unanswerable argument. The celebrated Barrère (celebrated, I mean, for his powers of special pleading, and of resolving every thing he chose into invisible dust) was obliged to contend, that if the king had been at the head of an army, *then* indeed he would have incurred the penalty of the law, and the penalty, according to the terms of the constitution, must have been "abdication;" but as he had offended far *more* grievously, as he had much *more* endangered the safety of the state by underhand machinations and correspondence with the enemy, he must be considered as having incurred some *greater* penalty, and that penalty could only be, death.

All the speeches are full of ability, and highly worthy your perusal. Every consideration that could be connected with the fate of the king was placed in every possible point of view by the ingenuity and eloquence of the different speakers; but there seems to have been only four of the duputies who had the firmness to speak against the decree for the trial. The Girondists wished to save the king, but were either unjust enough to suppose he deserved death, or cowardly enough to profess that opinion out of regard to their own safety; or, finally, suffered themselves to be actuated by what they thought the best policy of the case. What indeed this might be, what was the best course to be pursued by those who wished well to the king, it might not be very easy to say, amid the general storm of malignity and enthusiasm that raged against him; but it was not a very promising mode of defending the king's life, to begin with acknowledging that he deserved death.

Robespierre at last appeared in the tribune, on the 3rd of December. His speech was long, made a great impression, and, though it has not been the custom to consider this dreadful man as an orator, it is in vain, after reading this speech, or his other speeches at this period, to deny him the praise of eloquence.

"Louis," said he, "was king; and the republic is now founded. By these simple words is the celebrated question, which now occupies you, at once decided. Louis has been dethroned for his crimes. Louis denounced the French people as rebels. To chastise them, he called together the armies of

the tyrants, his brothers; but victory and the people have decided that it was *he* only who was the rebel. Louis cannot, then, be judged; he has been already judged; he is already condemned, or the republic is not absolved. To propose to make a process of trial for Louis XVI., in whatever form or manner, is to retrograde, and fall back again into royal and constitutional despotism. The very idea is counter-revolutionary, for it is to bring the Revolution itself into question. In truth, if Louis can still be the proper object of a trial, Louis may be acquitted, he may be pronounced innocent;—what do I say?—he must even now be presumed to be so, till he has been adjudged the contrary. And if Louis then is absolved, and if Louis can be presumed innocent, what becomes of our Revolution? If Louis be innocent, the friends of liberty are all calumniators; the traitors to the kingdom are all the friends of truth and the defenders of oppressed innocence; the manifestoes of foreign courts are all only lawful protestations against a domineering faction; the very detention which Louis has to this moment suffered is an unjust vexation; and the Fédérés, the people of Paris, all the patriots of the French empire, are guilty; and this grand question, pending now before the tribunal of nature, between crime and virtue, between liberty and tyranny, is at last decided, and in favour of crime and tyranny."

And again. "When a nation has been obliged to have recourse to the right of insurrection, she enters again into the state of nature, as far as the tyrant is concerned. How is he to invoke the social compact? He has annihilated it. It may exist, if the nation choose, between the citizens, in regard to each other, but the effect of tyranny and insurrection is entirely to break it, in regard to the tyrant; it is to constitute the two parties, the people and the tyrant, in a state of war. Tribunals, judiciary processes, these are intended for the members of the community. It is a gross contradiction to suppose that a constitution can preside over the new order of things; it would be to suppose that it can survive itself. What, then, are the laws that are to replace the constitution? Those of nature, those that are the basis of society, the good of the people. The right of punishing a tyrant, and dethroning him, is the same thing; the one admits but of the

same forms as the other. The process of trial of a tyrant is the insurrection; his judgment is the downfall of his power; his punishment is that which the liberty of the people requires. The people judge not as judiciary tribunals judge; they pronounce no sentence, they launch their thunder, they condemn not their kings, they reduce them to their original nonentity. And better is *their* justice than that of tribunals. If it is for their safety that they arm themselves against their oppressors, how are they to be bound to adopt a mode of punishment by which their safety may be again endangered.

"Where was ever the republic in which the punishment of the tyrant was made a matter of question? Was Tarquin called into judgment? What would they have said at Rome, if there had been Romans who had dared to declare themselves his defenders? And what do *we* do? We actually call advocates from every place to plead the cause of Louis XVI. Just Heaven! all the ferocious hordes of despotism are preparing to lacerate anew the bosom of our country, in the name of Louis XVI. Louis still contends with us from the depths of his prison; and here we are, doubting whether he is guilty, and whether we may treat him as an enemy. We are asked, Where are the laws to condemn him? The constitution is invoked in his favour. I shall not repeat all the unanswered arguments that have been produced by those who have condescended to combat this species of objection; I shall address but one word more, to those whom they have failed to convince. The constitution, then, I say, forbids your doing every thing that you have done. If Louis could be punished by dethronement, you had no right to pronounce any such sentence without having first called him to his trial; you have not the right to detain him in prison: he has a right to demand his enlargement, and damages for the injury he has received. The constitution condemns you. Go, fall at the feet of Louis, and invoke his clemency. For myself, I should blush to discuss more seriously these constitutional quiddities. I leave them to the schools of the palace, or rather, the cabinets of London, of Vienna, or Berlin. I know not how to stand long discussing, when I am convinced that it is a disgrace even to deliberate."

"But now comes a new difficulty. And it may be thought that the pain of death is too cruel. I have been always against the punishment of death, for it cannot be necessary to society that for ordinary crimes any individual should die. But a king dethroned in the midst of a Revolution—a Revolution, that is any thing but cemented by the laws; a king, the very name of whom brings down upon the nation the scourge of war: neither imprisonment nor exile can render the existence of a king a matter of indifference to the public weal. And this cruel exception to all ordinary laws which justice acknowledges, can be imputed only to the nature of his crimes. It is with regret that I pronounce the fatal truth; but Louis must die, that the country may live."

"I propose to you to determine instantly on his fate. I demand that the Convention declare him from this moment traitor to the French nation, and a criminal to humanity. I demand that he be made an example to the world, on the very place where died, on the 10th of August, the generous martyrs of liberty. I demand that this memorable event be consecrated by a monument, destined to nourish in the heart of the people a sentiment of their rights, and a horror of tyrants; and in the soul of tyrants a salutary terror of the justice of the people."

I must leave these few extracts to give you some general idea of the speech of this atrocious man. It was long, and produced a great effect; it failed, however, of its immediate object, for the opinion given by Pétion at last prevailed, and it was decreed, that Louis should be, not immediately sent to the scaffold, but tried by the National Convention.

On the 10th of December, therefore, a report was made by Lindet, a committee was formed, and a regular accusation drawn up; the king was summoned to the bar, and without any previous notice of the questions, was required to give his answers; these questions or heads of indictment having been deliberately agreed upon by his enemies.

This portion of the general subject I do not now enter into. The whole trial, the questions put to the king and his answers, and the defence of his counsel, have been all published, and you will easily find them and naturally read them.

But when you come to look at the trial, you will see that it

was carried on by a personal examination of the king, by question and answer.

There is a great difference of opinion between the French and English lawyers on occasions of this nature. The great object to be accomplished, say the French, is, that the guilty shall not escape; the great object, say the English, is, that the prisoner shall be properly protected. The great point, says the one system, is, the discovery of the truth; truth, says the other, must not thus be sought: the life of a man is not to depend on his own firmness of nerves and quickness of faculties, nor on the moderation and fairness of the judge, who, if made an examiner, may, or rather must, soon be converted into an advocate and accuser. I confess that humanity and good sense seem to me to be with the English system. Look at our own state trials, and consider the scenes that have occurred. See what the tendencies of judges and advocates are. Observe the questions that, even on such an occasion as this, the trial of the king of France, were asked by the court before whom he appeared.

"Who are the members of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies that you have corrupted?"—"Who are the persons that have presented you with projects?"—"Who are those to whom you have promised money?"—"You have spent millions in concert with Tulon and Mirabeau to produce counter-revolutions in the provinces, and you have endeavoured to turn your popularity into a means of enslaving the people; what have you to answer?—And was it not for the same reason that you gave money to the workmen of the Faubourg St. Antoine?—And was it not to ascertain the public feeling on the subject of your going to St. Cloud, that you feigned indisposition?"

Upon this system of question and answer, a trial, instead of proceeding upon distinct issues, regularly announced, exclusively adhered to, and distinctly proved by testimony, has a tendency to become a sort of conversation, where the faults of all present, judges, advocates, and audience, the faults whether of understanding or of temperament, may, or rather must, come into play, and extremely to the injury of the prisoner; nor is it proper for any system of law to place a human being in these cruel dilemmas, between a regard to his

own life and an attention to the care of his veracity and of his moral feelings.

These observations I throw out for your consideration; but on the whole of this examination of Louis, it may surely, I think, be said, that the questions were not confined each to a distinct point, and were not, therefore, such as an accused person might instantly and entirely gather up in his mind and reply to, but were questions, the matter of which was spread over a large surface—questions that required, many of them, the speech of an advocate properly to discuss and answer, and were totally unfair and unfit to be addressed to the king, when suddenly called, without any notice or preparation, to make, *vivâ voce*, a defence of the acts of himself and his government during a revolutionary period.

Again. It must be observed that the questions of the Convention seemed to take it for granted that any resistance to the popular party, from the first opening of the states in 1789, was treason to the state; that the varying leaders of this popular party were on every occasion not only right, but so infallibly right, that the assertion of any contrary opinion was such an indication of all want of patriotism, that it was to be considered as a crime, and to be punished even with death: it was taken for granted that men were to be allowed, at the end of a Revolution, to start up, and, with such inflamed feelings and notions as they themselves *then* entertained, try those who had appeared at the *beginning* of a Revolution, and who naturally proceeded upon such notions and feelings as existed in themselves and those around them at the *earlier* period in which they were called upon to act.

In addition to these observations, it may, I think, be remarked, that the king's enemies, in and out of the Convention, after all their diligence, ability, and virulence, the activity of their agents, their papers found in the iron closet and elsewhere; though all the transactions at issue were transactions of yesterday, and done in the very presence of themselves and their friends; though it was dangerous for a single human being to give fair evidence in favour of the king, while there was every temptation for men to misrepresent and vilify him; still, that there was not a single act to be found in which he had attempted to carry his own opinions

into effect by positive force; they could not produce evidence of a single call that he had made on the allied powers for assistance, of a single order which he had given for the troops to fire upon the people, a single threat or menace offered to any popular leader, a single instance of arbitrary imprisonment of any one member, or of arbitrary punishment of any one libellist; not a single example could be shown of sternness, severity, or vindictive feeling in the conduct of the king; and all this through a period of four years, during which every thing had occurred that could irritate the feelings of any man educated under an arbitrary system, called when young to exercise the functions of an arbitrary monarch, and from the first and at all times surrounded by relatives, friends, and counsellors brought up under the same arbitrary system, and with no feelings, no comprehensions of propriety and right, that were not derived from it.

I do not conceive that this is at all to overstate the case before you.

You will reflect, therefore, on the proceedings that you have already been called to notice, and observe hereafter those that are immediately to ensue.

The king retired (as indeed he was told he might do), but the appearance he had made on his trial, the dignified resignation of his manner, and the artless promptitude and reasonableness of his answers, made an evident impression on some of his audience; and there were those of his enemies who were almost afraid that some explosion of applause would have been witnessed from the multitude in the tribunes: but, at this distance of time and place, we can little conceive how dreadful was the system of terror then established in Paris—how dreadful, and how complete. The populace were inflamed by pamphlets and handbills, and by the speeches of orators in the streets and public places, who were hired for the purpose: the Jacobins, in and out of the Convention, were every where in a state of fury: and though the Girondists wished to save the life of the king, they were overawed or overwhelmed, or unable to determine what course it was best to pursue, amid the general uproar of malignity that unhappily prevailed against him.

The king had been kept by the Convention ignorant to the

last of any intention of examining him; and he was then hurried to their bar, to answer, as he might, questions that had been deliberately drawn up by a select committee, and afterwards corrected and enlarged by the whole Assembly. Upon his retiring to his prison, it actually became a question, owing to the violence of some of the deputies of the Mountain, as it was called, whether he should be allowed counsel, a privilege that the constitution had in every case permitted. The agitation and tumult were extreme. A decree, however, to that effect was at length passed. Target declined the honour, which the king by his choice had conferred on him, on account of his age and infirmities; but the public (ready censurers when any meanness can be suspected) would admit of no reasons of the kind, and his conduct was universally and justly reprobated. Lamoignon Malesherbes, on the contrary, volunteered his services, when past the age of seventy; for "he had been," he said, in his letter to the Convention, "twice called to the counsels of him who was then his master, when the office was an object of ambition to all the world; and he owed him the same service now, when many might think the service but dangerous." This venerable man had been illustrated by a sentence of banishment towards the end of the reign of Louis XV. when he had resisted the court. He had afterwards been minister to the present king, the unfortunate Louis XVI., in the beginning of his reign, and he seems to have been aware that the offer he was now making would probably cost him his life, as in the event it did; but he had resolved, when he saw his unhappy king and master thus hunted down by his merciless enemies, "to follow, to the last gasp, with truth and loyalty." Lally Tollendal, Malouet, and others, were ready, and offered to do the same. Gleams of this kind are reviving amid this dark scene in the history of mankind.

The Convention then decreed (and even after a debate, for no better terms could be procured) that the king might see his children, but not the queen and the princess Elizabeth; nor were the children to see them, if they saw the king, till sentence was pronounced. The unhappy father calmly considered that the children were more necessary to the mother and the princess than to himself, and declined the sort of

favour conceded to him. For what end or purpose was a cruelty like this to be exercised? The Convention were going immediately to try and put him to death; the counsels of the queen could have been of no avail; and yet in the mean time he was not to be allowed the last sad comfort of his existence on this side the grave, the sympathy and support of his wife and sister.

The Assembly had, however, the decency to listen to the request of the two veteran advocates, and a more youthful counsellor, M. De Seze, was added, when the papers had become too multitudinous for their examination; and on him devolved ultimately, the duty to pronounce the defence, a defence that De Seze had to draw up in four nights, while, as he says, the days were employed with his colleagues in looking over the papers. Certainly no proper time was allowed. The defence is not long, and should by all means be read. The king did not choose De Seze to address himself to the imagination or the feelings of his judges, but only to their understandings; and on this supposition, the defence could not be better drawn up than it is. You will find it distinct, compact, and well reasoned.

In the first part of the defence, De Seze insisted upon the inviolability of the king, as others had done before him; and the argument, drawn from the terms and provisions of the constitution, was, as you are aware, quite unanswerable. It was presented by De Seze in every point of view; all the evasions of it, that had been offered by ingenuity and sophistry, were successfully combated, and all, that could be hereafter devised, were anticipated. There was, indeed, no escape possible, from the articles of the constitution.

"The offences of Louis," De Seze observed, "have been foreseen by the constitution, or they have not. If they have not, there is no law that can be applied to Louis; if they have, Louis can only have incurred the penalty of abdication. It is the only penalty mentioned, even when the offence supposed is that of war waged against the nation; an offence that includes every thing, under whatever titles of perfidies to the constitution, &c. &c. that can be urged against him; in all and in every case, the only penalty pronounced is the presumed abdication of sovereignty. Certainly," he continued,

"the nation can now declare that it no longer chooses a monarchical form of government, as the inviolability of the chief is the consequence; but it cannot efface the inviolability which existed while Louis was on the throne. He was inviolable while king; the abolition of royalty can work no alteration in his condition in that respect; all that can result from it is, that you can apply the penalty of abdication; and applying that, you can apply no other. But do you choose to try Louis," he observed, while concluding this head of the defence, "merely as a citizen? Where, then, are all the regulations which the constitution has presented for the protection of every citizen? Citizens! I shall now speak with the freedom of a free man. I look around to find judges among you, and I see only accusers."

These were words in the mouth of the young advocate that did him honour; the words (considering the system of terror by which he was surrounded) of a virtuous courage; they have immortalized his name, and they were not forgotten when the family was, in subsequent times, restored to the throne.

"You are to pronounce, then," he continued, "on the fate of Louis, and it is you yourselves that accuse him; you are to pronounce on the fate of Louis, and your wishes you have already disclosed; you are to pronounce on the fate of Louis, and your opinions are already circulated all over Europe. Shall Louis, then, be the only Frenchman for whom exists neither law nor any of the forms of it? Is he neither to have the rights of the citizen, nor the prerogatives of a king?"

For several days after the defence, the time of the Convention was mostly taken up in hearing the opinions of the members. Those who were desirous of saving the king, or who retained any notion whatever of the general principles of equity and justice, attempted to incline the Assembly to a sentence of confinement during the war, and exile after it. The Girondists were chiefly distinguished in this way: they endeavoured to repair their faults, as far, at least, as the king's life was concerned; they afterwards, on this account, laboured to procure an appeal to the primary assemblies; lastly, to postpone the execution of the sentence; but, as you will hereafter see, it was too late. You will find, that in every

effort they failed. They had, in truth, been preparing the death of the king from the first moment of their meeting him in the Legislative Assembly, and the demons of fury, whom their incantations had summoned up to work their pleasure, would now no longer obey their bidding.

Some of the deputies attempted to make answer to the defence; St. Just and Barrère more particularly. I shall select some paragraphs from the long and elaborate speech of the former. I do so, that you may observe the tone and manner of the enemies of the king; the cruel ingenuity with which every measure of his reign and every event of the Revolution was converted into an accusation against him.

You remember the principal passages in the life of Louis; observe now the colour that is given to them—observe the reasonings of St. Just.

"For the first time under the sun," said St. Just, "since the commencement of history, has the system of the tyranny of a king been that of gentleness and the appearance of goodness. On all occasions has he put himself in the place of the country, and sought to seduce to himself the affections that belong only to that country: a snare this, the more delicate, because, by uniting it to intrigue and concealed violence, Louis supplanted the laws, as well by force as by the refinement of his proceedings, and by the influence that belongs to virtue in misfortune. Those tears that he has shed have not been thrown away; they still fall on the heart of every Frenchman, who cannot conceive all that faithlessness to those who have so long loved him, that faithlessness which meditated their enslavement. The wretch has even afterwards caused to be put to death those who were at the very moment loving him. What outrages has it not been necessary to commit before the people could be undeceived? Neither the flight of the king, nor his protestation, by which he made a sacrifice of liberty, nor his refusal to present himself at the altar of the federation, where the country called him to press him to its heart—nothing could open the eyes of a people who so resolved to cherish him. His sceptre was left him; has he been grateful? What good has he done? How has he reigned? The people have only known liberty by the red flag; and while the government was massacring the

people at Nancy, money could be thrown to them at Paris, and the language could be, 'I wish I had it in my power to do more.' The people, kind and credulous, because it knows neither ambition nor intrigue, would never have hated the prince, if the prince had but respected its rights, and governed with uprightness; but seditions were created to arm the law, accuse the people, and authorize cruelty. It is easy to see that Louis had perceived too late that the extinction of prejudices had been fatal to his tyranny. What movement of conscience, then, was it, that could make him deny his sanction to a decree, where his refusal so exposed the safety of the state? What sort of conscience and religion is that which strips one of all sense of humanity for one's country, and makes one forget that it is for her, not for one's self, that one reigns at all? If what was claimed by the law troubled his conscience, he should have ceased to reign. There is no Deity that would require a man to be a trouble to the earth, and to be perfidious, the better to honour him. Thus, in whatever point of view his conduct can be seen, Louis has deceived Heaven above and deceived men below, and is culpable in the eyes of all.

"You have been told that in the sack of the Tuileries the law did not put under its seal papers that Louis might have opposed to those produced against him. But why has he preserved these papers with such care? Why are they marked off by him? Why did he not reject them with horror? But it would be a pleasure inconsistent with humanity to strike at a guilty person where he is most exposed.

"Pass we on to the 10th of August. The palace was filled with assassins and with soldiers. You know but too well what has passed; the defenders of the king, in their inflammatory representations of it, have outraged all truth. Louis says, that he has not shed the blood of the 10th of August. But what has he done to prevent it? What trait of courage or of generosity can be told of him on that memorable day? He wished, he said (and in this very place), to prevent the commission of a great crime; and what greater crime could he have committed, than the assassination of our citizens? He placed himself in the midst of us; he made his way here by force; here, in this very place, the soldiers that accom-

panied him menaced the representatives of the people. Did he here appear, for a single moment, while in the midst of the tumult, to distress himself with any thought of the blood that was flowing? Ungrateful both to the one party and to the other, the danger of his servants affected him not more than the danger of the people. One shudders when one thinks that a word, that a single word from his mouth, would have stayed the fury of the soldiers; that a word, perhaps, that a hand stretched out, would have calmed the people. I have heard something of an appeal to the people from the judgment which the people is now itself to pronounce by the mouth of us, its representatives. Citizens! if you permit this appeal to the people, you thus say to the people, 'It is a matter of doubt whether your murderer is culpable or not.' When a people has once emancipated itself from oppression, the tyrant is already judged. Every thing will be done to reduce the people to weakness by terror of its own excesses; but this humanity of which we hear, is cruelty to the people; the pardon that they labour to suggest to you, is the sentence of death to liberty; and the people—should the people pardon the tyrant? The sovereign, like the Supreme Being, has he not his moral laws and his laws of eternal justice? And where is the law of nature that can give a sanction to crimes so great? Ask an appeal to the people! What other language could be held, if one wished to save the king, if the gold of the stranger had bribed us? Forget not, that when it is a tyrant who is to be judged, a casting voice will be sufficient to prevent all pardon. This day decides the fate of the republic. There is an end of it, if the tyrant is to remain unpunished. Your country is in the midst of you; choose between her and the king, between the exercise of the justice of the people and of your own personal weakness. Strike a balance, if you please, between the example you owe the world, on the one side, the impulse you ought to give to liberty, the inflexible justice you owe the people; and the criminal pity, on the other side, which you owe to him who never had any pity himself. But if there be any unaffected by what may hereafter be the fate of the republic, let him fall at the feet of the tyrant; let him restore to him the knife, with which he will again sacrifice our fellow citizens, forget his crimes, and make the people say

that there are those who have corrupted us; that we have been rendered less alive to the welfare of the people than to the fate of the assassin. It is not without difficulty that liberty can be obtained; but, situated as we are, it is not for us to fear, it is for us to conquer; and well shall we then triumph. No possible consideration ought to stop the course of justice; she is the companion of wisdom and of victory."

It was thus that a human being, capable, as you see, of every refinement of the understanding, could plead against the life of a fellow creature in the assembly of his fellow men, and could prevail. The speech of St. Just was long, but the paragraphs I have selected will give you, for the present, an adequate idea of its purport and spirit. I need not delay you longer with any reference to the speech of Barrère; I must all along suppose you to read the histories hereafter yourselves.

While such were the speeches in the Convention, the virulence and fury of some of the constituted authorities in Paris were perfectly dreadful. One repulsive instance of it now occurred, to which I will just allude.

Eighteen of the sections presented themselves at the bar, accompanied by the patriots who were supposed to have been wounded on the day of the 10th of August, and by the widows and children of those who had then fallen. The harangues which the speakers of the deputation delivered, were of the following nature. "You see before you," said one of them, "widows, orphans, and mutilated patriots covered with wounds, who are come to demand vengeance. These are the victims who have escaped that death to which Louis the tyrant had devoted them. Hear you not that terrible voice from heaven, which denounces unto you, 'He that sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed?' The tears of these widows, the cries of these orphans, the groans of these mangled citizens, the ghosts of many thousands who have swelled the sacrifice of tyranny, all, through me, repeat the commandment of nature. Louis has proved himself a traitor, forsworn, and an assassin; and yet you go on tediously discussing the question whether he ought to suffer the punishment due to his crimes."

In this manner the speaker proceeded, asking at last permission for a part, he said, of these wretched victims to pass

before the Assembly. Other speakers harangued with even more violence; and at the end, the wounded of the 10th of August were paraded through the midst of the Assembly, and one or two were carried across the hall in a litter. It would be difficult to say how a more unprincipled or deadly blow could have been aimed at the life of the king, or how the perpetrators of this measure could have better deserved the very accusations with which they loaded the unfortunate monarch.

But to proceed. It is observed by Hume, when commenting on the tragical death of our own Charles I., that "between resisting a prince and dethroning him, there is a wide interval; but a very wide one between dethroning and punishing him: that no reader was ever shocked when he read, in ancient history, that the Roman senate voted Nero, their absolute sovereign, to be a public enemy, and even without trial condemned him to the severest and most ignominious punishment; but that when we pass from the case of Nero to that of Charles, the great disproportion," he says, "or rather total contrariety of character, immediately strikes us, and we stand astonished, that among a civilized people so much virtue should ever meet with so fatal a catastrophe." This sentiment of the historian may surely be, with still greater reason, applied to Louis; and, in his instance at least, whatever be our political principles, we may indeed say that we stand astonished, that in such a division of the world as Europe, in such a kingdom as France, and at the end of the eighteenth century, an amiable, benevolent, well-intentioned monarch like Louis, whatever might be his follies or even his faults, could ever be visited by so tremendous a punishment as a violent death. Yet such is the melancholy fact that we have now to witness; and the revolting process of this great national crime I must now briefly allude to. You will see the details in the histories.

On the 15th of January, 1793, each member of the Convention stood up in his place, and gave his answer to the following question:—"Is Louis Capet guilty of a conspiracy against the liberty of the nation, and of attempts against the general safety of the state?" Of the seven hundred and forty-nine members, eight were absent from illness, twenty on some commission, thirty-seven gave their votes and their

reasons at full length, about seven declared that they thought it improper as legislators to give any answer at all, and all the rest answered distinctly in the affirmative. Not one pronounced him innocent. Nor, perhaps, on reflection, will it appear that this could well be expected in a Convention formed on the supposition of a republic, and while communications of some kind or other, whether proved or not, must have been supposed to have existed between the king and the allied powers, or between them and the queen at least, and with his assent.

But the next question was of a different nature, and of more consequence. The Girondists, who had hunted down the king till, on the 10th of August, they had dethroned him, were brought a little to a pause when they witnessed the massacres of September, when they saw the men of blood with whom they had connected themselves, and when they afterwards found that it was not in their power to punish them; they wished not exactly to shed the blood of the king, nor, it may be supposed, did all the members of the Assembly. Ferocious as was the Assembly, and dreadful as were the times, there must, some of them, have come from the bosoms of their families, from the midst of the domestic relations of life, from its joys and sorrows; and, while exposed to the common events of our existence, must have known what it was "to pity and be pitied." The Girondists, therefore, proposed, that the judgment of the constitution, whatever it might be, should be referred to the sanction of the primary Assemblies. They expected from the Convention the verdict of death, and they hoped that in this manner the *execution* of the sentence might be escaped; and this, too, was understood in the Convention. Long and violent debates on the question had agitated the minds of the Assembly and the public. Robespierre and others (Robespierre with great ability) spoke against the question, against the appeal to the people, Vergniaud made a great appearance in favour of it; but the difficulty was no doubt the chance of a civil war, if such a subject as the king's death was thrown out to the public for their decision. The ground which the Girondists had chosen was not the best; the venial nature of the king's mistakes and faults was the only true one: but the more moderate party, if such a term can be any where

applied in such an assembly, had not a sense of duty sufficiently strong, amidst the general reign of terror, to take the most manly, the most honourable, and therefore the safest and best line of policy.

The second question, then, as I have just intimated to you, was this,—Shall the judgment of the National Convention on Louis Capet be submitted to the ratification of the people?

Of the seven hundred and forty-nine members, deducting from this number those that on various accounts did not vote, four hundred and twenty-three voted against the question, that is, against the appeal to the people; only two hundred and eighty-one distinctly for it; which left a large majority of one hundred and forty-two against the king. This vote, too, might be expected, for the reasons I have mentioned,—the danger of a civil war.

The third question, however, was the important one, the nature of the sentence; and it was adjourned to the next day. When the Assembly accordingly met, the first attempt that was made in favour of the king was by Le Hardy; he moved that, as in all other penal cases, Louis should not be adjudged to death but by a majority of two-thirds. Danton was loud in his opposition; every thing, he insisted, of whatever importance (the issues of war, the lives of millions), was decided by a casting vote, and so must, therefore, the life of the king. Lanjuinais replied, with the most admirable force and spirit, "that they went on from one violation of the forms of justice and humanity to another; that the penal code required two-thirds, but that the truth was, that they were now voting amid the poignards and clamours of the factions." The order of the day was, however, carried, and the motion lost. Danton followed up his success by obtaining a decree that the Assembly should not part till they had decided the fate of the king. It was now seven in the evening, and each member in his turn got up, went to the bureau, and, amid the sympathizing sensations of the galleries, gave his opinion separately. The Assembly sat up all the night, and were thus engaged all the next day, till seven the next evening. And it is now that our affliction, that our horror begins (we read the votes that were given)—"Death," "death," "death," seems the eternal word. "Imprisonment till the peace," "banishment," occasionally occur; but the eye, as

it wanders on from one name to another appears to find nothing to meet it but "Death," "death," "death."

What scene is this? we ask ourselves. We have not to do with men on a field of battle, men rushing to the charge of each other, life for life, the victor following him who has just been his opponent; even then, the helpless man that is subdued and flying can sink upon his knees, and as he asks for quarter, can receive it: but it is not the sack of a town, a citadel taken by assault, the rout of an army, that we are contemplating; it is legislators sitting in their Assembly, deliberately, each after the other, pronouncing their opinion; and it is the calm, concentrated triumph of the unsparing cruelty of the human heart. Where are we? we cry. Unfeeling, unjust, unrelenting men that ye are! is there no alternative but death? Would Louis have shed the blood of one of you? Did any harsh, or fierce, or cruel thought ever visit his gentle mind? For what end or purpose this merciless execution? Look around you, and observe what is passing: the Duke of Orleans is voting with you; the contrivers of the massacres of September are voting with you. Look at your galleries: "the abomination that maketh desolate" is set up; the refuse of the night cellars, the fiends and ruffians of your guilty metropolis are applauding you. Is your republic, then, to begin its career with the insurrection of the 10th of August, the massacres of September, and the execution of your yielding, peaceful, benevolent, disarmed, and imprisoned sovereign? Before you proclaim the cause of Liberty, and call present and future ages to her worship, are you to outrage all the feelings of the wise and good, wherever they may be found? Is your object a civil war and a war with all Europe? Are you to shut the gates of mercy on mankind?

But no voice was heard to utter words, like these, of expostulation and reproach; and vain, with too many of the Assembly, were all suggestions of the kind, whether of justice, humanity, or policy. The same fearful sound of "Death, death," was but too continually heard through the long hours of a winter's night. Some there were, no doubt, that shrunk from the last act of barbarity, and on them be such praise as was deserved, bestowed! Duchastel came tottering from his bed of sickness, and voted for the king;

but Vergniaud for ever dishonoured his great faculties by a vote against him. As every member mounted the steps of the bureau, a sort of intense silence waited for the word he was to pronounce; it was heard, and sounds of applause or reprobation re-echoed in the tribunes, and accompanied him in his return to his seat. The deputies could not always command themselves, and a violent and tumultuous interchange of menaces and invectives often ensued, amid the indignation of the more humane voters and the bloodthirsty impatience of the galleries, and of but too many of the members of the Assembly. It was supposed that the votes were nearly equal, that the majority against the king was trifling, if any; and nothing can be conceived equal to the interest that was excited in the Assembly, and in every avenue that led to it, till the numbers could be ascertained. But the fatal truth was at last clear, and the president had to pronounce, that of the members three hundred and eighty-seven had pronounced the word "death," and but three hundred and thirty-four any milder word of banishment, or chains, or even conditional execution.

The king now entered a formal protest against the sentence. "I owe it to my honour," said he, "I owe it to my family, not to subscribe to a sentence which makes me guilty of a crime with which I do not reproach myself. I appeal from the judgment of its representatives to the nation itself."

On the next day, one last despairing effort was made that the sentence should be suspended. But "No, no," was the merciless answer; "No, no: three hundred and eighty to three hundred and ten!" and the fate of the king was, therefore, irrevocably decided.

Such was the termination of all this wild uproar of headlong virulence and injustice, of all this senseless fanaticism of political cruelty.

But another scene must now be shown you. We must turn to the king. While all this tempest of invectives and cries for vengeance was beating on his devoted head, and while St. Just and others were reasoning and speaking in the manner to which I have alluded, the king was himself also employed in considering the past events of his reign, what his intentions had been, and what the faults that he had committed; the treatment that he had received from his friends, his ene-

mies, and his people; his relation to his family, his wife and his children; and, finally, his last and great account with his Creator and his God. He thought of making his will and testament: he had but little worldly wealth now to bequeath; but it soothed his spirit, and properly occupied his thoughts, to prostrate himself in humility and penitence before his own, almighty, and more equitable Judge, and to make a last bequest of his sentiments and opinions to those who might still be found to honour them—those who were now more than ever dear to him, from the final separation that was approaching, and from the thought of that troubled scene in which he was now to leave them.

I will read you passages from this will, and at some length, that you may see fully reflected in this faithful mirror what the king was, even after all the events of the Revolution, and contrast it with what you have already seen of the fury and cruelty of his enemies.

"Having been," he says, "for more than four months shut up with my family in the tower of the Temple, by those who were my subjects, and deprived of every communication even with my family since the 11th of this month; and being moreover involved in a trial, of which, from the passions of men, it is impossible to foresee the event, and for which neither pretext nor precedent can be found in any existing law; having no witness of my thoughts but God, and no one but him to whom I can address myself, I here declare, in his presence, my last will and sentiments."

The first paragraph of the will is of a religious nature, and too solemn to be here recited; but the will afterwards proceeds in the following manner:—

"I beg all those whom I have offended, through inadvertency (for I do not recollect having ever intentionally offended any one), and also those to whom I may have given a bad example, to forgive me for the evil which such conduct may have produced. I beseech all those who are endowed with charity to join their prayers with mine to obtain of God the pardon of my iniquities. I pardon with my whole heart those who have become my enemies without cause, and I pray to God to pardon them; as also those who, from false or mistaken zeal, have done me the greatest injuries. I recommend to God my wife, my children, my sister, my aunts, my bro-

thers, and all those who are attached to me by the ties of blood, or in any manner whatsoever. I earnestly entreat of God to cast the eyes of mercy on my wife, my children, and my sister, who have for a long time suffered with me; and in case of their losing me, that he may be their support and consolation, as long as they shall remain in this perishable world. I recommend my children to my wife: I never doubted her maternal tenderness; and I recommend, above all, that she carefully endeavour to make them good Christians, to teach them to consider worldly grandeur as dangerous and perishable, and to fix their minds on eternity, where alone solid and lasting glory is to be found. I entreat my sister to continue her tenderness to my children, and that she will be to them as a parent, if they should have the misfortune to lose their mother. I beseech my wife to forgive me all those hardships she has undergone on my account, and all the uneasiness I may have given her in the course of our union; and if she should think that she has any cause to reproach herself on account of any part of her conduct towards me, she may rest assured that I retain nothing on my mind unfavourable to her. I recommend, with the greatest earnestness, to my children, after what they owe to God, which must ever be considered as their first duty, to remain always united to each other, submissive and obedient to their mother, and grateful for the pains and care she takes of them; and I conjure them, for my sake, to respect their aunt as a second mother. If my son should ever have the misfortune to be established on the throne, I anxiously recommend that he should devote himself to the happiness of his countrymen; that he should divest himself of all resentments and animosities, particularly those which have a reference to my misfortunes and miseries. He can ensure the happiness of the people only by reigning according to the laws, although, at the same time, a king cannot make himself respected, and do all the good which is in his heart, without a necessary degree of authority, without which he must be confined in his operations; and when he cannot acquire respect, he necessarily becomes more hurtful than useful. I recommend to my son to take care of all those persons who have been attached to me, as far as the circumstances in which he may find himself, shall afford him opportunity. He ought ever to

regard this as a sacred debt, which I have contracted towards the children or parents of those who perished for my sake, or have been rendered miserable on my account. I know there are several persons amongst those who were connected with me, who have not behaved themselves towards me as they ought to have done, and who have even shown ingratitude; but I forgive them (for in times of trouble and effervescence men are not always masters of their conduct); and I beseech my son, should he find an opportunity of serving them, to reflect only on their misfortunes. I wish it were in my power openly to express my gratitude to all who have shown me a truly disinterested attachment; but if I have been painfully affected by the ingratitude and disloyalty of those to whom I have always acted with kindness, I have likewise had the consolation of receiving services and strong marks of attachment from several of my subjects, on whom I never had bestowed any favour: I beg that all those persons will accept my grateful acknowledgments. In the present situation of things, I fear that I might injure them by being more explicit on this subject; but I particularly exhort my son to seek opportunities of making them a suitable return. I think, however, that it would he calumniating the nation to express any fear of openly recommending to my son M. de Chamilly and M. Hue, whose sincere attachment to me has induced them to shut themselves up along with me in this melancholy abode, and who have been frequently in danger of becoming victims to their generosity. I also recommend to him Clery, with whose attention I have every reason to be satisfied since he has been with me; and as he has remained with me to the last, I beg of the commune to give him my clothes, my books, my watch, my money, and all the other effects belonging to me which have been deposited in the hands of the council of the commune. I most willingly pardon those who guarded me, the harshness of their conduct, and the constraint which they thought necessary to impose upon me. I have found in the Temple some persons of feeling and humanity; may they long enjoy that serenity of mind which such dispositions naturally produce! I beseech MM. de Malesherbes, Tronchet, and De Seze, to receive my most grateful thanks and cordial acknowledgments for the pains and labour they have taken for me. I conclude by declaring

before God being ready to appear in his presence, that I do not reproach myself with any of those crimes with which I have been charged."

Such was the testament of Louis. We see here nothing of virulence, animosity, or accusation; no language of invective or blame; all is calmness, resignation, forgiveness, piety; no human passions, no earthly resentments, any longer interfering; the composed and sublimed Christian awaiting his fate, and depending upon his God.

It was in this manner that the king was passing some of his solitary hours about the end of December. The storm grew louder and more violent as the year closed and as the new year advanced. He had listened to the beating of it from his tower; had appeared before the Convention to answer their accusations; his counsel had been heard, and at last the debates had closed, the sentence been pronounced, his protest been received; the official authorities had waited on him to announce his doom; all was now over, and he was to die. It only remained, therefore, for the king to close the last scene of his sufferings with the same composed dignity of behaviour that he had hitherto maintained.

I may shortly allude to a few particulars: you will read the histories. In the account given by Clery, you will see the extraordinary and unmeaning, but most intolerable cruelties, that were exercised upon this unfortunate family by the commune of Paris, in whose charge they were. There are no terms of contempt as well as indignation that would sufficiently appease the heart, while we are contemplating such proceedings. I cannot further refer to them, and I turn rather to the account given us by the Abbé Edgworth. The king named and was allowed to see this venerable ecclesiastic, who might administer to him the offices of religion.

"The moment I saw the king," says the abbé, in the recital that he has drawn up, "a prince once so elevated by fortune, and now so fallen, I was no longer master of myself; tears rolled down my cheeks, and I sunk at his feet, unable to express myself in any language but that of my affliction. The sight of me thus prostrate before him affected him more, far more, than the decree of the Convention, the sentence of death, which had just been read to him. Tears flowed in like manner down the countenance of the king.

"Recovering himself at length—'Pardon,' he cried, 'pardon me this weakness, if weakness it must be called, whatever be the occasion; but I have lived so long in the midst of my enemies, that the sight of a faithful subject like you speaks so differently to my heart, that, spite of myself, it quite unmans me.'" Saying this, he raised the abbé from the ground, and retired with him into an inner room. "No doubt," he cried, "for *me* there is now but one great concern;—what, indeed, are all concerns compared to it?—but for the present, I must beg a moment's respite from you: my family are coming down to me. In the mean time, look over this writing for me: I am glad to have this opportunity of communicating it to you." It was the testament to which allusion has just been made, and which the king proceeded to read to the abbé, with a voice and a countenance firm and composed while the will adverted only to his own misfortunes, but no longer so (the voice faltered and the tears came) when he had to pronounce the names that were dear to him, and when it was the husband that was reading, the father, the brother, and the kind master, not the king.

The interview with his queen and his family shortly followed; an interview which no one who has loved, and has then had to part for ever, will profane by any very near approach or very lengthened description. It was ended on the king's promising to renew it the next morning at seven, before he was carried away for execution: a promise that, on a little reflection, it was neither for the king to perform nor for the queen and the family to claim. He had been much overpowered by this last sad trial, and at twelve he retired to rest. And it *was rest*. Clery, his valet, sat by his bedside, and then saw the triumph of his master over all his enemies: the peaceful slumbers of a man whom he was ordained, in a few hours, to awaken, that he might prepare himself for the scaffold. The bell of the Temple struck five, the appointed hour; Clery made some slight noise about the fire, and the king awoke, rose, and dressed himself, and was gratified to find the restoration of his strength, that sleep had afforded him. He then received the communion, and sat waiting for his summons. The drums were at last heard to roll; the sounds approached. The abbé mentions the cold ice that shot through his veins; but the king, he says, was not disturbed.

The court was filled with military, and Santerre and the municipal officers appeared. "Your benediction, sir," said the king to the abbé; "all is now consummated: pray God that he may sustain me to the last." As he left the court of the prison, he turned more than once to cast a farewell look at the tower, where he knew the queen and his family were confined; but it cost him too much, and he forced himself forward. He got into the coach that waited for him, and the procession moved slowly on, through a double line of soldiers, under an escort of cavalry. But it was a procession through a city appalled and motionless; the inhabitants were retired within their houses, and a frightful void was every where to be observed. For some hours the metropolis had exhibited the appearance of a vast desert, and a dead silence prevailed, broken only by the rolling of drums, the trailing of cannon, or other military sounds, that told their own fearful meaning but too plainly.

Arrived at the place of execution, Louis, who had been hitherto employed over the breviary of his confessor, perceived where he was. "Take care," he said to the gens d'armes, "of this gentleman," putting his hand on the abbé; "let him not suffer any insult after my death;" and he then got out of the carriage and descended among the executioners. They were going to strip off his clothes, but he put them aside, and took off his upper garments himself. Nature, indeed, had done with her resentments; but when they approached, for the purpose also of tying his hands, a sentiment of strong indignation ruffled the calm tenor of his thoughts, and he loudly remonstrated. He even attempted to defend himself; but he looked to the abbé, and seemed to ask for counsel. "You will thus," said the abbé, who was now apprehensive of some brutal violence to be offered to the king more intolerable than death itself, "you will thus," said the abbé, "but the more resemble, in this one last instance, the Saviour, who will shortly be your recompence." At the sound of that name, every tumultuous feeling died away in the bosom of the king; he submitted, and was ascending the scaffold: "Son of St. Louis," said the abbé, "mount to heaven!" These were the last friendly words that reached the ear of the king, and none other were ever after worthy to follow them. They had been spoken, as it subsequently ap-

peared, unconsciously by the abbé; they had burst from the holy man in the agony of affliction and in the inspiration of religion, and they were to the king an anticipation of the future; they struck not on a heart that could not vibrate to their impulse, and they poured visions of glory into that vale of the shadow of death which he was now every moment entering. What followed you already know; the last act of barbarity that it was possible to commit was perpetrated.

One word more, therefore, one parting glance at this most unfortunate of kings, and I conclude. The hopes of his reign had failed; every sacrifice that he had made, as he mournfully said, had been in vain. He was called tyrant by the people he had loved; he had seen his nobility destroyed, his clergy proscribed, his state and dignity insulted, his guards butchered, his palace sacked, himself dethroned; he had left his queen in prison, soon (as he must have known) to follow him to the scaffold; his sister and his children to be desolate and to be orphans, amid a wild world, where wicked men were to bear sway, and where they were to find guardians and protectors amongst those who were now to shed his blood. He had taken a last farewell of them; every earthly pride, every comfort of his feelings was denied him. While his enemies were raging to destroy him, his friends blamed him; wherever he turned, no images presented themselves but those of defeat, mortification, disappointment, and affliction; every affection of his soul had been rent asunder; he stood alone in the universe, apart from his fellow men, and his step was on the verge of eternity. Such was the situation of Louis. Yet was he still serene; in his countenance no despair, in his frame no trembling. And why was he to tremble or be cast down? Every earthly tie, indeed, had parted from his heart; but *one* still remained,—the link that bound him to his God. It had remained through all the trials and calamities of his life, and though the instrument of death descended, it was never broken.

END OF VOLUME II.

CHARLES WHITTINGHAM,
CHISWICK.